The impact of EU conditionality on democratisation in Turkey: institutional transformation and policy (re)formation of minority rights, freedom of expression, the military and the judiciary by Özkurt, Fatma Zeynep
Özkurt, Fatma Zeynep (2013) The impact of EU 
conditionality on democratisation in Turkey: institutional 
transformation and policy (re)formation of minority rights, 
freedom of expression, the military and the judiciary. 
PhD thesis, University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/14376/1/598046.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
The Impact of EUConditionality on
Democratisation in Turkey: Institutional
Transformation and Policy (Re)formation
of Minority Rights, Freedom of Expression,
the Military and the Judiciary
Fatma Zeynep Ozkurt
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
July 2013
Abstract
This thesis focuses on the impact of EU conditionality on democratisation in
Turkey. Built on the assumption that Turkey's democratisation process cannot
be fully understood without taking the EU's Impact into account, this thesis
argues that even if external actors (e.g., the EU) can create opportunities for
domestic political change In target states (e.g., Turkey), these actors cannot
impose democracy externally; instead, they can provide support, or encourage
power holders towards a more open and democratic system. Ultimately,
however, these efforts cannot produce democratisation unless there are
sufficient pro-democracy pressures at the domestic level.
Empirically, the study examines institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation in Turkey in the course of Its EUaccession process by conducting
cross-sectoral and cross-temporal analysis. The analysis involves four policy
areas and three time periods. These areas include minority rights, freedom of
expression, the military and the judiciary; the domestiCchanges in these policy
areas are traced across three time periods: 1999-2002, 2002-2004, and 2005-
2008.
The study is motivated by an academic interest in the intricacy of Turkey's
long-term association with the EU and seeks to explore the external and
internal dynamics of Turkey's candidacy process by employing theoretical tools
offered by Europeanisation research. Following a Europeanisation theoretical
framework, as devised out of new institutionalist theories, the thesis traces
and analyses the democratisation process of Turkey and examines Turkey's
pre-accession process at two levels. It first looks Into EU-Ievel factors to
explore how the EU influences domestic change In Turkey with respect to its
conditionality strategy and influence mechanisms; and secondly, it examines
the domestic factors that pertain to each policy area to assess how EU
conditionality is translated into domestic policy responses.
Drawing upon data derived from primary and secondary sources, the thesis
has three main findings. First, the recent reforms in Turkey represent a
substantively significant effort to consolidate Turkish democracy. Second, as
the cross-sectoral analysis illustrates, Turkey's strong desire to accede to the
EU played a triggering role in the institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation of Turkey. Third, although EU conditionality greatly influenced
the domestic political debate surrounding the recent political reforms,
ultimately the internal political dynamics determined and shaped the policy
outcomes in Turkey.
The research also reveals that to fully understand the impact of EU
conditionality on domestic change in Turkey, we need to draw on both the
external incentives and the social learning models, since they explain different
aspects of domestic change based on diverging international and domestic
level factors. As a wider outlook, the thesis reflects on the role of international
organisations in democracy promotion, relating it to wider academic debates
on democratisation and Europeanisation and their implications for domestic
transformations in target countries.
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION, THEORY and
METHODS
The Introductory chapters of this thesis set out the research puzzle that
this thesis aims to solve: the impact of EU conditionality on Turkish
democratisation in general, and the Institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation of minority rights, freedom of expression, the military, and the
judiciary in particular.
Nonetheless, before starting the empirical Investigation, there are a
number of areas that should be delved Into in order to provide any consistent
deductions on the main research question. These areas include:
1. The contextualisatlon of the international dimension of
democracy promotion;
2. The conceptualisation and theorisation of Europeanisation;
3. Designing the research on Europeanlsation.
The following chapters in Section 1 cover these areas respectively.
Introduction (Chapter 1) provides the general scope of the thesis. Chapter 2
portrays the discussion on the international dimension of democracy
promotion; and Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical framework on
Europeanisation. Section 1 concludes with research design and methodology
(Chapter 4).
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1. Introduction
1.1. Scope and Purpose
A wide range of academic literature has extolled the benefits of
international actors helping countries on the path to democratisation. This is
especially true In the case of the European Union (EU), which provides many
non-member and candidate states with guidelines regarding the Improvement
of democratic practice, which must be adopted in order to have a stronger
affiliation with the Union. The EU employs conditionality as an instrument to
provide incentives in exchange for compliance with certain conditions, which
candidate countries are required to meet. In the context of its enlargement
policy, the EU employs conditionality as a political tool to develop and
democratise candidate countries. Using Turkey as a case study, this thesis
seeks to illustrate that, in stark contrast to existing studies that highlight the
Impact of the EUon the process of democratisation in candidate countries, the
EU'sactual effect on democratic transformation is relatively limited.
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of EU
conditionality on the institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in
Turkey. The thesis considers the conditionality-compliance dichotomy as an
interminable challenge between the EUas an external actor, and target states
such as candidate countries, which are subject to the external pressures of the
EU. The outcome of this pressure can be determined by delving into external
and Internal factors relating to the EU'sconditionality strategy.
Firstly, institutional transformation is referred to as a 'rational' and
'sequential process', the outcome of which is usually the creation of new
structures or the organisation of new principles (Kezar, 2001: 33). There are
several factors that affect how the process of a particular type of
transformation occurs. These include rewards or options, which can provide
incentives for continuing or enabling transformation, and for encouraging
9
changes from existing actions to new or additional ones (Eckel et al., 1998,
1999a, 1999b; Tierney and Rhoads, 1993). Bacharach et al. (1996: 477)
describe the process of institutional transformation by stating that 'to the
degree that organiations are systems of exchange, they may be said to be
transformed through a process by which the logics of action that parties bring
to the exchange are aligned, misaligned, and realigned'.
Secondly, policy (re)formatlon, which mainly involves 'cultural' and
'institutional' normative changes, Indicates significant developments in the
realm of domestic pouctes, where the 'absence' or 'lack of' policy agendas are
changed Into the actual formation or (re)formatlon (e.g., revision) of domestic
potlcles and rule adoptions. These policy changes are seen as the outcome of a
'complex process of interaction' between national, International, or
transnational actors (Krizsan and Popa, 2007), where they reflect on the
'collective understanding' and 'expectations' of the conventional behaviour of
actors, who share a common Identity (Finnemore and Sikklnk, 1998). Domestic
policy reforms are conveyed and socialised through a process of the
internalisation of norms, principles and practices under the influence of
domestic and external actors (Sayed, 2006: 1-2). Considering the EU's
external pressure, as part of its overall democratisation process, the
institutional transformation of Turkey is presumed to involve new systemic
organisational approaches to change governmental institutions in order to
increase their coherence, coordination and administrative capacity in line with
the EU's own practices. In a similar vein, policy (re)formation In Turkey is
assumed to entail the internalisation of new or renewed domestic policy
reforms in a political and normative context; this is where the EU's impact
through its conditionality strategy is felt to a great extent.
Literature on democratisation posits that although democratisation has
previously been seen as a domestic process, since the end of the Cold War,
international actors and supranational organisations such as the EU have
become more influential in the internal affairs of developing countries. In this
10
period, there was a significant increase in the Interest paid by western liberal
democracies and international Institutions to the promotion of democracy and
democratic principles, such as human rights and the rule of law, and the
strengthening of good governance, as part of their foreign policy objectives
(Stokke, 1995; Burnell, 2000; Santiso, 2001; Schlmmelfennlg, 2005a). These
democratic principles are often regarded as 'the global gold standards' for
democratic governance in nation-states (Burnell, 2000).
Through the mobilisation of liberal democratic principles, international
organisations seek to promote democratisation. They do so by encouraging,
and in some cases demanding, the introduction of democratic principles In
non-democratic national settings. In that respect, international organisations
aim to help Individual states to achieve conformity and regularity, whilst
generating a community of states wherein compliance with the international
system is achieved through certain strategies. Specifically, they develop both
formal rules and informal norms and procedures to shape domestic interests,
regularise behaviours, and/or constrain political activities within target states
(Checkel, 1999a; 1999b). These liberal democratic values and principles, and
human rights issues have a prominent place in the foreign policy objectives of
the EU and they constitute the main pre-conditions in the EU's enlargement
process.
This thesis specifically looks at the EU as an important international
organisation and the main external actor impacting upon Turkish
democratisation for two reasons. First of all, the literature on Europeanlsation
describes the concept Itself as a process where domestic poltttcs, policies, and
polities are changed through engagement with the EU system. It also puts
particular emphasis on the EU and its transformative power and impact on
domestic political change in target states. In this literature, the EU is accepted
as an important global agent due to its deliberate attempts in the promotion of
democracy, and in the reformation of domestiCstructures and pollcles of target
countries (Barzel and Risse, 2004; Burnell, 2008).
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It is assumed that the EU uses Its transformatlve power by means of
providing certain economic, political and social incentives, with the Intention of
reforming the political structures of target countries through the application of
external pressure (Prldham, 1999a; Grabbe, 2002; Schlmmelfennlg and
Sedelmeler, 200Sa; Barnes and Randerson, 2006; Yrlmaz, 2009). The EU
utilises political conditionality as its main Instrument to promote democratic
principles, human rights and good governance; and it complements its
conditionality strategy with democracy promotion in Its region (Maler and
Schimmelfennig, 2007: 40). In fact, all previous candidate countries of the
2004 and 2007 enlargements had already been subject to political
conditionality as part of the EU's pre-accession framework. Particularly after its
fifth enlargement round, in ex-communist states this Issue acquired more
salience as the 'Europeanisatlon of candidate countries' progressed, where the
EU's external Impact became a central issue and was accepted as one of the
main determinants of Institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon of
candidate countries.
The EU has had a direct Impact as an external actor on domestic
change in Turkey. In the process of accession negotiations, the EUhas actively
involved and engaged with policy (re)formation in Turkey by bringing In new
policy objectives to support democratic consolidation and advancement as part
of its pre-accession framework. Furthermore, with the prospect of membership
at stake, the EU has gained an extensive leverage over Turkey's political
reforms as part of its democratisation process. Since then, the EUhas acted as
the main democracy promoter in Turkey through the use of different
mechanisms, Instruments and approaches. The EU has been doing this by
providing assistance for Institutional transformation with the intention to
transform formal models of Institutions so that behavioural change can be
obtained, by initiating social learning in order to change norms, beliefs and
values, and by getting Involved In diplomatic interactions to Influence group
12
dynamics of political elites who actively participate in the political reform
process (Burnell, 2008: 425).
1.2. Aim
Turkey presents Itself as a complex case study when analysing the
Impact of the EUon institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in the
context of the 'Europeanisation of candidate countries'. This thesis contends
that Turkey's democratisation process coincides with Increased pressures from
the EU on Turkey, within the context of EU accession negotiations. Although
relations between Turkey and the EU started almost half a century ago, it was
not until the European Council summit in Helsinki in 1999 that the EU's
external impact on domestic transition in Turkey was felt.
Formal relations between Turkey and the EUstarted with an association
partnership in 1963, when Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement with the
European Economic Community (EEC). Against this background, Turkey Is
considered the candidate country with the longest history of association with
the EU (MOftOler-Bac,;and McLaren, 2003: 18). This was followed by Turkey's
first application to the European Community (EC) for membership In 1987,
which resulted in the refusal of Its Initial application, due to Turkey's
inadequate democratic credentials and low levels of economic and financial
development. In the meantime, Turkey signed the agreement on the Customs
Union with the EU, which came into effect in January 1996.1 Although this
seemed to be a positive development, the decision of the European Council of
Luxembourg in 1997 to exclude Turkey from accession process negatively
affected relations between the two parties. As MOftOler-Bac,;and McLaren (2003:
18) argue, the relations between Turkey and the EU have a significant impact
on the functioning of Turkish democracy.
1 Thus far, Turkey remains the only country that has completed the Customs Union prior to
becoming a member of the EU(Ozier, 2012: 125).
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Nonetheless, two years later, In 1999, Turkey was declared a candidate
country at the European Council of Helsinki, which marked the beginning of a
momentous domestic change In Turkey under the influence of the EU. Although
Turkey became a candidate In 1999, it was not until October 2005 that the
accession negotiations finally started. However, the accession negotiations
were halted nearly a year after the opening of accession negotiations. This was
mainly caused by Turkey's refusal to open Its ports to, and approve of, any
trade privileges for Cyprus. The EU in turn took this reaction as a violation of
Turkey's Custom Union agreement with the EU. Therefore, the EU decided to
suspend the opening of eight chapters of the Acquis Communautalre. On this
issue, the European Commission noted that unless Turkey met its obligations
towards Cyprus and came to a resolution, the Council would not take any
action regarding the opening of any new chapters In the Acquis
Communautatre.?
As will be discussed later in the thesis, even In the absence of a
concrete prospect of EUmembership or a functioning pre-accession framework
after 2008, the current AKP government intended to work on political reforms
and endorsed significant legal and constitutional amendments, which are
considered crucial for Turkey's democratisation process.? This is a puzzling
outcome since it challenges the arguments of the previous studies of
Europeanisation, which predominantly assumed that conditionality - along with
a strong membership perspective - provides the strongest Incentive. Hence, it
is the main determining factor for institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation at the domestic level. Nevertheless, the 'open-ended' character
of the current accession negotiations, and talk of the EU's limited absorption
capacity in connection with its 'enlargement fatigue' in the aftermath of the
2 Since the beginning of the accession negotiations, only one chapter (Science and Research)
has been closed. Among others, the suspended chapters include external relations, transport
policy, financial services, agriculture and rural development, free movement of goods, right of
establishment and freedom to provide services.
3 During his visit to the Azerbaijani Parliament on 29 June 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdo~an, stated that 'Turkey should be accepted into the European Union. If not, we'll
change the name of the Copenhagen criteria to the Ankara criteria and continue with the
reforms' (The Journal of Turkish Weekly, http://www.turkishweekly.net).
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EU's eastern enlargement of 2004, has indicated the changing character of the
EU's political, economic and security rationale as well as the EU's incentives for
enlargement (Phinnemore, 2006a: 8). These changes at the EU level have
caused a complete political stalemate in Turkey. Consequently, the accession
negotiations came to a halt In 2008, slowing down Turkey's domestic
tra nsformation.
Therefore, this thesis posits that although Turkey has shown significant
democratisation efforts as part of the EU's pre-accession framework, its
reluctance to comply with EU rules and norms In some policy areas presents an
interesting research puzzle. This puzzle asks why progress on institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation of a number of areas (such as minority
rights, freedom of expression, the military, and the judiciary) has so far been
problematic and/or unsteady compared to other policy areas. In other words,
the puzzle arises from the characteristics of the Turkish case in view of the fact
that there has not been linear convergence towards European norms.
Furthermore, there have been periods of slow-down and acceleration in
political reforms in the aforementioned problem-areas, particularly in the post-
Helsinki-era.
1.3. Argument
Building on the assumption that Turkey's democratisation process
cannot be fully understood without taking the Impact of the EU into account,
this thesis argues that even if external actors (i.e. the EU) can create
opportunities for domestic political change in target states (I.e. Turkey), these
actors cannot impose democracy externally. Instead, they can provide support
or encourage power-holders towards a more open and democratic system.
Ultimately however, these efforts cannot produce democratisation, unless
there are sufficient pro-democracy pressures at the domestic level. This thesis
claims that conditionality is not at all times well suited to impact upon
institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in candidate countries,
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hence it is not suited to act as the most decisive factor. Instead, this thesis
suggests that democratisation overwhelmingly depends on domestic conditions,
and EU conditionality only plays a marginal role in this process, which can be
identified as a 'triggering' factor.
This thesis seeks to reveal how a range of global/external pressures
(e.g. democracy promotion of the EU) and events (e.g. EU accession
negotiations) combined to open a political opportunity for democratisation in
Turkey. This thesis also aims to examine whether EU conditionality has been
effective in transforming institutional structures and policy (re)formation in
Turkey, in the course of the country's EUaccessionprocess.
On the other hand, this thesis is motivated by an academic interest in
analysing the intricacies of Turkey's long-term association with the EU. The
main research question of this study, along with sub-research questions
(further discussed in Chapter 4), is intended to 'unpack' the complex
relationship between Turkey and the EU; in connection with the conditionallty-
compliance dichotomy, this thesis will shift the focus from the EU to the
domestic level, in other words, it will incorporate a bottom-up approach in its
analysis. It is important to incorporate a bottom-up approach because, as
Papadimltriou and Phinnemore (2004: 636) put forward, 'the unpacking of
domestic contexts has often been the missing link in Europeanisation studies',
Studies which fail to explore domestic contexts either follow a 'linear direction'
or miscalculate the extent to which domestic actors or institutions are relevant
in the Europeanisation process.
In light of this context, the main research question of this study can be
listed as:
(Q): How does Europeanisation impact upon institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey? How does it
affect the political actors, institutions and cultural norms and
values embedded in the Turkish political system?
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The findings of the empirical analysis in Chapters 5-8 point to several
factors that may have contributed to the diverging periodical outcomes of
Turkey's minority rights, freedom of expression, the military, and the judiciary
policies under the influence of EUconditionality. These have included domestic
adoption costs, the Turkish state's identification with the EU, domestic
resonance, the Turkish state's capacity and the political will of actors at the
domestic level as well as sizeable and credible rewards and legitimacy at the
EU level. The findings show that the combination of favourable domestic
conditions (successful identification with the EU, the state's capacity and
political will of actors as well as low domestic adoption costs) and strong
conditionality (i.e. sizeable and credible rewards and high levels of legitimacy)
provide the best possible outcome of positive Europeanisation, which indicate
the successful institutional transformation and policy (re)formation of the
policies.
The findings also show that any change in the values of these variables
would either result in fractional Europeanlsatlon (the combination of
unfavourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality), indicating a
partial adjustment instead of complete transformation; or negative
Europeanisation (the combination of unfavourable domestic conditions and
weak conditionality) as an indicator of an ineffective process and policy
outcome. As will be discussed in the concluding chapter (Chapter 9), it is also
observed that domestic adoption costs, identity, state capacity and the political
will of actors ultimately seem more decisive in explaining the differential
process and policy outcome on Turkey's institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation in the aforementioned areas.
Therefore, the limited impact of EU conditionality on the institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey, while still considered an
important and indispensable element and a major triggering factor for Turkish
democratisation, is likely to be a result of the precedence of domestic
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conditions that overshadow the strength of EU conditionality. Ultimately, the
findings reveal that no external actor or strategy can induce democracy from
outside if the political capacity and willingness to advance the level of
democracy is absent in the domestic sphere.
1.4. Theoretical Framework
Theoretically, this thesis seeks to explore the external and internal
dynamics of Turkey's candidacy process by employing theoretical tools offered
by the literature on Europeanisation. In the analytical framework of this thesis,
'Europeanisatlon' transpires as the most problematic Issue. This Is due to the
fact that the term encompasses interaction dynamics between Turkey and the
EUduring the accession process as weli as the domestic changes that occurred
under the influence of the EU. Therefore, this thesis acknowledges
'Europeanisation' as a process entailing a two-way interaction: rule transfer
(from the EU) and rule acceptance (by Turkey) in line with the EU's
conditionality strategy.
The main theoretical investigation of this thesis starts with the basic
premise that EU conditionality exists and that it is unavoidable in the context
of accession negotiations. The thesis posits that conditionality reflects on the
power asymmetry between the EU and target states since It provides the EU
with extra powers, enabling it to impose rule adoptions as a precondition for
membership admission (Hughes et al., 2004a: 523). This in turn leads to a
rational deduction that domestic change is a highly expected outcome of an
asymmetrical interaction between the EU and the target country. Taking this
statement as a starting polnt, the theoretical investigation focuses on different
aspects of such an impact. These different aspects include the different forms
of EU Impact, Its effectiveness, pace, direction and timing (sorzet and Risse,
2003: 60).
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Nevertheless, the theoretical investigation on Europeanisation shows
that although the EU's Impact on domestic transformation is inevitable - in the
sense that EU policies and conditionality comprise of an 'impetus' for
institutional transformation and policy (re)formation - the two different
strands of thinking in the institutionalist framework differ in their hypotheses
on how EU policies and conditionality matter. In fact, existing research on
Europeanisation places great emphasis on the 'differential impact' of the EUon
domestic changes, and in most cases, its impact is explained through the
effectiveness of EU conditionality at the international level, and the historical
trajectories of the target states at the domestic level (Cowles et al., 2001;
Barzel and Risse, 2003; Barzel, 2010).
Following a Europeanisation framework as devised out of new
institutionalist theories, the thesis focuses on the concept of EU conditionality
and the conditions that impact on the effectiveness of this conditionality.
Previous studies on the effectiveness of conditionality towards candidate
countries during the accession process reveal that there are two theoretical
models to test which conditions explain the policy outcomes and the
effectiveness of conditionality. The first model, the external incentives model,
is a rationalist bargaining model and presumes that factors such as the
'political costs of adoption' and 'credibility of incentives' account for the
effectiveness of conditionality. The second model, the social learning model,
follows a sociological institutionalist stance and presumes that factors such as
'societal salience' and 'identity' are necessary conditions for the process of EU
rule transfer and adoption. These two models offer different arguments to
explain the effectiveness of conditionality and the diverging policy outcomes.
Adopted from Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier's (200Sa) study of the
effectiveness of EUconditionality on candidate countries, six hypotheses based
on these two theoretical models are put forward in this thesis to examine the
diverging levels of the effectiveness of EUconditionality across minority rights,
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freedom of expression, the military and judiciary policies in Turkey. Further
Information on the hypotheses can be found in Chapters 3 and 4.
In light of this context, this thesis also endeavours to reflect upon the
analytical challenge of attempting to find an actual cause-effect relationship
between the EU's external Influence and domestic change in target states. In
relation to the power asymmetry debate, It is often assumed that the
Europeanlsation process and conditionality principle follow a top-down
approach. However, given the complexity of the relations between Turkey and
the EU, this thesis adopts a two-dimensional approach on cause-effect
relationships, by referring to Europeanlsation as a top-down and a bottom-up
approach. This two-dimensional approach Is useful for two reasons. Firstly,
these approaches help to understand the major challenges that caused
Turkey's troublesome reception of EU conditions and the consequent failure In
full adoption of EU rules; secondly, they also enable a conception of the EU's
effective external pressure. In support of the Inclusion of the bottom-up
approach to the theoretical investigation, Radaelll (2004: 4) argues that this
two-dimensional approach enables the identification of different components of
the 'system of interaction' at the domestic level, hence this approach provides
an Improved grasp of the specifics of the EU's impact on domestic
transformations.
Last but not least, the thesis tests the explanatory values of
international and domestic level variables in relation to the external Incentives
model and the social learning model. Whilst doing this, the thesis also traces
and analyses the democratisation process of Turkey, and examines Turkey's
pre-accession process at two levels. It first looks into EU-Ievel factors to
explore how the EU influences domestic change in Turkey with respect to its
conditionality strategy and influence mechanisms. Secondly, it examines the
domestic factors that pertain to each policy area In order to assess how EU
conditionality is translated into domestic policy responses. The application of
different theoretical models comes out as an imperative to delve into the
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complex interaction between Turkey and the EU, by identifying the main
dynamics of the Interplay between EU conditionality and respective EU-Ievel
and domestic level factors.
1.5. Methodology
Methodologically, this thesis employs qualitative techniques developed
in comparative politics (Gerring, 2001), utilising a small-N approach. In
particular, this thesis embodies qualitative case study research, and in order to
make a causal inference linking the research question and the hypotheses, this
thesis conducts cross-sectoral and cross-temporal analysis (King et al., 1994:
75-115; George and Bennett, 2005: 166). Furthermore, a process-tracing
method has been chosen to uncover the causal paths behind the domestic
change in Turkey, in relation to its democratisation process, and in order to
understand the reasons behind this development or the lack of such
development.
The research in this study relies heavily on documentary sources. The
core of the empirical research includes the analysis of primary sources along
with academic literature. This is complemented by data gathered through
interviews. For the interviews, a 'semi-structured' style was chosen for the
purposes of keeping the focus of the topics constant and to provide a partial
structure to the interview while allowing the necessary flexibility for both the
interviewer and the interviewee so that they can improvise on the discussion of
the toplcs. Further information on the research design and methodology of this
thesis is provided in Chapter 4.
1.6. Research Design
Empirically, the thesis examines the impact of EU conditionality on
Turkey's democratisation process with respect to domestic developments and
political reforms, by conducting cross-sectoral and cross-temporal analysis. In
this respect, the research process of the thesis combines the analysis of a
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small sample of policy areas, with an in-depth investigation of different time
periods. The empirical analysis thereafter Involves four policy areas and three
time periods. These policy areas are minority rights, freedom of expression,
the military, and the judiciary. The domestic changes and policy outcomes are
traced across three time periods: 1999-2002, 2002-2004 and 2005-2008.
There are two main reasons for the selection of the above-mentioned
policy areas. Firstly, modern conceptualisations of democracy indicate that
democratic systems require: effective civilian control over the military; the
promotion of political freedoms, such as freedom of expression; the protection
of minority rights; and, efficient and impartial judicial systems (Mayo, 1960;
Przeworski, 1995; Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 1999). Whilst these areas form some
of the key components of liberal democracies, they also constitute the policy
areas that are incorporated by the EU In the Copenhagen political criteria
regarding the EU's formal membership accession conditions; yet, at the same
time, they constitute the main challenges for Turkey in the process of EU
accession. Secondly, the examination of these cases Is useful for identifying
the explanatory values of the necessary conditions for the effectiveness of EU
conditionality, since this type of examination creates an opportunity to
elaborate in further analysis on the diverging policy outcomes of these selected
policy areas. The selection of the cases and variables is discussed extensively
in Chapter 4 (section 4.4).
The first period of analysis (1999-2002) starts with the decision made
by the European Council in Helsinki in 1999, where Turkey was granted EU
candidacy status, marking the beginning of a 'strategic mutual transformation'
process (Tanlak, 2002). The ending of the first phase (also the beginning of
the second phase) coincides with the early general elections held in Turkey;
this Is also when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) established the first
single-party government to have come into power since 1987. The second
period is significant due to the extensive reform packages adopted by the AKP
government, and the positive relationship between the EU and Turkey. The
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third period of analysis starts with the announcement at the European Council
in Brussels, in December 2004, that accession negotiations for Turkey's EU
membership would be opened on 3 October 2005. In contrast to the previous
period, the third phase witnesses a gradual decrease in the pace of reforms
and an increase in conflicting views at the EU-Ievel towards the prospective
membership of Turkey. This periodisation will be useful to assess the
explanatory values of the independent variables, due to their potentially
different or altering overall impact on the dependent variable of this thesis -
the democratisation process of Turkey, formulated in the form of its
compliance with the EUconditions.
Specifically, the case study analysis begins with a narrative of the EU's
liberal norms and an overall approach to each policy area, for instance the EU's
approach to minority rights policy. Then, the same approach is applied to the
case of Turkey, where Turkey's approach to the same policy area is scrutinised.
This is followed by the identification of the conditionality instruments applied
by the EU. In the final section of each empirical chapter, these conditions and
instruments of EUconditionality are evaluated and the rule adoption process is
discussed along with progress made on the implementation of rules (hence
degree of compliance), which are in accordance with the EU's liberal
democratic principles, norms and standards. The largest part of the data is
collected from the Commission's Regular Reports and Strategy Papers, the
Accession Partnership Documents and Action Plans, as well as the National
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, which is complemented by semi-
structured interviews. Further information on data collection methods is
provided in Chapter 4 (section 4.5).
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1.7. Relevance and Added Value
As previously indicated, the main purpose of this thesis is to provide a
comprehensive analysis of the democratisation process In Turkey and more
specifically the EU's external impact on Turkey's Institutional transformation
and policy (re)formation in the realm of democratic reforms. This thesis seeks
to contribute to the literature in three main areas. First, the thesis aims to
offer a conceptually rigorous study of democratisation and Europeanisatlon, by
linking the two processes together in the case of Turkey. The attempt to
address both democratisation and Europeanlsatlon debates within the general
theories of political change has not been studied to this extent before. This
examination also has contemporary political relevance since it can provide
readers with a starting point for a deeper analysis of external pressure
exercised on Turkey, which could serve as a model for other prospective
candidate countries in the process of democratisation and Europeanisation.
Studying the debate on Turkish democratisation and the Impact of EU
conditionality and subsequent institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation steps taken also contributes to a better understanding of
challenges faced by other democratising countries (and potentially EU
candidate countries) with their own system-wide policy and domestic
structures, and provide constructive insights for comprehensive questions of
democratisation and Europeanisation.
This thesis posits that Turkish democratisation has served more as a
means to prospective EU membership rather than an end in itself. Even if
Turkish democracy has advanced particularly after it gained EU candidacy
status in 1999, Turkey's visible political orientation, state tradition and deeply
embedded political ethos played a crucial role in the alignment process with
the EU's democratic credentials. In that respect, domestic political
developments and the attitudes of political elites had a key role in shaping the
political reform process and policy outcomes in Turkey. Although the EU
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accession process has significantly triggered political reforms in Turkey and
brought about substantial constitutional and legal amendments particularly in
the areas in relation to the functioning of Turkish democracy, such as the
protection of minority rights, freedom of expression, democratic governance of
civil-military relations and judicial independence, the nature of the pre-existing
domestic structures, Turkish national politics and policy-making emerged as
the main determinants of actual domestic change. Externally induced
democratic credentials cannot be sufficient for a triumphant Turkish
democratisation on their own as they cannot prompt a concrete domestic
change in isolation from other factors stemming from national contexts. A real
democratic change henceforth can only be achieved if the Turkish political
system and polley structures can be altered in a way to accept any new sets of
democratic rules, norms and values that are crucial for the functioning of
democracy.
Secondly, there is a rapidly growing body of literature that adopts a
Europeanisation theoretical framework. So far, the democratisation of Turkey
with respect to its institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in the
selected areas has not been analysed using international and domestic level
factors provided by the external incentives model (devised out of rationalist
institutionalism) and the social learning model (devised out of sociological
institutionalism). With the new empirical data, this thesis aims to contribute to
this rapidly growing literature. It intends to do this in three ways: firstly, by
questioning the effectiveness of conditionality as an external influence
mechanism; secondly, by discussing the relationship between conditionality
and compliance, based on domestic level factors (e.g., the social salience and
embedded political attitudes and political culture) and EU-Ievel factors (e.g.,
the legitimacy of the EU in the relevant policy areas); and thirdly, by providing
a model of interaction, demonstrating a two-dimensional reflection on the
process outcome in relation to the dynamics between domestic conditions and
EUconditionality.
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Finally, thus far, the literature on Europeanlsation has largely
maintained the same opinion on the explanatory values of theoretical models
of Europeanisation when discussing the effectiveness of EU conditionality.
'Credible EUconditionality' and 'size of adoption costs' are mainly identified as
the principal factors Influencing the effectiveness of conditionality, which falls
into the theoretical model of external incentives (Schimmelfennlg and
Sedelmeier, 200Sa). However, this thesis challenges the propositions of
previous studies on conditionality. Based on empirical evidence, it suggests
that neither the external incentives model nor the social learning model can
account sufficiently for the policy outcomes in Turkey. Instead, a more
balanced approach is adopted by drawing on more than one theoretical model.
Different models can explain different aspects of domestic change based on
diverging international and domestic level factors.
1.8. Structure of the Thesis
This chapter (Chapter 1) has introduced the general scope of the
thesis and incorporated the research topic, the main research question, and
the intended contribution of the thesis as a whole. The subsequent chapters
are organised as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a critical engagement with the literature on the
international dimension of democracy promotion by focusing on the discussion
of the EUas a democracy promoter and its crucial role in the democratisation
processes of states. Among the topics that are reviewed are the EU's
democratic norms and principles, and its conditionality strategy. Each sub-
section briefly introduces and critically assessesthese concepts, and examines
the international dimension of democratisation in a wider perspective. This is
followed by a discussion on the history of Turkish democratisation.
Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical framework of the thesis. In the first
section of Chapter 3, previous academic research on 'Europeanisation' is
discussed. Most importantly, this involves the identification and clarification of
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core concepts, and a reflection on the implications of viewing the EU as the
main external actor impacting upon the domestic political structures of target
states. It also discusses the concept of conditionality in relation to its origins
and characteristiCS, and engages with factors that make conditionality
effective. Subsequently, the following section of Chapter 3 is devoted to a
discussion of new institutionalist theories, and the interlinked theoretical
models - namely, the external incentives and social learning models.
Therefore, Chapter 3 presents arguments for why these two theoretical
models, in relation to new institutionalist theories, are suitable for the study of
institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in a candidate state for EU
membership.
Chapter 4 focuses on the research design and methodology. This
chapter starts with the justification of the case selection. This is followed by a
discussion of the operationalisation and measurement of variables, and the
formulation of hypotheses. For analytical purposes, Chapter 4 also covers an
illustration of a model of interaction of variables. Chapter 4 concludes with an
overview of data collection methods.
Chapters 5-8 present an empirical analysis of the case studies. The
main concern in these chapters is to examine the impact of EU conditionality
on the institutional transformation and policy (re)formation cross-sectorally
and cross-temporally. The systematic analysis of domestic change will be
conducted in the areas of minority rights, freedom of expression, the judiciary
and the military by utilising a process-tracing method (see Chapter 4). The
analysis considers whether there has been any domestic change in relation to
Turkey's democratisation and if so, to what extent EU conditionality accounts
for this outcome. It also discussed whether there are other factors determining
the policy outcome at the domestic level. To address these issues, each
empirical chapter starts with a brief historical analysis of the EU's approach to
the specified policy area and examines whether an effective EUconditionality is
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utilised. In the final section of these chapters, a summary of the main findings
in relation to the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4 is presented.
Chapter 9, summarises and compares the key research findings. The
findings are then related to the academic literature on Europeanisation and
democratic conditionality.
Chapter 10, the final chapter of the thesis sums up the research in
general and reflects in greater detail the limitations of this thesis and Indicates
potential areas of research.
The next chapter (Chapter 2) firstly looks at the International
dimension of democratisation and democracy promotion of international
organisations, and introduces the main democratic principles of the EU. This
debate is fruitful since it shows how the EU uses political conditionality,
predominantly in relation to democracy promotion, good governance and
human rights practices, which concurrently represent the main political
accession conditions of the EU in the context of its enlargement policy.
Secondly, it links the debates on EU democracy promotion with the historical
record of democratisation efforts in Turkey, prior to when Turkey came directly
under the influence of the EU's political conditionality. This unified approach
aims to present a retrospective examination, in order to understand the former
dynamics between Turkey and the EU,which have played a part in shaping the
current state of affairs.
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2. The International Dimension of Democracy
Promotion
2.1. Introduction
Democracy promotion has become an important issue in international
relations, and it continues to be more and more prominent. It Is widely
believed that international democracy promotion leads to global 'democratic
peace', increasing the possibility of wider 'economic well-being' and 'welfare of
societies' that are in the process of democratisation (Burnell, 2008: 414-415).
The 21st century in particular has witnessed the large-scale engagement of
numerous international organiations (lOs) in democracy promotion throughout
the world. As Kubicek (2003: 1) notes, the said engagement of lOs in
democracy promotion can be verified simply by looking at instruments that
promote political liberalisation and result in democratic consolidation in target
countries, such as 'alliances', , trade pacts', and 'economic assistance'.
It can be argued that the importance of lOs as democracy promoters
has increased especially in the aftermath of the Cold War. Formerly, it was
believed that the role of lOs was limited. However, during the Cold War as
changes in the balance of power occurred, the roles of lOs in world politics
significantly increased. lOs became important actors in the diffusion of
democratic norms and values. Nonetheless, the political environment in the
post-Cold War period also became more suitable for potential political changes
and the expansion of democracy in the European continent (Kubicek, 2003: 1).
In a similar vein, Burnell (2000: 8) contends that thereafter analysis of
democratisation process, without taking the international dimension of
democratic transition and/or consolidation into account, became increasingly
indefensible.
In light of this context, the European Union (EU) deserves special
attention due to its active interest in democracy promotion. The EU is accepted
as one of the 'well-established' international actors in democracy promotion
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along with the United Nations (UN) and the USA (Burnell, 2008: 414-415). It is
also known that the EUhas successfully transformed from being a union based
on economic Interests into a major international organisation with political,
social and economic aims and objectives.
When examining EU foreign policies, it can be seen that the EU has
been actively involved in the democratisation processes of various countries
within the region and it endorses the emphasis on human rights and the rule of
law as universal democratic principles. In that respect, the EU has set
democracy and democracy promotion as a central aspect of its external
relations; and the EUhas aimed to spread its democratic principles in its region.
At the same time, the EU principles on democracy, human rights and the rule
of law are strictly embedded In the declarations of the European Council, the
EU's Association and Partnership documents, Cooperation Agreements, as well
as its Treaties (e.g., the Maastricht Treaty, Lome Convention), and pronounced
in the Copenhagen Criteria, which specifies the democratic conditions for the
EUmembership accession (Kubicek, 2003: 1).
In that respect, this chapter alms to present an overview of the role of
the EU as an international organisation in democracy promotion and the ways
in which it has an impact on domestic change In target countries in relation to
their institutional transformation and policy (re)formation. As the argument in
this thesis goes, the EU became an indispensable actor in Turkish
democratisation and domestic change. The EU, through its conditionality
strategy, has been deeply involved in the institutional transformation and
policy (re)formation in Turkey; and, the EUbecame a major reference point for
the Europeanisation/Westernisation of Turkey with reference to the
internalisation of universal democratic norms and principles in the Turkish
context.
The discussion in this chapter therefore sheds light on the
characteristics of the EU as a democracy promoter and aims to unveil its
contributions to the spread of democracy within its regional sphere, particularly
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in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe. This discussion also makes
references to the democratic principles of the EU, which later In its
enlargement policy became the main accession criteria for membership. Based
on this, a general democratic template of the EU can be identified where
certain policy areas such as minority rights, freedom of expression, the military,
and the judiciary are found to be important to analyse In the context of
democratisation and democracy promotion.
Last but not least, this chapter also incorporates an historical overview
of Turkey's democratisation efforts since the beginning of the establishment of
the Republic in 1923. It provides an overview of domestic changes in relation
to the spread and consolidation of democratic values at the domestic level
prior to its candidacy status for EUmembership was affirmed. This chapter also
alms to shed light on the Initial stages of the relationship between Turkey and
the EU In order to open up the debate on the problematisatlon of the Impact of
EU conditionality on the democratisation process in Turkey, and domestic
patterns of institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in the Turkish
context.
2.2. International Organisations as Democracy
Promoters: the Case of the EU
The dominant the actor-oriented approach within literature on
democratic transitions to a great extent gives emphasis to the role of political
actors in explaining any regime change at the domestic level (Rustrow, 1970);
according to which, democratisation is determined by the decisions of major
political actors wherein old political elites are considered to be the biggest
potential threat to this process (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Di Palma,
1990; Karl, 1990), as these actors are responsible for showing sufficient
political will to change the political landscape of the country. However, as
previously noted, with the increasing role of international organisations in
democracy promotion around the world, an 'international' dimension has been
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brought into the analysis of democratisation. Hence, democratisation processes
can no longer be analysed by focusing exclusively on domestic politics.
In general, democracy promotion by international organisations
develops at the regional level instead of a wider global level because the
promotion of democratic values and norms becomes less demanding and more
straightforward due to the political Interactions between structurally
interconnected target states and the international organisations In the same
region. In light of this context, the EU is seen as the most 'articulated' and
'intensive' form of those interconnected structures wherein its 'conditionality'
strategy comprises the 'essence' of those political Interactions where the EUas
an external actor impacts upon domestic change and democratisation at the
domestic level (Pridham, 1999b: 59-60). In that respect, the adoption and
implementation of conditionality by regional actors, such as the EU, signify the
importance given to the promotion and dispersion of democracy in their
peripheries.
Over a decade ago, Linz and Stepan (1996: 73) stated that 'if one
considers the entire world and all major actual (or potential) cases of
democratisation in modern times, the analysis of international influences can
be pushed much further and a series of nuanced hypotheses can be advanced'.
Linz and Stepan (1996: 74) also emphasised the importance of 'regional
hegemons' by referring to their contribution to democratic transitions by
means of their 'geopolitical and economic power', where their powers are
specified by the adoption and promotion of coherent policy options with respect
to a wide array of 'incentives' and 'disincentives'. In this context, regional
hegemon is seen as an external (f)actor implementing neutral or moderate
pro-hegemon foreign policy within target countries to stimulate transition to
democracy or democratisation at the national level (Doorenspleet and Mudde,
2008). In that respect, the relevant regional hegemons can playa significant
role in the democratic transition processes in target states. Therefore, it can be
argued that one way of promoting democracy can be attained firstly, by
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communicating with the political actors with pro-democracy tendencies in the
target state; and secondly, by applying the material and social incentives in
order to facilitate democratic reforms (either in the form of reform packages,
or legal amendments); and thirdly, by monitoring and measuring these
reforms.
The EUapplies conditionality as an important instrument or a strategy
to compel target countries towards domestic reform and change, and more
specifically, towards institutional transformation and policy (re)formation. In
this context, the EU offers certain incentives to target countries in order to
externally support the capacity of these countries to improve their political
setting in relation to democratisation, human rights promotion, the rule of law,
and the protection of minority rights. In that respect, conditionality posits the
act of 'linking by a state or international organisation of benefits desired by
another state to the fulfilment of certain conditions' (Smith, 2003: 108).
Therefore, the adoption and implementation of conditionality by regional actors,
such as the EU, signifies the importance they give to the promotion and
dispersion of democracy.
In that regard, Pridham (1999b: 60) argues that democratic
conditionality should be seen as a tool for assessing the effectiveness of the EU
in terms of influencing and promoting democracy and states that 'the EU
possesses an institutionalised regional framework which readily transmits the
kind of influences and pressures that may affect the course of democratisation,
deliberately or otherwise'. Therefore, it can be argued that the EU, being one
of the most influential international actors as a democracy promoter, exerts its
influence on countries with the help of its strategy of democratic conditionality,
which at the same time comprises a precondition for its membership, forces
target (i.e., candidate) countries to adopt a democratic political system and
further implement liberal democratic norms and procedures associated with the
EU. In a similar vein, Schmitter (1995: 524) recaps the lasting influence of the
EUas a democracy promoter as follows:
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First, EUmembership is expected to be permanent in nature and to
provide access to an expanding variety of economic and social
opportunities far into the future. Second, It Is backed by a 'complex
interdependence', an evolving system of private transnational
exchanges at many levels and involving many different types of
collective action (parties, interest associations, social movements,
sub-national governments etc.), And, finally, it engages in lengthy,
public, multilateral deliberation and is decided unanimously In the
Council of Ministers and by an absolute majority in the European
Parliament. This requirement enhances the 'reputation' or
'certification' effect beyond the level attainable via unilateral
recognition or bilateral exchanges where other criteria (i.e. security
calculations) may override the democratic ones. More than any
other International commitment, full EUmembership has served to
stabilise both political and economic expectations. It does not
directly guarantee the consolidation of democracy; It indirectly
makes it easier for national actors to agree within a narrower range
of rules and practices.
Moreover, regional hegemons can promote democracy in two forms:
negative or positive. A negative form of democracy promotion Is Indicated by
sanctions (either financial or political) employed by lOs, such as the EU. To
elaborate this further, it can be argued that establishing such a requirement
scheme on meeting conditions (ranging from democratic and human rights
conditions to various liberal democratic principles), as well as Introduction of a
conditionality clause based on unsatisfactory progress of a candidate country,
emphasises the negative side of the democracy promotion equilibrium. On the
other hand, the positive form of democracy promotion is associated with terms
such as support, incentive, inducement and reward. The EU, by offering
various rewards and necessary support (either technical or financial), aims to
expedite the process of democratisation within candidate countries. As
Carothers (1999: 6) argues 'democracy aid' provided by International
organisations is the 'most common and often most significant tool for
promoting democracy'.
Furthermore, as a result of the Europeanisation process, regime change
and institutional adaptation at the EU level becomes inevitable. In that respect,
as indicated by Laffan (1998: 242), the EU should not only be seen as a new
'level' of governance, but also as an innovator of new 'approaches' of
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governance. Nevertheless, it is important to bear In mind that with
Europeanisation member states become subject to various supranational
influences on policy-making and thus policy competence at the national and
supranational level becomes highly contested. This reasoning Is evident in the
fact that some member states differ in terms of their 'openness' to
Europeanisation, as well as their adaptation to internationalisation, compared
to others (Laffan, 1998: 242). Along those lines, Sadurski (2004: 374), from
the candidate countries' point of view, stresses that despite the material costs
of accession to the EU, the citizens of candidate countries show a high level of
support for the accession itself since the process of Europeanisation in general
and EU accession in particular significantly contribute to democratic
consolidation, as well as to the adoption and promotion of liberal democratic
rules and institutions at the national level.
Besides, there is a common tendency among candidate country leaders
and citizens to believe that the EUaccession process and further attainment of
membership strongly favours a robust democratisation process by the
candidate country. The main reason for this conviction is that the EU aims to
provide necessary tools to endorse democratic political systems in candidate
countries and that it promotes initiatives on democratic credentials, such as
fighting against corruption, imparting efficient public administration and a
system of justice (Sadurski, 2004: 371-372). Therefore it can be argued that
EUaccession improves the quality of democratic principles and practices within
the candidate countries since the EU model of democracy embodies
benchmarks such as consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and the
protection of human rights, which are crucial for the promotion of democracy
in the target candidate countries.
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2.3. Democracy Promotion in Europe
In the 1970s, Southern Europe witnessed regime transformations
within various countries and for the first time In Its history, the EU (then the
EC) was actively involved in the transformation processes of these countries.
Being an organisation consisting of democratic countries, the EU, via key
political actors, assisted countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece by
developing political and economic incentives, creating commercial ties, and by
guiding and informing them about the end results of democratisation. Even
then, the EU explicitly stated that the membership of those democratising
countries would be dependent on their level of democratic consolidation
(Kubicek, 2003: 8). For Instance, as Closa and Heywood (2004: 15) argue,
Spain's exclusion from the EC'transformed Europe into a symbol of democracy'
and eventually 'membership was viewed as an anchor for democracy'.
Supporting this, McLaren (2008: 249) argues that It was Spain's unsuccessful
application for associate status of the EECthat resulted in the EEC'sutilisation
of conditionality strategy to 'produce regime change' since at that time the
member states restricted the EEC membership to 'fully functioning
democracies'; and this decision of the EEChas eventually had a direct impact
on other candidates, such as Turkey.
By maintaining close relations with these countries, the EU carefully
monitored their democratisation processes, and when necessary, intervened by
means of providing necessary financial or political assistance to assure that the
democratic transition In those countries was not Interrupted by any problem
that might occur at domestic or international level. Schmitter's (1986: 4-5)
reference to the importance of the international context in the democratisation
process of the Southern European countries supports this assertion. Schmitter
argues that, although the transitions to democracy were predominantly
explained by domestic/national variables until that time, in the case of the
'liberalisation' and/or democratisation of Southern Europe, international actors
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such as 'extraregional powers' appeared to be highly supportive and therefore
took important roles in terms of bolstering the transition processes.
Whitehead (1996: 271) also argues that the processes of democratic
transition and consolidation were heavily influenced by the potent political and
economic incentives offered by the EU. Nevertheless, as indicated by many
scholars (e.g. see Linz and Stepan, 1996) the democratisation process in
Southern Europe initially started at the domestiC level, rather than at the
international level. Only after the involvement of the EU in the later stages of
democratisation of Southern Europe did the international dynamics start to
play role in overall domestic change in the region. Even so, as Pridham (1999b:
62) states, the EU became a 'symbolic reference point' in the 1970s for
flourishing democratisation and it was seen as a moral supporter of democratic
values that had an undeniable impact on the countries that wished to become
a part of it. For instance, as Heywood (1993: 6) notes, for Spain, the EC
membership was one way to 'escape the traditional isolationallsm which has
left it lagging behind its competitors and marginal to international
developments' .
For democratisation to appear at the domestic level, certain conditions
need to be present. In that respect, as suggested by Dahl (1998)4, by taking
the essential and favourable conditions necessary for democratic institutions as
a reference point, it can be concluded that Southern European countries had a
smooth and efficient transition period since the domestic political forces within
those countries in combination with strong social support for democracy
reinforced new democratic ideas; therefore, the role of the EU was one of
guardian waiting outside and taking action when necessary instead of being
the main facilitator of the democratisation process within those countries
4 Dahl (1998: 84-86) formulates a number of institutions structuring the minimum
requirement for large-scale democracy; these institutions include: i) elected officials (elected
by citizens) who have the constitutional right to rule, and control government decisions on
policies; ii) free, fair, and frequent elections under limited or no government coercion; iii)
freedom of expression; iv) right to access legally to independent and non-governmental
sources of information (including sources that oppose government); v) freedom of association
(right to form independent associations, organisations, interest groups, and political parties).
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(Kubicek, 2003: 9). In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
EU has been significantly Involved in the transformation of ex-communist
countries. The EU's principle was to disperse the Ideals of prosperity and
security, as well as democracy, among those countries. Most of the time the
EU's involvement was characterised by being an arbitrator in the
democratisation process due to its efforts at delineating common liberal
democratic norms and values for domestic and international political actors, as
well as developing an entrenched institutional structure surrounding these
norms and values.
Moreover, it can be argued that the EU, through the use of its
enlargement policy, committed itself to the stabilisation of the emerging
democracies and endorsement of economic growth. The EU's enlargement
requirements incorporate necessary conditions (such as Implementation of
political and economic reforms) to be fulfilled by those countries in due course.
On the other hand, it is also important to stress the willingness of ex-
communist states to become a part of Europe. This became the main drive for
those countries to comply with the EU's rules and conditions by means of
implementing various political and economic reforms. Currently, compliance
with the EU rules is the main condition of becoming a member of the EU. As
indicated by Kubicek (2003: 2), the mutual eagerness and efforts of the EU
and various ex-communist countries on the improvement of democracy
resulted in compliance with the democratic criteria; and the success stories
belonged to countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovenia. As suggested before, the potential EU membership accelerated the
political and economic reform processes in those countries and compelled them
to comply with its requirements.
More specifically, the EU, by means of political dialogue and assistance
in institution building, heavily involved itself in the process of democratisation
in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). The Europe
Agreements which were seen as approval of the association status of CEECs
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(also the further status of potential membership) provided the necessary
ground for initiating democratisation processes within those countries. In this
context, as Phlnnemore (2006b: 39) states, the negotiations on a Europe
Agreement denote 'the EC's initial response to the CEEcountries' desire for
closer relations and ultimately membership'. Furthermore, those Europe
Agreements explicitly Indicated the conditional character of membership offers
by emphasising the prerequisite of compliance with its rules regarding the rule
of law, respect for human rights, the establishment of multi-party political
system, free and fair electoral system, as well as economic liberalisation
(Pridham, 1999b: 65).
One important point to remember here Is that the promotion of
democracy cannot be explained only by the EU's efforts. This assumption can
be proven by pointing out the countries which have not yet complied fully with
the EUconditions. Kubicek (2003: 3) categorised those countries as 'reluctant
democratisers' and characterised them as countries that fall behind or fail to
keep up with 'political liberalisation' regardless of the EU's assistance. The
commonly-known examples within this category included Slovakia under
Meciar, Croatia under Tudjman and Ukraine in the course of independence.
Turkey is also argued to be one of these reluctant countries towards
democratisation process, in spite of external pressure asserted by the EU.
Kubicek (2003: 3) argues that it would be misleading If one investigates the
role of the EU in promotion of democratisation only within the success stories;
and further claims that the analysis of the relations between reluctant
democratisers and the EU as democracy promoter should be taken Into
consideration since it creates a common ground on which the effectiveness of
the impact of external actors on the diffusion of democratic norms and values,
and the response of problematic countries, can be analysed from a
comparative perspective.
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2.4. The Democratic Principles of the EU
The EU as an organisation has always consisted of states supporting
democracy. It Is based on principles such as liberty, democracy and the rule of
law. The creation of EU policy in favour of democracy has been articulated
repeatedly in various resolutions, Commission communications, and Council
conclusions. The roots of the democratic principles of the EU can be traced
back to the early 1950s when the EUadopted shared values and principles of
other important international organisations.
To start with, in 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations
proclaimed the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
Declaration then became the fundamental text for every member of the United
Nations (UN) and constituted the primary text for fundaments of basic human
life with respect to an assortment of rights and freedoms. These rights and
freedoms are set under different Articles of the Declaration but when taken as
a whole, it is possible to identify some of the most relevant ones as: equality
before the law, protection against discrimination, right to freedom of thought,
right to freedom of opinion and expression, and right to freedom of assembly
and association (United Nations, 1948). Along those lines, in 1950, the Council
of Europe (CaE) adopted the EuropeanConvention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which came into force in 1953. This
document, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, lists a number of
rights and freedoms reaffirming the superiority of the fundamental rights as
the indicators of 'justice' and 'peace' in the world and this is based on a
country having an effective political democratic system (Council of Europe,
1950).
In addition, with the adoption of the Birkelbach Report in 1962, the
European Parliamentary Assembly pronounced the political and institutional
aspects of accession to or association with the European EconomicCommunity
(EEC) as part of political integration. The Birkelbach Report is seen as a
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defining document in the establishment of the enlargement Acquis. It forms an
'explicit link between democracy and accession to the EEC' (McLaren, 2008:
237). This report articulates that candidate countries should show full
commitment to the economic and political, as well as institutional, obligations
of the EECin order to gain membership status. Furthermore, it puts democracy
and respective institutional framework on the agenda as one of the conditions
for membership (Torreblanca, 2003: 10-11; McLaren, 2008: 237; Ozbudun
and Gen~kaya, 2009: 43).
Further integration of political objectives was also seen in the
Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) signed In 1992 in which 'respect
for human rights' was made a general principle of Community law. This change
in the Community's common position was acknowledged as the opening of a
new era in the European integration process. The reasons for the
emergence/adoption of the TEU were predicated on various internal and
external occurrences. There had been a strong motivation among the member
states towards the advancement of the Single European Act by adopting new
reforms consequently resulting in progression towards political integration. On
the other hand, externally, the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in
Eastern Europe as well as the reunification of Germany forced the Community
to reassess its international position. In light of this context, the fundamental
values of the EUare stated in Article 2 of the TEUas:
'The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to
minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a
society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice,
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail' (European
Union, 1992).
In relation to that, Crawford (2000: 92-93) argues that the Resolution
of the Council of Ministers (Development) on 'Human Rights, Democracy and
Development' of November 1991, adopted prior to the Maastricht Treaty, has
been considered as an essential policy statement since it outlines four political
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constituents of 'sustainable development'; namely, human rights, democracy,
good governance and decreased military expenditure. The inclusion of
democracy, good governance and military elements evidently Indicated the
broadening of the political component of the Community's legal framework.
Moreover, the introduction of two policy instruments, a 'carrot' and a 'stick',
verified that the Community would closely monitor and persistently assess the
performances of the member and candidate states based on the measures for
the respect for human rights and democracy taken by the Community itself.
These benchmarks constitute the basis of the EU's democratic norms
and values. Nevertheless, it is Important to highlight that with each different
enlargement period the EUcame to a point where setting clearer benchmarks
became inevitable. It would not be possible for the EU to evaluate and
measure the level of compliance of the candidate countries only by looking at
its initial fundamental values. In that respect, in 1993, the Copenhagen
European Council came to an agreement that the ex-communist countries, that
is to say, the CEECs,would be able to achieve EUmembership only if they met
certain conditions. It was there and then that membership conditions which
had already been set beforehand were explicitly proclaimed. The membership
conditions declared at the European Council of Copenhagen in 1993 are:
• a functioning market economy with the capacity to cope with
competitive pressures and market forces within the EU;
• stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; and
• the ability to take on the obligations of EUmembership including
adherence to the aims of economic, political and monetary union
(European councu, 1993).
The constituent aspects of the Copenhagen criteria have been
processed and refined over time by way of legislative amendments of the
European Council, the Commission and the Parliament, in addition to the laws
and regulations of European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
Rights. It is also important to bear in mind that neither the conditions of
membership nor the Copenhagen criteria developed over night. Although it has
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always been comprehensible that EU membership has been and will continue
to be open to any European country which pursues liberal democratic regime,
it has taken a long time for the EU to strictly define its democratic conditions
for membership.
These conditions were set for the first time in the 1970s when the
membership applications of Greece, Spain and Portugal were put forward.
There had not been any concern for the countries of the first enlargement
period given that they were already established democratic regimes. Then
again, the criteria of the 1970s only showed a gradual change and constituted
a general requirement framework for the EU. Pridham (1999b: 65) argues that
starting from the 1980s, the EUdeveloped Its conditions and transformed them
from being 'formal criteria' into conditions on 'substantive democracy'.
Therefore, it can be argued that over time, the EU had developed a more
rigorous set of conditions for accession, particularly in the cases of CEECs
(Pridham, 2005), and the Western Balkans, while its commitment to
enlargement has significantly diminished (Phlnnemore, 2006a). At this point, it
is important to remember that since the Copenhagen criteria were set in 1993,
there was no mechanism to regulate or monitor the compliance of old member
states.
In 2001, the Commission proposed a new strategy on the promotion of
human rights and democratisation process. The proposal on an evolving EU
human rights policy became an innovative onset of a more efficient EU policy.
With this strategy, the human rights policy not only has been placed at the
centre of the EU external policy, but at the same time, with respect to
democratic values, this policy has been set as a precondition for the
attainment of sustainable development (European Union, 2001). For the EU,
this strategy broadened its scope on human rights by extending and linking the
field to the wider context of interdependence with the EU's other primary goals
and activities, such as the promotion of democracy. This initiative establishes
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closer and stronger links with UN standards; hence, providing a new source of
reference for the European stance on democratic principles.
It can be argued that the abovementioned developments in the
democratic principles of the EU are crucial steps in the progress of creating a
coherent EU policy on human rights and democracy, since a coherent policy
offers a valid ground for the adoption of structural democratic objectives,
which in turn reinforces the EU's leverage on candidate countries in terms of
promoting change and expediting the reform process within those countries.
Furthermore, with these initiatives, the EU has radically advanced itself in
terms of operating in consensus and displaying visible procedures and projects
on democratic reforms and human rights Issues. Nevertheless, the Increased
consensus among the member states of the EU facilitated the Union's
development and enhancement of the Union's role In democracy promotion.
Central to the EU's approach, there have been other initiatives for the
promotion of democracy and protection of human rights. Among them, a
particular development aid programme called the European Initiative for
Human Rights and Democracy (EIDHR) stands out. With the EIDHR, the EU
aims to deeply integrate the democratisation and human rights policies Into its
entire range of EU policies and programmes, as well as providing financial
support for related projects. Overall, within an international framework, these
initiatives and further implementation of specific projects enhance the reforms
on legislation, administration and the judiciary, which are fundamental to the
progression of human rights practices, fundamental freedoms and
strengthening democracy, in addition to good governance among countries.
The objectives of the EIDHR for the development and consolidation of
democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms are stated as:
• enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in
countries and regions where they are most at risk;
• strengthening the role of civil SOCietyin promoting human rights
and democratic reform, in supporting the peaceful conciliation of
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group interests and in consolidating political participation and
representation;
• supporting actions on human rights and democracy issues in
areas covered by EU Guidelines, including on human rights
dialogue, on human rights defenders, on the death penalty, on
torture, and on children and armed conflict;
• supporting and strengthening the international and regional
framework for the protection of human rights, justice, the rule of
law and the promotion of democracy; and
• building confidence in and enhancing the reliability and
transparency of democratic electoral processes, in particular
through election observation (European Commission, 2009).
These particular objectives illustrate that the EUwith EIDHRputs great
emphasis on the importance of fundamental rights such as the right to
freedom of thought, opinion, religion, expression as well as the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and association. By doing this, it aims to help
civil society to be more open and pluralistic in order to improve democratic
legislation and political representation which in turn will stimulate dialogue
between citizens and governments. It also reinforces official dialogues on
human rights issues, promotes particular instruments for sustaining the
process of consolidation of democracy and contributes to the transparency of
elections. All these credentials reaffirm the EU's commitment to strengthening
the promotion and consolidation of democracy within an international
framework and to build a democratic political culture amongst countries.
In light of this context, as in the case of the CEECs,Turkey has become
subject to the EU's formal accession criteria involving its democratic principles
since 1999, when it gained candidacy status. Since then the issues of
democratisation and human rights have been as major features of Turkey-EU
relations. The increasing importance of democratisation and human rights is
argued to be a major shift in the focus of Turkey-EU relations which were
predominantly concentrated around economic matters in the 1960s and 1970s
(Dagl, 2001). After Turkey gained candidacy status, the issues of human rights
and democratisation became the focal point of the political affairs between the
two actors. It is plausible to argue that the EU's intensive involvement in
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democracy promotion and intention to spread its democratic principles in non-
member or candidate countries, including Turkey, has opened the space for
radical initiatives and political reforms In target countries. As a result of this,
and in conjunction with Turkey's ever-lasting EuropeanisationjWesternlsation
efforts and determination to become a member of the EU, a dynamic domestic
transformation process Is observed at the domestic level.
When examining the EU's democratic principles and formal criteria for
membership, policy areas, such as minority rights, freedom of expression, the
military, and the judiciary, pose interesting case studies in the context of the
EU's democracy promotion in Turkey. As will be discussed In Chapter 4 in detail,
these are the policy areas that are entailed In the formal membership criteria
of the EUwhere the EUputs its main influence mechanism of conditionality In
force to trigger the political reform process In Turkey, as well as Its institutional
transformation policy (re)formatlon. These are also the policy areas which pose
a great obstacle to Turkey's democratisation process where the influence of the
EU is most felt at the domestic level. In particular, the EU's influence Is greatly
felt when examining the decision-making processes of political actors, and
alterations in the Institutional structure of the state, as well as evolving
democratic norms and values In Turkish political system. These constitute the
major parts of the pre-accession dynamics, where EU conditionality mayor
may not account for domestic change in Turkey. In that respect, the analysis
of these problematic cases, which are individually analysed in the empirical
chapters of the thesis (Chapters 5-8), is assumed to be constructive for a
better understanding of the dynamics of Europeanisation at the international
level and the other factors that can account for domestic transformation in
Turkey at the domestic level.
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2.5. Historical Record of Democratisation in Turkey
Turkey has been facing an unstable process of democratisation
throughout its history. For almost every decade since its establishment, Turkey
became subject to regime collapses followed by military intervention 5 in
domestic politics. In that respect, it can be argued that the democratisation of
Turkey has been negatively affected by deep-rooted problems in its political
system. In order to understand the dynamics of the current political culture
and to explain the 'obscure historical conditions' (Schmitter, 1986: 6)
impacting upon Turkey's democratisation efforts, it is necessary to portray the
years of democratic experiment(s) that have taken place before Turkey was
given candidacy status in 1999. This section also serves as background
information for the upcoming empirical chapters (Chapters 5-8).
Turkey, born out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, carried its
Ottoman legacy for many years. The first democratic experiments were
conducted by its predominant centralist state structure under the heavy
influence of state elites and bureaucracy (Ahmad, 1993: 69). Already since the
creation of the Republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal AtatOrk, the pre-eminence
of European values were acknowledged by the statesmen. The main aim of
AtatOrk, the statesmen and the intelligentsia was to Europeanise/Westernise
the country, as well as to create and shape Turkey's own political development
and its democratic consolidation (Ozbudun and Genc;kaya, 2009: 81). As
McLaren (2000: 118) states, since then, Turkish leaders have aimed to
establish that 'Turkey is western, and more specifically that it is European'.
Although the direct relationship between Turkey and the EU started in
1959, statesmen under the leadership of AtatOrk had attempted to
europeanise/westernise and modernise the country with increasingly more
5 However it has been commonly argued that since the establishment of the Republic, and in
the instances where the military was assigned tasks of protecting the Kemalist state and
nation, the military has never attempted to form a permanent military regime. In fact, the
military handed power back to the civilians when the internal or external threats were taken
under control and since the main intention of military interference was to assist the re-
emergence of the 'right democratic order' rather than establishing permanent military regime
(Brown, 1987; Hale, 1994; Zurcher, 2004).
47
proactive political reforms and initiatives. Nevertheless, It was not easy at the
beginning to rid the country of the 'imperial' and 'patrimonial' heritage of the
Ottoman Empire. In fact, these obstacles caused an isolation of the newly
established 'administrative centre', as part of the new institutional structure of
the Turkish state, from the periphery, representing the local communities
(Zurcher, 2010: 141). This type of isolation, in turn, instigated a relationship
between the two sides based on 'control', 'cooptation', and 'regulation', Instead
of 'consultation', 'coordination', and 'consociation'. In spite of this Isolation, the
urge to transform the political structure of Turkey emerged from within the
state itself. However, rather than involving 'social integration' Imperatives, the
scope of this transformation was centred on 'state-building' endeavours
reflecting upon the very presence of the imperious statist composition of
Turkish state In the early years of Its establishment (Sunar and Sayan, 1986:
166-167; Zurcher, 2010: 144).
With the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the political revolution
in Turkey had begun. The main aim of this revolution was to change the former
political authority, which was based on an 'Imperial-patrimonial monarchy',
legitimised by religion (Zurcher, 2010: 136); and to replace this political
structure with secular state formation wherein the legitimacy of the state itself
and its actions would be bound by the rule of law. This type of state formation
would also require the protection of state sovereignty, a constitutional
parliamentary system, and most importantly, the free will of Turkish citizens.
The state revolution was nevertheless accepted as a 'revolution from above'
that was initiated at the state-level instead of the mass-level with the intention
of transforming political and cultural change, rather than the social structure of
Turkey (Sunar and Sayan, 1986: 169). In fact, the Turkish revolution was
claimed to be the most 'progressive' event, both at the national and
international level, in the post-war period (Ahmad, 1993: 65). Therefore, it can
be argued that although very premature, the recognition of democratic values,
such as the rule of law, secularism, and constitutional warranties, mirrored the
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political efforts of the newly-appointed political authorities in acknowledging
the superiority of European/Western standards and practices.
Nevertheless, it was not an easy task for Ataturk and his fellow
statesmen to establish a democratic political setting. In fact, it took more than
two decades to advance the level of democracy in Turkey. Initially, i.e. in the
early days of the Republic, the political system was a state-dominant mono-
party authoritarian regime, led by a single party, the Republican People's Party
(CHP), composed of the state's ruling elite, the military and the civil
bureaucrats (Ahmad, 1993: 62; Zurcher, 2004: 176; Zurcher, 2010: 146). It
did not come as a surprise that Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic,
became the leader of the CHP. He was widely supported by the secular and
progressivist 'intelligentsia', composed of academics, lawyers, and state
officials. Following the Initial aim of Europeanisatlon/Westernlsation, the CHP,
the first political party in the history of Turkey, claimed to stand for western
liberal values and supported secular and nationalist policies. The party also
made it clear that it would be against radical and authoritarian tendencies
(ZOrcher, 2004: 168). Two interviewees made a Similar point by stating that
the Republican People's Party has always regarded western civilisation as a
symbol of a certain 'code of behaviour' that respects and promotes universal
norms of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Interview, Member of
Parliament, CHP Deputy#l, 2012; Interview, Member of Parliament, CHP
Deputy#2, 2012).
In this new political structural composition, the military and the
bureaucracy, two entities which were heavily involved in the establishment of
the Republic, became the old guardians of the state, whereas the ruling
political party (CHP) was seen as a new actor in politics. Although
Europeanisation/Westernisation was one of the priorities since the early days,
the governing elites, at times, followed rather traditional and authoritarian
manners in ruling the country by using repressive measures to protect the
indivisibility and homogeneity of the Turkish state. Even if the establishment of
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the CHP intended it as a political party, the CHP did not become the main
political authority rapidly or efficiently. In fact, although the party was given
the responsibility to make political decisions, the military and bureaucracy
continued to be actively present in the decision-making process, based on the
fact that these two actors had deeper roots within society, making them more
institutionalised than the political party, and hence more consistent, more
homogenous and better integrated socially (Sunar and Sayan, 1986: 169-170).
On the other hand, in contrast to the general democratic settings, the
early political regime in Turkey was purely based on the Idea of concentration
of powers in the centre, which in turn held back the spread of democratic
values and practices in the country. In addition to this, the insufficient and
ineffective peripheral groups, and the deficiency in distribution and
differentiation of political powers, widened the segregation between the centre
and the periphery consequently causing unsuccessful incorporation of the state
and society, as well as the adaptation of democratic political regime. In other
words, the necessary bond between the 'top' and the 'bottom' was missing.
The legacy of this Incompetence In the political arena had undeniable Impacts
on the democratisation process of Turkey in later periods. As Sunar and Sayan
(1986: 172) note: 'the outcome of an elite-instigated democratisation from
above was a crippled democratic regime with a short lifespan'.
The liberalisation process of Turkey started to develop In the 19s0s,
more than two decades after the establishment of the Turkish Republic.
Despite the presence and active involvement of the military and bureaucrats in
politics as the guardians of the state, political dynamics immediately changed
after the transition from single-party to multi-party politics with the emergence
of the Democratic Party (DP) as an opposition to the CHP.The change to the
electoral system, which was to create better structures for multi-party
governance and possibilities for cooperation via coalition governments, has
been regarded as a major landmark in Turkey's modern political history (van
der Lippe, 2005). In fact, the lack of an opposition party prior to the
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establishment of the DP was seen as one of the main deficiencies in the
Turkish political system (Ahmad, 1993: 102), and an obstacle for the
consolidation of democracy and the spread of democratic norms and values.
Although the initiation of multi-party politics was a promising sign for
Turkish democratisation, the transition to 'real' democracy did not occur with
the transition to multi-party politics. As Heywood (1996: 162) argues, even if
political parties are considered vital in representative democracies, in some
cases, they can also destabillse the continued existence of 'open and free
discourse and exchange upon which democratic institutions depend'. This was
also evident in the case of Turkey. Soon after the transition to multi-party
politics, the military and bureaucratic elites increased their support for the
ruling party, CHP. At the same time, their support for CHP and hostility
towards the newly established DP hindered the emergence of a new political
discourse, which in turn made the political system resistant to multi-party
politics (Sunar and Sayan, 1986: 172; Ahmad, 1993: 102-103; Zurcher, 2004:
222).6
In this political setting, after its establishment, the DP proposed that
the party would implement the principle of national sovereignty and would
carry out its party policies based on democratic credentials (Ahmad, 1993:
103). However, after winning the elections in 1954, the political leadership of
DP became more authoritarian, which caused severe obstacles for
democratisation efforts in that period (Weiker, 1963: 6-11; Zurcher, 2004:
230; Jung, 2006: 136). Since the DP did not have deeply-established roots
within society, it aimed to reach out to the public by utilising certain tools such
as 'clientelist networks', or by attracting 'religious sentiments' and promoting
'populism' in order to conceal its institutional defiCiencies (Sunar and Sayan,
1986: 173; Ahmad, 1993: 105). At the same time, the CHP stayed in
opposition and maintained its 'bureaucratic, elitist politics' while taking action
against the DP by inciting the bureaucracy (both administrative and judiciary)
6 For a discussion on the Turkish party system, see Sayan (2002).
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and the intelligentsia. Moreover, it was also commonly known that the CHP
always implied that, if necessary, it would rely on the military as the guardians
of the state in order to remove the OPfrom power due to the OP's 'activation
of traditionalism', which was perceived as the biggest threat that the OP
leadership caused to Kemalist ideologies (Sunar and Sayan, 1986: 173;
Ahmad, 1993: 110). This hostility between the OP government and the CHP
opposition, along with both party leaders' authoritarian tendencies, directly
affected institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey.
Europeanisation/Westernisation efforts In this period were subverted
and the two parties became extremely ineffective in meeting the demands and
needs of the public at the domestic level. However, this had changed
particularly after Turkey officially applied for an association agreement with the
EEC in July 1959, shortly after Greece had applied for its association
agreement in January 1959 (Ozbudun and Genc;kaya, 2009: 81). One of the
reasons for Turkey's application for associate membership of the EECis directly
linked to Turkey's 'quest for external validation of its European credentials and
a desire to participate in a community of Europeans' (McLaren, 2000: 118). An
interviewee made a similar point by stating that it was for Turkey's quest for
westernisation rather than economic or political benefits that Turkey has
always aimed for EU membership (Interview, Member of Parliament, CHP
Oeputy#2, 2012). Nevertheless, the association agreement could only be
completed in September 1963 due to a sudden military intervention in Turkish
politics in 1961. The first military Intervention in the history of the Turkish
Republic was caused by the increasing authoritarian measures of the OPand
the party's explicit references to religious sentiments (Ahmad, 1993: 112;
Zurcher, 2010: 272). Also, the ever growing confrontation between the two
parties triggered the process of military intervention, which was widely
supported by the CHP, the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia. It was widely
known that the military, if deemed necessary, would intervene in politics as
one of the guardians of the state in order to protect the 'status quo' from the
52
'threat within' and persevering with Ataturk's 'path of civilisation' (Zeydanhoglu,
2008: 155). As Dodd polnts out '[T]he military's intervention was intended to
effect significant changes in , though not to overthrow the system itself - and
to impose, say, an authoritarian military or single-party regime - the Turkish
military is frequently regarded as the guardian of democracy' (Dodd, 1983: 1).
The second attempt at transition to a fully democratic regime came
after the 1961 military intervention by adopting new rules and regulations.
Even if this second democratic experiment was also imposed from the top, as
was the case of the first experiment, the governing elites managed to adopt a
new Constitution. The 1961 Constitution clearly demonstrated that, for the first
time, political actors tried to achieve the 'balance of power' by bringing certain
checks and controls into the political system (Ahmad, 1993: 129). The making
of a new constitution, which was totally different to the previous rulings of the
Ottoman Empire, was seen as a reflection on the democratisation efforts by
the ruling authorities in this period. For instance, the inclusion of the notion of
'balance of power' in the constitution not only brought dispersion and
differentiation of the ruling elites' responsibilities, but also helped to establish
various control mechanisms on the political parties. Furthermore, the
Constitutional Court and the Senate were established for the first time in order
to examine the legislative activities and to counter-balance the Assembly.
Other than the change to the electoral system and the transition to multi-party
politics back in 1946, among other developments in the 1960s, were the
foundation of a state-planning organisation responsible for the coordination of
economic development, and the establishment of the National Security Council
(NSC) responsible for security-related issues (Sunar and Sayan, 1986: 175;
Zurcher, 2004: 245; Ozbudun and Genc;kaya,2009: 14-16).
What is striking in that period in terms of the dispersion of democratic
principles and norms is that Turkey witnessed a sudden legal change in terms
of individual rights and civil liberties and associative freedoms which were
clearly stated within the 1961 Constitution (Ahmad, 1993: 129). The 1961
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Constitution evidently gave greater civil rights than ever before including rights
for students to organise associations, rights for workers to strike, and more
autonomy for universities. Thus, one can conclude that the democratic
experiment of the 1960s was reasonably liberal in nature, in stark contrast to
the initial periods of the Republic. The newly-established institutions made it
difficult for political elites to behold sudden and radical changes In the political
arena or any re-emergence of the authoritarian ruling system or concentration
of power within one political party (Zurcher, 2004: 245). Furthermore, for the
first time, in an environment with greater political freedoms, leftist intellectuals
could unite and form their own parties which signalled the formation of a new
political ideology as an alternative to the political setting formed in the early
days of the Republic (Ahmad, 2003: 127). In that sense, the development of a
democratic regime seemed to gain momentum in this period.
Nevertheless, it is commonly believed that Turkey did not experience a
liberalisation of society in general, but only constitutional liberalisation in the
1960s. Although certain constitutional amendments were made, which resulted
in the extension of certain civil and political rights, the political parties
continued to use their power to curb these rights, and work for their own
benefits instead of the common good of the society. In that respect, the
relegation of democracy was accelerated In this period, partially due to the
newly emerging party system with many deficiencies and the problematic
relations between the ruling elite and the weak society (Sunar and Sayan,
1986: 175-176), which can directly be linked to the very notion of revolution
from the 'top', rather than revolution from the 'bottom'.
This also implies that, although the political re-structuring in the 1960s
was significant, certain 'underlying' political structures were hard to dissolve.
In fact, the social life in this period was highly politicised (Ahmad, 2003: 127).
The newly-emerged ideological division between left and right had widely felt
among the society and political elites. In particular, the emergence of the left
had directly challenged the day-to-day politics in Turkey, since the rightist
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groups became more cautious of the activities of the leftist groups and began
to organise against them. Furthermore, after the establishment of the Justice
Party (AP) in 1965 under the leadership sulevrnan Demirel, political conditions
became even more complicated both at the international and domestic level.
More specifically, the unresolved Cyprus Question, the Arab-Israeli war of 1967,
as well as the increasing militancy of students and workers and the struggle
between labour and capital, had all made the decision-making process of the
APgovernment more difficult, and posed potential threats to its power (Ahmad,
2003: 132).
Furthermore, more conflicts emerged on the political front in the 1970s.
In particular, the distrust among political parties dramatically increased the
creation of ideological divisions among political parties, as well as
governmental inconsistencies and inefficiencies (Ahmad, 1993: 146-147). This
period was also marked by the weakening of the Kemalist elite, the expansion
of a self-governing bureaucracy, the diffusion of the ruling system, and the
expansion of the clientelist network among various 'professional and social
associations'. Furthermore, party politics in that period was depicted with
expanding party fragmentation resulting from the introduction of proportional
representation and consequent emergence of small parties and, therefore,
forming a new polarisation and 'ideological confrontation' within the system.
The polarisation in the party system resulted in severe difficulties with
government formation, which in turn was destructive for the implementation of
democratic regime (Sunar and Sayan, 1986: 177-179; Zurcher, 2004: 258-
259). As a result of this political turmoil, the military intervened in politics for a
second time in 1971. The military justified its intervention based on the fact
that it is the military's responsibility to bring order back into politics and
protect the ideological integrity of the country (Ahmad, 1993: 148; Ozbudun
and Genc;kaya,2009: 18).
As a result of the above mentioned trends in the 1970s, instability in
the political arena became insurmountable, leaving the political actors facing
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an intensifying crisis, which also affected the institutional transformation and
policy (re)formation in Turkey and slowed down the democratisation process.
The military intervention of 1971 was believed to have been carried out by
radical-reformist military officers who were in support of the 1961 Constitution.
These officers held Demirel's government responsible for the 'anarchy' and
'unrest' in Turkey, and called for the formation of a new government 'formed
within the framework of democratic principles and Inspired by Kemalist ideas'
(Ahmad, 2003: 134). Nevertheless, the officers' strategy to restore law and
order in the country was based on the idea of defeating the leftist movements.
It also became clear later on that the Constitution of 1961 and the guarantee
of extended political freedoms was more difficult than antiCipated for the
political elites to manage on legal grounds. Against this background, the
Constitution of 1961 was amended in a way so as to modify the institutions of
the state and society, and to curb civil and political freedoms.
On the other hand, social democracy became an important political
ideology in the 1970s and it was found to a certain extent to be responsible for
the military intervention in 1980. After the military intervention in 1973,
general elections were held, where the CHP, under the leadership of SOlent
Ecevit, won 33.3 per cent of the votes, but failed to win enough votes to form
a Single-party government. As a result, Ecevit, after long deliberations with
other political parties, managed to form a coalition government with the
National Salvation Party (MSP) of Necmettin Erbakan in January 1974.
Nevertheless, the formation of a coalition was overshadowed by increasing
political terrorism and the insurgence of political violence caused by attacks of
nationalist groups, such as the 'Grey Wolves' (Ahmad, 2003: 140-141). Due to
this political turmoil at the domestic level, not much had been achieved in
terms of democratisation or strengthening of relations with regional or
international powers. The only substantial development with regard to Turkey-
EU relations in the 1970s was the signing of an Additional Protocol in
November 1970, which only served as the basis for the intensification of the
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basis of Turkey's relations with the Community (Ozbudun and Gen~kaya, 2009:
81).
The political system was finally beleaguered and, for the third time in
Turkish history, military intervention took place on 12 September 1980. This
intervention was caused by severe threat imposed by the armed confrontation
among the opposing political groups (i.e., the Radical Left and Extreme Right)
(Zurcher, 2004: 263; Zurcher, 2010: 280), and by the increasing competition
between 'religiously-oriented' political parties to form a government. These
developments undoubtedly put the territorial integrity, the secular character
and democratisation of Turkey In danger (Ahmad, 1993: 181). In the
aftermath of the military intervention of 1980, the political arena became more
complicated and disruptive than ever before, which resulted In a three-year
long period of martial law. Therefore, in contrast to the developments in the
aftermath of the 1961 military intervention, the military intervention of 1980,
produced the domination of the state by the adoption of strict controls over
party politics, the bureaucratic system, professional associations and even
universities. Furthermore, the changes in that period involved the recurrence
of concentration and centralisation of power, but this time with the addition of
active participation of the military in the political arena with an emphasis on its
'strong oversight powers' (Sunar and Sayan, 1986: 183-184).
The military mainly involved itself in pollttcs via the 'automatic' election
of General Kenan Evren to the presidency for a seven year term in the national
referendum of 1982. The new constitution adopted in 1982 gave 'ultra' and
indisputable powers to General Kenan Evren. Furthermore, his actions or
political decisions were not under any sort of judicial review, consequently
making the executive stronger than ever (Zurcher, 2004: 281). With regard to
that period, Sunar and Sayan stated that 'what is envisioned in the 1982
Constitution is a state divorced from polities and a depoliticised society' (Sunar
and Sayan, 1982: 184); also providing the military guarantee of the society's
authorisation to 'justify interference' in politics by making necessary
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amendments to the new constltutton? (Ahmad, 1993: 184; Capezza, 2009: 13;
Ozbudun and Genc;kaya,2009: 19).
Nevertheless, 1983 set the scene for positive developments in Turkish
politics. Although the military presence was still apparent in every sense, e.g.
through the banning of previous political parties from politics, retaining veto
power over the establishment of new political parties and having further
controls over various political activities, such as election campaigns (Ahmad,
1993: 187), the 1983 elections resulted in the success of the newly-founded
Motherland Party (ANAP) under the leadership of Turgut Ozal. Turgut Ozal's
party politics involved economic liberalisation projects with a strong emphasis
on an open economy and conservative cultural values (Zurcher, 2004: 283).
Although the party associated Itself with another newly-founded party, the
Nationalist Democracy Party (MOP), and although the military faced a serious
quandary since the victory of the ANAP was not expected, the military
respected the election results and agreed to transfer governmental power to
Turgut Ozal's ANAP. The final decision of the military to acknowledge the
results of the election showed that the electoral process was becoming more
legitimate (Ahmad, 1993: 188).
The 1980 intervention of the military in Turkish polities was not
welcomed in Europe. In fact, even the transition to civilian government in 1983
did not stop the intensifying concerns in Europe on the democratic nature of
the new political regime and its respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms (Ahmad, 1985; Dagl, 1996). Following the national elections, local
elections held in 1984 also proved to be a second success for the ANAP.With
the appointment of civilian officials at the local level, the political regime of
Turkey became more and more civilised where the manipulation by the military
7 Article 15 of the Constitution of 1982 states that 'no allegation of unconstitutionality can be
made in respect of laws, law-amending ordinances and acts and decisions taken in
accordance with the law numbered 2324 on the law on the constitutional order' (Republic of
Turkey, Constitutional Court, 1982).
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forces in politics was no longer present (to a certain extent) (Sunar and Sayan,
1986: 185; Zurcher, 2004: 283; Greenwood, 2006: 39).
However, it was soon realised that the military was disinclined to allow
full freedom of action to the recently elected civilian government and continued
to influence politics through various institutional and informal mechanisms
(Cizre, 1997: 153). Mainly, along with the NSC, the military was authorised to
check up on the civilian authorities by participating In various government
bodies (e.g. having seats on the boards of Higher Education Council and the
Radio and Television Supreme Council overseeing tertiary education and
broadcasting respectively) (Aydin and Keyman, 2004: 19). In addition to these
institutional arrangements, the military also continued its influence in politics
via informal mechanisms, such as conducting undisclosed meetings with
government ministers and other officials, and making public statements
(Ahmad, 1993: 188; Jenkins, 2007: 344).
Soon after (hal's government was formed, it was declared that the
government's ultimate aim was to attain membership in the EU.Ozal's interest
in strengthening relations with the EUwas based on his realist view of political
and economic gains of having closer ties with the European Community (EC).
In fact, Ozal considered that having closer political and economic ties with the
EUwould ultimately integrate Turkey into Europe structurally and make Turkey
'an indispensable part of Europe' (Dagl, 2001: 18). Nevertheless, the
continuation of the military's influence in politics became one of the major
obstacles for the normalisation of relations between Turkey and the ECjEU in
this period. In that respect, relations between the two actors did not evolve
immediately. Already in that period, the ECjEU made the restoration of
relations conditional upon Turkey's progress in improving its records on human
rights and fundamental freedoms (Dagl, 2001: 18-19). These negative
developments mirrored the fact that Turkey still had to go a long way to bring
its so-called democratic regime up to standards within the EU.
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Nevertheless, in this period, the EC emerged as a major international
actor that could impact upon democratisation in Turkey. As a response to
Turkey's desire to restore its relations with the EC/EU, the EC/EU itself could
effectively impose its convictions on the cornerstones of democracy regarding
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In that respect, the
EC/EU steadily increased its pressures on domestic change in Turkey - if
Turkey deemed to continue to strengthen Its relations with the EUand if it was
still interested in becoming a part of the Union. Finally, in 1987, Turkey applied
for EC/EU membership. However, the political turmoil and low levels of
democratic consolidation in Turkey had caused concern within the EU.
Therefore, the Community was reluctant to offer Turkey membership.
Therefore, the EC/EUrejected Turkey's initial application In 1989 based on the
argument that the country was not ready for membership due to low levels of
political and economic development. More specifically, the 'anti-democratic'
policies of the Turkish state and violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms were cited as the main impediment for Turkey's membership of the
European Community (Ozbudun and Genc;kaya,2009: 81-82).
The 1990s witnessed another period of political conflicts. First of all, a
new political party called the Welfare Party (RP) appeared on the political
scene in 1993. The RP became famous for its Islamist character and its
rejection of Kemallst ideology which in turn hastened the contention between
Islamists and Kemalists (Zurcher, 2004: 290). In December 1995, the RP
became the largest party in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) and
in June 1996 the party formed a coalition government with the True Path Party
(DYP). After the RP came to power, its political stances and in this period
clearly indicated that Turkish secularism was under serious threat. This in turn
encouraged Kemalist elites to provoke the military and the judiciary as well as
academic circles, to take action against the ruling RP.
In the 1990s, the tension between Islamist fundamentalists and
secularitsts intensified. The major debate in this period dealt with the turban
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ban (a headscarf completely covering a woman's hair) in public and inside
state buildings, which included universities. In 1990, fundamentalists
assassinated Professor Muammer Aksoy (the President of the Turkish Law
Society) and Bahriye O~ok, an theologist and left-wing politician, which was
followed by the murder of Ugur Mumcu, the 'most famous living journalist' in
Turkey, who widely wrote on the connections of the Islamist fundamentalists
with Iran and Saudi Arabia, in a car bomb in January 1993 (Zurcher, 2004:
289-290).
Therefore, it did not surprise the public when the military made public
pronouncements warning that secularism was put under threat by Islamist
activities conducted by the government (Jenkins, 2007: 345). As a result of
anti-secular activities carried out by the RP, the military intervened in 28
February 1997 in order to revitalise and normalise the tension between Turkish
democracy and secularism (Aydm, 2007: 17-18). However, this time the
military did not intervene directly, instead it mobilised public opinion against
the government. This mobilisation was prompted by a memorandum prepared
by the NSC emphasising the fight against political Islam. This post-modern
intervention resulted in the dissolution of the government and the resignation
of the Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan (Greenwood, 2006: 39).
Also, in the same period, and in addition to the emergence of political
Islam (Zurcher, 2004: 288-289), the Kurdish question emerged as another
challenge for the democratisation process (Ozbudun and Gen~kaya,2009: 25).
The Kurdish question posed severe concerns for the Kemalist Ideology and was
perceived as a fundamental threat to the nation-state as well. This situation,
as expected, compelled and justified the presence of the military in domestic
politics (Tocci, 2001: 22; Aydm and Keyman, 2004: 19; Bilgin, 2005: 188). In
fact, the insurgency launched by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in 1984
became one of the main reasons for the military to retain its authority in the
political arena. Later in the 1990s, this insurgency expanded into a 'Iow-
intensity civil war' and resulted in strict military administration in the south-
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eastern region of Turkey (Jenkins, 2007: 345). This indicates that the military
still exercised certain powers and influence over politicians, policies and
domestic politics, and regarded itself as an important and Indispensable
political actor. Yet, Jung (2006: 143) argues that the 'political autonomy' of the
military was not limited to national defence matters. Particularly in the 1990s,
the 'security conception' started to expand into a wider area, where the
distinction between external and internal security threats became blurred;
hence, allowing the military to have an impact upon politics on a regular basis.
However, at the international level, Turkey's relations with the EU
started to develop in the mid-1990s. As Oni~ (2008: 37) argues, the process of
actual Europeanisation started in the formal sense, in line with extensive
political reforms and EUconditionality, when Turkey initiated its Customs Union
(CU) with the EU in 1995. The CUwas seen important and necessary for trade
liberalisation in Turkey, but it was also found to be 'instrumental' for the
promotion of democratisation efforts." Nevertheless, In the early 1990s, due to
the EU's rejection of Turkey's membership in 1989 on the basis of the
problematic nature of Its democracy and democratic principles, the EUdid not
have substantial credibility or leverage In pushing political reforms within
Turkey. Despite the positive developments of the CU, the lack of a clear and
credible conditionality strategy on the EU's part, and the failure of Turkish
political elites to cope with widespread economic and political deterioration,
have undoubtedly raised concerns over Turkey's commitment to Europeanise
its political domain (6nl~, 2008: 37). Ugur (1999) described the
aforementioned developments and the troublesome relations between Turkey
and the EU in 1990s as 'the anchor-credibility dilemma'.
Given this background of Turkey-EU relations, circumstances started to
change progressively after the Helsinki Summit in 1999, where Turkey was
recognised as a candidate country for EU membership. Without a doubt, the
credibility of EU conditionality has significantly improved, and its leverage on
8 For the detailed information on trade liberalisation in Turkey see Oni~ and Baklr (2007).
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domestic change in Turkey with regard to its institutional transformation and
policy (re)formation grew to a great extent. In a way, candidacy status
provided sufficient incentives for Turkey to initiate the long awaited political
reform process. Since then, Turkey is involved in a progressive yet rather
troubled process of domestic transformation under the influence of EU
conditionality. In that respect, It can be argued that the key sphere In which
Europeanisation has had an impact Is democratisation. The empirical chapters
(Chapters 5-8) will deal with this development by looking specifically at
institutional transformation and policy (re)formation of Turkey In the areas of
minority rights, freedom of expression, the military and the judiciary.
2.6. Conclusion
This chapter aimed to open up the debate on the role of International
organisations in democracy promotion in general and the role of the EU in
particular. This debate is remarkably Important to understanding the
democratic template of the EU and to comprehend the ways in which the EU,
as a major international actor, Intends to spread its democratic norms and
values, not only in its member states, but also in candidate or non-member
states. The synopsis of the EU'searly engagements with democracy promotion
in southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe also provided Invaluable
insights on the legal mechanisms the Union developed for the dispersion of its
democratic principles. More specifically, the initiation of the conditionality
strategy as part of the EU's enlargement policy showed how the EU has
transformed conditionality into being a major influence mechanism on
domestic transformation in candidate countries within the Europeanisation
framework.
This chapter also aimed to introduce the policy areas under
investigation in this thesis, in connection with the democratic credentials of the
EU and its formal accession criteria. Finally, this chapter incorporated a
historical overview of the political landscape of Turkey from the beginning of
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the Republic until the European Helsinki Summit in 1999, where Turkey was
recognised as a candidate county. This historical overview is anticipated to be
useful first to unveil the major political actors, political settings and embedded
cultural and political norms and values in the Turkish context, which are
assumed to account for the dynamics of institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation in Turkey; and secondly, to distinguish patterns of the EU's
involvement in Turkish democratisation between the establishment of the
Republic in 1923 and Turkey's recognition as a candidate country In 1999.
The following chapter (Chapter 3) introduces the theoretical framework
of the thesis. It identifies Europeanisation as the most suitable framework to
reflect on the interactions between the EUand Turkey in the context of Turkish
democratisation in general, and the institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation in Turkey in particular.
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3. Europeanisation - Theory and Practice
3.1. Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, major international organisations,
principally the EU, have proclaimed that the normative foundations of the
European community are the promotion of liberal democracy and respect for
human rights. In that respect, democracy promotion, particularly around
Central and Eastern Europe, emerged as one of the main goals of international
organisations. Enlargement became one of the main foreign poliey objectives
of the EU, based on the presumption that Its enlargement into Central and
Eastern Europe through EU accession would potentially be constructive for
democratising CEEpolitical regimes and for consolidation of democracy in the
region (Sadurski, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeler, 2004). These
developments at the international level subsequently triggered the
development of various influence mechanisms under the EU's conditionality
strategy (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Vachudova, 2005).
The subject of EU enlargement, integration and democracy promotion
has been robustly investigated, with multiple theoretical frameworks and
concepts having been developed to explain the impact of the EUas an external
actor on the democratisation processesof countries. It is In this literature that
conditionality emerged as one of the most effective influence mechanisms of
the EU, with respect to democracy promotion (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz,
2007). In fact, there is an extensive literature on conditionality, Investigating
the conditions under which the EUconditionality principle has had an impact in
target countries, such as the CEECs(Schmitter, 1995; Grabbe, 1999; 2001;
2003; Phinnemore, 2000; 2010; Mattli and PlUmper, 2002; 2004; Vachudova,
2001; 2005).
Yet, this study argues that this particular area of research still remains
under-explored and under-theorised. Admittedly, even though the EU
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conditionality strategy is commonly acknowledged as one of the most effective
strategies for democracy promotion, few scholars have questioned its
effectiveness with respect to institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation within the scope of democratisation of target countries. This can
be considered problematic given their low levels of democracy. Hence, it is
important to examine to what extent and under which conditions International
actors (i.e., the EU) and norms have an Impact on the democratisation
processesof problematic countries.
Through the study of the international dimensions of the
democratisation process in Turkey, the Europeanisation process and the
effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality, this thesis shall question the
impact of international institutions on domestic politics and the democratisation
process in general, with a specific focus on Turkish domestic politics and its
democratisation process. It seeks to investigate the effects of Europeanisatlon,
the use of conditionality by international institutions In candidate countries,
and the transfer of democratic norms and values, in order to shape the
democratic outcome of candidate countries on specific dimensions of
democracy.
This research question therefore refers to the developing literature on
Europeanisation, focusing on the impact of international organisations on
domestic change and more specifically on the EU's role in promoting
democratisation in non-member states/candidate countries. The literature,
which focuses particularly on Europeanisation, mainly analyses how the EUhas
acted as an anchor for democratic reforms in candidate countries. Essentially,
this literature has been explored by two main approaches from international
relations - rationalist and constructivist theories - which propose different
models to explain the conditions under which the EU has been effective in
promoting domestic change and invigorating the democratisation process in
candidate countries.
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In that respect, in studies of Europeanisation, and EU conditionality,
the rationalist and constructivist theories are adapted for the purpose of
building a causal linkage between the impact of international organisations and
the level of domestic change in candidate countries, within the enlargement
process. Having identified these two theoretical approaches, competing
explanations about the underlying principle, the conditions and the main
mechanisms of enlargement are analysed (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier,
2002: 509). Furthermore, this project, based on the main research question
outlined above, assumes that EU conditionality becomes effective when and if
the target candidate countries comply with the EU's democratic criteria,
established under the Copenhagen political criteria. Therefore, it is plausible to
argue that the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality is directly
connected with democratic changes, in the form of policy changes and rule
adoptions that occur within the target candidate countries.
Furthermore, it is important to note that, under the scope of studies on
Europeanlsation and EU conditionality, and with respect to the analytically
distinctive theoretical approaches previously mentioned, the international and
domestic factors are perceived as the joint testing polnts for the
conceptualisation of particular (external) influence mechanisms on the one
hand, and domestic changes within countries on the other (Schmitter, 2001;
Whitehead, 2001; Schimmelfennig et al., 2002; Schimmelfennig and
Seledmeier, 200sa; Schwellnus and Schimmelfennig, 2008). In that respect,
this study aims to conceptualise the influence exerted by International actors
(i.e., the EU) in the formation of democracy within target countries (i.e.,
Turkey) by following these two theoretical approaches, since they offer
different but not necessarily unrelated explanations for the alterations in the
democratisation process of countries.
This chapter introduces the concept of political conditionality and
theoretical models relevant to this concept. It also presents a discussion on the
literature on Europeanisation and theories of Europeanisation, which helps to
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understand and explain the theoretical framework of this thesis. In that
respect, this chapter specifically focuses on the external incentives model and
the social learning models. There are three reasons for the selection of these
models. Firstly, they are well-equipped to explain the process and
effectiveness of conditionality. Secondly, they suggest a number of
circumstances that have an impact on the effectiveness of conditionality.
Thirdly, they provide clear examples to explain the diverging policy outcomes
across different policy areas. Subsequently, the hypotheses that are used to
analyse and examine the effectiveness of EU conditionality under the EU's
enlargement policy, put forward from these theoretical models, are also
presented. The chapter ends with a conclusion on the theoretical framework of
this thesis.
3.2. Political Conditionality
Conditionality is a very complex phenomenon. It originates from the
Bretton Woods Institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and World Bank, and its first application dates back to 1952 (Eckaus, 1986:
242). Conditionality brought remarkable changes at the international level,
since its application enabled many international organisations to use
conditionality instruments to promote and protect their self-interests
(S0renSen, 1993; 1995; Stokke, 1995). Through the use of conditionality,
international organisations (also seen as donors) provide certain incentives
(e.g. technical or financial assistance), based on the compliance of target
governments or support for their self-interest, and their ability to meet and
implement certain conditions and policies. Hughes et al. (2004a; 2004b) define
conditionality as an interaction between multi-level actors, including an
international level actor (donor) with self-interests and perceptions, and a
domestic level actor (recipient). In their interactions, the donor is expected to
provide certain rewards or sanctions based on the target countries' compliance
or non-compliance with the conditions specified by the donor.
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The first generation of conditionality is economic conditionality, and its
objectives include a number of structural adjustments, such as market
liberalisation, budget balance, and administrative reforms. Political
conditionality is considered as the second generation of conditionality, and it
combines economic and political reforms involving democratic governance,
promotion of democratic norms and human rights (Stokke, 1995: 1). In
general, conditionality involves certain conditions set by an international
organisation, which need to be fulfilled by a target government in order to
receive rewards offered by the same International organisation. The
composition of these rewards is multifaceted. Along with common technical
and financial aid or assistance, the rewards also Include a prospective
membership to an International organisation or an institution, such as the EU.
The EU uses conditionality as a strategy In Its enlargement polley. In
that respect, EU conditionality generally follows 'a strategy of reactive
reinforcement or reinforcement by reward' scheme (Schlmmelfennig and
Sedelmeier, 200Sa). In the case of the EU, conditionality dictates the fulfilment
of the criteria set out at the Copenhagen summit and the adoption of the
Acquis Communautaire for membership. In that respect, a candidate country
should meet the main entry requirements by adopting EU conditions, which
results in the restructuring of domestic polldes and policy processes of the
target country. To put it briefly, a target country is required to, according to EU
conditions, receive the reward ('carrot'), but if it fails to reach these conditions,
the EUwithholds the reward ('carrot'); in some cases, the EUgives a sanction
or punishment ('stick') for this failure.
It can be argued that, in the case of the EU, the use of political
conditionality has evolved remarkably over the years. Previous studies on
conditionality show that the effectiveness or overall impact of conditionality
can vary depending on different countries, institutional settings, or policy areas,
due to several factors. For Instance, conditionality might generate intended
outcomes for some of Its objectives, rather than for others, and this outcome
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might also vary in different settings (i.e., in different countries). The literature
on the pre-accession process of CEEC and the literature on the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)9offer a valuable source for an Illustration of the
factors which might impact upon the effectiveness of conditionality. The
concerned literature posits that the success of the EU's eastern enlargement,
in promoting democracy, and the EU's liberal democratic norms and values
came out as a result of the strong incentives offered by the EU (Kubicek, 2003;
Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Kelley, 2004;
Schimmelfennig, 2004; 2005; Schlmmelfennig and Schwellnus, 2004;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; 2005a).
In the case of CEECs,the successof EUconditionality Is often explained
by referring to the concept of 'asymmetric Interdependence' (Schimmelfennlg,
2010). This explanation is directly linked with cost-benefit calculations of
candidate countries. It is presupposed that the benefits of engagement in an
intense cooperation with the EUwould be higher than the costs of compliance,
and the relative costs of compliance would be significantly lower than the costs
of non-compliance, since the latter implies the possible exclusion of candidate
countries from the EU (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003: 44).
Among the other factors impacting upon the effectiveness of
conditionality is dependence on the EUboth in the economic and political sense.
Kubicek (2003: 17-20) contends that conditionality is more likely to work in
the first place if a candidate country is economically and politically more
dependent on the EU. Secondly, conditionality becomes more effective if there
are no veto players at the domestic level and, in particular, if the impact of the
political actors is marginal. Thirdly, conditionality becomes more effective if
there are certain governmental and non-governmental actors in support of EU
9 There is a wide range of literature on the ENP; however this literature is not incorporated
into this thesis. For a detailed analysis of the ENPand EUconditionality, see Kahraman, 2005;
Schimmelfennig, 200Sb; smith, 2005; Dannreuther, 2006; Kelley, 2006; Lippert, 2007;
Kochenov, 2008; Freyburg et al., 2009; 2011; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009; 2011;
Bechevand Nicola"idis,2010.
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membership, which could apply pressure to the existing authorities for
compliance with EUconditions.
3.3. Europeanisation and Domestic Structures
In the literature on Europe, there is clear evidence of increasing
references to the concept of Europeanisation (Featherstone, 2003: 5). The
context of Europeanisation is mostly used to depict the 'adaptation of policies
and policy processes', but it is also used as a 'historic phenomenon', a
'transnational cultural diffusion' and as an 'institutional adaptation'
(Featherstone, 2003: 6-12). The concept of Europeanlsatlon is defined as 'the
emergence and development at the EU level of distinct structures of
governance' of political, legal and social institutions that coordinate
interactions among actors (Risse et al., 2001: 3). Nevertheless, as Radaelll
(2000; 2003) states, despite the wide usage of the concept, which reflects the
dynamism of the debate in academic circles, there is still a danger of stretching
the concept to indefinable conceptual frameworks In which the term lacks a
precise meaning - along with other risks of concept misformation and
degreeism.1o
In a similar vein, Featherstone (2003: 3) describes Europeanisation,
based on both its minimalist and maximalist significance, and contends that
Europeanisation can be a useful starting point in understanding the current
changes in European politics, as long as it secures an accurate meaning. In a
minimalist sense, Featherstone associates Europeanisation to policy-making at
the European level and stresses the implications of EU-Ievel policies in the
domestic context. However, in a maximalist sense, Europeanisation is
10 By building on a range of Sartori's works (1970; 1976; 1991) on the development of a
conceptual analysis, Radaelli (2000) emphasises the importance of the difference between
'intension' and 'extension' in Europeanisation research. According to this categorisation,
'intension' represents endogenous properties of the concept, while 'extension' refers to the
empirical cases to which the concept is applicable. Radaelli points out that particularly in the
early stages of Europeanisation research, emphasis given to extension rather than intension
was much wider based on the fact that, the more the concept could be observed empirically
the more the research agenda would be justified. Nevertheless, he accurately stresses that
the danger of 'degreeism' that arises 'when differences in kind are replaced by differences of
degrees' will also be relevant in the case of Europeanisation research, if the question of 'what
is not Europeanised?'cannot be answered thoroughly (Radaelli, 2000: 4).
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identified as a process of structural change, influencing both social and political
actors, formal institutions, as well as Ideas and interests; he suggests that 'this
structural change that it entails must fundamentally be of a phenomenon
exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely
identified with, Europe' (Featherstone, 2003: 3).
On the other hand, rather than accepting Europeanisatlon as a 'new
theory', or an 'ad-hoc approach', Radaelli (2004: 2-3) recommends that It
'should be seen as a problem, not as a solution', and should be conceptualised
as 'a set of post-ontological puzzles', a way of 'orchestrating existing concepts'
in political science that lead the way to a different focus in relation to
integration theories, governance theories, and other classic themes in
comparative politics. Radaelll (2004) suggests that the potential of
Europeanisation can be better understood if It Is regarded as 'something to be
explained rather than something that explains'. Radaelli also notes that
although it is too soon to tell whether Europeanisation studies will be able to
advance as a progressive research agenda or not, these studies are still
important in terms of the information they bring to three main areas. These
areas are: i) offering a way of understanding the domestic impact of
international politics; ii) offering an understanding of the relationship between
agency and domestic change; and Iii) contributing to the formulation of
research frameworks, by interlinking approaches of international governance to
the models of domestic politics (Radaelli, 2004: 2-3).
Nevertheless, most scholars acknowledge that this diversity in
approaches to the concept of Europeanisatlon is useful in building adequate
conceptual frameworks, particularly in the initial stages of an emerging
research agenda; others assert that this diversity (or diversification) may also
lead to an intellectual segregation In the field of Europeanisation. In fact, Olsen
(2002: 923) finds the research on Europeanlsation 'disorderly' and claims that
more academic effort should be invested in understanding the dynamics of the
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contemporary European polltv, rather than trying to conceptualise what
Europeanisation 'really is'. Accordingly, Olsen (2002: 923) states that:
The empirical complexity and conceptual confusion should lead not
to despair, but to renewed efforts of modelling the dynamics of
European change. An immediate challenge is to develop partial,
middle-range theoretical approaches that emphasise domains of
application or scope conditions and that are empirically testable. A
long term challenge is to provide a better understanding of how
different processes of change interact and make Institutions co-
evolve through mutual adaptation.
It is argued that one reason why there is disagreement on the actual
definition of Europeanisation can be related to the challenging nature of the
concepts or issues Europeanisation addresses. As previously noted, it does not
only refer to various practices of institution building; It also suggests the ways
in which these practices are carried out, both at the EUand domestic level. In
relation to this, Radaelli (2004: 6) distinguishes three main conceptual
frameworks used in Europeanisation research, each focusing on a different
aspect of the process: Europeanisation as 'governance', Europeanisation as
'institutionalisation', and Europeanisation as 'discourse'.
It should be noted that what these three approaches argue about
Europeanisation are not contradictory with one another; yet, they are practical
in the way that they develop viable links between the empirical data and the
theoretical assumptions. In the absence of this identification, there could be
the danger of over-estimation; the empirical evidence of domestic change and
the impact of the EU, as well as the possible direction of the two (top-down vs.
bottom-up), could be misinterpreted if the cause-effect links are not well-
formulated within the research design on Europeanlsation (Radaelli, 2004: 6).
On the other hand, Heritler (2001: 1), who sees this implication as
'transformation', argues that 'transformation not only involves policy aspects
strictu sensu, such as the general problem-solving approach and policy
instruments used, but also the administrative structures and patterns of
interest mediation in which the implementation of these policies is embedded'.
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In that respect, it can be deduced that the scope of Europeanlsation should not
be restricted to EU member states that are active in the processes, but it
should also cover the accession/candidate countries, and other applicant states.
Evidently, with the EU's eastern enlargement, a new dimension has been
added to the research agenda on Europeanisation. Europeanlsation, in the
case of the EU's eastern enlargement, has brought the concept of
Europeanisation of candidate states to the forefront of the research agenda.
This type of Europeanisation has also substantiated the differential impact of
the EU accession process among the CEECs(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeler,
200Sa; Sedelmeier, 2006; Phinnemore, 2010), raising various questions on the
impact of the EU on accession states and the effectiveness of its influence
mechanisms. Nevertheless, the influence exerted by the EU, with regard to its
institutions and policies, is acknowledged as one of the main driving forces of
domestic change in CEECs.
The literature on Europeanisation has demonstrated convincingly that
Europeanisation does exist and, to a great extent, it has been effective in its
member states before their accession. Initially, Europeanisatlon is referred to
as 'institution building at the European level', where the research has focused
on the development of 'policy competences' at the EU-Ievel. Gradually though,
scholars have shifted their focus towards the effects of Europeanisatlon at the
national level. 11 Yet, it became clear that the scope and the direction of
domestic change in each and every member state has not been clear; instead,
the domestic impact of the EU has been significantly differential, as argued by
many scholars who have contributed to the debates on how much change has
been the result of the EU accession process, in the institutions, policies and
political processes in member states (Cowles and Risse, 2001; Herltler et al.,
11 For example, Olsen (1995), Andersen and Eliassen (1996) and Rometsch and Wessels
(1996) studied the influence of EU-Ievel activities (mainly the activities of Brussels) on the
national-political institutions and policy-making methods of member states. Kohler-Koch
(1997) studied the Europeanisation effects at the sub-national level, by analysing the impact
of the EU on regional governments, policies and outcomes. Haverland (2000) and Duina
(1999) examined the domestic implementation of specific European rules and regulations;
and others assessed the impact of Europeanisation process within a particular country
(Bulmer and Paterson, 1987; 1989; Katzenstein, 1997; Schmidt, 1996).
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2001; Featherstone and Radaelll, 2003; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005; Graziano
and Vink, 2006).
In general, the literature on Europeanisation presents a two-fold analysis
on the impact of the EU on candidate states; on one hand, Institutional and
legal transformation is measured by the progress made by target states in the
adoption and implementation of the European acquls; on the other, the
financial and technical assistance offered by the EU during the accession
process. Therefore, the process of Europeanisation not only requires 'legislative
harmonisation' through legal rule adoption, but also Influences Interaction
dynamics between target states and the EU, through 'Interest-articulation'
mechanisms. In that respect, the implementation of EU provisions relies
heavily on subtle 'behavioural and organisational' characteristics in target
states (Cernat, 2006: 129-135).
Although the effects of Europeanisation have had certain commonalities
across the CEECs, in this particular geographical context, the process of
Europeanisation has also caused diverse political and institutional outcomes in
individual target states. 12 In fact, as Risse et al. (2001: 3) posit,
Europeanisation entails the formation of new 'layers of politics', which interact
with pre-existing ones, leading to 'distinct and identifiable' changes in domestic
politics - even if these changes are perceived as 'domestic adaptation with
natural colors'.
3.3.1. Europeanisation as Institutionalisation
The understanding of 'Europeanisation' as institutionalisation has
significantly contributed to the development of a significant research agenda,
debating on several issues, such as 'national adaptation' or different ways of
(re)defining pre-existing political structures with the materialisation of a new
(i.e., EU level) of governance (Harmsen, 2000: 52). This particular research on
12 These commonalities include development of a less politicized civil service (Goetz, 200S),
tempered party competition (Vachudova, 2008), and a degree of decentralisation and
regionalisation (Bruszt, 2008).
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Europeanisation as institutionalisation has offered a wide range of empirical
insights on this subject matter. The main conceptual frameworks of this
research also derived from the new-institutionalist theoretical perspectives.
The scholars who define Europeanisation as institutionalisation (Cowles
et al., 2001; Olsen, 2002; Radaelli, 2003) outline the comprehensive
interlocking between the two main Insights of institutionalisation as: i) the
formation of 'politico-administrative' models at the EU level; and ii) the
readjustment of national models, as a response to the rising European polity.
At this point, it should be noted that there has been a recent shift in research
focus, where scholars have become more interested in the ways that EU level
polities and policies are transferred and institutionalised at the domestic level,
rather than looking at the creation of formal and informal models at the EU
level (Radaelli, 2004). Corresponding to this assertion, Borzel (1999: 574)
accurately defines Europeanisation (as institutionalisation) as 'a process by
which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-
making'.
There are several ways that Europeanisation as institutionalisation has
an effect on different areas at the domestic level. Radaelli (2003: 35-36)
identifies these as: i) macro-domestic structures (public administration,
political and legal structures, structures of representation, intergovernmental
connections); ii) public policy (actors, problems, style, instruments and
resources; iii) normative and cognitive structures (values, norms, discourses,
narratives, policy paradigms). These areas have common ground with the
dimensions where Borzel and Risse (2000) propose that the domestiC impact of
Europeanisation has an effect: 'polity', 'policies' and 'politics'. Equally, Herltler
(2001: 3) suggests that Europeanisation engages with 'European decisions, the
processes triggered by these decisions as well as the impacts of these
processeson national policies, declslon processesand institutional structures'.
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Cowles et al. (2001: 4-5), on the other hand, distinguish 'institutions'
from other 'domestic structures', and argue that Europeanisation has a
separate impact on 'policy structures' and historical/cultural specific 'system-
wide domestic structures'. When these differences or diverging approaches to
the role of Europeanisation as institutionalisation are taken into account,
Radaelli's (2003: 30) description of Europeanisation comes out as the most
inclusive one. In fact, Radaelli acknowledges the shortcomings of the previous
approaches and intends to shed light on the imperative features of empirical
analysis. He argues that his description is acquainted with 'the importance of
change in the logic of political behaviour [ ...J, refers to process of
institutionalisation [ ...], accommodates both organisations and individuals [ ...],
is broad to cover variety of interests [ ...J, and can be applied to both the
member states and to other countries' (Radaelli, 2003: 30). According to this
formulation, Europeanisation stands for:
processes of (i) construction, (Ii) diffusion, and (iii)
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy
paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', and shared beliefs and
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU
public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of
domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public
policies (Radaelli, 2003: 30).
As previously noted, in general, empirical research on Europeanisation
tends to focus on 'policy change' and validates the EU's external impact; while
research on Europeanisation, in terms of domestic and cognitive/normative
structural changes, gives greater emphasis to the role of the internal dynamics
within a certain context, wherein the measurement and explanation of these
domestic changes appear to be more intricate. This intricacy subsequently
reflects upon the difficulty of identification and measurement of 'domestic
change' and 'domestic impact', as a result of the process of Europeanisation,
and develops into a common narrative in Europeanisation literature. In fact, as
noted by a small number of scholars, the effects of Europeanisation are by and
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large regarded as 'asymmetrical' and 'irregular' (Featherstone, 2003: 11-12).
In support of this assertion, Herltter (2001: 2) states that:
The process patterns and policy outcomes of Europeanlsation have
not been uniform across the member states and do not reflect
either the well-defined will of a 'unified supranational actor', or a
pervasive problem-solving rationality that imposes itself
'automatically' so as to increase the overall efficiency of European
policy decisions in the context of a transnational interdependence
of policy problems. Instead, the political reality of European
policymaklng is 'messy' insofar as it is uneven across policy areas
and member states, institutionally cumbersome, and subject to the
dynamics of domestic politics, each with Its own particular logic. As
a consequence, the outcomes of European policymaklng tend to be
much more diverse then one would expect and preclude any
simplistic explanation of Europe-induced changes.
In turn, this asymmetry and the irregularity of the effects of
Europeanisation necessitate a further separation between the EU-Ievel
factors/elements within a particular domestic context and the actual features
of the EU's impact. Radaelli (2003: 37) critically draws attention to the
possibility that changes, which occurred at the domestic level, may not be
linked to the EU's impact, but instead, they may be a result of other domestic
dynamics or processes. In Romania, for example, although the early post-
casusescu governments had been better associated with democratic principles,
the rule of law, and market economy than previous administrations, they were
showing a 'general reluctance' to meet the demands of the transition process,
particularly prior to 1996. Attempts by the Romanian governments to initiate
domestic reforms failed (Phinnemore, 2001: 246). In a similar vein,
Featherstone (2003: 11-12) polnts out that in order to link domestic change
with the EU's impact, and hence in order to identify the EU as the 'prime agent'
to cause change, evidence is required of 'direct causal effect'.
In the research of Europeanisation as institutionalisation, once different
aspects of 'domestic change' are distinguished, the second step in empirical
analysis pays attention to the identification of different impact/influence
mechanisms; at the theoretical level, new institutionalist approaches are found
to be appropriate to discuss these mechanisms. When examining new
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institutionalist approaches, there is a clear distinction between different
frameworks which explains the process of Europeanisation and related
influence mechanisms, based either on the 'actors' involved or on the
'institutions' that are subject to change. These new institutionalist approaches
are rationalist institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical
institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Rationalist institutionalism and
sociological institutionalism portray 'two logics of change' and are not 'mutually
exclusive'; in fact, in most instances, they occur concurrently and depict
different phases in 'a process of adaptational change' (sorze! and Risse, 2000:
2).
The following section discusses the new institutionalisms, with particular
emphasis on the external incentives model and the social learning model, to
present the two main models that carry explanatory values for the impact of
the EUon domestic changes in target states.
3.4. New Institutionalisms
The institutionalist comeback in the 1980s and 1990s produced three
alternative institutionalisms - rationalist, sociological and historical - each with
its own explanation of institutions and understanding of the role of institutions
in politics (Pollack, 2009: 125-126). To solve the empirical puzzle on
Europeanisation effects and the EU's role in domestic change, the literature
has drawn on these strands of institutionalist thinking. In spite of the
differences in their explanations, these institutional isms seek to grasp the way
the institutions work and their impact on politics at two dimensions - domestic
and international - by analysing their role in political and social engagements
(Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936-937).
Rationalist and constructivist approaches of Europeanisation both
assume that the 'misfit' between European and domestic policies, institutions
and political processes constitutes a necessary condition for domestic change,
and that institutions mediate or filter the domestic impact of Europe, which
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emanates from pressure of adaptation caused by such misfit. However, they
differ in their assumptions of exactly how institutions matter (Borzel and Risse,
2003; sorzet, 2010). Nevertheless, these two approaches are found to be
adequate to answer for the 'differential impact' of the EU on the institutional
transformation or domestic change in target states. Although they have been
criticised for conceptualising Europeanisation as a 'one-way street' (Olsen,
2002), the primary 'top-down' approach, rather than 'bottom-up' approach,
came into view as a pertinent way to study the domestic impact of the EUon
target states whose relationship with the EU is 'asymmetrical' (Borzel, 2010:
8).
The historical institutionalist approach, similar to sociological
institutionalism, analyses the ways in which institutions influence individual
behaviours with a focus on the development and changes over time (Thelen,
1999; Bulmer, 2007). It specifically looks into instances of 'institutional
persistence' to change, which brings in the concept of 'path dependency',
referring to a situation wherein preceding decisions shape the forms and
structures of future developments (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters et al., 2005).
'Path dependency' is also depicted as a notion 'according to which political
developments can become locked on a particular path even if the initial
embarkation on that path was the result of unexpected events (Chari and
Heywood, 2008: 181).
The theoretical approach of this thesis will be restricted to the
application of two strands of institutionalism, which are widely utilised in the
studies of Europeanisation. These strands are rationalist institutionalism and
sociological institutionalism, which will be elaborated further below. As these
two strands of institutionalism make different assumptions about the impact of
the EU on domestic change (i.e., institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation), a framework constructed around two institutional isms makes it
possible to generate competing hypotheses, which can then be tested, verified
or falsified. However, the aim is not to prove one theory wrong, but to test
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them against each other in order to observe if one is more suitable for
explaining the differential outcome in the Europeanisation of Turkey's political
structure. It is also plausible that not all institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation in Turkey can be described by the same logic, and that these two
theories can capture different aspects of the EU's role In domestic change
through Europeanisation.
The following section discusses rationalist and sociological
institutionalist strands in detail. In the beginning, their core assumptions are
outlined, and followed by an overview of previous academic studies using these
particular theoretical strands to identify factors involved in Europeanisation and
the impact of the EU on domestic change in target states. Finally, generic
hypotheses that can be deduced with regards to the Impact of the EU on
domestic change, and relevant evidence that is required to verify or falsify the
hypotheses in question will be presented.
3.4.1. Rationalist Institutionalism - the External
Incentives Model
Rationalist institutionalism draws analytical tools from 'new economies
of organisation', emphasising the importance of the 'development of
institutions'. These institutions emerge as a result of an attempt to reduce the
'transaction costs' of the action taken in the absence of the institution in
question. From this perspective, politics is perceived as the scene of 'struggle
for power' and a 'series of collective action dilemmas'. The latter image of
politics involves various occasions where actors aim to maximise their
preferences and benefits potentially leading to a 'collectively sub-optimal'
outcome. Hall and Taylor (1996: 945) explain this outcome as the one '[ ...]
that could make at least one of the actors better off without making any of the
others worse off'. The origins of institutions are explained by the rationalist
institutionalists by following a functional logic in terms of the 'effects that
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follow from its existence' (e.g. see Hall and Taylor, 1996; Tallberg, 2002;
Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002; Pollack, 2003).
In relation to Europeanisatlon, rationalist institutionalism indicates that
the EU assists domestic change by changing 'opportunity structures' for
domestic actors. The first and foremost condition here is the 'demand' for
domestic adaptation as a result of the misfit between the EU and domestic
norms and conditions. In the process of domestic adaptation, cost-benefit
calculations of strategic actors shape the effectiveness of rule transfer (i.e.,
transfer of EU policies and institutions) or the EU's domestic impact.
Institutions at this point may enable or constrain actions of rational actors by
portraying some options as being more low-cost than others, or vice versa.
In this perspective, Europeanisation is perceived as an 'emerging
political opportunity structure', which provides potential resources to some
actors to wield influence, at the same time as restraining the other actors'
capacity to pursue their goals. Therefore, domestic change is ensured if
domestic political Institutions in the target state(s) prevent domestic political
actors from vetoing adaptation to EUrules and conditions (Borzel, 2010: 6). In
relation to that, Borzel and Risse (2000) suggest two conditions under which
Europeanisation may generate domestic change: I) presence of a certain
degree of 'Incompatibility' between the European and national levels; and il)
level of willingness of the institutions and actors to respond to the 'adaptational
pressures'.
In that respect, the starting point of the rationalist interpretation on the
EUis based on the assumption that actors (both at the EUand domestic level),
who are actively involved in the related-decision making arenas, act
'strategically' to achieve their 'preferred outcome' (Aspinwall and Schneider,
2001: 7). For that reason, the rationalist institutionalist approach intends to
explain Europeanisation by considering the actions of policy actors, who
support or refuse to accept the changes within the national policy-making
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context, emerging from the demands for policy changes originating from the
EU. Attention therefore should be given to the 'reform capacity' of the
national/domestic policy actors against the EU's polley demands in order to
evaluate the level of 'fit-misfit' (Barzel, 1999; Cowles et al., 2001); in other
words, to evaluate the level of 'match-mismatch' between the aims of the EU
and the target states (Herltler et al., 1996; Herttler, 2001).
More specifically, this 'misfit' can be seen either in the form of 'policy'
or 'institutional' which is generally related to the general perceptions on how
domestic change (i.e., institutional transformation and policy (re)formation) is
accomplished. In that respect, it can be argued that the level of 'adaptational
pressure' originates from Europeanisation (i.e., EU's external pressure) Is very
much dependent on the level of 'misfit' between the EUand the target state.
This dependency, in turn, reflects upon how much change Is needed at the
domestic level (Cowles et al., 2001). In fact, it can be assumed that the more
similarity between the national and EU-Ievel policy procedures exists, the less
the adaptation of changes result from Europeanisation (Herltler, 2001; Knill
and Lehmkuhl, 1999; 2002; Barzel, 2002).
Nevertheless, it is argued that stumbling upon 'adaptational pressures',
as a result of the fit-misfit in a specific national context, does not necessarily
mean that Europeanisation will trigger a change (Cowles et al., 2001). For
instance, Radaelli (2003) is critical about this notion of 'fit-misfit', along with
the substance of 'adaptational pressure' suggested by the institutionalist
perspective for understanding the Europeanisation process; and contends that
the notion of 'fit-misfit' is socially and discursively constructed. Instead,
Radaelli (2003) argues that domestic actors who are particularly seeking new
opportunity structures, can make good use of Europe as a force base for
domestic change, albeit the absenceof existing pressure from the EU.
Within the rationalist institutionalist perspective, the 'logic of
consequences' (March and Olsen, 1998) is extensively emphasised to explain
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the process of Europeanisation according to which actors, both at the societal
and political level, are provided with new opportunities as a consequenceof the
'misfit' between the EU and domestiC levels. In that respect, 'Europeanisation
leads to domestic change through a differential empowerment of actors
resulting from a redistribution of sources' (Borzel and Risse, 2000: 2). In spite
of this, it is argued that the 'capacity' of actors to take advantage of new
opportunities provided by Europeanisation is dependent on two core factors: i)
multiple veto points; and ii) the presence of formal institutions that will act as
facilitators for the actors to pursue their interests (Cowles et al., 2001; Barzel
and Risse, 2000). According to the first factor of 'multiple veto points', it is
stressed that 'if the power is dispersed across political system and more actors
have a say in political decision-making, Europeanisation is difficult' (Cowles et
al., 2001: 9). In addition, this assumption paints to the possibility that the
level of domestic change may be likely to differ according to the attitudes of
the existing formal institutions. In fact, institutions may make certain 'material'
and 'ideational' sources available for the societal and political actors to foster
domestic change; or, on the contrary, may display resistance (Borzel and Risse,
2000: 1).
Stemming from the rationalist institutionalist perspective, the external
incentives model epitomises a 'bargaining' framework that represents a model
of behaviour based on 'material incentives' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier,
200Sa). According to the external Incentives model, actors substitute any form
of 'information', 'threat' or 'promise' to their preferences, where their 'relative
bargaining powers' emerge as the decisive factor on the outcome of the
bargaining process. As previously noted, this type of interaction also follows
the 'logic of consequences' (Checkel, 1998; March and Olsen, 1998). The main
intention in this model is utility maximisation, where domestic actors (i.e.,
target states) are expected to maximise their benefits based on their fixed
preferences in the process rule adoption and compliance, whilst external actors
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(i.e., the EU) impose external pressure for domestic change (Checkel, 1999c:
548).
According to this model, 'reactive reinforcement' constitutes the main
influence mechanism that the EUemploys to exert external pressure in target
states. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002) posit that 'reinforcement', as a
social structure, is exploited by a social actor (e.g. an international
organisation, such as the EU) to alter another actor's (e.g. target state, such
as an EU candidate state) behaviour. The expected outcome of reinforcement
then should prove consistency in pro-social behaviour by means of 'reward'
and 'punishment'. In this process, 'reinforcement by reward' depicts the
reaction of the international organisation on the fulfilment of its conditions by
the target state, by offering or withholding rewards, rather than taking any
further actions that might be perceived as 'proactive reinforcement' or
'punishment' (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003: 496). If the latter two were utilised,
then the process outcome would either be 'reinforcement by support', if the EU
intercedes further to achieve rule compliant behaviour of the target country by
means of offering additional rewards, or it would be 'reinforcement by
punishment', if the EU imposes additional conditions, increasing the adoption
costs for the target states (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 200Sa: 10-12).
Therefore, based on the external incentives model, it can be argued
that the EUas the external actor is expected to set its rules based on its liberal
democratic norms and conditions, and the target states are expected to adopt
these rules. This type of arrangement is supported by the rewards given by the
EU in return for rule adoption and compliance by the target state. The rewards
in this model can be categorised as material incentives, in the form of either a
combination of technical and financial assistance, or in the form of enhanced
institutional ties. More specifically, the assistance offered by the EU refers to
its external programmes, such as 'Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of
Independent States' (TACIS) and the 'Programme of Community Aid to the
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe' (PHARE),and institutional ties refer
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to the formal interaction linkages between the EUand the target state, such as
cooperation, trade agreements, and ultimately, membership, as the strongest
institutional tie (Schimmelfennig et al., 2002: 4).
According to the external incentives model, there are a number of
factors that cost-benefit calculations of actors are dependent on. These factors
include 'determinacy of conditions', 'size and speed of rewards', 'credibility of
conditionality', 'veto players and size of adoption costs' (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier, 2005a: 10-12). Along the same line, Moravcsik and Vachudova
(2003: 44-46) identify 'concessions' and 'compromises' as the two main factors
impacting on the cost-benefit calculations of actors. According to their view,
the balance between 'concessions' and 'compromises', reflecting the priorities
of both sides during the bargaining process, would result in the compliance of
the target state, if the relative weight of costs associated with bargaining
process and rule adoption are lower than the costs of exclusion from the EU
membership. The general findings of the empirical analysis, carried out by this
model, reveal that the main determinants of conditionality strategy are 'size of
adoption costs' and EU rewards, in addition to the 'credibility of conditionality'
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b: 215).
3.4.2. Sociological Institutionalism - the Social Learning
Model
Sociological institutionalism describes institutions not only as 'formal
rules, procedures or norms', but also as the 'symbol systems, cognitive scripts
and moral templates' which serve as a framework for actors; and investigates
the reasons behind the adoption and diffusion of specific sets of institutional
forms. From this perspective, institutions carry the same meaning as culture,
which connects the 'institutional explanations' and 'cultural explanations' based
on 'organisational structures', where culture is understood as collective norms
and values. Thus, attaching roles to institutions, as the regulators of 'norms of
behaviour', leads to the internalisation of those norms and values (Hall and
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Taylor, 1996: 942-949). Whereas rationalist accounts of Europeanisation
intend to explain domestic change by concentrating on the preferences of
actors, sociological institutionalist perspectives assign a greater role to existing
institutional arrangements in shaping the possible outcomes of Europeanisation.
Other areas of the literature on Europeanlsation draw on sociological
institutionalism in order to specify Influence or change mechanisms based on
the 'ideational and normative' processes of Europeanisation. In contrast to the
rationalist institutionalist approach, sociological institutionalism uses the notion
of 'logic of appropriateness' in order to explain how 'actors are guided by
collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper, i.e. socially
accepted behaviour in a given rule structure' (Barzel and Risse, 2000: 8); this
approach also illustrates the ways in which actors are influenced by
collectively-shared understandings of what constitutes proper, socially-
accepted behaviour. Therefore, these collective understandings of proper
behaviour define the way that actors pursue their goals and their perception of
'rational action'. For that, meeting social expectations in a given situation
becomes the driving factor for actors, rather than maximising their self Interest
(Barzel, 2010: 7).
This type of logic is used as 'the variant that focuses on the cognitive
dimension of institutions that provide particular interpretations of the world
that convey ideas and belief systems (Herttler, 2001: 4); and goes hand-in-
hand with the concept of 'Institutional isomorphism', to Imply that institutions
which interact with one another or share a similar environment have the
tendency to develop 'homogeneity', in terms of their 'normative' and 'cognitive'
structures (Borzel and Risse, 2008: 8). In that respect, within the sociological
institutionalist perspective, domestic change originating from the
Europeanisation process is regarded as 'socialisation' and a 'collective learning
process' that manifests itself as new institutional ideas and belief systems
(March and Olsen, 1998; Knill and Lenschow, 2001).
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In this perspective, Europeanisatlon is perceived as the 'emergence of
new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning' to which target states
are subjected, and which they are expected to incorporate into their domestic
structures. The sociological perspective presupposes different ways in which
reforms are facilitated by domestic actors. For instance, domestic actors are
socialised into new norms and rules of appropriateness, by means of
'persuasion' and 'social learning', by epistemic communities (also referred to as
'norm entrepreneurs'). Domestic change is therefore more likely to take place
if these eplstemic communities are active and if they succeed in making EU
policies 'resonate' with domestic norms and beliefs (Borzel, 2010: 7).
As seen in the case of the rationalist institutionalist perspective, the
importance of the existence of mediating factors is also stressed within the
sociological institutionalist perspective. The two main mediating factors, which
influence the level of domestic change, are identified as: i) the presence of
'norm entrepreneurs', or 'change agents', to 'persuade others to redefine their
interest and identities', ii) the characteristics of the 'political culture' (whether
it is built on 'consensus-building' and 'cost-sharing' or not) (Borze' and Risse,
2000: 9). In that respect, the sociological institutionalist perspective develops
a dynamic understanding of 'culture', as it contextualises the concept by
interlinking it to the ways it is constructed among actors, as being part of
norms and identities.
With its strong emphasis on social learning, sociological institutionalism
emerges as an alternative approach to rationalist institutionalism by examining
the possible lack of domestic change in the ideas and interests of social and
political actors, even though they are 'empowered' as a result of the
'redistribution of power resources', wherein social learning is assumed to build
'an agency-centred mechanism to induce such transformations' (Cowles et al.,
2001: 12). As put forth by Bulmer and Radaelli (2004: 11), social learning can
be considered an important feature of Europeanisation since it accepts the EU
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as 'a platform for the convergence of ideas and policy transfer between
member states'.
Nevertheless, the literature reveals that the scope of the social learning
concept, in explaining policy change, is quite broad. Particularly in the research
on Europeanisation, the social learning concept is divided into two parts,
'simple institutional learning' which emphasises 'absorption' on the one hand,
and 'thick learning' which emphasises transformation on the other (Schmidt
and Radaelli, 2004: 189). As posited by Cowles et al. (2001: 12), 'thick
learning' is not common and it 'usually takes place after critical policy failures
or in perceived crises when actors reassesstheir set of preferences [ ...] or even
collective identities'.
Therefore, prompted by the literature on international socialisation
within a constructivist framework, and, at the same time, stemming from the
sociological institutionalist perspective, the social learning model epitomises a
model of behaviour, based on processes of social influence, imitation,
argumentation and identification (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al.,
1999, Checkel, 2001). It constitutes the main alternative to the external
incentives model in terms of assessing the impact and effectiveness of EU
conditionality on domestic change in target states. In that respect, the social
learning model brings in a different dimension in terms of explaining how
international institutions can influence state actors and make them comply
with their rules and norms, based on sociological principles.
As previously noted, in contrast to the external incentives model, the
social learning model recognises actors, not only as utility-maximisers based
on their cost-benefit calculations, but also as social actors who reach their
verdict based on their adaptable preferences, values and norms. This type of
interaction also follows the 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen, 1998;
Checkel, 1998). The main intention of this model is to carry out social
interactions in support of the appropriateness of norms, values and the
89
'content' of preferences of domestic actors. According to this behavioural
model, domestic actors are expected to achieve rule adoption and compliance,
provided that the norms and values demanded by the external actor are
appropriate (Checkel, 1999c: 548).
Therefore, based on the social learning model, it can be argued that
target states adopt rules and/or comply with the EU conditions, if they are
convinced (persuaded) by the external actor; and if they are confident about
the 'appropriateness' of the rules exerted by the external actor
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a: 18). Similar to the external
incentives model, this type of arrangement is supported by the rewards given
by the EU in return for rule adoption and compliance by the target state.
However, the rewards in this model can be categorised as non-materialist
incentives, which can potentially affect and change the preferences of target
states. Examples of such incentives include 'policy dialogues', 'knowledge',
'norm', 'learning', and/or 'persuasion' (Checkel, 2000: 4-5).
According to the social learning model, the main mechanism that is
utilised in the process of bargaining is based on the interaction of various
sociological factors, such as 'legitimacy', 'identity', and 'resonance'
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a: 18). It is argued that these factors
qualify to explain the variance of the EU's impact on domestic change in target
states, as they have a direct effect on the persuasive power of the EU.
Similarly, particularly for the initial transitional change, domestic factors, such
as institutional arrangements, public pressure, and presence of opposition
elites, have a definitive impact on the level of compliance. These factors are, in
turn, directly affected by various external influence mechanisms, such as
'resonance', 'persuasion', 'advice', 'inspiration', and 'motivation' for reform
process (Sadurski, 2004: 375-378). The general findings of empirical analysis
carried out with this model reveal that the main determinants of conditionality
strategy are 'legitimacy' and 'resonance' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier,
200Sb: 215).
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3.5. The Europeanisation of Candidate Countries
As previously noted, as a result of the dynamic nature of European
integration and enlargement processes, a new research agenda has emerged
wherein new research questions on the accession dynamics and the EU's
external influence mechanisms extended the scope of empirical studies. In
general, it is argued that there is a differential impact when the EU's role on
domestic change is compared with that of the member states on one hand,
and the candidate countries on the other. In fact, as Grabbe (2003: 303) puts
forward, 'the effects are likely to be similar in nature, but broader and deeper
in scope' for candidate countries.
So far, the Europeanisation of CEECs has attracted much of the
scholarly attention. A lot of this literature examines Europeanlsation from the
perspective of the accession countries and, to a large extent, problematises
their experiences with domestic change in the context of EU impact.
Nevertheless, the results of these empirical studies agree on the main
argument that Europeanisation effects have produced 'diverse' and 'ambivalent'
responses and outcomes (Hughes et al., 2002: 1; Haughton, 2007: 233).
These differential outcomes are generally linked to the 'structural dissimilarities'
amongst the CEECsand the ways in which EU-Ievel governance is managed, in
relation to individual candidate states. As previously noted, the EU has been,
and still remains, in an advantageous position in the Europeanisatlon processes
of candidate countries. In fact, between candidate countries and the EU, there
is 'an asymmetrical relationship which gives the European Union more coercive
routes of influence in domestic policy making processes' (Grabbe, 2003: 303).
As a result of this asymmetrical relationship, candidate countries in the
Europeanisation process cannot influence EU policy-making. Rather, their
actions (i.e., efforts to democratise, Europeanise, bring about domestiC change
and institutional transformation etc.) are mainly triggered by strong incentives
to implement EUpolicies, emerging from the prospective of EUmembership. In
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relation to that, as noted by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 661), this
powerful status of the EUhas provided itself with an 'unprecedented influence'
on the 'restructuring of domestic institutions' and the 'entire range of public
policies' in candidate countries.
The key concern in this particular research agenda is with the
exploration of different influence mechanisms employed by the EU in order to
transform the domestic structures of the candidate countries in the accession
process. For the purpose of exploring these different mechanisms (of domestic
change as a result of Europeanisation effects), attention is mainly given to the
'external governance' aspect of the EU enlargement process; where the
'external governance' is mainly concerned about 'what is exported' or 'how rule
transfer happens' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 662).
One of the main policy strategies of the EU In its enlargement process
towards candidate countries is conditionality. Although the principle of
'conditionality' is initially employed by international organisations, such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), the notion of
'democratic' or 'political' conditionality, as a mechanism/instrument to endorse
social and political reforms, has been extensively used by the EU in recent
years. For that purpose, the literature on Europeanisatlon has extensively
focused on conditionality strategy (also referred to as democratic
conditionality), in order to assess European integration dynamics and the EU's
impact on the democratisation processes of ex-communist states (Kubicek,
2003; Vachudova, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a; Pridham,
2005; Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007), where it is identified as the EU's
main strategy to cause domestic change in target states (Borzel, 1999; Cowles
et al., 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Radaelli, 2004).
In these studies, conditionality is accredited as the most effective
influence mechanism among the other strategies of EU democracy promotion
which the EU uses to induce target states to comply with certain rules and
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conditions. As Pridham (2002a: 956) notes, 'among notions of international
influences in democratisation, "conditionality" is the one most resonant of
deliberate efforts to determine the process's outcome through external
pressure'. By the same token, Checkel (2000: 1-2) points out that
conditionality is a strategy by which the compliance of national governments is
endorsed by international institutions, with the help of certain incentives; and
this implies a mutual agreement in which target governments are expected, if
not obliged, to take certain 'policy actions', whilst international institutions
provide necessary technical and financial assistance. It can be argued that, in
the case of the EU, conditionality strategy signifies the implementation of
'policy instruments' which triggers the compliance of the target states with the
EU's rules and conditions. As a result of this process, the EU aims to ensure
that target states are capable of taking responsibility for their membership and
that they do not cause any additional burden on the EU(Barnes and Randerson,
2006: 351-352).
It should be noted here that democratic conditionality became
particularly important with Spain's application for EUmembership. At that time,
the implications of the Franco regime became a huge concern for the EU,
whereas, in previous rounds of enlargement, being a 'liberal democracy' was
accepted as a sufficient condition for EUmembership (Pridham, 2002b: 205).
Nevertheless, it is after the declaration of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993 that
conditionality became a 'central and proactive' component of the EU
enlargement process, with its strong emphasis on the achievement of
'substantive democracy' (Pridham, 2008: 373). In a similar vein, Grabbe (1999:
7) notes that in the enlargement rounds concerning CEECs,higher standards
were set for the applicants, than those required from current member states.
The formulation and lncluslon of the Copenhagen criteria to the
'accession conditions' has initiated a new era for EUmembership accession. As
declared in the Copenhagen European Council Summit, 'accession will take
place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of
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membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required'
(European Council, 1993). By readjusting its accession conditions this way, the
EU has provided the applicant countries with a clear indication of the costs of
compliance during the accession process. Grabbe (2003: 307) perceives this
aspect of membership obligations as the commitment of candidate countries
'to converge with a maximalist version of the EU policies'. More specifically,
this convergence involves the acceptance and application of the Acquls
Communautaire - the collection of the EU legislation - to the domestic
legislative framework of candidate countries.
It should be noted that the Copenhagen criteria Implicitly dictates two
variants of conditionality: 'acquis conditionality' and 'democratic conditionality'
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 663). The 'acquis conditionality'
advances as a consequence of processes and debates over 'policy substance'
and 'agenda-setting', and at times, lacks clarity in legal terms, meaning that
some of its parts become open to interpretation (Grabbe, 1999: 6-7);
'democratic conditionality' gives the EU the power to intervene in many
'sensitive' policy areas of the candidate states (Prldham, 2002a; Grabbe, 2003).
It is argued that the vagueness and Irregularities concerning the
conditionality principle creates an analytical challenge when determining to
what extent Europeanisation in candidate countries has occurred as a result of
conditionality, and to what extent other 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' factors
have been influential during the accession process (Grabbe, 2003: 311).
Furthermore, as Hughes et al. (2002: 3) note, the absence of specific 'tools',
either to measure or to implement the accession criteria, also contributes to
this analytical challenge. When examined from the perspective of candidate
countries, it becomes clear that most of them criticise the EU for not being
offered equal benefits, and for being obliged to meet additional criteria and
normative standards, which were not demanded from the current member
states (Schimmelfennig et al., 2002: 11). Therefore, it can be concluded that
EU conditionality does not have a 'uniform logic'; instead, it varies and
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transforms depending on the 'content of the acquis', the specific 'policy area',
the 'country' concerned, and the 'political context' (Hughes et al., 2004b: 26).
3.6. Summary of the Theoretical Framework
The table below summarises the hypotheses and variables derived from
the external incentives model and the social learning model. The table
specifically allows EU-Ievel and domestic-level variables to be scrutinised, in
order to verify or falsify the hypotheses. Firstly, the external incentives model
is used as a test model to examine the effectiveness of EU conditionality on
institutional transformation and policy (re)formation processes. It mainly
assumes that conditionality will be most effective if credibility of EU accession
and the size of EU rewards are high (EU-Ievel factors) and domestic adoption
costs are low (domestic-level factor). Secondly, the social learning model is
used as an alternative to the external incentives model to examine the
effectiveness of EU conditionality. This model assumes that conditionality will
be most effective if the legitimacy of an EU policy (EU-Ievel factor), the
identification of target government with the EU and the domestic resonance
(domestic-level factors) are high. The factors associated with both theoretical
models are used to explain the diverging outcomes that EU conditionality
might have on different policy areas, in the context of Turkey.
Extensive forms of financial
and technical assistance
Absence or limited forms of
financial and technical
assrstance
Absence or failure of prompt
and proportionate delivery of
rewards
Ability to adopt rules,
absence of veto players
Inability to adopt rules,
presence of veto players
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High normative quality of the
EU rules and conditions;
presence of coherent
presentation and ownership
perception
Successful self-identification
with the EU; perception of the
EU as an aspirant group
High levels of conformity
between domestic rules and
EU conditions
Low normative quality of the
EU rules and conditions;
absence of coherent
presentation and ownership
perception
Unsuccessful self-identification
with the EUi absence of
perception of the EU as an
aspirant group
No or low levels of conformity
between domestic rules and EU
conditions
This chapter has introduced the theoretical framework of the thesis.
The folio ing chapter (Chapter 4) presents the research design and
methodology; and discusses in detail the case selection, hypotheses, along
ith dependent and independent variables.
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4. Research Design and Methodology
4.1. Introduction
As previously noted, most of the studies on Europeanisation mostly
examine the EU's external impact on domestic change from a 'top-down'
perspective; however, this study focuses on both the 'top-down' and 'bottom-
up' perspectives, by examining the domestic context and the interplay between
the external and internal actors together in the research puzzle. Inclusion of
the 'bottom-up' approach in this analysis allows the process-tracing of
domestic developments, with references to selected cases (Radaelli, 2004: 4;
Haverland, 2007: 62) in order to assess the dynamics of the EU's impact on
Turkey.
To begin with, this chapter discusses the case selection and research
design. Secondly, it re-introduces the main research questions and identifies
the chosen variables, which are based on the proposed theoretical models (see
Chapter 3). This is followed with an illustration of the hypotheses and
suggestions on where the research expected a change in the three different
periods (1999-2002, 2002-2004, 2005-2008), and possible applications in a
comparative framework. Finally, it explains the research methods and the data
used in this thesis.
4.2. Case Selection and Research Design
Case selection is an integral part of a good research strategy, and it
has an undeniable impact on the generalisation and reliability of the results of
any case study, with regard to the realisation of 'well-defined' research
objectives and outcomes. Therefore the main criteria used to select the cases
in this study are based on their relevance to the main research question and
the theoretical framework, for the purpose of improving the theoretical and
empirical understanding of the subject being researched (Yin, 2003: 34).
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Furthermore, case studies are vital for description(s) of complex events in
social sciences. Also, before explaining those events, it is unavoidable to
provide descriptions of the cases. In view of that, one of the advantages of the
in-depth case study method is stated as the 'development of good causal
hypotheses', which is seen as a supplement to good description (King et al.,
1994: 44-45).
The methodology of this thesis draws on qualitative methods developed
in comparative polities (Gerring, 2001) and its research design has a focus on
small-N research. This thesis also embodies a qualitative case study research,
and its focus is narrowed to four policy areas which, in turn, allow the
researcher to carry out a comparative analysis across units and in different
time periods. The case study method is adopted in this research because it is
found to be the most appropriate approach for the particular research puzzle
that this thesis is aiming to solve. Since this thesis seeks to assess the
empirical validity of the hypotheses deducted from the literature on
Europeanisation, the case study method is applied as one way of testing theory
(Van Evera, 1997: 49-88).
To begin with, Turkey is chosen as the case study for this project. As
previously mentioned, the main aim of this study is to explore the institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey, under the Influence of the
EU and its conditionality strategy. Schimmelfennig et al. (2003: 501) argues
that selecting 'hard cases' are more useful to understand the conditions of the
effectiveness of conditionality with regard to Europeanisation, wherein high
levels of conflicts provide better opportunity to observe the scope of the impact
of the EU, and conditionality strategy. In that respect, selection of Turkey as a
case study is seen as constructive in terms of examining the effectiveness and
limitations of conditionality as Turkey illustrates a 'hard case' where the
complex internal dynamics limit the impact of the EU. By employing a case
study method, the main aim is to carry out an in-depth empirical investigation,
in order to evaluate theories conducted in the field of Europeanisation, as well
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as to formulate hypotheses associated to Europeanisation with respect to the
causal mechanisms offered by the theories under consideration.
In order to make a causal inference linking the research question and
the hypotheses, this thesis conducts cross-sectoral and cross-temporal analysis
(King et al., 1994: 75-115; George and Bennett, 2005: 166). The units of
analysis are increased by comparing democratisation in Turkey based on four
policy areas and across three different periods. The perlodlsation of the cross-
temporal analysis is completed by examining key events in Turkey-EU relations
in order to determine the beginning and end of each period. The selected
timeframe for the analysis is the period from 1999 to 2008, which is divided
into three phases: 1999-2002, 2002-2004, 2005-2008. This timeframe is
chosen because it covers the period in which the EUhas been actively involved
In the Turkish democratisation process as part of Its conditionality strategy.
The first phase covers the period between 1999 and 2002, and begins
with the Helsinki Summit, where the Helsinki Council admitted Turkey to the
position of candidate country. The beginning of the second phase (2002-2004)
is marked by the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as the
single-party government in November 2002, which is considered as the
beginning of a new era in Turkish domestic politics. The third phase (2005-
2008) is marked by the decision of Brussels European Council in December
2004 to open accession negotiations for Turkey's EUmembership on 3 October
2005, and covers the period in which accession negotiations were ongoing.
Based on these three periods, this thesis examines the independent variables
(EU level and domestic factors) to identify the causal relationship between EU
conditionality and domestic change in Turkey.
2008 is found to be a logical end-point for the empirical analysis
because the accession negotiations of Turkey came to a sudden halt, and no
significant progress in relation to Turkish democratisation under the influence
of the EU has been achieved since then. The selected timeframe allows for the
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evaluation of the institutional transformation and policy (re)formation of the
four areas when EU conditionality had been actively present and influential on
domestic change in Turkey. Although ten years can be considered a relatively
short timeframe, it has been a particularly important period during which
major domestic changes occurred. It Is realistic and possible to trace processes
of domestic change in the selected timeframe considering the rapid
development of political reforms that took place under the influence of EU
conditionality.
Furthermore, the cross-sectoral analysis is employed by choosing four
policy areas for the empirical investigation: minority rights, freedom of
expression, the judiciary and the military. There are two main reasons for the
selection of these areas. Firstly, modern conceptualisations of democracy
indicate that democratic systems require effective civilian control over the
military; promotion of political freedoms, such as freedom of expression; the
protection of minority rights; and efficient judicial systems (Mayo, 1960;
Przeworski, 1995; Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 1999). Whilst these areas form some
of the key components of liberal democracies, they also constitute the policy
areas which are incorporated by the EU into the Copenhagen political criteria
implying the EU's formal membership accession condition; yet, at the same
time, they constitute the main areas which have presented challenges for
Turkey in the process of EUaccession.
In order to explore the reasons of variation in these policy areas, while
the causal impact of one explanatory factor on domestic change is analysed,
the other factors (both EU-Ievel and domestic level) are kept constant; the
correlation between independent variables is also considered in order to
eliminate the indeterminacy problem (King et al., 1994: 118). Ragin (1987:
116-118) identifies one of the main methodological tasks in qualitative
comparative analysis as the preliminary coding of all the variables in the
empirical analysis. In that respect, the analysis follows the 'concomitant
variation measures' (George and Bennett, 2005: 153) scaling the variation of
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Turkey's compliance with EU rules and conditions as 'high' and 'low', instead of
'present' or 'absent', due to the difficulty in exact specification of compliance.
As a result, in order to simplify the measurement of the independent variables
that are based on the competing theoretical models, a dichotomous coding is
used by giving a 'high' value to show that the characteristiC of the Independent
variable in question enables or advances compliance, and a 'low' value to
indicate that compliance is stalled or halted.
In contrast to previous studies on the EU's impact on domestic change
in Turkey, this thesis claims that social learning models are crucial for a
complete understanding of the Impact of EU conditionality in the case of
Turkey. The thesis ultimately contends that social learning may have been
Important in other cases where the effects of EUconditionality were examined
and this existing literature has missed a key piece of the puzzle in the study of
the effects of EUconditionality.
In relation to that, process-tracing is one of the key methodological
components in this project. The process-tracing method has been selected in
order to uncover the causal paths behind the domestic change in Turkey, in
relation to its democratisation process, and in order to understand the reasons
behind this development (or its lack Of). As King et al. (1994: 227) explain, the
method of process-tracing involves 'searching for evidence - evidence
consistent with the overall causal theory - about the decisional process by
which the outcome was produced'. In a similar vein, George and Bennett (2005:
153) state that process-tracing can be used to find out any 'causal chain
coupling independent variables with dependent variables and evidence of the
causal mechanisms posited by a theory'.
In that respect, process-tracing is used as a research procedure to look
at the processes by which initial conditions are transformed into particular
outcome(s). In this case, the outcome is the democratisation of Turkey, under
the influence of the EU. By employing this research method, it becomes
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possible to carry out within-case analysis by contemplating different policy
areas within Turkey, where several features of each polley are examined In
order to identify and assess the linkage between the respective causal factors
and final outcomes. In more detail, the process-tracing procedure is found to
be useful, firstly, to operationalise and measure the Independent and
dependent variables; and secondly, to explore the linkage between the
variables, with an emphasis on causality along with the causal mechanisms
connecting the Independent and dependent variables (Venesson, 2008: 227-
232).
4.3. Research Question
Previous research on Europeanisation and the EU's external Impact on
domestic change examined questions on the 'EU's role in democracy promotion'
and 'EU influence mechanisms'. The research interest in this study relates to
the main determinants of domestic change in target states, particularly on the
decisiveness of different EU-Ievel and domestic-level factors, In the course of
domestic change. This research argues that, in addition to EU-Ievel factors,
which can be considered as the main 'triggers' of domestic change, domestlc-
level factors are more decisive In terms of compliance with the EU
conditionality .
Furthermore, as previously noted In the Introductory chapter, the main
research question (Q) of this study can be listed as:
(Q): How does Europeanisation impact upon institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey? How does it
affect the political actors, institutions and cultural norms and
values embedded in Turkish political system?
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4.4. Operational/sation and Measurement of
Variables
As discussed in Chapter 3, the causal theories of this thesis are
rationalist institutionalism and sociological Institutionalism, and the theoretical
models applied are the external incentives and social learning models. As
previously noted, hypotheses derived from these two theoretical models need
not be mutually exclusive, as they can explain different aspects of external
impact and domestic change. In this section, a conceptualisation of the
variables and the hypotheses, which will be explored In the thesis, are
discussed. It is then followed by the classification of models of interaction of
variables and data collection methods.
4.4.1. Conceptualisation of Variables and Hypotheses
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable (D.V.) of this thesis Is the democratisation
process of Turkey. In order to explore the democratisation process, four policy
areas are chosen: minority rights, freedom of expression, the judiciary and the
military. In order to explore the variation on these policy areas, domestic
change Is divided into three groups. Firstly, rule adoption (hence, compliance
with EU rules and conditions), and alignment with the EU provisions and
international conventions are chosen as the first category. More specifically,
this category involves the ratification of the international conventions by the
Turkish Grand National Assembly, harmonisation of domestic laws and
regulations and National Adaptation Programmes with the EUacquis, as part of
Turkey's compliance with the legal structures of the EU.
The second category involves the transformation of institutions and
capacity development, in relation to policy (re)formation. In this category,
Turkey's compliance with the EU rules and norms is measured at the
administrative and institutional level by exploring the policy revisions in
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relevant public institutions. These revisions cover a wide range of parameters,
such as technical capacity development, adoption of coordination mechanisms,
in order to distinguish compatibility, and alignment at the institutional level.
Finally, the third category evaluates the overall cooperation between
the domestic level and the EU-Ievel Institutions. The cooperation between
these institutions is investigated In order to assess the level of compliance with
the EU requirements, and to identify the levels of EU-norm diffusion and
willingness of domestic institutions. The main Indicators in this category can be
identified as cooperative actions, such as twinning and PHAREprogrammes,
and additional institutional links and agreements with the EU Institutions.
This study assumes that the D.V. is shaped during the accession
negotiation process in two distinctive ways, with the strong impact of the EU
rules and conditions for membership (downward pressure/emphasis on
external actor) on the one hand; and on the other, Turkey's willingness and its
own efforts in complying with EU conditionality (upward pressure/emphasis on
domestic actor). In addition, this study aims to verify which one of these ways
has become more decisive or carries the explanatory value for domestic
change in Turkey during the process of Europeanisatlon in the selected policy
areas. As will be discussed In the following section, the model applied Is tested
based on four different configurations inspired by Schwellnus (2005),
demonstrating the 'supply side' of the EUand the 'demand side' of Turkey.
Independent Variables
Along the lines of the external and internal dimensions of the
Europeanisation process, the independent variables (I.Vs) are selected based
on the division between EU-Ievel factors and domestic factors. Table 4.1 shows
the sub-division of the independent variables (I.Vs) into domestic and EU-Ievel
factors. Whilst the EU-Ievel factors represent the EU's stance and strategies on
rule adoption and compliance, as well as its strategy to trigger domestic
change in candidate countries; the domestic factors epitomise the desires of
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target governments in the target countries, as well as epitomising the
conditions that facilitate or limit the impact of the EU.
Built on the previous literature and analysis on the transformative
power of the EU, particularly in the CEECs, the variables included in the
qualitative analysis are: size and credibility of rewards, size of adoption costs,
legitimacy, identity and resonance. Such analysis is similar to that carried out
by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (200Sa), where they focused on l.Vs which
were covered by the external incentives model (the size of rewards and the
size of adoption costs) as the main determinants of domestic change.
Furthermore, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier did not expect any significant
relationship with the main social learning models (identity and resonance), and
thus a specific case study demonstrating the explanatory value of these I.Vs
was found inconclusive in their case study. However, this study, as an
alternative to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier's previous work, integrates
social learning variables to test the validity of the previous theoretical
assumptions (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a).
Table 4.1 Sub-division of independent variables
External incentives model Social learning model
EU-Ievel size and credibility of rewards legitimacy
Domestic
level
size of adoption costs resonance and identity
(Table adapted from: Schimmelfennig et al., 2002; Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier, 2005a; Sedelmeier, 2006).
The variable, size of rewards, is one of the factors hypothetically
causing variation under the EU's strategy of 'reinforcement by reward'. The
basic inference of size of rewards is that they are offered if the target state
complies with the EU rules. The size of these rewards can be measured based
on materialistic or non-materialistic compositions; and they can take forms of
financial and technical assistance, access to the EU single market, or an access
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to expertise on structural/institutional adjustments. Yet, EUmembership is the
ultimate reward, as it represents the highest institutional ties that the EU can
offer as a reward; therefore membership is the most influential 'political
instrument' which can be used in order to enforce rule compliant behaviour In
the target states (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003: 496-497).
Credibility of rewards Is another factor impinging on the level of
compliance. Credibility can be assessed in different ways. At the outset,
rewards can be considered credible if they are given in proportion to the
progress achieved by target states in terms of rule compliance. Secondly, the
credibility of rewards increases if they are delivered promptly after the
adoption of a certain rule takes place (Schimmelfennig et al., 2002: 11).
The size of adoption costs Is an important domestic factor, referring to
the power costs of target states, due to their stance on complying with EU
rules and conditions in a given policy area, where the political decisions on
adoption of new rules may increase or decrease the costs of actual rule
adoption (Schimmelfennig, 2005c: 4-5). For instance, as Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier (2005a: 16) posit, there are two kinds of sources for adoption
costs. The first source can be identified as 'opportunity costs' for governments,
when they are deprived of alternative rewards by solely focusing on the
rewards offered by the EU, which are offered in return for rule adoption. The
second source can be identified as the 'welfare or power costs' for political
actors, where the costs are determined based on the presence or absence of
veto players in the political sphere. In that respect, the size of adoption costs
may predominantly shape the final decision of target states whether to accept
or reject EUrules and conditions; in fact, if the size of adoption costs increases,
this may result in an obstruction of the effectiveness of credible rewards and
incentives offered by the EU(Schimmelfennig, 2008: 921).
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Legitimacy corresponds to the normative quality of the EU rules and
conditions in a given policy area. In the process of Institutional transformation
and policy (re)formation, if an EU policy lacks legitimacy, then It may be
openly rejected at the domestic level. In that respect, the perceived legitimacy
of the EU's norms and rules at the domestic level becomes one of the decisive
factors for the convergence of national policies.
As Franck (1990: 38) states legitimacy can be measured by looking at
'the clarity with which the rules communicate; the Integrity of the process by
which they were made and are applied, their venerable pedigree and
conceptual coherence. In short, It is the legitimacy of the rules which conduces
to their being respected'. In that respect, legitimacy factor necessitates the
participation of relevant stakeholders such as polley-makers and national
ministry representatives in the process of EU rule adoption (Musselln, 2009). It
can be argued that only with their participation In the process of EU rule
adoption a high level of legitimacy can be obtained contributing to the
institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon in target states.
Within this context, the legitimacy of EU rules and policies depends on
how determinate the rules are at the EU level. Therefore, legitimacy reflects on
how the EU rules are defined (clearly or ambiguously), used (consistently or
inconsistently), and whether they have a legal ground and are accepted and
applied by all the EUmember-states. In that respect, high level of legitimacy is
expected if the community rules and policies are extensively tied to the legal
foundations of the EU itself (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 200Sa: 18-19).
In other words, the rules are considered to be legitimate if the related
norms and conditions are coherently presented by the EU, creating an
'ownership' perception among the EU member states. In that respect, rules
become legitimate if they are clearly defined and consensually shared by the
EUmember states, enhancing the compliance of target states (Schimmelfennig,
2006: 50).
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The Identity factor refers to the self-identification of a target state with
the consensually-shared collective identity of the EU. For the identity factor to
be effective, it is necessary for target states to perceive the EU as the main
'aspiration group' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 200Sa: 18-20).
Resonance is another factor impacting upon the level of rule
compliance. It refers to the compatibility of EU rules with older domestic rules,
norms and political traditions in target states (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig,
2010: 422). In other words, resonance refers to the extent to which there is a
'cultural match' or 'social salience' between EU demands and the domestic
rules and political discourse (Sedelmeier, 2011: 16). Within this context,
resonance factor shows variances in terms of generating institutional
transformation or policy (re)formation based on the degree of 'openness' at the
domestic level to accept or adopt new and external rules induced by the EU.
Therefore, it can be argued that a high level of 'openness' to adopt new
pollcles allows the EUpolicies to resonate effectively at the domestic level.
In relation to resonance, it is assumed that rule adoption (as well as
adaptation to these rules) becomes more likely if there is a high level or 'fit'
between EU rules and national policy norms; and if the externally imposed
rules can find 'domestic salience' in target states (Linden, 2002;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 200Sa; Lopez-Santana, 2006; Hopbach, 2012;
Tsakatika, 2012).
On the other hand, 'stronger' resonance with existing domestic rules
depends on certain factors. For instance, if the new rules exerted by external
actors on a specific policy area are too different from the rules the target state
employs, it can be assumed that it becomes difficult for domestic actors to
socialise in adopting those new rules. In fact, resonance is likely to be missing
if 'deep-rooted' policy ideas at the domestic level and new rules embedded in
the EU's policies hold opposing views on certain political matters (Tsakatika,
2012: 673).
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Furthermore, Trenz (2008: 276-277) argues that EU policies are likely
to find resonance if target states show sufficient competency to allocate
knowledge and organisational capacity for domestic transformation. In that
respect, for the formation of resonance at the domestic level, it is important to
have a scope of political communication, mediation, and public perception.
Only with a wide scope of the above mentioned features resonance can be
formed at the domestic level. Within this context, certain legacies In political
regime of a target state are likely to influence the extent to which externally
imposed rules and norms are accepted and become effective In shaping
transformation at the domestic level.
Furthermore, it can be argued that resonance between European rules
and existing rules in a domestic system is likely to be higher If the rules in
question are also the priorities of the domestic actors indicating the 'fit'
between the European initiatives and national norms and cultural traditions
(Vukasovic, 2013: 9). In a context where resonance takes place, the EU can
presumably reinforce 'existing policy paths' whilst national policies can be
harmonised with that of the EU(Tsakatika, 2012: 689). Only in the presence of
these factors resonance can be regarded as an Important mechanism for the
linkage between domestic policies and EU policies based on diffusion and
exchange of ideational interests (Trenz, 2008: 279).
Based on the above discussion, the following are the hypotheses to be
tested in the empirical chapters:
(HJ): Turkey's compliance with EU conditionality increases if the EU
offers substantial size of rewards
(Hz): Turkey's compliance with EU conditionality increases if the EU
delivers the rewards soon after Turkey's rule compliant behaviour (i.e.
rule adoption in a specific policy area)
(H3): Turkey's compliance with EU conditionality increases if Turkey
faces low levels of adoption costs in the process of rule adoption
(H4): Turkey's compliance with EUconditionality increases if the EUrules
are legitimate, i.e. coherently presented and ownership perception is
generated
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(HsJ: Turkey's compliance with EU conditionality increases if Turkey
identifies itself with the EU; and shares EU's norms and values (in a
specific policy area)
(HfjJ: Turkey's compliance with EU conditionality increases if there is a
high level of institutional association and conformity between existing
rules and newly introduced EUconditions.
The main body of this research focuses on 'hypothesis testing' (the
impact of the Independent variables on Turkish democratisation), In a primarily
deductive approach. In the closing section of this study, emphasis is placed on
'hypothesis generating', by using an Inductive approach. Therefore, the
research Intends to utilise 'retroductlon', with the Interaction of evidence
(Ragin, 1994: 47).
4.4.2. Models for Interaction of Variables
As mentioned previously, the goal of this thesis is to analyse the
institutional transformation and policy (re)formation of Turkey, by focusing on
four pollcv areas: minority rights, freedom of expression, the judiciary and the
military; and to test the explanatory values of the EU-Ievel and domestic-level
factors, based on the two theoretical models, to understand to what extent and
under what conditions the EUhas contributed to domestic change In Turkey. In
order to carry out the analysis, partially inspired by Schwellnus's (2005)
configurations, a minimal model for the Interactions of variables Is formulated.
As shown in Table 4.2 the model of Interaction demonstrates a two-
dimensional reflection on the process outcome, in relation to the dynamics
between domestic conditions and EU conditionality. The first dimension
demonstrates the 'supply side' of EU conditionality and Its effectiveness with
respect to the 'strength' of EU rules. The second dimension demonstrates the
domestic conditions based on a cost-benefit analysis. On the basis of this two-
dimensional reflection, several configurations on the process outcome can be
derived.
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T bl 4 2 Reflections on the process outcome; the relationship
a e . between domestic conditions and EU conditionality
WeakEU
conditionality
Iffectlven .. of condltlon.llty
DomeRIc
condltlou
baNd on
cost-
benefit
analy".
Favourable
domestic
conditions
(benefits> costs)
Affirmatlve/poslttve/
genuine
Europeanisation
Social learning-
driven/self-
Europeanisatlon
Unfavourable
domestic
conditions
(costs> benefits)
Fractional!
cond itional ity-d riven
Europeanisation
Negated/negative/
simulated
Europeanisation
1. Favourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality: This is
the best composition, since target states retain favourable conditions
for rule adoption and receive necessary external incentives boosting
their compliance to the highest level. Therefore, the result of this
configuration is the highest degree of rule adoption and domestic
change. Since it takes the essential domestic and EU-Ievel factors into
account as explanatory variables, both the external Incentives and
social learning models fit well Into this model. This type of domestic
change can therefore be described as affirmative/positive/genuine
Europeanisation.
2. Favourable domestic conditions and weak conditionality: This
model presupposes that domestic change can still take place, due to
favourable domestic conditions, even in the absence of strong
conditionality. The outcome on domestic change may not be as
significant as the previous model; nevertheless, it may represent what
can be called as sociallearning-driven/self-Europeanisation.
3. Unfavourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality: This
model provides a single-sided and therefore imbalanced domestic
change. It presupposes that partial compliance can still take place, due
to strong external incentives offered by the EU; however, the lack of
necessary favourable domestic conditions diminishes the pace of
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transformations, thus it also diminishes the compliance of target states.
This is mostly evident in the cases where target states show rule
compliant behaviour based on their cost-benefit analysis, which results
in partial or fractional compliance with EU rules. This type of domestic
change can be described as fractional/conditionality-driven
Europeanisation.
4. Unfavourable domestic conditions and weak conditionality: This
model represents a situation where both favourable domestic
conditions and strong conditionality is absent, which cannot therefore
result in actual domestic change, or compliance with EU rules. Thus In
this case, the most probable outcome would be the abandonment of
any initiatives on domestic change/transformation and absolute refusal
of compliance with the EU rules. This configuration can be expressed as
negated/negative/simulated Europeanisation.
4.5. Data Collection
Firstly, the research in this study relies heavily on documentary sources.
Particularly for the theoretical discussion, academic literature on new
institutionalisms, with reference to rationalist institutionalism (predominantly
on the external incentives model) and sociological institutionalism
(predominantly on the social learning model), are extensively used to draw
attention to the current debates in specialist studies. Furthermore, academic
literature has also been useful to provide the conceptual basis and empirical
evidence, and in addition for the formulation of arguments and hypotheses.
Nevertheless, the core of the empirical research includes the analysis of
primary sources. The EU-Ievel primary sources include: the European
Commission's Progress Reports, EU Directives, ConcluSions made by the
European Council Presidency, Accession Partnership Documents and the
European Commission's Strategy Papers on Enlargement. At this point, it
needs to be noted that the empirical analysis to a great extent relies on the
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aforementioned EU-Ievel primary sources. One of the main reasons for relying
on these EU documents is that these are the major documents that provide
accurate information on Turkey's democratisation efforts and weaknesses in
Turkish democracy.
On the other hand, the domestic-level primary sources, in relation to
the four policy areas chosen for this study, Include parliamentary hearings and
parliamentary committee reports, further enquiries on parliamentary
proceedings, official communications of the government, National Adaptation
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), political party and
government programmes, Law proposals and draft Law, judicial proceedings
and hearings, national legislations and regulations, the Turkish Constitution,
further directives, annual reports, publications and reports of think-tanks and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and newspapers.
Secondly, additional data has been collected by interviewing political
elites in Turkey. If carried out effectively, the elite interviewing technique can
make a significant contribution to the understanding of the research question
at hand in particular and, to the understanding of political phenomena in
general. Elite interviewing is often described as the 'most effective' way to
gather information about 'decision makers and decision-making processes'
(Burnham et al., 2008: 231). In most cases, 'elite interviewing can be used
whenever it is appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert about the topic
at hand' (Leech, 2002: 663).
In that respect, a limited number of interviews with elites were
conducted at a later stage of this research. The targeted 'elite' group for this
thesis includes political officers from the Delegation of the European Union to
Turkey, ministry-level officials from the Directorate General for Europe in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an eminent Member of the Foreign Affairs
Committee in the Grand National Assembly, Members of Parliament (from the
CHP, MHP, and AKP), and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as
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researchers and experts from a number of NGOs, Including the Turkish
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), Turkish Industry and
Business Association (TOSiAD), and Turktrade. The anonymlsed list of
interviewees can be found in the Appendix of the thesis.
For the interviews, the 'semi-structured' style was chosen as this style
keeps the focus of the topics constant, provides a partial structure to the
interview, where a written guide can be provided prior to the interview, but at
the same time it also provides the necessary flexibility for both the Interviewer
and the interviewee, where they can improvise on the discussion of the topics.
Furthermore, this allows the interviewee to describe, explain and elaborate on
their personal experiences freely and in their own words (Bryman, 2008: 438).
Having a written guide, which Includes a list of topics and questions prior to
the interview, is a particularly useful method for steering the conversation onto
topics that the interviewer wishes to find out more about (Bryman, 2008: 442-
443).
During the interviews, extensive notes were made by the author on key
points. In most cases, participants did not object to the digital recording of the
interview. Nevertheless, a few participants requested that their names were
not mentioned, and some information was given 'off the record'. These specific
requests were granted by the researcher. Hence, in order to avoid inconsistent
conventions for referencing, and to ensure consistencv, all Interviewees will
remain anonymous in this thesls, The interviewees have been very Informative
and helpful for exploring and refining certain areas of inquiry, not only In terms
of supporting the accuracy of the information gathered previously, but also for
the validity of theoretical assumptions; however, the data gathered from these
interviews were limited in terms of offering further insightful revelations to
explore in relation to the main research question.
This chapter has presented the research design and methodology of
this thesis. Having the theoretical framework and respective hypotheses and
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variables identified, in Section II of the thesis, in Chapters 5-8 in particular,
empirical analysis is conducted. The sequence of the empirical chapters is as
follows: minority rights, freedom of expression, the military, and the judiciary.
In each empirical chapter, the institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation of Turkey, and the effectiveness of EUconditionality, are traced
and analysed across three periods of time; these periods are 1999-2002,
2002-2004, 2005-2008.
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SECTION II: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Section 1 provided a contextual and theoretical foundation of
Europeanisation upon which further empirical analysis on specific cases
regarding EU conditionality and domestic change can be conducted.
Furthermore, by linking the international dimension of democracy promotion
and the role of the EUas a democracy promoter to domestic change In Turkey,
Section 1 provided an account of the importance of multi-dimensional aspect of
democratisation and the role of the EUas an international organisation in the
spread of democratic norms and standards In target countries.
Section 2 presents the empirical analysis of the thesis. It investigates
the impact of EU conditionality on the Institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation of minority rights (Chapter 5), freedom of expression (Chapter
6), the military (Chapter 7), the judiciary (Chapter 8), and provides a
comparative discussion on the empirical findings and policy implications
(Chapter 9) , and brings the thesis to a close by providing an overview of the
research, the limitations and the future potential areas of research (Chapter
10).
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5. The Reforms to Minority Rights in Turkey
5.1. Introduction
For almost 90 years, since the end of the First World War, International
protection of minority rights has been promoted by International treaties,
requiring the guarantee for the protection of minorities around Europe and the
Middle East. The general principles of minority rights protection measures were
developed by major international organisations, such as the United Nations
(UN), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)and the
Council of Europe (CaE); and these measures became an Important Integral
aspect of the European Union's legal framework. As indicated in the Minority
Groups International report on Turkey, these measures have been widely
developed within the framework of protection of human rights and aimed to
pledge 'full equality' of 'vulnerable ethnic, linguistic and religious' groups
(Minority Groups International, 2007: 8). However, it can be argued that in
contrast to its human rights regime, the EU's regime on minority rights has
been relativeiy less institutionalised and it has been subject to various
objections among a number of EUmember states (Keating, 2004: 378). In fact,
as will be discussed later, the principle of the protection of minority rights has
not been incorporated into the Acquis Communautaire, the main legislation of
the EU,which hinders the EU'scredibility In this area.
The most widely known instrument on minority rights in Europe Is the
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM),
adopted by the Council of Europe in 1995. For the members of the CaE, and
the Signatories to the present framework Convention, the FCNMis the 'first
binding treaty on minorities' and enforces obligations on the protection of
minority rights and promotion of minority cultures. However, in addition to the
FCNM, the CaE has employed other instruments in order to Instigate
effectiveness in minority rights policy, and increase its credibility in Europe. For
example, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
117
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) of 1950 unquestionably reinforces the FCNM,
by providing and strengthening the legal basis for the EU's human rights and
minority rights regime.
In effect, the ECHRaims to protect the universal recognition of human
rights and to achieve 'greater unity' between member states in the
understanding of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It can be argued
that these proposals not only constituted the primary texts In Europe for the
fundamental rights of basic human life, but also reaffirmed the superiority of
fundamental rights as the Indicators of 'justice and peace' around Europe
(Council of Europe, 1950). Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) was set up in 1959 as the main body of the jurisdiction on human
rights and minority rights Issues, Including violations of the civil and political
rights specified by the ECHR.As indicated, the ECtHR'scase-law 'makes the
Convention a powerful living instrument for meeting new challenges and
consolidating the rule of law and democracy In Europe' (Council of Europe,
EuropeanCourt of Human Rights, 1959).
Furthermore, the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) introduced the principle of
anti-discrimination (see Art. 13); and this article became a fundamental
principle of the European Union with regards to gender equality and the
abolition of the discrimination derived from differences in nationalities amongst
the member states (Betten and Grief, 1998: 56-59). Following this clause, In
2000, the European Council adopted an Employment and Race Directive
prohibiting any discrimination based on religion, belief, gender, racial or ethnic
origin in the areas of employment, education, health care, and social security
(European Council, 2000). In addition, the PreSidents of the European
Parliament, the Council and the Commission at the European Council meeting
in Nice, on 7 December 2000, signed the European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights, setting out 'in a single text, for the first time in the
European Union's history, the whole range of civil, political, economic and
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social rights of European citizens and all persons resident In the EU' (European
Union, 2000).
The Charter focuses on the fundamental rights and freedoms previously
proclaimed by the ECHRand other international conventions to which the EU
member states are signatories; and In relation to minority rights, it strictly
forbids any form of discrimination on the basis of 'membership of a national
minority' (European Union, 2000). However, It needs to be noted that the
Charter had not been legally binding until the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon
at the end of 2009. In fact, the issue of the Charter's former legal status was
previously discussed at the EuropeanCouncil meeting in Cologne, In June 1999
(European Council, 1999), but the Issue remained unresolved until 2009.
Overall, the absence of a common policy on minority issues significantly
hinders the legitimacy of the EU in this particular area.
On the other hand, it can be argued that parallel to Its Internal
measures on minority rights, the EU, mainly through its enlargement policy
and conditionality strategy, has had a significant Impact on the Institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation of candidate countries, particularly in
the area of minority rights. In this context, In partnership with the
aforementioned international organisations, the EU has also developed a
number of policy instruments and constructed a 'multi-dimensional approach'
to Europeanise national minority rights regimes In candidate countries. First of
all, 'respect for and protection of minorities' was accepted as a 'moral condition'
for EU membership; this moral condition was then formalised In the
Copenhagen criteria in 1993, ensuring the existing minority rights standards in
the EU. It can be argued that the formalisation of the Copenhagen criteria
significantly contributed to the legal alignment and institutional capacity
development in candidate countries.
These initiatives reflect convincingly upon the EU's commitment to
minority rights protection. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the non-
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inclusion of the EU's minority rights clauses in the Acquls Communautaire
raises concerns over the legitimacy of the EU in this particular area. In fact,
the EUdemands 'higher' standards from candidate countries, while the current
EU member states remain unwilling to adopt a common policy and meet the
same standards, with regards to their own minority groups (De Witte, 2000;
Toggenburg, 2000; Johns, 2003: 684).13 As Vermeersch (2003: 9) argues,
there is a 'lack of common EUpolicy' on minority rights, therefore the diversity
of minority policies in EU member states cause high levels of ambiguity; and
this also means that the EU's rules and conditions, along with its demands
from the candidate countries, are vague and open to Interpretation.
This outcome not only weakens the EU's legitimacy, but It also creates
certain setbacks in the transformation of institutions and polley (re)formation
processes in candidate countries. First of all, the vague definition of the
principle of minority protection at the EU level predudes the adoption of a
'dear and common' standard for all the candidate countries. This leaves room
for all the member states and candidate countries to apply their own definition
of minority to their policies. This vagueness also results in the Implementation
of diverging legislations affecting the social and cultural rights of the minority
groups at the national level. Nevertheless, Turkey's alignment with the EU's
standards on minority rights is recognised as one of the objectives of the EU,
in the context of Turkey's accession process, but it is also Important for
Turkey's own democratisation efforts.
In relation to the issues raised above, this chapter analyses the Impact
of EU conditionality on minority rights in Turkey during three periods (1999-
2002, 2002-2004, and 2005-2008). As previously noted, the minority rights
regime, or individual clauses on the protection of minority rights, is not part of
13 This is a fair criticism since the countries of Western Europe also experience problems on
minority issues at the national level. For instance, Germany does not recognise its Turkish
population as a national minority, and declares that they are 'new' to the country and are
mainly 'guest workers'. France, for instance, has not signed the Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities and continues to pursue Republican principles of unity.
Discrimination of Roma (especially in education and employment) in Slovakia and Italy also
reflects on the diverging stances on minority rights among the current EU member states
(Johns, 2003: 689-695; Tokta~ and Aras, 2009: 706).
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the Acquis Communautaire, and hence it does not provide the basis for legal
transposition. Even so, since the decision on the CopenhagenCriteria in 1993,
candidate countries are obliged to comply with the formal requirement of
'respect for and protection of minorities' (European Council, 2002); compliance
with this Criteria determines the EU's decisions as to when, and whether, a
candidate country should become a member, or what legal or technical actions
need to be taken before granting a candidate country membership. In light of
this context, this chapter examines Turkey's alignment with the EU minority
rights regime, as an indication of rule adoption on substantive matters and
hence as a formal aspect of Europeanlsation. This chapter therefore mainly
focuses on Turkey's efforts in Incorporating the legal and institutional
requirements, as well as international cooperation, to uncover the EU's impact
on domestic change in Turkey.
The systematic analysis in each empirical chapter (Chapters 5-8)
concentrates on the EU-Ievel and domestic level factors put forward by the
external incentives and social learning models. These factors are Identified as:
the size of domestic adoption costs, the credibility of conditionality, the size of
rewards, legitimacy, identity and resonance. Since minority rights policy covers
a broad field this chapter mainly concentrates on the social and cultural rights
of the Kurdish ethnic minority in Turkey, and examines policy changes in
relation to the social and cultural rights of Kurds. The motive for the focus on
the Kurdish ethnic minority group will be explained in the following section of
this chapter.
This chapter draws three main conclusions. Firstly, this chapter
illustrates that Turkey has been adjusting itself to the EU's minority rights
regime rather cautiously, due to the problematic of defining minorities. This is
reflected in the negative normative resonance of the domestic pollcles, which
remained constant across the three periods. Similarly, the EU's legitimacy in
the area of minority rights remained low across the three periods, due to the
fact that minority rights clauses were not included in the Acquis
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Communautaire. This provides evidence which confirms the EU's vague
definition of minorities and clauses on minority rights, as well as the absence
of a common policy in this area.
Secondly, there Is a variation in minority policy In Turkey across three
periods which can be explained by combination of a number of EU-Ievel and
domestic level factors. However, since legitimacy and normative resonance
with domestic rules do not show any clear explanatory value for domestic
change across the three periods, they fail to explain the diverging outcomes
across these three periods. Nevertheless, the analysis finds that, regardless of
normative resonance and lack of EU legitimacy, Turkey stili managed to put
significant, but rather limited, efforts Into aligning Its rules and practices with
those of the EU; this can be explained through conditionality-based and
socialisation-based factors.
Thirdly, this chapter finds that neither the external Incentives model,
nor the social learning model, can fully explain the policy processes and
outcomes. The analysis reveals that the size of rewards and credibility appear
as the key factors in explaining fractional Europeanlsatlon (partial adjustment
instead of full transformation) in the first period (1999-2002). On the other
hand, along with the size of rewards and credibility, the nature of the
government and its identification with the EU, and size of domestic adoption
costs appear as the key factors initiating a shift from adjustment to
institutional transformation, representing positive and formal Europeanisatlon.
Finally, in the third period (2005-2008), negative Europeanisatlon, no process
or policy outcome change is observed; this is due to unfavourable domestic
conditions and weak conditionality.
The analysis in this chapter begins with an attempt to conceptualise
minority rights built on classical traditions of democratic theorising. This
section aims to offer the rationale behind the selection of minority rights as a
policy area subject to change In relation to Turkey's democratisation efforts
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under the influence of EU conditionality. The following section provides a
historical overview of the internal dynamics in Turkey, In relation to minority
rights practices; and it also presents the domestic context In which Turkey Is
attempting to align with the EU'srules and practices In this area.
It is then followed by a discussion on EU conditionality and minority
rights in Turkey. This is In order to identify how the EU engages with and
approaches minority rights issues In general, and what the legal requirements
of the EU are on institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon In the
area of minority rights from the candidate states In general, and from Turkey
in particular, within the context of its enlargement policy. The final section
provides an overview of the poliey processes and outcomes In relation to
Turkey's democratisation, by analysing certain changes longitudinally In three
phases (1999-2002, 2002-2004, 2005-2008). This chapter concludes with a
discussion on the results.
5.2. Conceptualisation of Minority Rights
Democratic theory suggests that democratic regimes should provide an
environment where every individual gets equal chances of representation, and
equal access to political, economic and cultural rights. Furthermore, 'tolerance'
and 'respect for the views of political opponents' are also vital for the 'survival'
of any democratic regime (Miller et al., 1998: 66). Although It can be argued
that democracy assures 'popular will' through majority rule, It Is equally
important that democracy guarantees the basic rights of every Individual,
including the rights of any minorities. Successful democracies are inclined to
protect minority rights, by means of meeting the essential notion of majority
rule. In this context, majority rule implies that a particular governing body has
received more than fifty per cent of the votes. This leaves the Issue of the
protection of minority rights in the hands of various 'interest associations' and
'social movements', since they are able to provide a platform where different
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segments of society, such as an alienated minority, can have the opportunity
to express their preferences (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 78-79).
Having this political setting not only supports inclusive citizenship, as
one of the essential rights of democracy, but It also discourages the exclusion
of minorities from society. In fact, inclusive citizenship and equal
representation can be considered as two Important and essential elements of a
liberal democracy. Nevertheless, this requires that democratic regimes should
have the institutional basis to protect these elements of democracy, and It Is
this institutional basis that allows for the protection of minority rights
regardless of 'how singular or alienated' that minority might be (Democracy
Web, 2011a).
Following the argument that the protection of minority rights Is an
essential element of a liberal democracy, It can be said that Turkey has shown
severe deficiencies in this policy area. In addition, there has been a significant
divergence between Turkey and the EU, In terms of portraying and
characterising minorities, due to the differences in the ways that each party
assigns minority status to certain groups depending on their ethnic, racial or
religious backgrounds (Kramer, 1999: 34-35; Kramer, 2000: 40).
For analytical purposes, minority rights will be conceptualised based on
a 'group-specific approach' (Schwellnus, 2005). By adopting a 'group-specific
approach', firstly the general human rights principle will be narrowed down to a
particular 'cluster', where 'targeted' specific minority groups will be examined.
Secondly, 'state action' endorsing the 'Identity, welfare and the security' of
specific minority groups will be reviewed (Schwellnus, 2005: 54-SS).
In this chapter, based on this 'group-specific' approach, the Kurdish
ethnic minority is selected as the 'targeted' minority group that will be under
examination. The Kurdish ethnic minority represents an interesting but also a
complex 'targeted' group to examine in the context of Turkish democratisation.
Firstly, the Kurdish minority in Turkey has not been given a legal status Since
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the Treaty of Lausanne, also known as the treaty defining the borders of the
modern Turkish state in 1923. Since the Kurdish community In Turkey lacks
legal status as a national minority, their social, cultural and linguistic rights are
severely restricted. As Cornell (2001: 31) points out, many westerners
describe the situation of the Kurdish community in Turkey as a matter of
'oppression' and 'denial of rights' by a 'majority group' (i.e., Turkish people) of
an 'ethnic minority'.
Nevertheless, as part of the EUaccession process, consecutive Turkish
governments have been making legislative and institutional amendments to
existing laws and regulations, in order to improve their lives In Turkey as an
ethnic minority. However, as will be discussed in detail later in the chapter, it
can be noted that the Kurdish minority still experience a number of
discriminations, based on various socio-cultural motives; and the efforts of the
governments have not been sufficient to provide them with their full minority
rights. In fact, the problematic nature of the Kurdish minority and the
suppression over their minority rights in Turkey are considered as the 'main
obstacle to its (Turkey's) aspirations to full integration with European
institutions' (Cornell, 2001: 31). The EU, on the other hand, challenges this
'conventional minority regime' of Turkey, and through its pre-accession
framework, requires Turkey to establish a 'better treatment' of minorities in
Turkey (Toktas and Aras, 2009: 706-707). In this context, the analysis will be
on the cultural and citizenship rights of Kurdish minorities, which concern the
use of their native language, education and broadcasting rights.
125
5.3. Internal Dynamics of Turkey Concerning
Minority Rights
Turkey, a nation born out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, has
often been distinguished as being an 'intersection' between Eastern and
Western culture (Ylldlz, 2007: 792). Throughout the existence of the Ottoman
Empire, the state (the 'centre') classified each religious group or community as
a separate nation. This system of classification is referred to as the 'millet'
(nation) system (C;agaptay, 2003a: 614; KO~Okcan,2003: 475). The millet
system was first implemented when the Ottomans conquered Istanbul in 1453,
and this resulted in the rise and appreciation of 'tolerance' and
'accommodation' of different cultures (Davison, 1988: 44). From the very first
day, the founding leader of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal AtatOrk,
changed the Islamic ideology embedded in the nation and 'Imposed a strict
secular nationalism in an effort to westernise the country' (Ylldlz, 2007: 794).
AtatOrk's goal was 'to create a modern, rational state with Institutions and laws
which would facilitate the development of capitalism in Turkey' (Ahmad, 1991:
3-4).
The recognition of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 by the Treaty of
Lausanne signified a turning point in the history of Turkey. The Treaty was
signed by Turkey and the Allied Forces, including France, Italy, Britain and
Greece (after the downfall of the Greek forces) and the Treaty was put under
the guarantee of the Leagueof Nations. The Treaty legalises a broad range of
issues, including Turkey's traditional minority regime. It can be argued that
Turkey's traditional minority regime was created as a result of a dynamic
transition, occurring under the 'foundational legal framework' of the Treaty of
Lausanne and in conjunction with the nation-building strategies of the state
regarding minorities in Turkey.
In the Treaty, minorities were defined on the basis of their religious
identity. According to the Treaty, only non-Muslim communities were
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recognised as minorities, and they were granted numerous rights including,
'the right to use their own language, the right of political and civic equality, the
right to establish religious, educational and social welfare institutions, and the
right to freedom of religion, travel and migration (Hurewitz, 19S6: 122). This
resulted in the exclusion of various ethnic, linguistic and racial groups, such as
the Kurdish community, from gaining minority status. In many ways, the
Treaty of Lausanne, which is still legally binding in Turkey, falls behind in
terms of incorporating the existing international standards on minority rights
(Minority Groups International, 2007: 10). It can also be argued that there is a
disparity between the legally-established minority rights and their
implementations in the regime itself; the Kurdish issue evidently reflects upon
this disparity.
In many ways, Turkey's traditional minority regime is restrictive In
character and it fails to implement the rights guaranteed under the Treaty of
Lausanne. At the same time, the state hesitates to extend the social and
cultural rights of the Kurdish ethnic minority and explicitly refuses to legalise
their minority status, even though this became one of the major obstacles
during Turkey's EU accession process. Instead, the state is keen to retain
control in determining the particulars of its minority regime, even to the extent
where they might not completely fulfil the EU'saccession conditionality, which
could be considered as an important triggering factor for the democratisation
process of Turkey. It can be argued that the state manipulates any reform
attempts with regards to the social and cultural rights of the Kurdish ethnic
minority through political tactics and domestic legal measures, which are
restrictive by nature. As Toktas and Aras (2009: 70S) argue:
Turkey's minority regime is therefore the result of a dynamic
process, which has a legal foundational base on the one hand, and
state preoccupation with controlling minorities, which is backed by
societal strategies, on the other. In the resulting situation, one
may talk of the ongoing conflicting situation between the de jure
and de facto habitat of minority rights in Turkey.
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5.3.1. The Kurdish Question
The roots of the Kurdish 'ethnic' question go back to the early
Republican period. Since its establishment in 1923, the Republic of Turkey,
along with the ideologies of Ataturk, such as kernausrn," has followed insistent
'assimllationist' policies towards the Kurdish community. This can be explained
by the 'model of [a] nation' ideology that Ataturk adopted - in this, the nation
is one which is civic and whose 'maxim' is based on its Turkish identity (Asian,
2009: 3). In that respect, one of the most important principles of the Republic
emerged as the 'unity' of Turkish identity and culture, with anyone who lives in
the territory of the Turkish state to be accepted as a Turkish citizen and
referred to as a 'Turk', in spite of their ethnic origin (Corne", 2001: 34).
However, this principle of 'Turkish national conception' was soon to be
compared to the 'fascist ones triumphing Europe in the 1920s and 1930s'
(Corne", 2001: 34). It is argued that this form of national identity suppresses
the ethnic origin of individuals; thus, it clashes with people's former Identities.
By and large, the main historical causes of the Kurdish issue are seen as the
deficiencies in state and nation-building Initiatives, with regard to their
authority and power (iC;duyguet al., 1999: 994).
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the Kurdish
community living In Turkey has not lost Its own identity mainly due to
demographic reasons (the Kurdish people are the largest non-Turkish speaking
community), geographical reasons (they are mainly located in the south and
south-eastern region of Turkey, hence located in peripheries, away from the
administrative centre), and social-structural reasons (they are mostly
indigenous groups and are organised along 'tribal and feudal' lines) (Corne",
2001: 35). There are around 12 million Kurdish people living in Turkey. They
are either Sunni Muslims or Alevis, and they mostly speak a language called
14 Kemalism was presented as a state ideology in the 1930s. In spite of several structural
changes over time, Kemalism has continued to be a 'hegemonic cultural memory' to the
present day. It has been commonly accepted as a 'political discourse', defining political
margins, and as a 'standard' of political enunciation, in the public realm (Colak, 2006: 599).
For further on the different versions of Kemalism see Aydm (2004).
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'Kurmandji', in addition to other dialects such as 'Zaza'. Their social
organisation is based on tribal and feudal principles, where they are ruled by
the tribal leader, called the 'agha', and the tribes are mostly tied together by
'kinship ideology' (Ergil, 2000; Cornell, 2001).
In the early days of the Republic, governments adopted laws aiming to
create a 'homogenous' national unit at the individual level, by enforcing
'detribalisation'. For the Republican regime, tribes represented 'backwardness'
in social structures and the tribal leaders represented the actors or power
centres that could challenge the 'expansion of state authority' In the
peripheries (Asian, 2009: 4). Since then, the Kurdish community lagged behind
the rest of the Turkish population in social, political and economic development.
This lagging took place because while the 'aghas' were neglecting or refusing
to follow the pollcles of the central government (in order to preserve their
authority and power), the government did not pay sufficient attention on their
region, therefore decreasing the likelihood of the socia-economic development
of the Kurdish community (Cornell, 2001: 35-37).
On the other hand, having suppressed several Kurdish uprisings in
early years of the Turkish Republic, the actual 'question' on the Kurdish issue
started to escalate, particularly during mld-1980s with the creation of 'guerrilla
movements'. The expansion of the separatist activities of the Kurdish people
coincides with the adoption of a new (and probably the most liberal in the
history of Turkey) Constitution in 1961, after the military coup of 1960. This
Constitution made substantial amendments to the protection and improvement
of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of expression and human rights. It was
in this context that the Kurdish activist organisations started to point out their
'oppressed' minority rights and advocated for the separation of their state from
that of Turkey, thus encouraging the rise of 'Kurdish nationalism'. Among their
demands, there was a demand for the reformation of their society with the
promotion of equal treatment in social and economic spheres, along with the
establishment of a 'socialist system' (Cornell, 2001: 38).
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Particularly since the 1970s, the rise of Kurdish nationalism became a
highly contested political crisis in Turkey; this rise is attributable to the
separatist movements of Kurdish guerrilla groups, such as the Partiya karkeren
Kurdistane, also known as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (Robins, 1993).
Two of the major reasons for the rise of Kurdish nationalism were the
politicisation of the PKK and the launch of the 'guerrilla wars' in mid-1980s
(iC;duyguet al., 1999: 994). The war that took place between 1984 and 1999
was commonly viewed by the West as a 'national liberation movement' in
response to the 'oppression' and the denial of the rights of the Kurdish ethnic
minority by the Turkish state.
In fact, the main drive for the Kurdish uprisings was the desire for 'self-
determination'. After the military coup in 1980, the military stayed in power for
three years and within this time, it interpreted the Kurdish manifestations of
'self-determination' (along with separatism) as an imminent threat for the
country. In that respect, the military did not tolerate any forms of rights or
freedoms that challenged the 'national integrity' of the Turkish state; among
these rights were the speaking in Kurdish language, the listening to Kurdish
music, or any other forms of expressions of 'Kurdishness'. This resulted In a
serious 'cultural contestation' within Turkey (Asian, 2009: 2). Particularly in
the 1980s, restrictive laws on the cultural rights (stated above) of the Kurdish
people were quite common.
In relation to that, in the early 1970s, the Kurdish minority, who were
living in the south-eastern region of Turkey, started to migrate to the western
region. With this migration trend, there had been a sudden increase in
'enrolment in higher education' and, Simultaneously, it created awareness
amongst the Kurdish people of the differences between the two regions of the
country, with respect to their social, cultural and economic rights (Cornell,
2001: 31-39). In the same line with these assertions, iC;duyguet al. (1999:
994) assert that:
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In fact, Turkey's Kurds are faced with a plethora of options
which may ameliorate their admittedly unsatisfactory conditions.
Understanding these options and the context in which they exist
is essential to explain present and future possibilities regarding
the Kurdish question. The appeal of various possible solutions to
Kurds' problems (and henceTurkey's problems as well) depends,
among other things, on the identity of the Kurds in question and
that identity's strength and salience.
Such politicisation of the Kurdish issue reinforced the 'hard-line' policies
of political actors in the state governance and the military. These political
actors perceived the extension of the cultural rights of the Kurdish community
as a 'subtle prelude to autonomy and territorial secession' (Asian, 2009: 6).
Particularly, with the adoption of a new constitution in 1982, following the
military intervention in 1980, individual rights had been severely limited In
Turkey (Hale, 2003: 110). In fact, Article 13 of the 1982 Constitution
proclaimed that the fundamental rights and freedoms of Turkish citizens can be
restricted by law, in order to protect the integrity of the state (KIIi and
GozObOyOk,2000a: 266). On the other hand, the Turkish Penal Code included
numerous clauses (see Article 159 and Article 312) on fundamental rights and
freedoms that were mostly in support of severe legal punishments In cases of
public insults on the 'moral character of Turkishness' or encouragement of
antagonism on the grounds of class, race, or religion (Turkish Grand National
Assembly, 2004).
The 1982 Turkish Constitution, drafted under military supervision,
adopted the doctrine of the unity and indivisibility of the Turkish state, of its
territory, and of Its people. As Baban (2005: 54) argues, with this doctrine,
Turkey has adopted a 'republican version' of 'civic nationalism', emphasising
the unity of nation by not allowing cultural diversity. Therefore, it can be
argued that the definition of a minority has been strictly shaped by the Turkish
state doctrine of the indivisibility of the Turkish nation and state; furthermore,
it is openly expressed in Article 10 of the Constitution that: 'all Individuals are
equal without any discrimination before law, irrespective of language, race,
colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion, sect, or any such
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consideration' (Hale, 2003: 117). Based on this clause, Turkey rejects any
demands for the recognition of rights for ethnic minorities, such as the Kurdish
community, by emphasising the equality of all Turkish citizens given by the
constitution. This in turn stimulates the arguments of the Kurdish people who
are not given a legal status as an ethnic minority group and it therefore also
builds hatred amongst the ethnic minority groups, as their linguistic and
cultural rights are highly restricted.
Re-transition to multi-party politics In the aftermath of 1983 did not
result in the immediate 'relaxation' of the cultural rights of the Kurdish
community. The activities of the PKK and the Kurdish 'armed resistance'
strengthened the state's 'intolerance' on any form or manifestation of
Kurdishness (Asian, 2009: 6). Furthermore, In 1983, Law 2932 confirmed that
Turkish holds the position of the mother tongue of all Turkish citizens; and this
Law banned the use of Kurdish language in public spheres. However, In 1991,
Law 2932, banning the use of Kurdish language in public or private, was
repealed by the ANAP government and, as a result, the practice of Kurdish
speeches, songs and music became legalised. However, when examining the
broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish, this practice was
banned in Turkey until the reform package of 2002. Also, the Turkish
Constitution and the Political Parties Law proscribe the establishment of ethnic
political parties. In fact, the Constitutional Court has closed several political
parties on this ground, such as the People's Labour Party (HEP), The Party of
Democracy (DEP)and The People'sDemocratic Party (HADEP)(ozbudun, 2000:
143-144).15
Nevertheless, in the 1990s, things started to change. Law 2932 (the
law that banned use of Kurdish language in public and private) was abolished
15 The political parties mentioned above were allegedly formed to resolve the Kurdish question
in Turkey. The first in line, the HEP,was mainly composed of former members of the Social
Democratic Party (SHP), who were expelled from the party after their participation in an
International Conference about the Kurdish question in Paris; the party was formed in June
1990 and banned in July 1993; secondly, the DEPwas formed in May 1993 and banned in
June 1994; and thirdly, the HADEPwas formed in May 1994 and banned in March 2003
(Ntvmsnbc,2009).
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In 1991. Furthermore, the rhetoric of high-level state officials on the Kurdish
Issue showed a gradual relaxation in attitudes towards the Kurds. For instance,
in 1991, the Deputy Prime Minister, Erdal lnonu, stated that Kurdish citizens
should enjoy their 'cultural identity' fully. In a similar vein, in 1992, the Prime
Minister, SOIeymanDemirel, proclaimed his recognition of the 'Kurdish ethnic
presence'. Despite these instances of the relaxation of attitudes, overall
restriction on the socia-cultural rights of the Kurdish community prevailed. This
was mainly due to the lack of 'integrated state response' to the demands of the
Kurdish community on the liberalisation of their socia-cultural rights. The
initiatives of the political actors failed to ease the restrictions on Kurdish
linguistic and cultural practices, due to the resistance of state officials to
cultural policy changes (Yegen, 2007: 137).
In addition to these laws, another major concern emerged from the
continuing practice of the death penalty in Turkey. In contrast to the EU
practices, Turkey had continued to practice death penalty until 2002. It was
stated in the Penal Code that death penalties could be applied in certain cases,
such as homicide, criminal acts against the state, particularly during war, and
in instances where there were attempts to separate part a territory from the
state (Hale, 2003: 118). However, although the death penalty was still a legal
practice, no executions had been approved by the Parliament since 1984.
Finally, in 2002, the Turkish Parliament signed a European Convention protocol
abolishing the death penalty 'in all Circumstances', including during wars. The
European Commission regarded this move as a 'significant step on its way to
becoming a fully fledged democracy' (BBCNews, 2004).
In fact, policy analysts have commented that the signing of the
European Convention protocol marked a major step in the application of an
'extensive programme of human rights reforms' carried out by Turkey, in order
to reach its long desired goal of the membership of the EU (BBC News, 2004).
As a result of this protocol, the death penalty was replaced by life
imprisonment without parole. This change coincided with the capture of
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Abdullah Ocalan, the former head of the Kurdish militant organisation the PKK,
who was formally sentenced to death in 1999 for his role In the guerrilla war
against Turkey; according to a report by the USDepartment of State, the war,
which lasted longer than 16 years, had resulted in more than 30,000 casualties.
Although until recently, the activities of the PKKhad been conquered or
at least suppressed, it can be argued that the Kurdish problem has not actually
been resolved; the ongoing problems with the Kurdish minority stili pose an
important obstacle for the democratisation process of Turkey within the
context of EU accession negotiations. In fact, the Kurdish ethnic minority still
complains about the 'state imposed restrictions' on their social and cultural
minority rights; thus illustrating that certain legislative shortcomings currently
exist in Turkish politics.
In many ways, It is timely for Turkey to re-evaluate its stance on the
social and cultural rights of the Kurdish ethnic minority under the scope of its
minority regime. First of all, it can be argued that with the capture of the
leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, domestic conditions became appropriate
for the Turkish state to change Its rhetoric on the matter of subject. The first
step towards this end would be the disconnection between the previously
highly-associated 'Kurdish problem' and 'PKK terrorism' in the public realm.
The second step should then be the extension of social and cultural rights of
the Kurdish minority by carrying out the necessary reforms with respect to:
the use of their language; educational rights; television and radio broadcasts;
name/surname rights; and moderation/tolerance of political parties
representing the Kurdish minorities (Cornell, 2001: 43-46; Asian, 2009).
The next section focuses on EU conditionality with regards to minority
rights in Turkey and aims to shed light on the conditionality-compliance
relationship with respect to the EU'scredibility and Turkey's social resonance in
a wider perspective.
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5.4. EU Conditionality and Minority Rights in Turkey
It can be argued that In the case of Turkey, the EU conditionality
strategy, as part of its accession framework, has been In effect since 1999. In
this policy area, the EU conditionality that is in force over the three periods
mainly concentrates on minority rights, cultural rights and the protection of
minorities. On legal grounds, the accession conditionality and relevant
requirements concerning minority rights mainly involves the ratification of the
concerned charters and conventions, provided that minority rights policy Is not
included in the Acquis Communautalre. Furthermore, the conventions of the
CaEare also considered as part of the EU's accession framework strategy. On
the other hand, at the institutional level, EU conditionality and relevant
requirements involve Institutional transformation and their capacity-building, in
order to enhance their cooperation for the effective implementation of legal
provisions in this area.
Following the Helsinki Summit in 1999, where Turkey was granted
candidacy status, the European Commission released the first Accession
Partnership (AP) Document in March 2001. The APaims to identify the political
reforms that Turkey is expected to carry out and Implement as a prerequisite
for the opening of accession negotiations (Rumford, 2002: 52). In that respect,
the AP is intentionally designed as a road map (see Table 5.1) for Turkey to
follow, in order to recognise the priority issues to be undertaken as short-term
and medium-term measures. For instance, in the case of minority rights, in the
short-term, the AP of 2001 emphasised the need for stronger legal
enforcement for the protection of human rights and the development of a
comprehensive approach to enhance social and cultural opportunities for all
citizens. In the medium-term, the same AP called for a review of the
constitution, with a view that it would guarantee fundamental freedoms for all
citizens, and for the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (European Council, AccessionPartnership, 2001).
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In due course, the European Council revised the AP In May 2003. In the
AP of 2003, the EU reiterated its requirements in the AP of 2001, with
particular emphasis on the guarantee of fundamental freedoms without any
discrimination and the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. As previously noted, the EU's detailed requirements Involved
Turkey's legal and institutional alignment, and institutional capacity-building
for the effective implementation of concerned legal provisions, constituting an
important part of its conditionality regarding minority rights In Turkey. Within
the context of minority rights, the Kurdish Issue was acknowledged In relation
to social and cultural rlghts.16 According to Klrl$<;i(2004a: 284) the European
Commission decided to tackle this particular area by referring to minority
rights as 'cultural rights', in order to avoid convoluted definitional disparities
between Turkey and the EUwith regards to the Kurdish ethnic minority.
Yet again, the AP was revised for a second time in January 2006, after
the opening of accession negotiations in October 2005. In contrast to the
former APs, the AP of 2006 had a more comprehensive approach on the Issue
of minority rights. In fact, the requirements became more meticulous and
demanding. As in the case of former APs, the AP of 2006 required Turkey to
review its Constitution and other relevant legislation, In order to guarantee its
alignment with the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as with the
principles of the CoE's Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities. The AP of 2006 also underlined the need for legal and Institutional
alignment of national institutions, in line with the practices of the EU Member
States (European Council, AccessionPartnership, 2006).
In addition to the AP documents, the EU monitors Turkey's progress
with the support of its own Institutions. For instance, the European Commission
uses its annual progress reports (also known as regular reports) to evaluate
16 The AP of 2001 referred to the condition concerning the minority rights of the Kurdish
ethnic community as 'ensuring cultural diversity and guarantee rights for all citizens
irrespectiveof their origin' (EuropeanCouncil,2001b).
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Turkey's overall performance in meeting the EU demands per annum. In
general, the progress reports stress the negative aspects of Turkey's accession
process, by underlining the weaknesses and listing the shortcomings on a
specified issue and providing a comparative assessment of the progress made
in relation to Turkey's fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, in connection with
the previous year's report. In the period of 1999-2008, the European
Commission released ten reports on the progress of Turkey. It can be argued
that these reports are highly important for Turkey's self-evaluation; in the
fullness of time, these reports have become more extensive each year,
providing a comprehensive and detailed assessment of minorities and their
social and cultural rights in Turkey (Toktas and Aras, 2009: 707).
EU requirements on minority rights in Accession Partnerships
I
Remove any legal provisions forbidding the use by
Turkish citizens of their mother tongue In TV/radio
broadcasting
Develop a comprehensive approach to reduce
regional disparities, and in particular to improve the
situation in the south-east, with a view to enhancing
economic, social and cultural opportunities for all
citizens
2001 Accession Partnership
(Short-term)
2001 Accession Partnership
(Short-term)
2001 Accession Partnership
(Short-term)
Guarantee full enjoyment by all individuals without
any discrimination and irrespective of their language,
race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief
or religion of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms
Review of the Turkish Constitution and other relevant
legislation with a view to guaranteeing rights and
freedoms of all Turkish citizens as set forth in the
European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights; ensure the implementation of such legal
reforms and conformity with practices in EU Member
States
2001 Accession Partnership
(Medium-term)
2003 Accession Partnership
(Priorities 2003/2004)
2001 Accession Partnership
(Medium-term)
Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and its optional Protocol and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
2001 Accession Partnership
(Medium-term)
2003 Accession Partnership
(Priorities 2003/2004)
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Ensure cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights
for all citizens irrespective of their origin. Any legal
provisions preventing the enjoyment of these rights
should be abolished, including in the field of
education
Ensure cultural diversity and promote respect for and
protection of minorities in accordance with the
European Convention on Human Rights and the
principles laid down in the Council of Europe's
Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities and in line with best practice In Member
States
Guarantee legal protection of minorities, in particular
as regards the enjoyment of property rights in line
with Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on
Human Rights
Ensure effective access to radio/TV broadcasting in
languages other than Turkish. Remove outstanding
obstacles, particularly with regard to local radio and
regional private broadcasters
Adopt appropriate measures to support the teaching
of languages other than Turkish
2001 Accession Partnership
(Medium-term)
2006 Accession Partnership
(Short-term)
2006 Accession Partnership
(Short-term)
2006 Accession Partnership
(Short-term)
2006 AcceSSion Partnership
(Short-term)
5.5. Assessment of the Policy Process and Policy
Outcomes
In the following sections, the impact of EU conditionality on minority
rights in Turkey is examined across three periods. The first phase of analysis
(1999-2002) starts with the decision of the European Council at the Helsinki
Summit in 1999, where Turkey was granted EU candidacy status. The end of
the first phase (also the beginning of the second phase, 2002-2004) coincides
with the early general elections held in Turkey, where the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) established the first single party government to
come into power since 1987. The third phase (2005-2008) of analysis starts
with the opening of accession negotiations and covers the period where
accession negotiations were actively pursued. The analysis will focus on the
selected six variables (size of rewards, credibility, size of domestic adoption
costs, legitimacy, identity, and resonance) in these specified periods, in order
to identify the causal relationship between EU conditionality, institutional
138
transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey, in the area of minority
rights.
5.5.1. Phase I: 1999-2002
Since 1999, Turkey's candidacy status has marked the beginning of a
'strategic mutual transformation' in the country (Tanlak, 2002). This
transformation involved a series of major reforms and an Inherent change in
the nature of Turkish democratisation. Almost certainly, the attainment of
candidacy status was perceived as a 'belated' reward for Turkey, and this
triggered the rapid institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon In
many policy areas, including minority policy. Therefore, it can be argued that
in this period, the reward of candidacy became an Important push factor for
the initiation of a series of political reforms. In addition to the reward of
candidacy, Turkey gained the right to benefit from the EU's pre-accession
strategy. This strategy aimed to 'stimulate and support' Turkey's reform
process, where Turkey was provided with a 'single framework' for the
management of all the pre-accession financial assistance offered by the EU
(European Council, 1999b). These factors were hence seen as a reflection of
the substantial rewards on offer, in return for Turkey's fulfilment of its
promising reform initiatives.
This positive correlation between EU conditionality and Turkey's
compliance had shown an increasing trend in the first half of this period. For
instance, in June 2001, In the 40th Turkey-EU Association Council meeting In
Luxemburg, the EU declared its confidence in Turkey's satisfactory political
reform process, and encouraged Turkey to continue further on Its legal and
institutional alignment with the EU, within its pre-accession framework. At the
same meeting, the EU also decided in favour of Turkey's participation in
additional 'Community programmes', which in turn granted Turkey 'full access'
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to TAIEX17offices, as well as the formation of 'joint consultation mechanisms'
to transact business on issues related to the Customs Union (Council of the
European Union, 2001). It can be argued that the offer of tangible rewards In
the early days of Turkey's candidacy had created a positive attitude among the
leading political parties towards the attainment of full EU membership. This
effect was mainly caused by the presence of strong incentives to meet the EU
accession requirements by the ruling political parties. In a short period of time,
these political parties became robustly committed to the prospect of becoming
a member of the EU(Keyman and Oni~, 2004).18
In this period, the coalition government of the Democratic Left Party
(DSP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the Motherland Party (ANAP)
carried out a series of legislative and constitutional reforms in order to comply
with EU conditionality. Although, in the early days, the general trend in
attitudes towards the EU membership had been positive among the coalition
partners, it soon became apparent that the institutional transformation and
policy reformation could not be pursued without certain setbacks, which were
mainly caused by the deteriorating relations between the three political parties.
Soon after they had formed a government, the ideological differences between
the coalition partners became apparent. This In turn had an undeniable impact
on their perceptions of the prospective EU membership, and on their ability
and willingness to accept the EU as an aspirant group. Despite the Improving
attitudes to the prospect of EU membership in the second half of this period,
the initial negative outlook reflects the failure of the self-identification of the
coalition partners with the EU,which is an important domestic factor impacting
upon the overall institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey.
17 TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument, which comes
under the management of the Directorate-General Enlargement of the European Commission.
TAIEX provides technical assistance and expertise with regard to the 'approximation,
application and enforcement' of EUlegislation (European Union, 2012a).
18 The prospect of EU membership had at all times represented a chance for Turkey to
modernise/westernise and to integrate itself into the European community In general
(Keyman and Onis, 2004).
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For instance, at the beginning, the leading coalition partner, the DSP(a
nationalist-left party) was often reluctant to promote closer relations with the
EU and it was inclined to take 'hard-line' policies towards EU membership.
Nevertheless, with the efforts of the party leader BOlent Ecevit, the general
views on EUmembership showed positive developments in the DSP; the party,
along with its coalition partners, gradually became engaged In the political
reform process (Kiri!i<;i, 2004a: 284-293). Similar to the DSP, the MHP, the
second coalition partner and an ultra-nationalist party, was also reluctant
towards the prospect of EUmembership. Due to its ideological stance, the MHP
perceived the EU requirements on the extension of the cultural rights of the
Kurdish minority as a serious threat to the sovereignty and the integrity of the
Turkish state (Ankan, 2003: 70; Kiri$<;i,2004a: 284-293; Keyman and Oni!i,
2004: 183). Hence, the party remained reluctant to identify itself with the EU
and refused to show full commitment to compliance with EUconditionality. An
interviewee made a similar comment by stating that within the context of
ethnicity and beliefs any conditionality imposed on the Kurdish issue by the EU
would put the integrity of the Turkish state at risk (Interview, Member of
Parliament, MHPDeputy, 2012).
The third coalition partner, the ANAP,a centre-right party, proved to be
the most pro-European of the coalition partners. Since the beginning of its
establishment, the ANAp19 had been a strong advocate for liberal stances in
politics, as well as in economies. For the ANAP, the 'gradual liberalisation' of
Turkish politics constituted one of the main policy goals; and so the ANAPtook
various initiatives, such as transformation of Turkish economy from a closed
economy to an open-market economy with an emphasis on developing
Turkey's potential economic and political influence globally, as a means of
becoming a part of the European common market (ErgOder, 1991: 164-167).
19 The ANAPwas established as a political party in 1983 by Turgut Ozal. In October 2009, it
was merged into the Democratic Party and was considered as a 'centre-right' party with
nationalist views. The ANAPwas in support of restrictions on the role of the government in
the economy, and favoured private capital and enterprise (Kalaycioglu, 2002).
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It was also under the ANAPgovernment of Turgut azal that Turkey applied for
full EECmembership in 1987. In this context, ANAPremained the only coalition
partner which successfully identified Itself with the EU. However, since the
government was composed of three political parties, their mutual identification
with the EUas an aspirant group turned out to be unsuccessful. Consequently,
in this period, self-identification was an important domestic factor for
determining the outcome of Turkey's institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation remained inconclusive.
On the other hand, other internal dynamics, such as the emergence of
Kurdish separatism in the early 1990s, had continued to have a destructive
impact on the reformation of minority rights policy in Turkey in this period. The
emergence of Kurdish separatism and terrorist activities created major
domestic turmoil for the governing parties; hence, any reform, in order to
meet the requirements of the EU in the period of 1999-2002, was Initially
perceived as costly for the DSP-MHP-ANAPcoalition. In fact, the proclamations
on the separation of the Kurdish nation from the Turkish mainland forced
governing parties to undertake a 'state-centric' approach towards the Kurdish
issue in the 1990s, thus resulting in restricted minority rights amongst the
Kurdish ethnic minority living in Turkey (Kiri~<;i,2004a; 2004b; Kiri~c;I,2007).
Nevertheless, the capture of the PKK's leader, Abdullah acalan, In 1999
relatively reduced the rule adoption costs in the area of minority rights.
Although the PKKterrorist attacks had not stopped since ocalen's arrest, their
lntensltv had drastically slowed down after his capture. In the aftermath of
these developments, the political setting became more suitable for the
initiation of the reform process in general, and the liberalisation of the social
and cultural minority rights of the Kurdish community In particular (Kiri~c;i,
2004a: 284). For instance, a 'visible relaxation' was seen on the Kurdish
question as a result of the governing elites' adoption of a more 'moderate'
stance on the minority rights of the Kurdish community (Kiri~<;i,2007: 4).
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Within this political context, firstly, in October 2001, the DSP-MHP-
ANAPcoalition carried out a number of democratic reforms, which resulted in
significant amendments to the Turkish Constitution. Secondly, the coalition
government continued its legal alignment efforts, by adopting the relevant
legislative measures to enforce and Implement the constitutional amendments.
Their efforts were not restricted to the aforementioned Initiatives. The
coalition partners successfully prepared 'Harmonisation Laws', aiming to
transform the constitutional changes Into 'concrete actions', in order to bring
Turkish Law in the same line with the Acquis Communautalre. In that respect,
it is argued that the period of 1999-2002 set the scene for a 'profound and
momentous change' in Turkish polltlcs under the leadership of the DSP-MHP-
ANAPcoalition (bni~, 2003: 9).
With the constitutional amendments in 2001, first of all, the restriction
on the use of any language forbidden by law was taken out of the Constitution.
This was followed by a second constitutional reform package In August 2001,
which abolished the use of the death penalty in peacetime, revised the Antl-
Terror Law, and authorised broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. In
addition to these significant changes In the socio-cultural rights, mainly
concerning the Kurdish community, one major change took place with the
adoption of a third reform package where the law on teaching In languages
other than Turkish was amended, in order to allow for private teaching in
Kurdish (Aydin and Keyman, 2004: 36; MOftOler-Bac;,2005: 22).
This period had also been demanding for the EU. In 2001, due to
Turkey's considerable efforts in making constitutional amendments as part of
the EU's prerequisite for membership, the EU reciprocated and continued to
effectively carry out its legal responsibilities, as part of the pre-accession
framework offered to Turkey. For instance, the EU continued to work on the
completion of its 'internal procedures' to accommodate Turkey Into the
additional Community programmes, as well as the adoption and
implementation of a single framework for financial asststance to Turkey. These
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two liabilities also form the two important components of rewards offered by
the EU, subject to Turkey's overall compliance performance. This resulted in
the European Council decision in December 2001 to apply PHARE20procedures
in the EU-Turkey financial cooperation and the approval of Turkey's
participation in additional Community programmes as of 2002, which was the
year when the Framework Agreement was completed (Tanlak, 2002: 5).
Furthermore, the conclusions of the European Council on the Framework
Agreement, regarding Turkey's participation in Community programmes,
stated that Turkey was granted permission to apply for financial assistance to
participate in programmes such as MEDA21to implement cooperation measures
for the promotion of economic and social development In Turkey (European
Council, 2001a).
In spite of these major political reforms carried out between 1999 and
2002, in its annual progress report, the European Commission declared that no
significant progress had been achieved on the Kurdish question. In fact, in its
2002 Regular Report, the European Commission concluded that 'Turkey has
made noticeable progress ... [but] does not fully meet the political criteria
(European Commission, 2002); as a result, the Commission made the opening
of accession negotiations conditional upon the effective implementation of both
the constitutional changes and political reforms.
In that respect, the reform efforts of the DSP-MHP-ANAPcoalition
government, in order to comply with the EU rules and conditions in the area of
minority rights, did not result in affirmative/positive Europeanisatlon; Instead,
the government's efforts resulted in fractional Europeanisation. Fractional
Europeanisation only signifies Turkey's partial adjustment to the EU's rules and
20 PHAREis the Programme of Community aid, mainly to the Central and Eastern European
Countries, which was later extended to include other applicant countries from the western
Balkans. PHAREis the main financial instrument of the pre-accession strategy and has two
main priorities: institutional and capacity-building, and investment financing (European Union,
2007a).
21 The MEDA programme aims to achieve the objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership and is designed to assist Mediterranean non-member countries, such as Turkey.
One of the most highly relevant objectives of the MEDA programme for Turkey is almost
certainly the reinforcement of political stability and democracy, and the strengthening of
human rights and the rule of law in Turkey (European Union, 2007b).
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practices, instead of complete institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation. This was mainly due to strong conditionality, but unfavourable
domestic conditions also impeded the strong and credible external incentives
offered by the EU. Among those unfavourable domestic conditions were the
domestic opposition, in the form of veto players including the military and
nationalist political elite as well as low levels of domestic resonance resulting
from the irreconcilable definitional differences between Turkey and the EU on
the notion of 'minority'.
5.5.2. Phase II: 2002-2004
The early general elections held in November 2002 signalled the
opening of a new era for Turkey. As a result of the elections, the Justice and
Development Party (AKP), a newly-founded political party (its predecessors
being the Welfare Party (RP) and the Virtue Party (FP), gained the majority of
the votes, and formed the first single party government that had come to
power since 1987. The elections in 2002 differed from the previous elections,
not only because of the formation of a single party government, but also
because of the fact that the only party apart from the AKPthat passed the ten
percent threshold'" was the Republican People's Party (CHP), which happened
to be the only opposition party in the Parliament. Furthermore, a 'troubled
econornv'" in this period was also identified as one of the reasons for the 2002
general election results. It is also argued that, unlike the previous general
elections, the 2002 elections were closely monitored by non-state actors, such
as civil society organisations, and national pressure groups, as well as
international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the EU. It is argued that these non-state actors played a significant role in the
22 The legislature, composed of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, has 550 members
who are elected for a four-year term by a system based on proportional representation. In
order to participate in the distribution of seats, a political party is required to obtain a
minimum 10% of the votes cast at the national level, in addition to a specified percentage of
votes in the contested district (Turkish Grand National Assembly, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/).
23 Turkey heavily relies on foreign investment for economic growth. In 2001, Turkey faced a
serious economic crisis due to the mismanagement of budget deficits by the government and
the heavy reliance of the Turkish banks..on high-yield bonds as a primary investment, which
came as a result of continuing inflation (Ozatay and Sak, 2002; Ozkan, 2005).
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Turkish general election process by emphasising the need for a 'strong and
stable government' in Turkey and by serving as 'discursive reference points' in
favour of the political parties who were shaping their agenda before the
general elections (Oni~ and Keyman, 2003: 96-97).
AKP's election as the ruling party had been very controversial. Even
then, AKP had often been associated with a political islamist ideology which is
mostly considered as anti-Western and/or anti-EU (GOne~-Ayata, 2003; Oni~
and Keyman, 2003; Nasr 2005; Tank 2005). In fact, attributable to its Islamic
roots, a general concern emerged among governing and non-governing
political parties that AKP would pursue its Islamic ideology when it came to
power. However, AKP continuously denied the accusations on Its Islamic
identity and argued that it would not challenge the secular character of the
Turkish state. Furthermore, the AKP insisted on presenting itself as a market-
liberal, conservative-reformist and pro-European government (oze], 2003;
Dagl, 2008; karakas, 2011). This approach undeniably helped broaden its
appeal among public (<;agaptay, 2002a); and this helped the AKP to win the
votes of EUsupporters, liberals, and the Turkish industry (Karakas, 2011: 15).
In a similar vein, Oni~ and Keyman (2003) highlighted that AKP'smain
political stance has been concentrated on mainly three themes of 'competence,
integrity, and democracy'; and its discourse has focused on 'the protection of
individual rights and freedoms'. During this period, AKP concentrated on
carrying out domestic reforms that would lead the way to EU membership. In
this period, the AKPsuccessfully built up its support in the governing and non-
governing circles. The AKP's agenda was clearly aimed at winning public
confidence based on three principles; firstly, creating a state which is
democratic, transparent, accountable, and contributing to the development of
a free-market economy; secondly, encouraging innovation, enterprise and
investment, as well as achieving financial stability and effective
industrialisation; and thirdly, promoting social justice, in the sense that every
Turkish citizen will be treated 'indlvldiously' on the grounds of their 'religious
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affiliation' or 'ethnocultural identity', indicating a 'full equality of respect and
recognition' (OniSand Keyman, 2003: 101).
On the side of the opposition, the CHP, with its static ideology, more
centralised institutional structure and 'top-down decision-making' system,
stayed rather ambivalent regarding the prospect of EU membership. At the
same time, the CHP's efforts as the main opposition party in debating the
solutions to the economic and political problems remained rather limited,
showing the lack of enthusiasm or confidence within the party itself by showing
its passivity (Onis and Keyman, 2003). In the 1990s, the CHP's attitude
towards EUmembership was regarded as 'Euro-enthusiastic' simply because of
the idea that EU membership would contribute to Turkey's political, economic
and social development, with particular regards to the liberalisation of its
overall political regime, the strengthening of its democracy and of civil society
(GOnes-Ayata, 2003: 213-214).
However, after the 2002 elections, the CHP's position towards the EU
changed considerably and it took a rather nationalistic (although not as radical
as the MHP's nationalism) and pessimistic stance, due to the accession
negotiation dynamics and certain demands of the EU throughout the process.
Unlike the CHP, the AKP showed its absolute commitment to 'EU-related
reforms'. For instance, soon after the AKP came In power, It had to complete
the task of 'obtaining a date' for the opening of accession negotiations in the
Copenhagen Summit of the European Council, in December 2002 (Onl~ and
Keyman, 2003). For the AKP, EU membership would not only bolster the
Turkish democracy, but it would also provide Turkey with Instruments to
guarantee economic growth and political stability, in addition to the guarantee
of the widening of religious and personal freedoms (<;agaptay, 2002a). In that
respect, the AKPgovernment claimed it would fully support the EU's economic
and democratic standards, as well as the implementation of the legal and
institutional regulations set out by the EU.
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The period that started after the election of the AKP witnessed the
improving attitude of the EUtowards Turkey, which was realised in the form of
the presentation of a stronger accession strategy for Turkey, including an
increase of technical and financial assistance, as well as active involvement
and assistance in harmonising Turkey's legislation with that of the EU. In that
respect, the EUsuccessfully reflected upon its 'deeper commitment' to Turkey's
eventual EU membership (Kirisci, 2004c). Furthermore, at the Copenhagen
European Council in December 2002, the EU acknowledged Turkey's
determination to enhance the reform process by addressing priorities specified
in the 2001 Accession Partnership document, through the recent adoption of
legislative packages under the new government; moreover, the EUadvised the
government to further combat the outstanding deflclenctes in the field of the
political criteria for ascension, with particular reference to legislation and
implementation (European Council, 2002).
With regard to the financial assistance that the EU offered to Turkey,
the Council stated that the EU would 'significantly' Increase Its pre-accession
financial assistance for Turkey, in order to assist Turkey towards membership;
with regards to this potnt, the Council requested that the Commission would
prepare a proposal on a revised Accession Partnership. Finally, although the EU
welcomed the gradual reforms in Turkey as indicated in the Presidency
Conclusions, the Council remained hesitant on setting a definite date for the
opening of accession negotiations. Based on that, the Council decided to
review the Commission's progress report on Turkey scheduled for 2004 and,
on the basis of the Commission's further recommendations, it would set a firm
date for the opening of accession negotiations (European Council, 2002).
In this context, the AKP rapidly and effectively carried out the
necessary reform process to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, followed by an
amendment on the Accession Partnership in 2003, which explicitly stated
Turkey's deficiencies in the political sphere. Nevertheless, the revision of the
Accession Partnership document also provided more detailed recommendations,
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to meet the objective of providing support for Turkey's pre-accession
preparations based on the Council's recognition of Turkey's progress in
complying with the political criteria (European Council, 2003).
In that respect, the AP of 2003 reaffirmed the EU's promise of
increasing the financial assistance available to Turkey. It was after this
amendment to the AP in 2003 that the AKP government developed a
new/updated National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) as a
response to the requirements of the EU. The reform measures incorporated in
the NPAAof 2003, which were adopted by the AKP government, were in line
with the conditions specified by the Accession Partnership document; thus this
illustrated the compatibility of the reforms that were foreseen In the NPAAwith
the AP, proving the AKP's determination in complying with the Copenhagen
political criteria (Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EU Affairs, 2003). Further In
this period, another major event took place at the Brussels Summit in
December 2004. The major point of this summit was the discussion on the
adoption of six different pieces of legislation in Turkey and the decision of the
Commission in the same line with the Commission report and further
recommendations by the Commission, where it was declared that Turkey had
sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria based on the progress the country
had made (European Council, 2004).
While these international level developments generated favourable
conditions for Turkey's compliance with EU rules and conditions in the area of
minority rights, favourable domestic conditions also played a significant role in
Turkey's high performance on compliance. As stated previously, the end of PKK
terrorism in the period of 1999-2002 opened a new era in Turkey with respect
to the reforms concerning minority rights, particularly the cultural rights of the
Kurdish minority. This newly-emerging moderation was furthered during the
period between 2002 and 2004. The elimination of PKKterrorist activities and
Kurdish separatist movements significantly reduced the rule adoption costs of
the government and accelerated the reform process on minority rights.
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In terms of complying with EU conditionality, the AKP government
effectively handled the reforms of their socio-cultural rights despite the stance
of nationalist opposition parties on the extension of the rights of the Kurdish
minority. The AKPgovernment, with a seventh reform package in its first term,
further amended the law on broadcasting by allowing general broadcasting of
public and private radio stations and television channels. Furthermore, the AKP
government made necessary amendments to the law that tackles issues
regarding education (particularly the teaching of languages other than Turkish).
Furthermore, with these reform packages, the AKP removed various
discriminative measures and restrictions on the individual freedoms of the
Kurdish community. Among these reforms were the abolition of death penalty,
including during wartime (MGftGler-Bac;,2005: 26); the removal of Article 8 of
the Anti-Terror Law, which criminalised the 'propaganda against the indivisible
unity of the state'; removal of the Article 16 of the Registration Law, which
prohibited giving names/surnames to children that contradict the 'national
culture' and 'Turkish customs and traditions' (Asian, 2009: 13).
Although far from resulting in fundamental changes in the minority
policy, the reforms carried out by the AKP resulted in the radical extension of
socio-cultural rights of the Kurdish community and thus became the beginning
of a 'gradual' transformation of the 'notion of citizenship' (Keyman, 2010: 322-
324). In that respect, it can be argued that the reduction in the rule adoption
costs for the Turkish government (the AKPgovernment), in the period of 2002-
2004, was still valid due to the unchanged domestic conditions.
On the other hand, the full commitment of the AKP government to
comply with the EU rules and conditions, hence their making the necessary
constitutional changes and further legislative amendments, also indicate that
the costs associated with rule adoption remained low in this period. In that
respect, it can be argued that the AKPdid not face any similar constraints that
the previous coalition government that the DSP-MHP-ANAPhad faced in the
period between 1999 and 2002. In other words, by securing a majority
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government, the AKP was able to carry out the reform process as quickly as
possible in the absence of a coalition partner with ideological differences. In
this environmental context, it was less difficult for the AKPgovernment to pass
major legislative changes thus complying with the EU rules and conditions
(MOftOler-Bac;,2005: 24).
Furthermore, in its Regular Report on Turkey In 2004, the European
Commission stated a more positive attitude to the progress achieved in the
field of Kurdish rights and Turkey was rewarded by the setting of a date for the
opening of accession negotiations (European Commission, 2004). Therefore, it
can be concluded that the AKP's pro-EU stance and liberal approach on the
highly-contested issue of the extension of socio-cultural rights of the Kurdish
minority and the absence of veto players, resulted in the presence of
favourable domestic conditions and low levels of domestic costs. This was also
complemented by strong and credible EU rewards thus giving the rise to high
levels of compliance with the EU rules and conditions in the area of minority
rights. This phase therefore showed an affirmative/positive Europeanisation
where strong and credible external incentives coalesced with favourable
domestic conditions for institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon in
the area of minority rights.
5.5.3. Phase III: 2005-2008
The opening of negotiations on 3 October 2005 was a promising start
for the governing AKP, the political elites as well as to the general public in
Turkey. However, due to internal and international changes, the hopes of
almost everyone vanished and more importantly the political reform process,
in relation to Turkey's institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in
almost all policy areas, came to a halt. For instance, at the international level,
the dispute over the Cyprus issue (i.e., Turkey's hesitation to provide access to
the Republic of Cyprus to use Turkish ports and airports) (Hakura, 2006) and
the EU's decision to suspend the opening of eight chapters in the Acquis
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Communautaire have accelerated the conflicts between the two parties and
slowed down the political reform process.
Contrary to the theoretical assumption of the Increase In the credibility
of conditional rewards after the opening of accession negotiations, in Turkey
this gave rise to an exactly opposite outcome, due to the unfavourable
domestic conditions that took place in this period. In fact, after 2005, Turkish
public support for EUmembership drastically decreased due to the attitudes of
EU member states and their criticisms of Turkey. In support of this, an
interviewee openly stated that public perceptions toward the EU had become
extremely negative in this period, and the majority of the public had perceived
the EU as being 'disingenuous' and 'unfair' (Interview, a high ranking official
from the Undersecretary of the Ministry of EUAffairs, 2012).
Furthermore, according to a poll carried out by the International
Strategic ResearchOrganisation (USAK)24in November 2006, only 50% of the
Turkish people were supportive of Turkey's EUmembership bid, whereas it had
been 75% at the end of 2004 (USAK, 2006). It was also in that period that
discussions on Turkey became important in the 'pre-referendum' environment
in countries such as France and the Netherlands, where referenda would take
place for the approval of the European Constitution (EurActiv, 2005).
Nevertheless, after the opening of 'concrete' accession negotiations in
June 2006, a new negotiation framework was adopted consisting of 35
chapters in total; each chapter had to be opened and closed by the European
Council unanimously. Even though this was a promising starting polnt, in
December 2006, with the suspension of eight chapters in Acquis
Communautaire by EU Foreign Ministers, the reform process drastically slowed
down. The AKP government perceived this move as unjust to Turkey and
inconsistent with the previous decisions of the EU with regards to Turkey. In
spite of these negative developments, Recep Tayyip Erdogan eagerly
24 International Strategic Research Organisation (USAK) is an independent think-tank based in
Ankara. Further information on USAK can be found at: http://www.usak.org.tr.
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reaffirmed his party's commitment to full EUmembership and claimed that the
foreign policy objectives of his party regarding EU membership remained the
same and compatible with EU conditions, as well as Turkish state policies
(Hurrivet, 2006).
However, just before the re-election of the AKP In July 2007, its
decision in the election of a new president heightened domestic turmoil. The
crisis took place due to the fact that the AKP leadership did not nominate their
presidential candidate until the last minute, thus suggesting the highly likely
candidacy of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Despite this likelihood, after the
demonstrations of thousands of secular people in April 2007, the then Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul's name came forward as an alternative and he finally
stood as the AKP's candidate. Although the first round of voting in April was
enough to secure Gul's presidency, the main opposition party, the CHP,
boycotted the first round of voting in the Grand National Assembly. The CHP's
complaint concerning Gul's candidacy was upheld and the Constitutional Court
annulled the first round of elections on the grounds that 'a quorum had not
been present' (Morelli, 2011: 5). Therefore, Prime Minister Erdogan called early
elections for July 2007 and, with almost 47% of the vote, the AKP secured a
parliamentary majority (total 341 seats out of 550), and was able to elect
Abdullah Gul as the President of the Republic in August 2007 (Tezcur, 2007: 1-
4).25
After its re-election, the AKP, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, once again put forward its foreign policy objective as full membership
to the EU. Right after the AKP victory, Erdogan stated that the AKPwill 'press
ahead with reforms and the economic development that we have been we have
25 Abdullah GOI's presidential candidacy was highly controversial on many accounts. Firstly,
GO!'smembership to AKP, a political party closely affiliated with Islamic values, has been one
of the main reasons for the negative public response to his candidacy (<;avdar, 2007).
Secondly, many secularists have been tentative about GO! having roots in Islamist
movements in the past, and his wife wearing a head scarf, which is commonly considered as
symbol of 'Islamism and backwardness'. Thirdly, GUI's presidency was considered highly
controversial due to the possible disruption to the 'balance of political power' since AKP has
already been controlling the Prime Ministry and the Parliament, and by electing GOIas the
President, AKP would also assume the Presidency, hence gaining a supreme control in the
political front (Migdalovitz, 2007).
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been following so far' and further said that 'we will continue to work with
determination to achieve our European goal' (BBC News, 2007a). On the
European side, the Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso commented on
the election results saying: 'This comes at an important moment for the people
of Turkey as the country moves forward with political and economic reforms.
Prime Minister Erdogan has given his personal commitment to the sustained
movement towards the EU. I wish him every success with his new mandate'
(EurActiv, 2007).
However, the relationship between Turkey and the EU stalled for a
second time due to the slowed reform process as a result of domestic turmoil
surrounding allegations that the AKPwas trying to establish an Islamist state.
As one interviewee put it, In the post-2007 period, the political power primarily
focused on domestic affairs, which had a 'counter-balancing' effect on the
political reforms (Interview, Member of Parliament, CHPDeputy#l, 2012). In
March 2008, the chief prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals,
Abdurrahman Yalc;mkaya,flied a court request to the Constitutional Court to
close the AKP, based on its anti-secular activities. If the Constitutional Court
would have decided to bar the AKPbased on these allegations, this would have
resulted in EU accession negotiations being put on hold. The EU closely
monitored the court case and at times posited Its opinion by emphasising the
fact that a party closure in a democratic setting, particularly If the country in
question is a candidate country, would not be In line with the democratic
credentials of the EU. On this particular issue, the Enlargement Commissioner
Olli Rehn stated that: 'In a normal European democracy, political Issues are
debated in the parliament and decided through the ballot box, not in the court
rooms' (EurActiv, 2008).
This period clearly illustrated the ups and downs In the Turkey-EU
relationship and the dramatic decrease in the progress of the political reform
process in Turkey was attributable to the domestic and the EU-Ievel events.
Given that, it can be argued that the final phase of this period came with the
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adoption of a critical report on Turkey by the European Council in May 2008,
re-emphasising the EU's concerns on the lack of reforms made, the AKP's
closure case and the necessity of fostering of reforms. In that respect, the
Turkish government was recommended to 'resolutely' carry out further reforms
that are crucial for Turkey's democratisation process and its accession to the
EU.
Contrary to the fruitful period of 2002-2004, it Is possible to see that in
the period of 2005-2008 neither Turkey nor the EUperformed well In terms of
reward-compliance linkage. This alteration in performance can be explained by
several reasons. Firstly, changes In the attitudes of several EU member states
and the 'mixed signals' they sent to Turkey concerning the alternative
outcomes of the accession negotiations, such as 'privileged partnership'
instead of 'full membership', had a dramatic Impact on Turkey's eagerness to
continue the reform process and negatively affected public opinion on EU
membership. Secondly, in this period, the AKP government, which came Into
power after the general elections In 2002 and was re-elected in 2007, showed
a 'reform fatigue', in other words, an unexpected 'retreat from its political
agenda on the 'EU-demanded democratic reform measures' after the opening
of accession negotiations (Patton, 2007; Grigoriadis, 2009). In support of this,
an interviewee stated that due to the conflicts among its member states with
regard to Turkey's candidacy in this period, the EU failed to take strategic
decisions and therefore could not provide credible conditionality. The closure
case in turn became a 'matter of survival' for AKP, and shifted the governing
party's focus on its own internal dynamics (Interview, a former Foreign
Minister of Turkey, 2012).
Moreover, a number of member states have opposed Turkey's EU
membership such as, France, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, the
Netherlands, Luxemburg and Denmark. The main opposition comes from
Germany and France, and, following them, the Czech Republic and Austria;
they have explicitly stated their opposition to the membership of Turkey and
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have suggested alternative solutions to bind Turkey to the EU, such as the
'privileged partnership' primarily developed by the German Christian
Democrats (Kramer, 2006: 26).26
Although the European Council, in December 2004, decided to open
negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005, the year 2005 was filled with
suspicion. On the Austrian part, the presidency argued for an alteration In the
negotiations in support of an alternative solution to membership. In the same
line, Germany took the same stance when Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of
Germany, suggested the term 'privileged partnership', Instead of full
membership as the strongest deal that can be offered to Turkey. On the other
hand, in order to begin the accession negotiations prior to October 2005,
France attempted to introduce a new condition, which had to be fulfilled,
concerning the 'recognition of Cyprus' (Aydin, 2006: 1-6).
At the domestic level, it was argued that the sudden change In the pace
of reforms after the opening of accession negotiations occurred due to the AKP
government's 'private gains', since AKP started to 'cater' to the 'demands' of
its core religious support groups. The AKP's Initiatives in that respect Included
the party's attempts to allow the wearing of headscarves in public offices and
universities, facilitating the attendance of Islamic clerical school graduates In
universities, and reforming the Higher Education Board (YOK) with an aim to
weaken its tie with the secular state elites (Schleifer, 2006; Ugur and Yankaya,
2008: 594-595). These changes in the policy agenda of the AKP drastically
changed the direction of the democratisation reforms and the prospects of full
EUmembership for Turkey.
26 On the subject of opposition to Turkey's membership to the EU, Mclaren (2007: 275)
studied the attitudes of EU citizens to Turkey's candidacy to the EU based on theories of
'rational economic self-interest' and 'group-level interests and concerns'. The findings of this
study indicate that Turkish candidacy is more likely to produce concerns among EUcitizens in
relation to 'symbolic' issues such as 'threats to culture, way of life' instead of economic issues.
In a similar vein, an interviewee argued that one of the main reasons for the EU's sceptre
attitude to Turkey's candidacy can be linked to the exlstenual arguments surrounding
Turkey's religious identity (Interview, a Turkish actiVist, journalist and professor, 2012).
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Another important domestic factor in the slowdown of reforms was the
re-emergence of nationalist opposition towards the AKP's 'concessions' over
'the Cyprus issue and the rights of ethnic/religious minorities' and, in line with
the demands of the EU, the concessions over the rights of Kurdish people
(Schleifer, 2006; Ugur and Yankaya, 2008). In addition to that, the re-
emergence of Kurdish separatist movements and PKK terrorism In the course
of 2006 triggered the resurgence of hard-line nationalist oppositions to the
extension of the socio-cultural rights of the Kurdish community. As a result,
the AKP's policy towards the Kurdish problem lost Its pre-election liberal and
pluralistic vision, and it became costly for the government to carry out the
necessary reforms in this particular area (Oni~, 2009).
Before the general elections in 2007, nationalist opposition groups,
including political parties such as the MHPand the CHP,as well as the military,
created a threat to the 'support base' of the AKP. In that respect, the AKP
moderated its views from its previous full support of EUmembership to a more
moderate, restrained 'state-centric' and 'security-oriented' discourse on
'democratisation demands and minority rights'. Furthermore, the legislative
proposal of the AKP on the criminalisatlon of adultery, aiming to support and
protect family unity and to ensure gender equality, resulted In Intense
reactions domestically and internationally. This issue therefore negatively
affected the relations between the EUand Turkey to a great extent, since the
EU perceived this attempt as Turkey introducing 'Islamic elements' into its
legal system (Aydin, 2006: 24).
In that respect, Ugur and Yankaya (2008: 595-596) note that 'having
benefited from the legitimacy enhancing engagement with EU institutions and
member states for two years, it [the AKP] has shifted attention to new policy
ventures expected to bring higher returns in terms of support and legitimacy'.
All these domestic developments caused a decrease in the pace of progress in
the reform process; this was the result of the retreat from the previously
reformist attitude of the government and consequently the reform initiatives of
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the AKP's political agenda. In that respect, the AKP failed to show its previous
enthusiasm in making legislative amendments, thus explaining Its weak
performance in complying with the EUrules and conditions In this period.
Surprisingly however, a final attempt at pushing through reforms came
from the AKPwith the launch of several reforms in the area of minority rights
in 2008. In January 2008, the first 24-hour Kurdish television channel in the
history of the Turkish Republic started broadcasting; and In November 2008,
departments on Kurdish language were opened at the Universities of Dlcle and
istanbul, providing proof of the significant extension of the social, cultural and
educational rights of the Kurdish minority (6ni~, 2009: 32). An interviewee
explained that before the political reform process, the social and cultural rights
of the Kurdish minority were very limited. However, the reforms permitting the
first Kurdish television channel to broadcast, provided 'semi-collective' rights
for the Kurdish minority, which are extremely Important for the
democratisation process (Interview, a high ranking official from the
Undersecretary of the Ministry of EUAffairs, 2012).
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that despite the mixed signals of
several EU member states, the pro-enlargement EU member states continued
to support Turkey's reform efforts under the AKPgovernment. These member
states that had been In favour of Turkey's full EU membership were
'constructively critical' of Turkey's reform initiatives, by forcing the AKP to
continue with the democratisation reforms and they attempted to emphasise
that (despite all the alternative solutions to accession process of Turkey), the
'membership prospect' was still on the agenda of the EU. However, the AKP's
declining enthusiasm for the carrying out of reforms and the divergences
among the EU member states with regard to Turkey's membership had an
adverse effect on the reward-compliance linkage.
As a result, Turkey was not successful as in complying with the EU
rules and conditions. At the same time, the EUwas not successful in showing
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its full commitment to the accession process, in terms of providing Turkey with
the necessary incentives (for example, some member states tried to change
the ultimate reward of full membership to a privileged membership Instead) to
accelerate the reform process and hence accelerate the democratisation
process of Turkey, thus significantly lowering the credibility of the EU rewards.
An interviewee made a similar point on the EU's diminishing commitment to
the accession process by indicating that the 'carrot' of membership or
conditionality became invisible in this period (Interview, Ambassador,
Directorate General for Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). To conclude,
unfavourable domestic conditions and weak EU conditionality, with respect to
factors such as the legitimacy of EU rules and the credibility of the EU rewards,
endangered the process of democratisation in Turkey and resulted in a
negated/negative Europeanisation.
5.6. Discussion of the Results
This thesis argues that Turkey's democratisation process cannot be
assessedwithout taking into account the impact of the EUand its conditionality
strategy; and that Europeanisation has had a definite Impact on the
institutional transformation and polley (re)formation in Turkey. Nevertheless,
the way that the EU impacts upon political actors, Institutions and cultural
norms and values, embedded in the Turkish political system, varies across
policy areas and different time periods. As the analysis on minority rights has
shown, Turkey's institutional transformation and policy (re)formation In this
particular area did not show a steady and continual progress across three
periods, and there are several international and domestic-level factors that can
explain the diverging policy processes and policy outcomes. The detailed list of
intervening factors of institutional transformation and policy (re)formation can
be found in Table 5.2 which will be discussed below.
It can be argued that the non-linear progress of Turkey's
democratisation and domestic change, in relation to minority rights policy, can
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be seen as evidence for the different dynamics of domestic change In Turkey
following the pre-accession strategies of the EU. First of all, an analysis of the
first period (1999-2002) shows that the EUeffectively utilised conditionality as
its main influence mechanism. Secondly, the dynamics that accounted for the
degree of domestic change were mainly the material incentives offered by the
EU and the EU's credible conditionality. At this point, the material Incentives
mirror the substantial rewards offered by the EU, In return for Turkey's
compliance with its rules and conditions; whereas the EU's credible
conditionality epitomises the EU's capacity to adopt effective Influence
mechanisms at the early years of domestic change, as well as its significant
progress in determining the requirements and delivering sizeable rewards.
Hence, in accordance with the external incentives model, sizeable
rewards and credible conditionality can be verified as the main triggering
factors for the initiation of institutional transformation and the policy
(re)formation of minority rights in Turkey in the first period (1999-2002). From
the theoretical point of view, the external incentives model assumes that these
factors can cause a rule compliant behaviour in target countries, hence they
can account for domestic change In Turkey, In relation to the pre-accession
strategies of the EU. This line of reasoning provides evidence of the
effectiveness of the EUconditionality strategy and results In Europeanisation at
the domestic level.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 4, there are different levels of
Europeanisation, provided that there are other aspects that should be
considered when assessing the direction and pace of domestic change. If the
above conditions were taken as granted, regardless of other factors, this would
lead to a model of interaction where favourable domestic conditions, in
conjunction with strong conditionality, would result in positive and formal
Europeanisation. This assumption would then indicate a complete institutional
transformation and policy (re)formatlon of the specified policy area. However,
the analysis on minority rights shows that there are other factors, mainly at
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the domestic level, that can account for an atypical process and policy outcome
in this period. These factors can be identified mainly as being the nature of the
government and its identification with the EU, and the negative normative
resonance, as put forward by the social learning model, as well as high
domestic adoption costs, put forward by the external incentives model.
First of all, since the form of the government (consisting of coalition
partners with diverging ideologies), the strength of the government and Its
identification with the EU in the flrst period remained low, this hindered the
establishment of the favourable domestic conditions necessary for domestic
change. Secondly, due to lack of positive normative resonance of domestic
rules, the domestic factors and political setting became exceptionally
unfavourable. Finally, the size of domestic adoption costs were high, reflecting
on the sensitivity of the policy area, the presence of veto players and the
limited state capacity to carry out reforms, due to the unsuitable political
environment. In turn, these domestic factors impinged upon the effectiveness
of conditionality, the timing of formal rule adoption and the further compliance
with EU conditions in the context of Europeanlsation. Therefore, instead of
positive and formal Europeanisation, this period showed a fractional
Europeanisation entrenched by unfavourable domestic conditions and strong
conditionality. As a result, only partial adjustment and alignment with EU rules
and practices could be achieved, Instead of complete institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation which would be the result of positive
and formal Europeanisation.
A number of factors that account for the actual domestic change in the
first period (1999-2002) have shown differences in the second period (2002-
2004). Although international factors, including size of rewards and the
credibility of EUconditionality, remained high and did not show any variance;
domestic factors, such as the size of domestic adoption costs and the nature of
the government and its identification with the EU, have shown variances,
which can explain the diverging process and policy outcome of positive and
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formal Europeanisation. In conjunction with the factors put forward by the
external incentives model, including the size of rewards (high value), credibility
(high value), and size of adoption costs (low value), the social learning model's
factor, concerning the nature of the government and its identification with the
EU (high due to AKP's successful pro-European stance and party policy),
provides sufficient favourable conditions for institutional transformation and
policy (re)formation in this period.
The non-linear progress of Turkey's democratisation and domestic
change, in relation to minority rights policy in the third period (2004-2005),
becomes even more critical. In fact, the majority of the international and
domestic factors show variances signalling to yet another divergence in the
process and policy outcomes. Compared to the previous two periods, the size
of rewards, credibility and size of domestic adoption costs (of the external
incentives model) show opposite values (low, low, and high respectively) in
this period. Furthermore, although the nature of the government and Its
identification with the EU remains the same, hence constituting favourable
domestic conditions, it is apparent that there was no significant policy outcome
in this period. This outcome can be attributed to the dominance of
unfavourable domestic conditions and extremely weak conditionality, the
outcome of which is negative Europeanisatlon.
From the theoretical perspective, the analysis of minority rights has
shown that neither the external incentives, nor the social learning model can
individually explain the diverging process and policy outcomes. In fact, the
cross-period analysis reveals that while the external incentives model Is more
productive for assessing the first period (1999-2002) and the outcome of
fractional Europeanisation (partial adjustment to the EU rules and practices),
the second period (2002-2004) can be explained both by the external
incentives and social learning models.
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The decisive factors, which can explain the diverging outcome of
positive and formal Europeanisation (successful transformation and
(re)formation) in the second period, are the size of domestic adoption costs
(external incentives), and the nature of the government and its identification
with the EU (social learning). The final period can also be explained by the two
theoretical models, since neither favourable conditions (except the nature of
government and its identification with the EU), nor strong conditionality were
present. This outcome can be deduced by examining the lack of political
will/determination of the government (hence, its capacity to carry out reforms)
and lack of consensus among EU member states on Turkey's membership
prospect.
Table 5.2 Intervening factors of institutional transformation and policy
reformation
Period 1191-2002 2002-2004 2005-2008
High (significant High (significant Low (insignificant or
technical and financial rewards in return of no rewards); mutual
Size of reward. rewards in return of
national compliance and deterioration of
national compliance and alignment with the EU relations, negative(EU-Ievel) alignment with the EU legal and administrative perception of accession
legal and administrative framework) requirements and
framework) national progress)
High (effective High (effective Low (Ineffective
conditionality; conditionality; conditionality; double
significant progress in significant progress in standards, confusion;
the determinacy of the determinacy of indeterminate
Credibility requirements and requirements and requirements and
(EU-Ievel) delivery of rewards; delivery of rewards; unsuccessful delivery
membership membership of rewards;
perspective) perspective) diminishing or no
membership
perspective)
High (sensitive topic in Low (increasing benefits High (costs of
this period; presence of of legal and institutional compliance overweight
Size of
veto players; alignment' increasing the rewards; impact of
unsuitable, financial and technical diminishing or nodomestic undemocratic political assistance; prospect of membership
adoption costs environment) opening of accession perspective; limited(Domestlc- negotiations) incentives to proceed
level) with institutional
transformation and
policy (re)formation)
Low (vague clauses on Low (vague clauses on Low (vague clauses on
minority rights; less minority rights; less minority rights; less
institutionalised institutionalised institutionalised
clauses; no clauses; no clauses; no
Legitimacy incorporation in the incorporation in the incorporation In the
(EU-Ievel) Acquis; no common EU Acquis; no common EU Acquis; no common EU
policy on minority rights policy on minority rights policy on minority
rights
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Identity
(Domestlc-
level)
Low (failure of the
coalition partners in
self-identification with
the EU; diverging
ideologies, different
perceptions on the
prospective EU
membership
Low (diverging
categorisation of
minority status;
incompatible domestic
policy on minority rights
with the EU
conditionality)
Resonance
(Domestlc-
level)
High (successful
identification of the
ruling party with the
EU; EUas an aspirant
group)
High (successful
identification of the
ruling party with the
EU; EUas an aspirant
group)
Low (diverging
categorisation of
minority status;
incompatible domestic
policy on minority rights
with the EU
conditionality)
Low (diverging
categorisation of
minority status;
incompatible domestic
poucv on minority
rights with the EU
conditionality)
The next chapter deals with the empirical analysis of the institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation of freedom of expression in Turkey.
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6. The Reforms to Freedom of Expression Laws
in Turkey
6.1. Introduction
In the period preceding the establishment of the European Union (EU),
there had been several legal initiatives, which brought about significant change
in the right to, and the protection of, freedom of expression in the European
continent. First of all, in 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) outlining the 30 fundamental rights of all
people to live freely as individuals. In the UDHR, freedom of expression and
freedom of information (i.e., to seek, receive and Impart Information) are
accepted as two of the most important fundamental rights that people should
be able to exercise without fear of reprisal. Regarding freedom of expression,
Article 19 of the UDHR states that 'everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and Impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers' (United Nations, 1948).
The UDHR is commonly seen as the first attempt at the international
level in acknowledging fundamental human rights, which certainly have had a
huge impact on the Improvement of national and international human rights
law. As Hannum (1995: 289) puts forward, the UDHR transpires as the
'foundation of much of the post-1945 codification of human rights'. Since then,
the right to freedom of expression has been incorporated in various human
rights conventions and agreements, including the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). It can be argued that at present the UDHRnot only represents
a 'common standard of achievement' on human rights, but also a 'declaratory
of customary international law' (Reisman, 1990: 867). It also provides a basis
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for 'moral, political and legal influence' on human rights law on the global scale
(Hannum, 1995: 289).
On the other hand, in 1950, the Council of Europe declared the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
which prepared the ground for increasing freedom of expression across Europe
(Council of Europe, 1950). It has been widely referred to as the 'jewel in the
crown of the Council of Europe' (Council of Europe, 2012). The Convention
states the aim of attaining better unity between its members with the help of
acknowledging the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. The Convention also reaffirms the necessity of having an effective
political democracy in order to maintain human rights and fundamental
freedoms by collective enforcement. All the Member States of the EU are
signatories to the ECHR. However, although individual Member States are
signatories to the Convention, the EU In Its organisational capacity has not
signed the Convention. Regardless of this fact, the Convention still has a
strong impact on the practices of freedom of expression within the EU.
Furthermore, Article 10 of the Convention, corresponding to Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supports everyone's right to freedom
of expression, without being subject to impediments by public authorities; at
the same time, the Convention explicitly states that the exercise of the
freedom of expression should be disposed to several conditions, limitations or
even penalties set down by law. Article 10 proclaims that:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial Integrity or public safety, for the protection
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
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the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence,
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary
(Council of Europe, 1950).
On the other hand, in 1999, the Cologne European Council decided that
the fundamental rights, which are applicable at the EU level, should be
incorporated into a charter, in order to give them 'greater visibility' (European
Council, 1999a). In that respect, based on the general principles set out In the
ECHRand those derived from the 'constitutional traditions' that are common to
the EUMember States, the charter was prepared by a convention consisting of
a representative from each Member State and the European Commission,
along with members of the European Parliament and national parliaments. It Is
called 'the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union' and was
formally proclaimed in December 2000 in Nice by the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission.
However, the charter was given a binding legal effect equal to the
Treaties only after the Lisbon Treaty was came into force In December 2009.
The Charter includes not only the fundamental rights that apply to all EU
citizens, but also the economic and social rights which are contained in the
Council of Europe Social Charter and the Community of Fundamental Social
Rights of Workers. Furthermore, the Charter also reflects on the principles
derived from the case law of the Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights. Article 11 of the Charter states that:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without Interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers.
(2) The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected
(European Union, 2000).
It can be argued that the EU has shown a strong commitment to the
protection of the political rights and freedoms of people living in its member
states, which materialised in the adoption of extensive legislation within the EU.
Apart from the Charter, the EUhas also incorporated its principles on freedom
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of expression in the 23rdchapter of the Acquis Communautalre - 'the body of
common rights and obligations' binding all the Member States together within
the EU (European Commission, 2012a). This chapter, along with the
development of the EUas an area of 'freedom, security and justice', highlights
the importance of Member States having solid legal frameworks and reliable
institutions to underpin coherent policies and to ensure respect for
fundamental rights (European Union, 2012b). In Article 11 of the EU's
Explanatory Screening of the Chapter on the Judiciary and Fundamental Rights,
it is stated on the freedom of expression that:
(1) Scope under Community law equivalent to the protection
provided by Article 10 of the ECHR- freedom of expression, as
embodied in Article 10 of the ECHR, Is recognised as a general
principle of law the observance of which is ensured by the ECJ;
(2) Derogations are permissible only if they are In accordance with
law, pursue a legitimate aim and are necessary in a democratic
society, that is to say be justified by a pressing social need and
in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued;
(3) Commercial use of freedom of expression - freedom of
expression may be limited to an examination of the
reasonableness and proportionality of the interference when
the exercise of the freedom does not contribute to a discussion
of public interest and it arises in a context in which the Member
States have a certain amount of discretion (e.g. In a field as
advertising) ;
(4) Right to information - the right of access to documents of the
institutions is guaranteed to any citizen of the Union and any
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office In
a Member State (European Union, 2006).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the right to freedom of expression
is not absolute in itself. It has been recognised by the drafters of these major
human rights declarations that freedom of expression can be limited In a
number of circumstances, in order to protect legislative aims. These may
include the 'protection of an individual's reputation, public order, national
security, health and morals' (Council of Europe, 1950; United Nations, 1966).
In relation to the issues raised above, this chapter analyses the impact of
the EUon freedom of expression in Turkey, in three periods of time used in the
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previous chapter (1999-2002, 2002-2004, 2005-2008). As the main argument
of this thesis goes, the EU has an undeniable Impact on Turkish
democratisation in general, and on Institutional transformation and
(re)formation of national policies in particular. The EU considers freedom of
expression as one of the 'pillars' of democracy and as a precondition for
membership application, it has set high standards on the protection of freedom
of expression in the Acquis Communautalre and the EU's fundamental values of
justice, freedom, and security (European Union, 2012b). In that respect, as
part of its pre-accession framework, the EU has required Turkey to comply
with the formal rules and requirements to reform its legislation and practices
on freedom of expression, as stated in the Copenhagen criteria, and to align Its
legal framework with that of the EU. In other words, Turkey is expected to
adjust its national legislation in accordance with the Acquis Communautaire,
which requires an extensive reform agenda to bring the national legislation to
the same level as that of the EU member states, not only In terms of rule
adoption, but also in terms of implementation.
There are several factors that account for actual domestic change and
the effectiveness of EU conditionality on domestic transformation in Turkey. In
order to identify the main dynamics of domestic change in the area of freedom
of expression, the systematic analysis in this chapter concentrates on several
factors (both at the EU-Ievel and domestic level) put forward by the external
incentives and social learning models. As noted in the previous chapter, these
factors are identified as: the size of domestic adoption costs, credibility of
conditionality, size of rewards, legitimacy, identity and resonance. As It will be
discussed further below, since political freedoms cover a broad policy area, this
chapter mainly concentrates on freedom of expression in Turkey and looks into
the differences between Turkish and EUregulations in this field.
This chapter finds first that Turkey has been struggling to align its rules
and practices on freedom of expression with the EU's own practices; and the
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country had failed to achieve complete institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation in the area of freedom of expression by the end of the third
period. Nevertheless, in the first period (1999-2002), Turkey managed to
partially adjust itself to the EU's approach on freedom of expression; whereas
in the second period (2002-2004), domestic change became more observable,
due to favourable domestic conditions and the continuation of strong EU
conditionality. Therefore, as was the case for minority rights, the combination
of favourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality brought about
positive Europeanisation in this period. Unfortunately, this did not last long,
due to a downturn affecting changes both at the domestic and the International
level. In the third period (2005-2008), domestic conditions became highly
unfavourable, and there had been a sharp decrease in the strength of
conditionality, making it less influential for the concerned period.
Secondly, in contrast to the minority rights policy, the EUhas shown a
high level of legitimacy in the area of freedom of expression, since clauses
regarding freedom of expression have been successfully integrated Into the
Acquis Communautaire - representing the presence of a common policy at the
EU level. Therefore, the high level of EU legitimacy In the area of freedom of
expression is taken as constant across the three periods. Nevertheless, as a
cross-period analysis reveals, there are diverging outcomes and the constant
high value of EU legitimacy in the area of freedom of expression can account
for favourable conditions at the EU level, contributing to the strength and
effectiveness of conditionality, but it cannot fully explain the differences In
domestic change, and the impact and effectiveness of EUconditionality across
the three periods.
Thirdly, this chapter finds that neither the external incentives model,
nor the social learning model, can fully explain the policy processes and
outcomes. Whilst the size of rewards, credibility and strong conditionality
appear as the key factors in explaining partial adjustment in first period (1999-
2002), the difference between the first and the second period can be explained
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by the addition of successful identification of the government with the EU.This
positive domestic condition, along with low levels of domestic adoption costs,
to a great extent explains the positive shift from partial adjustment to a better
alignment, and on-going institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon.
This is considered as evidence for positive Europeanlsatlon In the second
period (2002-2004). However, even if the target government's Identification
remains the same, in the third period (2005-2008), Its capacity to carry out
reforms, as well as its political will and reform determination, have diminished
significantly. This came as a result of unfavourable changes both at the
domestic and EU level. This has resulted in negative Europeanlsatlon; hence,
no process or policy outcome Is observed, due to unfavourable domestic
conditions and weak conditionality in the final period.
The analysis in this chapter begins with an attempt to conceptualise
freedom of expression, built on classical traditions of democratic theorising.
This section aims to offer the rationale behind the selection of freedom of
expression as a policy area which is subject to change in relation to Turkey's
democratisation efforts under the influence of EU conditionality. The following
section provides a historical overview of the internal dynamics In Turkey, in
relation to practices on freedom of expression, and alms to present the
domestic context in which Turkey Intends to align Itself with the EU's rules and
practices in this area. It is then followed by a discussion on EU conditionality
and freedom of expression in Turkey, in order to identify how the EUengages
with and approaches political freedoms in general, and freedom of expression
in particular. The discussion will also analyse what the legal requirements of
the EUare on institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon in the area
of freedom of expression from Turkey, particularly within the context of its
enlargement policy. The final section provides the policy processes and
outcomes in relation to Turkey's democratisation, by analysing certain changes
longitudinally in three phases (1999-2002, 2002-2004, 2005-2008). The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the results.
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6.2. Conceptualisation of Freedom of Expression
Freedom of expression is one of the vital institutions of democracy.
Liberal democracy not only protects the civic liberties of people, but also
provides substantial freedom for people to express their opinions. It can be
argued that a democracy cannot be consolidated when there are no significant
political freedoms. As is mostly indicated, freedom of expression constitutes
one of the sub-components of political freedoms and its existence, and/or non-
existence, proves to be an essential test for the level of democracy (Mayo,
1960; Dahl, 1998; Held, 2006).
Following Diamond's (1999: 8) line of reasoning on freedoms as
'minimalist conceptions' of democracy, it is useful to break this principle into
sub-components. Among them are certainly the 'freedom of speech', the
'freedom of assembly' and the 'freedom of organisation'. These political
freedoms are accepted as the 'touchstone' of a democratic system; hence,
their existence is seen as the most essential test of the 'extent' of democracy
within a country (Mayo, 1960: 66). In fact, Dahl (1998: 46-53) introduced
'essential rights' and 'general freedoms' as two of the advantages of a
democratic system and labelled 'freedom of expression' as one of the core
political institutions in democracy. These trends not only denote the potency of
democratic political systems to guarantee accessibility and Implementation of
fundamental rights, but also their ability to provide a system where people can
enjoy ample range of freedoms (Dahl, 1998: 46-53).
In order to explain the dangers of suppressing opinions, John Stuart
Mill, who contributed to the foundation for the 'marketplace of Ideas' principle
which has served as justification for the 'liberal approach' to freedom of
expression, wrote in his famous work On Liberty that:
The opinion which is attempted to suppress by authority may
possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny
its truth; but they are not Infallible. They have no authority to
decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other
person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an
172
opmron, because they are sure it is false, is to assume their
certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty [ ...] There is the
greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true,
because, with every opportunity for contesting It, it has not been
refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting Its
refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our
opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its
truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being
with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right
(Mill, 2011: 33-35).
In that respect, it can be argued that freedom of expression is one of
the most fundamental of all freedoms and one of the basic foundations of
democracy. Without freedom of expression a democracy cannot exist, due to
the fact that It guarantees people to express their opinions without being
subject to interference from the state. It is freedom of expression which
creates a common ground, where people can freely discuss any political matter
and share their opinions, express their concerns and advocate for changes If
necessary. Freedom of expression also creates a chance for minority groups to
be heard, which is highly important for their full Inclusion as citizens within a
given society (Democracy Web, 2011b). In that respect, freedom of expression
not only enables participation in political life, but It also makes a more
balanced representation possible.
Following the argument that freedom of expression is one of the vital
institutions of democracy, it can be argued that Turkey has had many
shortcomings in terms of providing the necessary legal protections for the full
enjoyment of this political freedom. Although, in principle, Turkey's perception
on freedom of expression, hence its social salience, has been in line with the
EU's own perception, the practices of freedom of expression, and particularly
the imperfections at the implementation level, indicate that there are certain
divergences between Turkey and the practices of the EUMember States.
The problematical nature of Turkey's alignment with the EU in this area
can directly be linked to the internal dynamics in Turkey concerning the right
to freedom of expression. Nevertheless, as part of its pre-accession process,
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Turkey has been attempting to make necessary legislative and Institutional
amendments to guarantee the rights of its citizens to freedom of expression.
However, it can be argued that the right to freedom of expression has stili not
been fully guaranteed (or implemented) effectively, particularly In areas of
political relevance.
In this context, the analysis In this chapter focuses on specific articles
in the constitution directly linked with the practices of freedom of expression;
and it particularly looks at the differences between the procedures of the
European Court of Human Rights and Turkish courts, regarding the matters on
freedom of expression. This comparison is deemed useful to explore how EU
conditionality is accepted and assimilated in a problematic policy area, such as
freedom of expression, and to pinpoint any issues that might remain unaltered,
even after being subject to the exposure of the EU's external Impact. This
assessment is also useful for answering the main research question of the
thesis, that is, how Europeanlsation impacts upon the Institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey and how the EU Influences
specific cultural norms, values and practices embedded In Turkish political
system.
6.3. Internal Dynamics of Turkey Concerning
Freedom of Expression
It can be argued that freedom of expression has undergone a troubled
historical development in Turkey. Modern Turkey, emerging from the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, had carried the Ottoman legacy for
many years. In the first years of its establishment, Turkey became
predominantly a centralist state under the heavy influence of elites and
bureaucracy. According to Sunar and Sayan (1986: 166-167), the urge to
transform the political structure of the country emerged from within the state
itself and the scope of this transformation included 'state-building' endeavours,
rather than 'social integration'.
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Mustafa Kemal AtatOrk, the founding leader of modern Turkey, adopted a
new model of a nation which is civic and whose 'maxim' is based on its Turkish
Identity (Asian, 2009: 3). In that respect, the new nation was Intended to be
secular, nationalist, unified and centralised, with a culturally and ethnically
homogenous population (Cornell, 2001: 34). It Is argued that, In the early
years of the establishment of the Republic, AtatOrk had tried to control the
practices of freedom of expression, in order to create a notion of national unity.
In fact, it can be argued that in the early years of the RepubliC,by enabling
authoritarian legislative provisions and favouring the protection of the state
against citizens, Turkey refused to follow liberal democratic measures which
consequently had a negative Impact upon the practices of freedom of
expression.
Furthermore, as GOndOz(2001: 27) points out, 'separatist terrorism' has
been the one prominent reason for Turkey's continuously strict polley on
freedom of expression, due to threats It has posed on the Integrity of the
Turkish state. In particular, the activities of the PKK, which has been waging
an insurgency in south-eastern Turkey for the last three decades, has exerted
an enormous impact on restrictions related to freedom of expression. In this
context, the criticising of state pollcles, the ethnic Kurdish minority and
conflicts in south-eastern Turkey, and the role of the military became a few of
the most sensitive topics, and any attempt to express opinion on those topics
has been subject to strict limitations (MOftOler-Ba~,1998).
As indicated in the report of Human Rights Watch on violations on free
expression in Turkey, this internal security threat not only affected the
territorial integrity of the state, but it also Impacted the human rights practices
of the individual. This was followed by the adoption of an Anti-Terror Law In
1991, by which non-violent expression, mainly concerning issues with political
relevance, such as the debate on the Kurdish Issue, was severely repressed,
and many writers and intellectuals were imprisoned on these grounds (Human
Rights Watch, 1999).
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As it is often pointed out, the 'repressive actions' on freedom of
expression in Turkey are directly linked with its 'antiquated' legal system and
restrictive constitution, which are explicitly reflected in Turkey's rather
authoritarian past. In fact, the present constitution was introduced In 1982,
after the military coup of 1980, mostly written by military officials. The
significance of this constitution is that it had replaced the constitution which
was adopted in 1961, after the coup of 1960, and which was far more liberal in
scope. Along with the 1982 Constitution, Turkey's Penal Code also poses a
great limitation on the practice of freedom of expression. The Penal Code Itself
is based on the Italian PenalCode of 1889 and was adopted in 1926. It places
strong emphasis on an 'omnipotent state' and the ideology of Kemallsm
(Panico, 1999: 3).
Two interviewees shared a similar opinion on the point that one of the
main reasons for extensive state-imposed restrictions on fundamental
freedoms was the Constitution of 1982, which was drafted with a 'pro-coup
mindset'. The amendments by the AKPgovernment to the Constitution of 1982
in 2002 were extremely valuable for reducing the restrictions over freedoms
and for the democratisation process in general (Interview, Member of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament, 2012; Interview, a
Representative from the Turkish Industry and BusinessAssociation, 2012).
Particularly since Turkey became a candidate country for EUmembership
in 1999, major steps have been taken to reform human rights practices and
political freedoms. In this context, It became clear to political circles that the
Turkish Constitution should be revised in accordance with contemporary
democratic standards, for instance with regard to freedom of expression, which
is regarded as one of the most important touchstones of EU membership. In
that respect, starting from 1999, Turkey rapidly initiated legal adjustments,
whilst changing its national laws and regulations. With these changes, the
ideology of Kemalism and idea of a supreme state lost its importance to a
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certain extent, and this reasonably took pressure off the practices on freedom
of expression (Human Rights Watch, 1999).
Evidently, the judicial ruling of the European Court of Human Rights have
played a significant role in reforming individual rights concerning freedom of
expression in Turkish legislation. Whilst reforming Its legislation on political
freedoms, Turkey has taken into account these rulings and has initiated its first
attempts to transform its institutions and reform pollcles related to freedom of
expression, in addition to other political freedoms within a democratic
understanding (Batum and KalayclOglu,2001: 24-25). In that respect, In 2000,
an Inter-Party-Conciliation Committee and a Constitution Committee In the
Turkish General Assembly started to work on constitutional amendments
(European Commission, Regular Report, 2000), which are stili In progress as
part of Turkey's democratisation efforts.
6.4. EU Conditionality and Freedom of Expression
EU conditionality concerning freedom of expression has been in effect
since 1999, the year when Turkey was granted candidacy status. Mainly, the
accession conditionality and the relevant requirements concerning freedom of
expression involve the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire, the ratification
of aforementioned charters and the conventions. On the legal grounds, the
conventions of the CaE are also considered as part of the EU's accession
framework strategy. In support of this, one Interviewee stated that Turkey
recognises these charters and the conventions of the CoEas the main 'anchors'
in this field. As part of Its harmonisation process, Turkey intends to build its
reform initiatives in the area of freedom of expression and the judiciary based
on these 'anchors', which is considered vital for Turkish democratisation
(Interview, Researcher at the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation,
2012). On the other hand, at the institutional level, EU conditionality and Its
relevant requirements involve institutional transformation and capaclty-
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building, in order to enhance their cooperation for the effective implementation
of legal provisions in this area.
As a matter of fact, EU conditionality regarding the practice of freedom
of expression in Turkey has shown a great degree of legitimacy and credibility.
It is not only the requirements of this particular area which are incorporated
into the EU's legal framework and the Chapter 23 of the Acquis
Communautaire, but also the conditions and specific recommendations made
by the EU representatives have given clear indications to the Turkish
government, and have guided the government on the reform process.
Nevertheless, in addition to the Regular Reports, the Accession
Partnership Documents and the statements of the European Parliament are the
other important policy documents that expose what the EU more or less
expects from candidate countries. In fact, in the case of Turkey, guarantees
and practices of freedom of expression came out as one of the problematic
issues in these reports. More specifically, as can be found in the Accession
Partnerships, EU conditionality on freedom of expression in Turkey specifically
requires constitutional and legal alignment of practices of freedom of
expression with the EU's own practices of political freedoms. For the detailed
list of requirements on freedom of expression in the APs, see Table 6.1.
Strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees for the
right to freedom of expression in line with Article 10 of
the European Convention of Human rights;
Address in that context the situation of those persons
in prison sentenced for expressing non-violent opinions
2001 Accession Partnership
(Short-term)
2003 Accession Partnership
(Priorities 2003/2004)
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Convention on Human Rights (Articles
Remedy the situation of those persons prosecuted or
sentenced for non-violent expression of opinion;
Implement legal provisions on the right to re-trial
following the relevant judgement of the European
Court of Human Rights
Ensure the exercise of freedom of expression, including
freedom of the press, in line with the European
Convention on Human Rights and in accordance with
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights;
Continue to remedy the situation of those persons
prosecuted or sentenced for non-violent expression of
opinion
2006 Accession Partnership
(Short-term)
6.5. Assessment of the Policy Process and Policy
Outcomes
In the following sections, the impact of EU conditionality on freedom of
expression in Turkey is examined across three periods. As discussed in
previous chapters, the first phase of analysis (1999-2002) starts with the
decision of the European Council at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, where Turkey
was granted EU candidacy status. The ending of the first phase (also the
beginning of the second phase, 2002-2004) coincides with the early general
elections held in Turkey, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
established the first single government that had come to power since 1987.
The third phase (2005-2008) of analysis starts with the opening of accession
negotiations and covers the period where the accession negotiations were
actively pursued. The analysis will focus on the selected six variables (the size
of rewards, credibility, the size of domestic adoption costs, legitimacy, identity,
and resonance) in these specified periods, in order to identify the causal
relationship between EU conditionality and institutional transformation and
policy (re)formation in Turkey in the area of freedom of expression.
6.5.1. Phase I: 1999-2002
First of all, the incorporation of the Chapter on the Judiciary and
Fundamental Rights, Chapter 23 in the Acquis Communautaire of the EU
proves the high level of legitimacy of the EU on its conditions concerning this
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particular area. The incorporation of this chapter in the Acquis shows that the
EU has successfully developed a consensual norm on the fundamental
freedoms in general and the freedom of expression in particular; and it proves
that this area is fully integrated into its legal system, which is shared by the
member states. In that respect, it can be considered that the EU requirements
on the practices of freedom of expression in the candidate countries became
legitimate as they are clearly defined and coherently integrated in the EU legal
framework, and as such they strengthen the likelihood that the target
governments will comply based on these legitimate rules.
On the other hand, when examining Turkey's own practices in the area
of the freedom of expression, one can see that there is a clear divergence
within the legal framework and actual policy Implementation. Although the
principles that rest in the heart of the Turkish Constitution, and the human
rights principles of the EU in relation to freedom of expression, show a great
degree of commonality, the actual implementation of certain clauses in this
particular area show a considerable divergence. As a result of Turkey's
authoritarian past, the glorification of a superior state over all citizens and
their individual freedoms, and various internal security threats, the practices of
freedom of expression in Turkey are restricted and severely punished by the
judicial organs. Due to these divergences between Turkey and the EU, it can
be argued that the level of conformity between the principles Integrated in the
Turkish Constitution and the newly introduced EU rules and norms has shown a
low value, hence resulting in low resonance along with domestiC salience in
this policy area.
On the other hand, electoral support for pro-Islamist and ultra-
nationalist parties significantly increased in 1990s (<;arkoglu, 2002). In this
period, right after the fall of the minority government in November 1998,
President SOleyman Demirel placed the Democratic Left Party (DSP) leader,
SOlent Ecevit, in charge until the general elections of April 1999. As a result of
the general elections held in April, the DSPand the Nationalist Movement Party
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(MHP) became the two biggest parties; together with the Motherland Party
(ANAP), they formed a coalition and received a large vote of confidence by the
Parliament in June 1999. Since the initiation of the new government, the
coalition partners had been involved in serious legislative activities, which
resulted in the adoption of new laws and regulations in the areas essential for
the democratisation of the country. Nevertheless, It can be stated that the
identity factor shows a low value in this period, due to low levels of self-
identification amongst the coalition partners with the EU, as a result of their
ideological differences, as noted in the previous chapter.
The analysis of the size of domestic adoption costs, associated with
reforms on the freedom of expression, is multifaceted. In this period, PKK
terrorism became a major factor, increasing the size of domestic adoption
costs on improving rights to freedom of expression. As Kiri~c;1(2004a: 275)
paints out, the government adopted a hard-line policy in this period,
particularly on the Kurdish issue, which in turn negatively affected the practice
on freedom of expression, based on the argument that It may raise the
potential threat to the national security of the state. For Instance, the
Commission's Regular Report of 1999 on Turkey noted that, In spite of the
positive gestures made by the authorities, the situation regarding freedom of
expression had remained worrying (European Commission, 1999). After the
capture of Ocalan, the situation worsened.
Due to the nature of the Kurdish problem and the symbolic role of
Ocalan in activities of the PKK, the Ministry of Justice called on the Governors
to identify and take legal action against associations, foundations, publications,
organisations and individuals who were likely to take initiatives in favour of
Ocalan or participate in separatist propaganda. Another restrictive measure
was taken in April 1999, when the Public Relations Department of the Ministry
of Interior issued a circular prohibiting the use of certain terminology
potentially in support of 'separatist propaganda' or advocating for separatism
or terrorism in relation to the Kurdish question in press releases and
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publications; this was followed by an Increase In sentences In relation to the
abuse of freedom of expression in May by the General Penal Board of the
Supreme Court of Appeals (European Commission, 1999).
Nevertheless, in 2000, Turkey had shown 'positive' development in
terms of embarking on the transformation of Turkish society, by means of
political reforms, necessary for accession to the EU. Among those, were the
signature of two major international instruments In the field of human rights -
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, the Commtsslon
underlined the fact that, although Turkey had the 'basic' features of a
democratic system, It had been failing In implementing the necessary
institutional reforms (European Commission, 2000).
One of the reasons for this can be linked to the Inability of the
Government to protect the balance between Improving its human rights record
and providing more freedom of expression on the one hand, and respecting
and protecting the founding principles of the Republic of Turkey, such as
territorial integrity and secularism, on the other. To achieve this balance, the
Supreme Board of Co-ordination for Human Rights prepared a report In July,
covering a new S-year development plan (also known as 'Demirok report'), to
identify the political reforms which needed to be carried out In order to comply
with the Copenhagen criteria. This report was then evaluated, and adopted as
a reference and working document by the government In September; it set the
priority objectives with respect to human rights, including the development of
freedom of thought and expression and the establishment of a Human Rights
Department under the Prime Minister (European Commission, 2000).
As stated previously, the EU provides a common policy on the right to
and protection of freedom of expression. Since the EU adopted and
incorporated various norms and conditions on freedom of expression in its
legal framework, and the Acquis Communautaire, it provides clear and explicit
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demands or prerequisites which are required from the candidate countries In
this particular area. Furthermore, through the use of Its official tool, the AP,
the EU states its expectations in terms of Turkey's rule adoption and further
implementation in the policy area of freedom of expression. For instance, in
the AP document of 2001, as a short-term priority, the EU required the
strengthening of the legal and constitutional guarantees for the right to
freedom of expression, in line with Article 10 of the European Convention of
Human Rights; and, in that context, addressing the situation of those persons
in prison who have been sentenced for expressing non-violent opinions
(European Council, 2001b).
As a response to the AP of 2001, Turkey prepared the National
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquls (NPAA) in March 2001. In practice,
the NPAAincludes the list of the Issues included under the reform process and
gives references to the areas that the Turkish government Is planning to
amend or change in accordance with the EU'scritiCisms and requirements. For
instance, in the NPAAof 2001, it was stated that the Turkish Government gives
particular importance to the alignment of practices of freedom of expression
with the EU Acquis and the practices in the Member States; as well as the
enhancement of the freedom of expression In light of the criteria referred to In
Article 10 of the ECHR, including those concerning territorial integrity and
national security (Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EUAffairs, 2001).
It can be argued that in this period, the government showed Its
commitment to institutional transformation and policy (re)formation of the
freedom of expression in Turkey. This came into effect, with a number of
amendments made to the Turkish Constitution of October 2001, followed by
the adoption of legislation to enforce and Implement these amendments
(Kiri~~i, 2004a: 277). In fact, these reforms aimed to strengthen guarantees in
the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also limit capital
punishment. After these constitutional amendments, in November 2001, a new
Civil Code was adopted by the government, and these constitutional changes
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were followed by the introduction of the 'Harmonisation Laws' planned to
transform the changes in the Constitution Into 'concrete action', to bring
Turkish Law in line with the Acquis Communautalre.
As indicated in the Commission's Regular Report of 2001,
developments took place after the adoption of the package of thirty-four
amendments to the 1982 Constitution in October 2001, including the addition
of new provisions on the freedom of expression. For Instance, In Articles 13
and 14 of the Constitution, a number of restrictions, which limited the practices
of freedom of expression, were removed; and the principle of 'proportionality'
(i.e., any limitation of the rights protected must be proportionate) was
introduced. Secondly, the government accelerated Its efforts to finalise a
proposal for legislative changes aiming at the Implementation of constitutional
amendments with respect to freedom of expression, Including changes to
Articles 159 (concerning insults aimed at the parliament, the army, the
republic and the judiciary) and 312 (concerning Incitement to raclal, ethnic or
religious enmity) of the Penal Code and the Articles 7 and 8 (disseminating
separatist propaganda) of Anti-Terror Law (European Commission, 2001).
On the other hand, with respect to international conventions on human
rights, in April 2001, Turkey signed Protocol 12 of the European Convention on
Human Rights on the general prohibition of discrimination by public authorities;
however, the country failed to make any progress in acceding to a number of
other human rights instruments, such as the UN International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the UN International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. Furthermore, the Commission has criticised Turkey
for its violations on provisions of the ECHR in 127 cases. The Report also
touched upon the official data indicating that there had been a significant
number of journalists, writers, intellectuals, and politicians detained for
expressing views and opinions. According to the data, in 2000, around 160
people had been sentenced under Articles 159 and 312 of the PenalCode, and
Article 324 of the Anti-Terrorist law (these figures in 1999 were 347 and 1317
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respectively). Furthermore, in January 2001, around eighty journalists were
imprisoned for political activities or for alleged Infringements of various laws
(European Commission, 2001).
It can be argued that in the later years of this period, the domestic
environment became more suitable for political actors (i.e., government,
political elites and the military) to accept certain overdue changes that would
dramatically affect the composition of their institutional structures. Apart from
factors such as legitimacy, identity, resonance and the size of adoption costs,
one other factor that encouraged those changes can be Identified as the size
and credibility of rewards. For instance, as indicated before, the beginning of
this phase was marked with the Helsinki Summit where Turkey was granted
candidate status, consequently becoming eligible for receiving financial and
technical support as part of the EU'spre-accessionstrategy.
Following that, in June 2001, the EU declared Turkey's eligibility for
participating in 'Community programmes' that granted Turkey full access to
TAIEX offices, for the purpose of transacting business related to the Customs
Union (CU) (Council of the European Union, 2001). In December 2001, the
Council decided to apply the PHARE procedures to EU-Turkey financial
cooperation (Tanlak, 2002: 5), hence permitting Turkey to apply for financial
assistance by participating In the MEDA programme which Is aimed to
implement cooperation measures for the promotion of economic and social
development (European Council, 2001c).
In this period, the efforts of the coalition government to transform the
institutional structures and to reform the polley regarding freedom of
expression have not been a very successful. Instead of a complete domestic
transformation, the political reforms on freedom of expression showed only a
partial adjustment in Turkey to adapt to the rules and practices of the EU on
freedom of expression. Therefore, Turkey's partial adjustment to the EU
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represented a fractional Europeanlsatlon, signifying the model consisted of
unfavourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality.
6.5.2. Phase II: 2002-2004
After the adoption of a major constitutional reform in October 2001,
three more reform packages were adopted in February, March and August
2002, under the leadership of the DSP-MHP-ANAPcoalition. In fact, the
adoption of these reform packages illustrated Turkey's political leaders' grit
regarding further alignment with the values and standards of the EU, as part of
Turkey's membership application process. Nevertheless, It Is Important to
stress that these reforms were adopted during very troublesome political and
economic conditions, after long public debate, including intensive negotiations
and deliberations amongst the political parties, civil SOCiety,economic and
academic circles.
As noted in previous chapters in August 2002, the DSP-MHP-ANAP
coalition government decided to call early elections in November 2002. As a
result of the general elections, the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
gained the highest number of votes and formed a single-party government in
November 2002. The election campaign of the AKP had been openly pro-
European, supporting Western democracy discourses. This strategic campaign
helped the AKP to gain the most votes from different parts of the society,
which resulted in its significant victory in the general elections (Jung, 2006:
130). When examining the identity factor, one can determine that the AKPwas
more successful in terms of self-Identification with the EU. It was the AKP's
main foreign policy goal to promote the EU's economic principles and
democratic standards, and to implement its legal and institutional framework.
As part of its discourse, the AKP stressed the importance of democratic
consolidation and focused on the principles of the EU as stated in the
CopenhagenCriteria, thus initiating a speedy reform process with the intention
of 'obtaining a date' for the opening of accession negotiations (6ni~ and
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Keyman, 2003). With respect to freedom of expression, in Its party programme,
the AKP referred to the necessity of making constitutional amendments,
guaranteeing respect for and the protection of Individual rights and freedoms,
as well as amendments to relevant laws and the institutional capacity
development of a functioning and Independent judicial system. In that respect,
the AKP openly advocated the protection of governance based on the rule of
law, and accepted freedom of expression and thought as Indispensable
elements of a democracy (Justice and Development Party, 2002).
After the constitutional reforms of October 2001, which strengthened
guarantees in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, three new
sets of reform packages were adopted In February, March and August 2002
respectively. In particular, the reform package of August 2002 was Important
due the fact that it widened freedom of expression in Turkey. Nevertheless, In
spite of these positive developments, the Commission In Its Regular Report of
2002 raised its concern on the actual practices of freedom of expression and
stressed that, between October 2001 and June 2002, there were 95
applications made to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning
the violation of freedom of expression In Turkey. As a matter of fact, Turkey'S
failure in implementing those changes became evident when the authorities
had not executed ECtHRjudgements and had not ensured the payment of just
reimbursement ordered by the court as well as erasing the consequences of
criminal convictions violating the ECHR(European Commission, 2002).
In February 2002, a number of legal amendments were made
pertaining to freedom of expression. Among those were amendments to
Articles 159 and 312 of the PenalCode, and Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terror
Law. According to the first amendments to Article 159, prison sentences were
reduced from six to three years for insulting to the state and to state
institutions and threats to the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic and fines
were abolished which previously been imposed for criticising Turkish laws.
However, the actual definition of the offence remained the same. With the
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second amendment, the scope of provision was changed as: expressions of
criticism of the institutions are no longer subject to penalties, unless they are
intended to 'insult' or 'deride' those institutions (European Commission, 2002).
The problem with this amendment was related to the notion of
intention, as it is vaguely defined and can be interpreted in many different
ways; hence, the amendment may jeopardise the Implementation of this
Article in certain cases which are subject to It. As for Article 312, the
description of the offence has changed and the notion of 'Incitement [ ... ] In a
way that may be dangerous for public order' was added to the original
description of the offence 'incitement to hatred on the basis of differences of
social class, race, religion, sect or region'. With this additional phrase in Article
312, a new type of criminal offence was Introduced, namely Insulting 'part of
the people degradingly and in a way that hurts human dignity', which Is
punishable by six months to two years Imprisonment (European Commission,
2002).
Following that, the Council adopted a revised AP In May 2003. In the
revised AP, the Council stated that Turkey Is expected to 'pursue and
implement reforms concerning freedom of expression Including freedom of
press'. Furthermore, Turkey was expected to 11ftany legal restrictions in line
with the ECHR and remedy the situation of those people prosecuted or
sentenced for non-violent expression of opinion; as well as to Implement legal
provisions on the right to re-trial following the relevant judgements of the
ECtHR(European councll, 2003). After the renewed priorities set in the AP of
2003, the AKP government accelerated the reform process by adopting new
harmonisation packages. Over the previous year, four major packages of
political reforms were adopted in total that carried great political significance.
Following the reforms of the seventh harmonisation package, in July 2003, the
government introduced new measures, particularly in the areas of the freedom
of expression, the freedom of association and Civil-military relations, by a
series of amendments made to the Penal Code, the Law on ASSOCiations,and
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the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedure of Military Courts. Although
these amendments were far-reaching In the areas stated above, the
amendments made in the area of freedom of expression did not bring dramatic
changes, and the authorities failed to effectively implement any legislative
amendments in this area (Algan, 2008: 2245).
Throughout this process, the Turkish public to a great extent displayed
full support for the political reforms which were aimed at bringing Turkey In
line with the values, standards and practices of the EU. In the meantime, the
AKP government continued its efforts to achieve its main objective of
complying with the Copenhagen political criteria in time, by setting up a
'Reform Monitoring Group' overseeing the implementation of reforms. In 2003,
the Commission made a positive assessment of the government's objectives
and the positive stance of the public towards radical political reforms; however,
it stressed that in spite of these positive developments, the reforms had failed
to produce practical effects and their implementation remained slow and
uneven.
In the course of 2004, Turkey swiftly responded to the requirements of
the EU and took significant political measures. Among the measures taken in
2004 were the introduction of a new Penal Code, a new Civil Code (to be enter
into force in April 2005), along with further amendments to the Anti-Terror
Law and the Press Law. These changes were aimed at reducing restrictions or
the number of prosecutions and convictions in cases reiated to freedom of
expression. Furthermore, as indicated in the Freedom House report on Turkey,
after the constitutional amendments made In 2004, the principle of the
primacy of international and European human rights conventions over
domestic law were enshrined in the Constitution (Freedom House, 2005).
In spite of these promising changes to civil and political rights,
prosecutions and punishments towards non-violent expression of opinion were
still exercised in this period. As stated in the Commission's Regular Report of
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2004, the Turkish government failed to guarantee the deletion of criminal
records of those who were prosecuted. This reflected the limited Impact of
reforms and the Ineffective implementation of legal changes. For instance,
although Article 159 was amended previously, the same article has been used
to prosecute those who criticise the state institutions In a non-violent way
(European Commission, 2004). This exercise showed that the legal
arrangements failed to provide the Turkish legal system's alignment with the
ECtHR'sapproach on similar cases.
As a result, due to the lack of progress In reforms concerning freedom
of expression, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted an
'Interim Resolution on Freedom of Expression' where Turkey was repeatedly
encouraged to effectively implement those legal changes and was expected to
enhance the direct effect of ECHRin the interpretation of the amended Turkish
law. Nevertheless, acknowledging the progress achieved by Turkey since 2001
in the area of constitutional and legislative reforms, in June 2004, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe lifted the monitoring
procedure, which had been applied since 1996. However, It was made clear
that Turkey would still be subject to 'post-monitoring procedure' solely
focusing on a number of areas where Turkey was expected to pursue Its
obligations under the ECHR(European Commission, 2004).
In terms of the size of domestic adoption costs, it can be argued that
due to the increasing benefits of legal and Institutional alignment, along with
increasing financial and technical asslstance, domestic costs showed a low
value for this period. In this period, the EU's attitude towards Turkey with
regard to its democratisation process, along with political reforms and legal
amendments in line with the EU standards and practices, significantly
improved and showed a conslstentlv positive stance. This became evident
when the EU presented a stronger and clearer accession strategy for Turkey
and also with the inclusion of additional financial and technical assistance,
hence a 'deeper commitment' to Turkey's accession process (Kiri~<;i,2004c).
190
These positive developments can therefore be regarded as tangible
indicators of the size and credibility of rewards, showing a high value. In other
words, it can be argued that the substantial and credible rewards offered by
the EU helped the Turkish government to comply with the EU rules and
conditions, in terms of ensuring that the necessary legal and constitutional
changes, and rule adoptions were made. Therefore it can be argued that
although certain criticisms were made on Turkey's reform progress, along with
rule adoption and implementation, the prospect of membership was a tangible
reward to keep in the picture, as well as the Immediate delivery of additional
financial assistance to encourage the Turkish government to carry on with
political reforms (European Council, 2002). At the end of this period, despite
the existing shortcomings, the EUfound Turkey's efforts In the political reform
process and in aligning its practices with the practices of the EUmember states
satisfactory; in December 2004, at the Brussels Summit, the EU announced a
start-date for formal EU accession talks, which was set for 3 October 2005
(European Council, 2004).
In contrast to the previous period, the AKP government has
successfully identified itself with the EUand shown a great degree of political
will and determination to meet the pre-accession criteria of the EU. The
incentive provided by the prospect of EU membership and of the opening of
accession negotiations became one of the triggering factors for domestic
change in this period. Together with low domestic adoption costs, and strong
EU conditionality, this period showed an on-going improvement in terms of
institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in the area of freedom of
expression. In that respect, combined with more favourable domestic
conditions, strong conditionality assisted Turkey in complying with the EU rules
and conditions. In that respect, the combination of favourable domestic
conditions and strong conditionality resulted in positive Europeanisatlon in this
period.
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6.S.3. Phase III: 200S-2008
The period of 2002-2004 showed a remarkable level of development in
terms of adopting and implementing the EU rules, values and standards,
particularly in the area of freedom of expression. The AKP government had
made a series of constitutional amendments, along with the adoption of
harmonisation packages and put forward further Initiatives to be achieved from
2005 onwards. Having strong public support for the political reforms to attain
EU membership, along with the absence of veto players towards reforms on
freedom of expression, the AKP's job to transform the freedom of expression
became less troublesome and more suitable for drastic changes. The European
Council in December 2004 decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey
on 3 October 2005, and set out the framework and requirements for starting
accession negotiations with Turkey.
Turkey was firstly to enact six pieces of legislation, which particularly
enhanced human rights and the functioning of the judiciary; and secondly,
Turkey was expected to sign the Additional Protocol, extending the existing
Association Agreement with the EU to all new Member States. Fulfilment of
these requirements by Turkey resulted in the opening of accession negotiations.
However, in spite of these favourable conditions and good start to the
negotiations, they came to a halt rather quickly. As noted in the previous
chapter, the dispute over the Cyprus Issue between Turkey and the EU, and
the EU's decision on suspending the opening of eight chapters in the Acquts
Communautaire, brought the membership accession talks to a standstill. On
the other hand, the increasing threat of the resurgence of PKK terrorist
activities caused further impediments to the political reforms (Narh, 2009:
459).
Among the domestic and international factors impacting upon Turkey's
compliance with EU conditionality, which did not change in this period, are
legitimacy and identity factors. As indicated previously, despite the different
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time periods specified here, the EU's position on freedom of expression
remains constant, and therefore the legitimacy of the EU rules and conditions
in this area are considered high in this period. Since the target government
(i.e., the AKPsingle party government) that was subject to EUconditionality In
this period remained the same as in the previous period, the identity factor can
be considered high for this period.
Nevertheless, the changes in Turkey's level of compliance with the EU
conditions on freedom of expression in this period, and Turkey's reluctance In
continuing with the political reform process, signal that there are other internal
and external factors which can cause obstruction. As Patton argues, the main
external change came with the emergence of 'modalities of the EU behaviour
toward Turkey' (Patton, 2007). These modalities mostly stem from the recent
'division' between the EUmember states regarding Turkey's membership (I.e.,
debates on privileged partnership as an alternative to full membership). This
problem went together with difficulties on the EU's enlargement capacity,
implying that the EU may not accept new members If Its absorption capacity
hinders the integration momentum and hence the effective functioning of the
Union itself (Kramer, 2006: 25-27). In contrast to the previous periods,
between 2005 and 2008, the size and credibility of rewards showed a low
value.
On the other hand, In terms of the Internal dynamics, altering public
opinion on the EU accession constitutes an Important point of concern. After
2005, Turkish citizens' perception on the EU membership followed a
Eurosceptic stance. This in turn, negatively Impacted upon AKP's commitment
in Turkey's democratisation process. In addition to that, the nationalist political
elites disputed the desirability of the EU membership by pointing out the
dangers posed to the social traditions and the territorial integrity of the country,
which unquestionably triggered wide-spread suspicion over the prospects of
Turkey's membership to the EU(Hakura, 2006),
193
In the course of 2005, there had been a significant decrease In the
number of people sentenced for the expression of non-violent opinion, due to
the adoption of a new Penal Code. Particularly, the sentences for offences
committed through the media were removed from many, but not all, of the
Articles in relevant laws. Furthermore, the scope of Article 125 on defamation
has been limited and the reasoning on offences against fundamental national
interests was deleted from Article 305. Nevertheless, there are a number of
articles which were not covered in the recent amendments stili posing a great
threat to freedom of expression resulting from their vague definition referring
to offences, such as criticising symbols of state sovereignty, the reputation of
state organs and national security. In practice, Article 301 of the new Penal
Code (former Article 159 of the old Penal Code 'Insulting the State and State
institutions) had been widely used by the judiciary (European Commission,
200Sa).
For example, in August 2005, the novelist Orhan Pamuk was subject to
a court case under Article 301, due to remarks he had made to a Swiss
newspaper regarding the killings of Armenians and Kurdish people In Turkey.
In October 2005, Hrant Dink, a journalist of Armenian origin and the editor of
the bilingual Armenian-Turkish weekly newspaper, Agos, was convicted under
the same article and was given a suspended six month prison sentence In
relation to an article he had written on the Armenian Diaspora. Furthermore, In
September 2005, Emin Karaca was convicted under Article 301 in relation to
an article he wrote, in which he criticised the previous actions of the military.
As the Commission polnts out, these cases should be handled carefully by the
judiciary and should be considered carefully as to whether the concerning
expressions in these individual cases incite 'violence, armed rebellion or enmity'
(European Commission, 200Sa).
When examining the internal and external changes which brought the
political reform process to a halt, one can conclude that the size of domestic
adoption costs increased in the third period for the AKPgovernment to proceed
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with the legal changes, particularly in the area of freedom of expression.
Although the government has attempted to continue with political reforms on
the freedom of expression, the continuation of punishments for non-violent
expression of opinions, and particularly punishments on freedom of press and
imprisonment of journalists in this period, signalled the problematic nature and
unfavourable conditions for domestic change In Turkey. Following these
changes, in January 2006, a revised AP was adopted, setting out updated
priorities that Turkey was expected to address in this period. In the revised AP,
the priorities concerning freedom of expression essentially remained constant.
The AP of 2006 noted in particular that Turkey was expected to 'ensure the
exercise of freedom of expression, Including freedom of press, In line with the
European Convention on Human Rights and in accordance with the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights' (European Council, 2006).
On the other hand, throughout 2006, the authorities had focused on
the implementation of the new PenalCode, the Code of Criminal Procedure and
the Law on the Enforcement of Sentences following their coming Into force In
2005. In particular, the Ministry of Justice played an Important role In updating
the circulars addressed to prosecutors In January 2006. In November 2006,
the Commission in its Regular Report of 2006 stated that the political reform
process has significantly slowed down since the opening of accession
negotiations. The report polnted out that although there had been some
progress in the area of freedom of expression, the implementation of the new
legislation by the judiciary had shown a mixed picture and freedom of
expression in line with European standards has not yet been guaranteed by the
present legal framework (European Commission, 2006a).
In that respect, it can be concluded that the overall assessment of the
EUon the progress made by Turkey has been critical. It cannot be denied that
Turkey has gone a long way to align itself with the standards and the practices
of the EU, and to meet the obligations of membership; however, due to
undesirable domestic factors and an absence of strong EU conditionality, not
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much has been achieved in this period. In its Regular Report of 2007, the
European Commission reiterated its concerns on the ineffectiveness in
implementing the legal and constitutional amendments In relation to freedom
of expression, particularly on the restrictive jurisprudence established in 2006
by the Court of Cassation on Article 301. In fact, the increase in the number of
people prosecuted in 2006 (almost double compared with 2005) indicates the
continuation of conflicting practices in Turkey regarding freedom of expression
(European Commission, 2007).
In the NPAA of 2008, Turkey identified certain legislative and
administrative measures to implement, following a revised Accession
Partnership document in February 2008. Mainly, It was stressed that, In the
framework of freedom of expression and ECHR,measures will be taken not to
penalise expressions, which are in the form of criticism, but do not include
violence. This statement can be regarded as evldence of almost a decade of
inconsistency between Turkey and the EU In terms of implementing case laws
on freedom of expression (Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EUAffairs, 2008). In
April, the Turkish parliament finally adopted amendments to Article 301 of the
Turkish Criminal Code with the intention of strengthening safeguards for
freedom of expression in Turkey. The amendments mainly changed the
working of the article, the implementation of which remains problematic. These
amendments to Article 301 read as follows:
• A person who publicly degrades the Turkish nation, the State of
the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the
Government of Turkey and the judicial bodies of the State, shall
be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six
months to two years;
• A person who publicly degrades the military or security
organisations of the State shall be sentenced to a penalty In
accordance with the first section;
• The expression of an opinion for the purpose of criticism does not
constitute an offence;
• The conduct of investigation for such offence shall be subject to
the permission of the Minister of Justice (European Commission,
2008).
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In this final period, it was particularly difficult for the AKPgovernment to
carry out political reforms associatedwith freedom of expression. In addition to
the lack of credibility on the part of the EU, unfavourable domestiC conditions,
such as a lack of political will on continuation of political reforms and high
domestic adoption costs, have also contributed to the negative Europeanlsation
in this period, signifying inconsequential process and no policy outcomes. In
that respect, it can be concluded that Turkey failed to comply with the EUrules
and conditions on freedom of expression In this period; hence, It could not
pursue institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon.
6.6. Discussion of the Results
Following the argument that freedom of expression Is a vital component
of a liberal democracy, it can be argued that since the beginning of the
Republic, Turkey has failed to protect and promote this civic right. In fact, due
to authoritarian and strict legislative measures, taken In the early years of the
Republic, the practices on freedom of expression have been under the strict
control of the state; and the EU's ability to transform the Institutional
structures and reform policies on freedom of expression has been limited, due
to the embedded strong state character in Turkish politics and the lack of
political will to change the state's stance on granting political freedoms to Its
citizens. Nevertheless, as part of Its democratisation process, which gained
significant momentum after Turkey was declared as a candidate country in the
Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey has attempted to reform this policy area
under the influence of EUconditionality. The EU, on the other hand, through its
conditionality mechanism has increased political attention to freedom of
expression practices in the context of its enlargement policy and demanded
coordination of certain provisions laid down by the EU laws and regulations
concerning the effective pursuit of freedom of expression In candidate
countries.
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Turkey's Institutional transformation and poliey (re}formatlon In the
area of freedom of expression has been one of the most challenging areas in
the context of political reforms. The analysis of freedom of expression has
shown that there are great divergences between Turkey and the EUwithin the
legal and practical boundaries regarding freedom of expression. Even If the EU
has presented a common poliey on freedom of expression, which Is highly
institutionalised at the EU level mirroring the EU's strong legitimacy In this
particular policy, the assimilation of conditionality on freedom of expression at
the domestic level has been Insufficient, particularly due to the lack of
normative resonance of domestic policies. There are a number of factors that
impinged upon the effectiveness of conditionality, the timing of formal rule
adoption, and further compliance with the EUconditions, hence, Impinging also
on domestic change in the context of Europeanlsatlon. These factors are found
to be useful to explain the diverse process and policy outcomes when
compared cross-periodically and cross-sectorally. It can be argued that the
uneven development of Turkey's democratisation and polley change in the area
of freedom of expression can be seen as evidence for inconsistenCiesbetween
international and domestic level factors, which have shown variation between
three time periods (1999-2002, 2002-2004, and 200S-2008). A detailed list of
the intervening factors Impacting upon institutional transformation and polley
(re}formation of freedom of expression can be found In Table 6.2, which will be
discussed below.
First of all, the analysis of the first period (1999-2002) shows that the
conditionality strategy was effective, mainly accounting for the partial
adjustment of Turkish laws and regulations on freedom of expression and its
partial alignment with the EU laws and regulations, in accordance with the
procedures of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Secondly, the
factors that account for unfavourable conditions, posing a risk to domestic
change in the first period, can be Identified as the lack of Identification of the
governing coalition party with the EU and the sheer size of domestic adoption
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costs associated with political reforms on freedom of expression. On the other
hand, strong conditionality, due to the sheer size of rewards and credibility of
the EU in this period, can be considered as the main factors that can account
for the strength of EUconditionality in this period. In that respect, this period
has shown only a fractional Europeanlsatlon, instead of a complete domestic
transformation.
In the second period (2002-2004), however, while some of the factors,
such as size of rewards and credibility remained the same, a number of factors
have shown variance, including the size of domestic adoption costs, and the
nature of the government and its Identification with the EU. In that respect,
the lower size of adoption costs and pro-EU stance of the AKP government
have successfully contributed to the favourable domestic conditions In this
period. This, in turn, increased the opportunities for a complete Institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation, instead of a partial adjustment to
meet the EU rules and conditions. In that respect, this period has shown
positive Europeanisation.
The third period (2005-2008) has shown a sharp decrease In Turkish
democratisation in general, and the institutional transformation and polley
(re)formation of the entire domestic policies in particular. This result shows
that neither favourable domestic conditions, nor the strong conditionality
necessary for a successful domestic change, were present to enforce rule
adoption and compliance with the EU. For Instance, both the size of domestic
adoption cost and credibility have shown opposite values (high and low
respectively) which constitute part of the cause for negative Europeanisation in
this period. On the other hand, even If the identification of the governing party,
the AKP, remained the same, the lack of political will and domestic political
turrnoll, coupled with ambiguities at the EU level, have significantly reduced
Turkey's determination for further democratisation under the influence of the
EU. In that respect, no significant process or policy outcome could be
accomplished in this period.
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From the theoretical point of view, similar to the outcome of the
analysis on minority rights, the analysis on freedom of expression has also
shown that neither the external incentives nor the social learning model can
individually explain diverging process and policy outcomes cross periodically.
The cross-period analysis of freedom of expression reveals that, while the
external incentives model accounts better for assessing the first period (1999-
2002) and the outcome of fractional Europeanlsation (partial adjustment to the
EU rules and practices), the second period (2002-2004) can be explained both
by the external incentives and social learning models.
The decisive factors, which can explain the diverging outcome of
positive and formal Europeanisatlon (successful transformation and
(re)formation) in the second period, are size of domestic adoption costs
(external incentives) and the nature of the government and Its Identification
with the EU (social learning). In a similar vein, the final period can also be
explained by the two theoretical models, since neither favourable conditions
(except the nature of government and Its Identification with the EU), nor
strong conditionality were present; therefore both models might carry
explanatory value for the outcome of negative Europeanlsatlon. Nevertheless,
this outcome can be specifically attributed, firstly, to the lack of political
will/determination of the AKPgovernment, as well as Its capacity to carry out
political reforms; and secondly, to the lack of consensus among EU member
states on the prospect of Turkey's membership in the EU.
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Table 6.2 Intervening factors of institutional transformation and policy reformation
Size of rewards
(EU-Ievel)
High (significant
technical and financial
rewards in return of
national compliance and
alignment with the EU
legal and administrative
framework)
High (significant
rewards in return of
national compliance and
alignment with the EU
legal and administrative
framework)
Low (insignificant or no
rewards); mutual
deterioration of
relations, negative
perception of accession
requirements and
national progress)
High (effective High (effective Low (ineffective
conditionality; conditionality; conditionality; double
significant progress in significant progress in standards, confusion;
Credibility the determinacy of
the determinacy of indeterminate
requirements and requirements and requirements and(EU-Ievel) delivery of rewards; delivery of rewards; unsuccessful delivery of
membership membership rewards; diminishing or
perspective) perspective) no membership
perspective)
High (sensitive topic in Low (increasing benefits High (costs of
this period; presence of of legal and institutional compliance overweight
Size of
veto players; alignment' increasing the rewards; impact of
unsuitable, financial and technical diminishing or no
domestic undemocratic political assistance; prospect of membership
adoption costs environment) opening of accession perspective; limited(Domestlc- negotiations) incentives to proceed
level) with institutional
transformation and
policy (re)formatlon)
High (clear and High (clear and High (clear and
comprehensive clauses comprehensive clauses comprehensive clauses
on freedom of on freedom of on freedom of
Legitimacy
expression; highly expression; highly expression; highly
institutionalised institutionalised institutionalised(EU-Ievel) character; incorporation character; incorporation character; incorporation
in the Acquis; common in the Acquis; common in the Acquis; common
EU policy on freedom of EU policy on freedom of EU policy on freedom of
expression expression expression
Low (failure of the High (successful High (successful
coalition partners in identification of the identification of the
Identity
self-identification with ruling party with the ruling party with the
the EU; diverging EU; EUas an aspirant EU; EU as an aspirant(Domestlc- ideologies, different group) group)
level) perceptions on the
prospective EU
membership
Low (glorification of Low (internal political Low (internal political
Re.anance 'omnipotent'state; conflicts; restrictive conflicts; restrictive
( Domestlc- restrictive political measures particularly measures particularly
level) freedoms due to on subjects with politics on subject with politics
internal threats) relevance) relevance)
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The next chapter deals with the empirical analysis of institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation of the military in Turkey.
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7. The Reforms to the Role of the Military in
Turkey
7.1. Introduction
Western democracies in today's world make use of 'civilian power' as a
measure of 'progress towards democracy' (Kahn, 1997: 140); furthermore,
they acknowledge civilian control over the military as a fundamental condition
for the endurance of a democratic regime. Since the end of the Cold War, a
number of international organisations and multilateral security organisations
developed their defence diplomacy by Introducing a new framework on the
promotion of 'democratic civil-military' relations (Cottey and Forster, 2004: 31-
40). As will be discussed below, the EUcannot be considered as one of these
organisations, since It fails to provide a single framework or common policy on
democratic governance of the security sector or civilian control of military. In
that respect, the EU heavily relies on the legal frameworks and policy
benchmarks of various international organisations, and adopts their standards
as indicators of its own stance in this particular area.
For instance, the OSCEcan be identified as one of the most important
international organisations adopting standards for democratic governance of
the security sector and for civilian control over the military. Primarily, the
OSCE adopted a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security In
1994. The Code is significant due to Its provisions on democratic control of
military; and it is known to be the 'clearest defined' and widely acknowledged
agreement within the OSCE, which Identifies the essential norms and
standards on democratic control of the armed forces (Drent, 2006: SO-Sl).
Most importantly, the OSCECode accepts democratic control of the
military as an 'indispensible element of stability and security' and stresses that
the integration of the security forces with civil society is vital for the
'expression of democracy'. Furthermore, Article VII of the Code states that
'each participating State will at all times provide for and maintain effective
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guidance to and control of its military, paramilitary and security forces by
constitutionally established authorities vested with democratic legitimacy (par.
21). In addition, it states that 'each participating State will provide for Its
legislative approval of defence expenditures' (par. 22) and 'each participating
State, while providing for the individual service members' exercise of his or her
civil rights will ensure that Its armed forces as such are politically neutral' (par.
23) (OSeE, 1994).
Secondly, NATO is an International organisation carrying out activities
that promote liberal values and contribute to the democratic control of defence
forces. For instance, with the Peace for Partnership (pfP) programme, NATO
assists its member states In reforming their security sectors, particularly on
the establishment of constitutional frameworks enshrining democratic control
over military and parliamentary accountability (NATO, 1994). The pfP's main
objective is to 'promote a democratic change' In civil-military relations by
carrying out necessary reforms. PrinCipally, the PfP gives strong emphasis to
the support for democratisation of concerning countries for the purpose of
integrating them into 'Western security structures' (Szemerkenvl, 1996: 64-
67). In that respect, the notion of democratic governance of the security sector
emphasises the importance of influence mechanisms to prove external control
over military structures, in order to designate them Into the Western security
structures in Western Europe.
Furthermore, NATO also provides support to applicant countries that
need to establish coordinated civilian control of the military to become
members (Burk, 2002: 20). For that purpose, NATO set up a 'Membership
Action Plan' for its prospective members with the objective of assisting their
transformation in the defence sector. In that respect, this action plan serves as
a formal programme for the applicant countries. The requirements and
conditions of the plan include a wide range of issues, such as human rights,
security policy, and democratic governance of the defence sector (NATO, 1999).
In many respects, NATO provides detailed and clear benchmarks on
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'democratic-style civil-military relations'. For a detailed list of NATO
benchmarks, see Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 NATO's criteria on 'democratic-style civil-military relations'
'a clear division of authority between
the Head of State and the Head of
Government and the latter's security-
sector ministers enshrined in a written
constitution or public law and
designating who controls the military,
promotes officers in peacetime, has
emergency powers in crises and the
authority to declare war;
peacetime governmental or executive
oversight of general staffs and
commanders through defence ministers,
with the ministry clearly responsible for
all key choices and about the size,
shape, equipment and deployment of
the armed forces;
legislative oversight of the defence
organisation primarily but not
exclusively exercised through 'the
power of purse' - which (a) goes
beyond perfunctory (rubber stamp)
approval of what the executive
proposes, and (b) engages, through
committees, the main opposltlcn
parties, and (c) is supported by
knowledgeable parliamentary staff and
'outside' expertise;
a popular perception of civilian and
democratic control of the armed forces,
with (a) military staffs clearly
answerable to civilian office holders [ ...]
and (b) those civilian office-holders
themselves clearly accountable to the
elected representatives of the society-
at-large'.
In complementing the aforementioned initiatives on democratic
governance of the security sector, in 2002, the UN established the 'United
Nations Development Programme' emphasising the necessity of having
democratic governance of the security sector to guarantee people's safety, to
prevent the military from having coercive power, and assurance of military
accountability. For a detailed list of the UN Development Programme's
objectives see Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2 United Nation's principles of democratic governance in security
sector
Civil-military relations must be based on
a well-articulated hierarchy of authority
between civil authorities and defence
forces, on the mutual rights and
obligations of civil authorities and
defence forces, and on a relationship
with civil society based on transparency
and respect for human rights
Security organisations should operate in
accord with international and
constitutional law and respect human
rights
Ultimate authority on key security
matters must rest with elected
representatives
Security personnel must be trained to
discharge their duties professionally and
should reflect the diversity of their
societies- including women and
minorities.
Information about security planning and
resources must be widely available,
both within government and to the
public, Security must be managed using
a comprehensive, disciplined approach.
This means that security forces should
be subject to the same principles of
public sector management as other
parts of government, with small
adjustments for confidentiality
appropriate to national security
Civil authorities need to have the
capacity to exercise political control
over the operations and financing of
security forces
Policy-makers must place a high priority
on fostering regional and local peace
Civil society must have the means and
capacity to monitor security forces and
provide constructive input into the
political debate on security policy
Last but not least, the Council of Europe (CaE) comes into the picture
as a strong advocate of pluralistic democracy, human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law. In that respect, CoE membership is often
regarded as confirmation of a country's democratic credentials. In relation to
the democratic governance of the security sector, in 2005, the CoE issued a
Recommendation on the 'democratic oversight of the security sector in
member states'. The Recommendation emphasises the importance of
subordination of the armed forces to national democratic institutions, and the
necessity of 'civilian command authority' over the operations of the armed
forces; additionally, it proposes actions for strengthening the legislation on and
member states (Council of Europe, 2005).
the practice of democratic governance of the defence sector within CaE
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Although the EU has been involved in the promotion of democratic
governance of the security sector, Its contribution to providing clear
benchmarks (i.e., a formal document setting out the rules and conditions) has
been quite limited. Rather than having a comprehensive policy and legal
framework on democratic control of the security forces, the EU relies on the
formal documents, Recommendations or the Codes that are provided by other
regional organisations such as the UN, OSCE, NATO, and CoE. On the other
hand, the only main reference to democratic governance of the security sector
amongst EU-Ievel agreements can be found in the Commission's 2003
Communication on Governance and Development. This Communication links
democratic governance to the development in the usual course of events and
further indicates that 'security system reform,27 (SSR) is central to good
governance. According to the principles of SSR, 'effective management,
transparency and accountability' are the compulsory measures for a highly-
developed security system (European Commission, 2003a). Furthermore, in
2006, the European Commission identified the main objective of SSR as the
explicit contribution 'to strengthening of good governance, democracy, the rule
of law, the protection of human rights and the efficient use of public resources'
(European Commission, 2006b).
Moreover, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (also
known as the Venice Commission), which serves as the CoE's advisory on
constitutional matters, prepared a study on democratic control of the armed
forces in 2007. This study aims to evaluate functional approaches, mutual
political rules and standards on the democratic control of the armed forces;
and it is in support of the idea that democratic control over the military is an
important aspect of democracy, since it serves for the alignment of the
interests of the military on one hand and of the democratic society on the
27 According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD)
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), SSR should aim for: i) the establishment of
effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system; ii) improved
delivery of security and justice needs; iii) development of local leadership and ownership of
reform processes; and iv) sustainability of justice and security service delivery (OECD, 2007).
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other, in order to guarantee and protect the democratic constitutional values of
nation states. It is also stated in this study that the control of the military by
civilians helps to condense the 'civil-military gap', which in turn facilitates
'confidence, cooperation and coordination' between civilians and the military,
and promotes the integration of the two entities under the roof of a democratic
society (Council of Europe, 2007).
Based on the aforementioned official documents that the UN, OSCE,
NATO, CoE promote, it can be concluded that civilian supremacy over the
armed forces, and transparent and accountable legislation are considered by
major international organisations as the fundamentals of democratic control
over the security sector; and that the absence of such control may cause
severe hazards for the consolidation of democracy. It can be argued that these
organisations are in a better position in terms of providing tangible guidelines
on what democratic governance of the security sector entails and in terms of
specifying the norms and standards on the subject, and the organisations,
which provide the EUwith a reason for requiring democratic governance of the
defence sector from prospective member states (Hanggi and Tanner, 2005);
whereas the EU itself fails to provide those guidelines on democratic
governance of security sector. In fact, although the official documents of the
EU give references to civilian control of the military, within the framework of
democratic governance of security sector, these references appear to be
detached from one another, consequently calling attention to the EU's
deficiencies in providing a comprehensive framework for its member states;
and in the case of its enlargement policy, where the EU demands certain
changes in reforms from candidate countries to align with the EU's own
standards and practices in this particular area.
Therefore, it can be argued that, as in the case of minority rights, the
non-lncluslon of concrete rules and conditions by the EU on civilian control of
the military or democratic governance of the security sector in its main body of
law (i.e., the Acquis Communautaire), raises concerns over its legitimacy in
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this policy area. The EU, in the absence of a common policy, illegitimately
demands political reforms from candidate countries as part of their pre-
accession framework. This legitimacy problem also jeopardises the institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation of candidate countries. Nevertheless,
the EU recognises Turkey's alignment with its standards on democratic
governance and civilian control of the military as one of the main objectives in
the context of Turkey's accessionprocess.
In relation to the issues raised above, this chapter analyses the impact
of EUconditionality on civilian control of the military in Turkey in three periods
(1999-2002, 2002-2004, and 2005-2008) by focusing on the legal and
institutional developments, as well as international cooperation. Similar to the
minority rights regime, democratic governance of the security sector and
Civilian control of the military are not incorporated into the Acquis
Communautaire. This can be considered as a reflection on the lack of common
policy and of a solid basis for formal and legal transposition of domestic rules.
Nevertheless, this chapter examines Turkey's alignment with the EU on the
issue of civilian control of the military as an indication of rule adoption on
substantive matters, hence the formal aspect of Europeanisation. This chapter
therefore mainly focuses on Turkey's efforts to incorporate the legal and
institutional requirements on civilian control of the military, as well as
international cooperation to uncover the EU's impact on domestiC change in
Turkey.
In order to assess the factors impacting upon the effectiveness of EU
conditionality, in relation to the institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation in the area of the military, the systematic analysis concentrates
on the EU-Ievel and domestic level factors put forward by the external
incentives and social learning models. To reiterate, these factors are identified
as: the size of domestic adoption costs, the credibility of conditionality, the size
of rewards, legitimacy, identity and resonance. Furthermore, since democratic
governance of the defence sector, and more specifically civilian control of the
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military, covers a broad field, this chapter mainly examines the process and
policy changes of the three main components of civil-military relations in
Turkey, which are: the powers of the National Security Council, the presence of
military representatives in public bodies, and the military budget transparency.
This chapter finds first that civil-military relations has been one of the
most challenging policy areas for Turkey to fully transform its institutions and
reform its policies in line with the EU's own rules and practices. The military
has always had great autonomy in Turkey. It was not only the major player in
the nation-state building process, but the military was also the guardian of the
state, responsible for the protection of the unitary and secularity of the nation.
Furthermore, the military has enjoyed power in political affairs, and became an
ordinary player in Turkish polities. Nevertheless, this dominance entirely
conflicts with the rules and norms that the EUhas set out in relation to civil-
military relations and democratic governance of the security sector. In that
respect, it can be argued that normative resonance on civil-military relations
has carried a negative (low) value across the three periods, reflecting on the
contradictory norms and practices In this policy area.
On the other hand, similar to its pollcles on minority rights, the EU's
legitimacy in the area of civil-military relations was weak; hence its legitimacy
remained low across the three periods. The main reason for the EU's low level
of legitimacy lies in the fact that its Acquis Communautaire does not include
any specific clause on Civil-military relations or the democratic governance of
security sector. This, in turn, mirrors the lack of a common polley at the EU
level in this particular area. Therefore, legitimacy and normative resonance
with domestic rules do not show any clear explanatory value for domestic
change across the three periods. Therefore, both legitimacy and normative
resonance fail to explain the diverging outcomes across the three periods.
Nevertheless the analysis finds that regardless of normative resonance and
lack of EUlegitimacy, Turkey still managed to put important, but rather limited
efforts, in aligning its rules and practices on civil-military relations with that of
210
the EU, which can be explained through conditionality-based and socialisation-
based factors.
Secondly, this chapter finds that neither the external incentives model,
nor the social learning model can fully explain the policy processes and
outcomes. Whilst size of rewards and credibility appear as the key factors in
explaining fractional Europeanisation (partial adjustment, Instead of full
transformation) in the first period (1999-2002), in conjunction with these
factors, the nature of government and its identification with the EUand size of
domestiC adoption costs in the second period (2002-2004) also contribute to
explaining the shift from adjustment to Institutional transformation, which is
mirrored in positive and formal Europeanisatlon. On the other hand, in the
third period (2005-2008), negative Europeanisation was seen, which can be
explained by unfavourable domestiC conditions and weak conditionality. The
combination of these factors, hence, did not produce any process or policy
outcome on civil-military relations In the third period.
The analysis in this chapter begins with an attempt to conceptualise
democratic governance of the security sector and civilian control of the military
built on classical traditions of democratic theorising and formal documents
provided by the major International organisations including the UN, OSeE,
NATOand CoE.This section aims to offer the rationale behind the selection of
the civilian control of the military as a policy area subject to change, in relation
to Turkey's democratisation efforts under the influence of EU conditionality.
The following section provides a historical overview of the internal dynamics in
Turkey regarding civil-military relations; and aims to present the domestic
context in which Turkey is attempting to align with the EU's rules and practices
in this area.
It is then followed by a discussion on EU conditionality and the role of
the military in Turkey in order to identify how the EU engages with and
approaches civil-military relations in general; and what the legal requirements
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of the EU are on institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in the
area of the civilian control of the military in candidate states In general, and
from Turkey in particular, within the context of its enlargement policy. The
final section provides the policy processesand outcomes in relation to Turkey's
democratisation by analysing changes longitudinally in three phases (1999-
2002, 2002-2004, 200S-200S). This chapter concludeswith a discussion of the
results.
7.2. Conceptualisation of Civil-Military Relations
In history, one of the primary concerns of human governance has been
the achievement of the 'subordination of military forces' to a 'political authority'
(Kohn, 1997: 140). Civilian control of military, in other words, the
subordination of military power to a civilian authority is an important
component of liberal democracies along with civic pluralism, protection of the
rule of law, an independent judiciary, as well as the protection of minority
rights and fundamental political freedoms (Diamond, 1999: 3-4; 10-12).
Dahl (199S: 14S-149) identifies the 'control of military and police by
the elected officials' as one of the 'essential' conditions for democracy to
endure. The 'control of [the] military and police by elected officials' is placed
under the essential conditions of democracy, since democratic political
institutions cannot develop and persist under the influence of the military and
police. It is also considered that military control over a democracy is the
biggest internal hazard, in view of the fact that both the military and the police
can attempt to control politiCSwithin a society by means of 'physical coercion'.
In that respect, it is very important to limit the power of the military and the
police and restrain those entities by democratically elected officials (Dahl, 1995:
14S-149). In a similar vein, Kohn (1997: 142) stresses that civilian control
involves a decision-making process in which decisions on national security
should be made by the 'popularly elected' and 'approved offlclals' beyond of
armed forces.
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The foundations of civilian control can be listed as 'democratic
governance and the rule of law', 'accountability to public institutions', 'effective
counter-veiling power' and a 'military tradition committed to neutrality'.
Civilian control is commonly accepted as a necessary, but not a sufficient,
precondition for a democratic system. For a functioning democracy, a 'stable
and legitimate' governmental structure, along with the rule of law and civil
liberties, is essential for the perseverance of effective democratic governance
(Hanggi and Tanner, 2005).
The second foundation lies in the functional state apparatus that
defines the methods by which the military is put under civilian control. One of
these methods involves the military's transparency and its accountability to the
legislature which reinforces the military's identification with the people by
encouraging public discussion and mutual trust on matters concerning the
military, such as defence policy, military budget and military operations. The
third foundation focuses on counter forces, such as the militia and the pollee,
which can curb the likelihood of the military itself violating civilian control. The
final foundation is the 'abstinence' of the military from intervening in politiCS.It
is fundamental for democracies to work without the direct or indirect
involvement of the military in politics, i.e. through dictatorship or the
overthrowing of the government; thus, it necessitates the military's neutrality
in political platforms, letting the constitutional and legitimate process of the
governing work on its own (Kohn, 1997: 144-146).
For the consolidation of democracy (in other words, the construction of
a more accountable, representative and receptive democracy), it is necessary
to disperse political power, particularly by limiting the impact of military in
political affairs. In that respect, for an efficient and legitimate democratic
government, deterring the military from becoming involved in the political
sphere is highly crucial. As Diamond (1999: 113) argues, 'democracy cannot
be consolidated until the military becomes firmly subordinated to civilian
control and committed to the democratic constitutional order'.
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Within the same line of reasoning, Przeworskl (1995: 46-48) argues
that if the power of the military is not curbed, then the military may potentially
act as a separate state within a democratic state, which In turn may create
domestic problems regarding the functioning of the democracy since military
intervention in politics has a restrictive Impact on the operation of democratic
institutions. In a similar vein, Hanggi and Tanner (2005: 8) Indicate that the
absence of democratic control of the military has a detrimental Impact on
internal and external security, as well as on the political and economic
development of countries in the process of transition. Therefore It Is highly
important to attain civilian control over the military If the aim Is to have a
democratic political system, where institutions are not limited or Influenced by
the ideologies supported by the military.
From an institutional perspective, the general principles of democratic
governance of the security sector involve civilian, parliamentary, judicial and
public control of the security sector. This includes a constitutional and legal
framework consisting of management of security sector by civilian
governments and the oversight of related laws and budgets within the
jurisdiction of civilian courts and with the participation of civil societies in the
process of national debates on security issues (Hanggi and Tanner, 2005: 15).
In a similar vein, Cizre (2004: 110) identifies the underlying principles of
democratic governance of the armed forces as a 'clear constitutional division of
authority between the civil and military sectors, parliamentary control of the
defence budget' and in order to ensure political neutrality 'governmental
discretion over the professional, institutional and political activities of the
military' is required. This, according to Cizre, corresponds to the necessity of
having an executive control over the military, along with the parliamentary
supervision of the government in power and the military itself (Cizre, 2004:
110).
As previously noted, for analytical purposes, democratic governance of
the defence sector, and more specifically civilian control over the military, In
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Turkey will be examined in connection with three components: the powers of
the National Security Council, the presenceof military representatives In public
bodies, and the military budget transparency. Although the military has been
an indispensable actor In Turkish politics from the very first day of the
establishment of the Republic, as part of the EUaccessionprocess, the powers
of the military and Its impact on politics have been significantly curbed. In
order to better understand the impact of EUconditionality on the Institutional
transformation and policy (re)formatlon of Turkey In the area of civil-military
relations, the next section provides a detailed overview of the culturally
embedded character of the military in relation to the role of the state and
Kemalist ideology.
7.3. Internal Dynamics of Turkey Concerning Civil-
Military Relations
During the nation-building process, the founder of the Republic of
Turkey, Mustafa Kemal AtatOrk, and his closest ally, General ismet Inonu,
regarded the military as a vital 'partner' that would intervene If It was deemed
necessary to safeguard the 'unitary' and 'secular' character of the state
(Greenwood, 2006: 38). In fact, Karabelias (1990: 130) notes that 'the
military institution has been the leading force behind the transformation of the
social, economic and political structure of the Turkish state'. It was Atatork's
aim to create a new nation that is homogeneous and indivisible, in which the
unity of all citizens would be protected. He believed that 'national
heterogeneity' encouraged separate identities within the Ottoman Empire, thus
limiting social integration and resulting in the dissolution of the Empire Itself
(Bora, 1998: 39-42). It is based on the idea that Turkey adopted so called
'French conception of civic nationalism and citizenship', which indicates that
everyone would be bound to the state through the bond of citizenship,
regardless of their ethnic or religious background. (Tocci, 2001: 2-3).
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There are different conjectures on the formation of the Republic. While
it is sometimes speculated that Mustafa Kemal AtatOrk formed a 'secular-
democratic republic', wherein the civilian and the military spheres were
disengaged from one another (Heper and Itzkowltz-Shlfrlnson, 2005: 237); it
is often argued that modern Turkey inescapably Inherited 'hierarchical lines'
from the Ottoman Empire, causing the continuation of close 'military-state ties'
in the early years of Republic (Narh, 2000: 108). This heritage thus assigned
the military a permanent role in society; and as Narh (2008: 108) argued, 'the
military became not only the Republic's defenders, but also the guardians of
secularism and the six principles of [Kemalist tradition of AtatOrk),.28
So far, when the military's presence within Turkish politics has been
discussed, Kemalist sentiments within society surface In the form of nationalist
expressions. Kemalism constitutes the underlying dogma for the Importance of
the military in Turkey. Since Its establishment, the military has been seen as
the guardians of the Kemalist nation state and the Republic of Turkey. The
military henceforth has not been regarded as a threatening actor within politics
by Turkish citizens (Jenkins, 2007: 339). On the contrary, the 'ultimate
justification' of the political influence of the military has been directly linked to
its 'guardianship' of the national Interest; and its primary goal has been the
protection of national unity (Cizre, 1997: 154).
Therefore it can be argued that the military has been perceived as an
entity that protects the preferences of secular Turkish citizens and that
suppresses the extreme religious and separatist acts which may potentially put
the social and territorial integrity of the state in danger. Furthermore, since the
military has been regarded as the sole provider and guarantor of Internal and
external security in Turkey,29 most of Turkish society never questioned Its
28 Kemalism was adopted as the ideology of the new Turkey in 1931. Kemalism has six
principles: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Etatism, Secularism and Reformism (Pfaff,
1963; Narh, 2000; Capezza, 2009). For a detailed analysis of the six principles of Kemalism
see Karpat (1959).
29 Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Service Internal Service Code of 1961 states that the 'duty
of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard Turkish territory and the Turkish Republic as
stipulated by the constitution' (Jacoby, 2004: 133).
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presence within active domestic politics (ozbudun, 2000: 151), until relatively
recently. The military has always influenced governments In power either
directly or indirectly. It has justified its presence in the political domain by
'appealing to the national interest and Its role In maintaining unity' (<;andar,
1999: 131).
Therefore, it can be concluded that the military has always enjoyed
considerable power in Turkish politics. For most of the time, the military
presence in Turkish politics is perceived as the 'refusal of subjugation to
civilian rule' and the 'protection of its institutions against reprisals for Its role In
past authoritarian governments' (rurkmen, 2008: 152). In that respect, the
military's exceptional role in politics has always been a 'major obstacle' for
Turkey's integration into the EU; and this even became a major Issue during
the EU accession negotiations (Narh, 2000: 107). However, the EU accession
process has changed this tendency to a certain extent. It has become clear to
the Turkish public and the Turkish government that the military's Involvement
in politics is not compatible with the EU'sprinciples, such as the civilian control
and democratic governance of the military. In fact, Turkey has been required
to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria to become a member of the EU and 'the
democratic control of military in Turkey' has been one of the most Important
conditions of the political criteria (GOneyand Karatekelioglu, 2005: 440-411).
To conclude, the above discussion has suggested that since the
establishment of the Republic, the military has enjoyed a great level of power
in politics with the enforcement of a specific interpretation of the Kemalist
nation-state. At times, this involvement has been judged by regional
organisations such as the EU as being undemocratic and sometimes as
violating basic human rights. The EU, in that sense, through Its conditionality
strategy and its external influence mechanisms has been trying to reform
Turkey in the area of civil-military relations with the Intention of aligning
Turkey to the practices of the EUmember states. Nevertheless, the Impact of
the EU on the reform process in the area of civil-military relations In Turkey
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has only been a push factor rather than the reason for actual change (Falta~
and Jansen, 2006: 14).
In a similar vein, Heper and Itzkowltz-Shifrlnson (2005: 244) explained
this conditionality-compliance dichotomy in the area of civil-military relations
as, 'a combination of a type of self-restraint exercised by the military, civilians'
changing their conduct of politics, and more recently the military following suit
as well as the "carrot policy" of some International organisations', This
argument can be justified based on the fact that certain domestic variables,
such as social resonance and domestic adoption costs, have not been
compatible with the practices and expectations of the EU. In that respect, It Is
Important to understand the Turkish context, I.e. Turkish political culture and
Institutional behaviour in order to better assess the effectiveness of EU
conditionality on the reforms of civilian control of the military In Turkey.
The next section focuses on the concept of EU conditionality on the
democratic governance of military in Turkey and alms to shed light on the
conditionality-compliance relationship with respect to the EU's credibility and
Turkey's social resonance in a wider perspective.
7.4. EU Conditionality and Democratic Governance
of Security Sector
As part of its democracy promotion agenda, the EUcarries out activities
on reforming the security sector of Its neighbours or third countries. The
rationale behind these activities has roots in the EU's argument that political
and economic liberalisation in modern democracies cannot be accomplished If
the defence and security sectors of countries are under- or un-reformed, and if
the military is not under civilian control. However, even if the EU has been
successfully involved in promoting security sector governance within Its region,
it fails in supplying a comprehensive policy framework on security sector
governance. When examining the Acquis Communautaire of the EU (which
accumulates the overall legislation, legal acts and decisions inclusively, thus
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constituting the main body of the European Union law) It can be argued that
democratic governance of security sector or the principle of civilian control
over the military are not thoroughly incorporated Into the Acquls.
Even if the aforementioned principles are somehow Incorporated within
the requirements of the EU as part of the compliance with the Copenhagen
political criteria, the criteria themselves leave room for a vague Interpretation
of what they actually mean. In fact, concepts of democratic governance of the
security sector or civilian control of the military and the armed forces are not
used explicitly, and the criteria themselves fall to provide clear and credible
guidelines on how to achieve these requirements. For Instance, the information
on the democratic governance of the security sector or civilian control of the
military is only mentioned by the EUwhen this Information Is Incorporated Into
the European Commission's Regular Reports, which are the only official
documents stating the EU'sexpectations on this matter.
On the other hand, when it comes to the EU's Internal dynamics, It can
be seen that the EU Is not fully involved In the defence programmes or
agendas of its individual members. As previously mentioned, this leaves
plenty of room for manoeuvre, In which the EUcan potentially manipulate the
candidate countries based on Its own advantage while not using the same
forceful action towards its own member states. This can support the argument
that the EU loses its credibility when it comes to providing clear, coherent and
tangible guidelines in the area of civil-military relations, which consequently
obscures the process of the compliance of candidate countries (Hanggi and
Tanner, 2005).
Nevertheless, in addition to the Regular Reports, the Accession
Partnership Documents and the statements of the European Parliament are the
other important policy documents that expose what the EU more or less
expects from the candidate countries. In fact, in the case of Turkey, the
subordination of the military to democratic control came out as one of the
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problematic issues in these reports. More specifically, as can be found in the
Accession Partnerships, EU conditionality on civilian control of the military in
Turkey specifically requires good governance, institutional stability, democratic
control, transparency and accountability of the military. For the detailed list of
requirements in the APs, see Table 7.3.
Align the constitutional role of the National Security
Council as an advisory body to the Government in
accordance with the practice of EU Member States
2001 Accession Partnership
(Medium-term)
Adapt the functioning of the National Security Council
in order to align civilian control of the military with
practice in EU Member States
2003 Accession Partnership
(Priorities 2003/2004)
Continue to align civilian control of the military with
practice in EU Member States;
Ensure that civilian authorities fully exercise their
supervisory functions, in particular as regards the
formulation of the national security strategy and its
implementation; 2006 Accession Partnership
(Short-term)
Take steps towards bringing about greater
accountability and transparency in the conduct of
security affairs
Establish full parliamentary oversight of military and
defence policy and all related expenditure, including
by external audit
Although the EU fails to put forward a common policy on the
democratic governance of the security sector and civilian control of the military,
it nevertheless presents a detailed account of the preconditions to be fulfilled
by Turkey as part of its pre-accession framework. Before analysing the
changes with respect to the driving forces behind the institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation of the military in Turkey, it is
necessary to provide an outline of the EU's requirements for democratic
governance of the military in Turkey. This outline presented in Table 7.4. is
composed of the requirements set mainly by the European Commission and
the European Parliament.
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EUconditionality on democratic governance of military in
TurkeyTable 7.4
Standard requirements:
.The Chief of Staff should be accountable to the Defence Minister;
.There should cease to be military representatives on the High-Audia-Visual Board
(RTUK) and the High-Education Board (YOK);
.There should be full parliamentary control of the defence budget, including
auditing, which means a lifting of the 'secrecy clause' and bringing extra-budgetary
funds into the defence budget;
.The functioning of the State Security Courts should be brought fully in line with
European standards, particularly with regard to the defence rights and the practice
of principle of fair trial.
Commission's requirements whose 'Implementation' and the 'Interpretation
of alignment' to EUpractice Is Important:
.Alignment of the functioning of the National Security Council to EU practice;
.Abolition of the informal mechanisms through which the armed forces In Turkey
exercise influence.
Nore extensive requirements stltted In the europun Parliament'. Reports:
.The adoption of a new constItution In which dvillan control over military 15
enshrined as it is in most EU states;
.Abolition of political tasks of the military, Including think-tanks;
.Application of EU norms of company law, competition policy and financial
accountability to businesses with military connections.
In European democratic constitutional states, the control of politics lies
with the government and the parliament. Based on this, Turkey is expected to
eliminate the role of the military as a political actor; hence limit its impact on
political affairs. In that respect, any military task that involves political matters
should be directed to the government. However, as noted above, the EU's
expectation on the 'alignment to European practice' of civilian control of
military is equivocal and misguiding since there is not a single European
practice, but several different practices. It is therefore not legitimate to
demand alignment with European practices which do not necessarily
correspond to a particular form. Hence, it becomes necessary to adopt broader
requirements instead of too specific conditions which can be widely applied to
any candidate country. It is particularly for this reason that the EU
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incorporated its conditions on the democratic governance of the defence sector
and civil-military relations from other International organisations mentioned
previously and created a set of basic standards and norms on what Is known as
'democratic civilian control' (Drent, 2006: 78-80).
7.5. Assessment of the Policy Process and
Outcomes
In the following sections, the impact of EU conditionality on civilian
control of the military in Turkey Is examined across three periods, as was the
case with the previous empirical analysis. The first phase of analysis (1999-
2002) starts with the decision of the European Council at the Helsinki Summit
in 1999, where Turkey was granted EU candidacy status. The ending of the
first phase (also the beginning of the second phase, 2002-2004) coincides with
the early general elections held in Turkey where the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) established the first single-party government that had come to
power since 1987. The third phase (2005-2008) of analysis starts with the
opening of accession negotiations and covers the period where accession
negotiations were actively pursued. The analysis will again focus on the
selected six variables (the size of rewards, credibility, size of domestic
adoption costs, legitimacy, identity, and resonance) in these specified periods
in order to identify the causal relationship between EU conditionality, and
institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey In the area of
civilian control of the military.
7.5.1. Phase I: 1999-2002
Basedon the reviews in the previous sections, it can be asserted that in
the area of civil-military relations, the legitimacy of the EU, particularly on
democratic governance of the defence sector and democratic control of the
military, has been predominantly low; and this effect has been valid for the
three periods under examination. This is mainly due to the fact that the EUhas
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not developed a common consensual norm on democratic control of the
military that is incorporated into its legal system. Rather than having Its own
policy, the EU heavily relies on the formal documents of major International
organisations such as the OSCE,NATO,the UN, and the CoE. It can be argued
that while the current members of the EUenjoy a high level of autonomy over
their national legislations In relation to civilian control of the military, the EU
illegitimately demands that candidate countries align their practices on clvll-
military relations with its own general practices.
On the other hand, when examining Turkey's own practices In the area
of Civil-military relations, one can see a great difference between Turkey and
the practices of the EUmember states. In contrast to the general norms of the
EU on democratic governance of the defence sector and democratic control of
the military, the military in Turkey enjoyed great power not only In security
issues, but also politically. Therefore, It can be concluded that the level of
conformity between the pre-existing domestiC conditions In Turkey and the
newly Introduced EU rules and norms is low, hence leaving resonance along
with 'domestic salience' low in this policy area. Clearly, the absence of strong
and collective norms on the democratic governance of the defence sector,
coupled with the strong presence of the military In domestiC politics, in
contrast to the EU member states' own practices, significantly reduced the
favourable conditions for rule adoption In this particular area regardless of the
three periods under examination.
As indicated in previous chapters, the coalition government that was In
power after Turkey gained its candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit in 1999
was composed of three political parties, the DSP, the MHPand the ANAP.The
ideological differences between the coalition partners were apparent from the
beginning of the coalition partnership when the three of them came to power.
In fact, the reluctance of the MHP, an ultra-nationalist party, to adopt the
reforms demanded by the EUand their negative attitude to EUmembership in
general caused severe setbacks in the alignment of Turkey's own practices
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with that of the EU. The DSP on the other hand was showing medium-level
efforts to engage fully with the reform process, due to Its hard-line policies
particularly on matters concerning the national security of the country.
Given that, it was only the ANAP, a centre-right party that became a
strong advocate of EUmembership. The ANAP's leader, Mesut Yllmaz, was the
only politician in government who confronted the role of the military In politics.
According to Mesut Yllmaz, the main obstacle for Turkey's accession to the EU
was caused by 'national security syndrome' which hindered constitutional
amendments on the military-related issues demanded by the EU (Cizre, 2003:
213; Bilgin, 2005: 191). In that respect, It can be stated that the Identity
factor shows negative stances in this period due to the low levels of self-
identification amongst the coalition partners as a result of their Ideological
differences. Nevertheless, the coalition partners managed to have a rather
moderate pro-European perspective and remained committed to carry out
reforms to attain full membership to the EU regardless of disputes amongst
themselves.
On the other hand, an analysis of the size of domestic adoption costs
associated with reforms on Civil-military relations is a complex one. The
military has always been a political actor In Turkey. Its presence and direct
involvement in political affairs has always been a paint of concern for the EU.
As one interviewee put It, the Issues of civil-military relations and the role of
the military in Turkish politics have always been kept in a 'closed-box' in
Turkey. It was not until the Helsinki Summit that this box was finally opened
(Interview, Political Officer on PubliCadministration and security sector reform,
political affairs, CFSP, press and information section, Delegation of the
European Union to Turkey, 2012).
Starting with the Commission's 1998 Regular Report on the progress of
Turkey, the EUspecifically demanded constitutional changes which would limit
the power of the NSCand bring more accountability and transparency to the
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defence budget (European Commission, 1998). The guardianship role of the
military in Turkish politics in particular Increased the size of the adoption costs
in this area, along with the Internal security concerns which emerged In the
early 1990s, such as the Kurdish problem, the terrorist activities of the PKK
and the resurgence of political Islam; these concerns consistently kept the
military In the political domain, hence the role of the military created a
controversial environment when the EUaccessionprocess Is taken Into account.
However, it should be noted that the size of the adoption costs became
lower after the Helsinki summit. The main reason for this can be explained by
the EU's decision on declaring Turkey as a candidate country In 1999. In fact,
after Turkey gained its candidacy status, the military started to change Its
strategy on certain issues involving national security, and amended Its policies
and adopted more positive approach towards EU membership, but never fully
disappeared from the political arena, due to the sensitive security matters
affecting the national Interests of the country as a whole, I.e. those that
affected the secularist character of the country and Its territorial Integrity.
Nevertheless, immediately after their term started, the DSP-MHP-ANAP
coalition partners began to readjust the structure and the power of the military,
in accordance with the standards and practices of the EU. For Instance, with
the constitutional amendments In June 1999, military judges were banished
from the State Security Courts. This was then followed by an amendment to
Article 118 of the Turkish Constitution in favour of raising the number of
civilian members in the NSC with the Incluslon of a Minister of Justice and
other deputy ministers; this was accompanied by an amendment on the
recommendations of the NSC,where the statement suggesting that something
was a 'priority consideration' (therefore recommended by the military) was
removed and the actual obligation of the NSCwas changed into the 'notifying'
of the Council (Jenkins, 2007: 346).
Following the constitutional changes, the Commission In Its Regular
Report of 2000, evaluated Turkey's institutional transformation and policy
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reformation in the area of civilian control of the military as unsatisfactory and
recommended that 'civilian control of the military stili needs to be Improved'
(European Commission, 2000). In relation to the alignment of the Institutional
structure of the military, the same Report noted that 'contrary to EU, NATO
and OSCEstandards, instead of being answerable to the Defence Minister, the
Chief of the General Staff is still accountable to the Prime Minister' (European
Commission, 2000). It is often argued that the military's independent power
baselo in this period created certain setbacks for policy (re)formatlon In this
area, in a way increasing the domestic adoption costs by acting as potential
veto players in the political arena (Capezza, 2009: 14). Furthermore, the EU
also drew attention to the problematic nature of the wide Impact that the
military had in Turkey, by emphasising that Important institutions, such as the
Council of Higher Education in charge of controlling the activities of higher
education institutions, and the Higher Education Supervisory Board, stili
appoint one military official selected by the Chief of General Staff (European
Commission,2000).
As a response to the EU requirements on civilian control of the military
in the APof 2001, in March 2001, Turkey prepared the National Programme for
the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). In practice, the NPAAIncludes a list of the
issues under the reform process and gives references to the areas that the
Turkish government is planning to amend or change In accordance with the
EU's criticisms and requirements. In relation to civilian control of military
forces, the NPAA of 2001 set up a medium-term action plan aiming to
transform the institutional structure of the military. According to the proposal,
in the medium-term, Turkey would review the relevant articles of the
Constitution and other legislations in order to transform the Institutional
structure and functions of the National Security Council, which, at that time,
acted as a constitutional body providing consultations on national security
30 In this period, the military had retained an independent power base by being directly
accountable to the prime minister's office instead of being subordinate to a civilian defence
minister (Capezza, 2009: 14).
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matters (Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EUAffairs, 2001). It can be argued
that the intention for a 'review' reflects Turkey's reluctance to adopt and
implement EU conditionality on civilian control of the military, due to high
levels of domestic adoption costs which would otherwise result In solid
references to the alignment of the NSC'swith the practices of the EUmember
states as part of its NPAA.
In this period, as part of its political reform agenda, the DSP-MHP-ANAP
coalition made a number of amendments to the Constitution, which were
followed by the adoption of legislation for the enforcement and Implementation
of the concerning constitutional amendments (Klrl~~I, 2004a: 277). The
amendment of the Constitutional Court appears as one of the major changes In
relation to civilian control of the military. With this particular amendment, the
role of the military was significantly curbed; In fact, according to the
amendment, the military would no longer be able to act upon allegations of
'unconstitutional acts prior to the review that would be conducted by the
Constitutional Court' (Capezza, 2009: 14). The same period witnessed the
acceptance of 'Harmonisation Laws' as a second stage In the alignment of
Turkish Law with the practices within the EU. These efforts were often
regarded as significant reform initiatives and signs of the Instigation of a
'momentous change' in Turkish politics (Onl~, 2003: 9).
The Commission in its Regular Report of 2001 welcomes the first steps of
political reforms on civilian control of the military, but finds these Initiatives,
particularly the constitutional amendments on the composition of the NSC,
insufficient and further requires the effective Implementation of the preceding
rule adoptions. In that respect, the Report specifically states that:
As part of the constitutional reform package, the provision of
Article 118 concerning the role and the composition of the National
Security Council has been amended. The number of civilian
members of the NSChas been increased from five to nine while the
number of the military representatives remains at five. In addition,
the new text puts emphasis on the advisory nature of this body,
stresslnq that its role is limited to recommendations. The
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Government is now required to 'evaluate' them Instead of giving
them 'priority consideration'. The extent to which the constitutional
amendment will enhance de facto Civilian control over the military
will need to be monitored (European Commission, 2001).
It can be argued that in the second half of the first period, the domestic
environment became more suitable for the political actors (I.e., the
government, political elites and the military) to accept certain overdue changes
that would dramatically affect the composition of their Institutional structures.
Apart from the factors that are examined thus far, one other factor that
contributed to the positive changes can be identified as the size and credibility
of rewards. Theoretically, any target government In a candidate country Is
more likely to adopt and implement EU rules and norms If the EU delivers
substantial rewards, I.e. financial and technical assistance, In return for their
compliance (Schimmelfennlg et al., 2003: 496-497). In addition to that, these
rewards are considered credible if and when they are given In proportion to the
progress achieved by the target governments, and If they are delivered
promptly after the rule adoption (Schimmelfennlg et al., 2002: 11).
As indicated in the previous chapters, this phase was Initially marked
with the Helsinki Summit where Turkey was granted Its candidate status and
consequently becoming eligible to receive financial and technical support as
part of the EU's pre-accession strategy. Following that, In June 2001, the
European Council declared Turkey's eligibility to participate In 'Community
programmes' that granted Turkey full access to TAIEX offices for the purpose
of transacting business related to the Customs Union (CU) (Council of the
European Union, 2001). In December 2001, the Council decided to apply the
PHAREprocedures to EU-Turkey financial cooperation (Tanlak, 2002: 5) hence
permitting Turkey to apply for financial assistance by participating In the
MEDA , aimed to implement cooperation measures for the promotion of
economic and social development (European Council, 2001c). In that respect,
the size and credibility of rewards carried a high value for the first period.
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To conclude, the institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon of
civil-military relations did not show a complete change In the first phase.
Although the DSP-MHP-ANAPcoalition had successfully Initiated certain
changes, aiming to increase civilian control over the military and to curb the
military's presence and influence in politics, their ideological differences have
caused certain setbacks and negatively affected their Identification with the EU,
and also increased the size of domestic adoption costs. These two factors, In
turn, caused unfavourable conditions for domestic change. Nevertheless, the
EU successfully offered tangible and timely rewards In this period which,
despite the EU's lack of legitimacy on civil-military relations, contributed to
strong conditionality. Therefore, with the combination of unfavourable
domestic conditions, and strong conditionality, only partial adjustment
referring to fractional Europeanlsatlon could be achieved In this period.
7.5.2. Phase II: 2002-2004
In 2002, just before the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took
office, the EU found Turkey's efforts to reform civilian control of the military
insufficient. Therefore, in the second period, EU representatives were
compelled to force the new government to address Turkey's shortcomings In
civil-military relations. Contrary to everyone's expectations, political affairs
changed drastically at the domestiC level. Although the election of the AKPas a
Single-party government caused widespread concern among military, political
and Civilian circles due to the party's alleged Islamist roots (Dogan, 2005: 429;
Jenkins, 2007: 348), the party rejected any accusation of its supposed Islamist
identity (C;agaptay, 2D02b; 20D2c) and insisted that they would not challenge
the secular character of the Turkish state.
In that respect, as noted in previous chapters, when examining the
identity factor, one can determine that in contrast to the previous coalition
government, the AKP, as a single-party government, was more successful In
terms of its self-identification with the EU. For instance, one of the AKP'smain
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foreign policy goals was to promote the EU'sdemocratic principles; and as part
of the party's discourse, regularly stressed the Importance and further need for
democratic consolidation in Turkey. It is often argued that the AKP was
successful in wisely curbing the powers of the military and Its Influence on
political affairs; and AKP's justification was based on Its efforts to open
accession negotiations with the EU as soon as possible. In fact, the election
campaign of the AKPhad been pro-European and In support of the discourses
of Western-style democracy. Its strategiC election campaign helped the AKPto
get most of the votes from across different sections of the SOCiety,which
resulted in its decisive victory in the general elections (lung, 2006: 130).
Therefore in this period, the AKPinitiated a speedy reform processwith
the Intention of 'obtaining a date' for the opening of accession negotiations
(Onl$ and Keyman, 2003). More specifically on the subject of civilian control of
the military, the AKP, in its party programme, emphasised that the key action
In curbing the influence of the military on political matters would be Turkey's
alignment with the EU's democratic norms and principles (<;agaptay, 2003b:
214). Parallel to the Commission's Regular Report of 2001, In the Regular
Report of 2002, a similar emphasis was given to the Implementation of the
rules on civilian control of the military that had been recently adopted. In
relation to this issue, the Report stated that the constitutional amendment,
introducing changes to the composition and role of the National Security
Council, had been put Into practice. Nonetheless, these changes do not appear
to have modified the way in which the National Security Council operates In
practice (European Commission, 2002). Based on this effect, In December
2002, the European Council in Copenhagen demanded that the Turkish
government should promptly take action in Identifying the remaining
shortcomings in this area, and should produce an action plan aiming towards
the adoption and implementation of the necessary legislation (Drent, 2006:
75).
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Following that, with the adoption of a revised AP In May 2003, the
Council advised Turkey to 'adapt the functioning of the National Security
Council in order to align civilian control of the military with practice In the EU
Member States' (European Council, 2003). It Is often argued that the
aforementioned advice comprises a better approach In contrast to the
Commission's former advice In the APof 2001 concerning civilian control of the
military, which arguably underestimated the distinctiveness of the role of the
military in Turkey. In fact, the advice of 2002 sees the actual problem of the
NSC's role In Turkey in a broader perspective, rather than following a similar
approach of the AP of 2001, which was rather 'formalistic' and 'legalistic'
(Drent, 2006: 74).
Furthermore, this period set the scene for the Introduction of a number
of harmonisation packages. For Instance, the seventh harmonisation package
was introduced in August 2003; this package Included new measures to reform
the NSC, in order to accomplish institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation in alignment with the practices of the EU Member States.
Turkey's respective responses to the EU's formal requirements In this policy
area further involved the enhancement of the accountability and transparency
of the Turkish armed forces. In that respect, the AKP government made
significant efforts to preserve an impartial dialogue with military officials which
demonstrated the government's determination In the democratisation process
and respective political reforms in this period. This was followed by TGNA's
decision on the composition of the NSC.According to the TGNA's decision, the
NSC would be supervised by a civilian member Instead of a military official
(Capezza, 2009: 14). Among the other changes were additional clauses on the
defence budget and the control of defence expenses (MOftOler-Bac;,2005: 27);
this also included the abolition of the unrestricted access of the military to
civilian agencies and the authority to check on the implementation of NSC
recommendations (Jenkins, 2007: 347).
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Nevertheless, there had been certain setbacks on the reforms
concerning civilian control of the military In this period. In particular, EU
conditionality failed to enforce reforms concerning the status of the Chief of
Staff (of the Turkish Armed Forces). As previously noted, the Chief of Staff Is
directly accountable to the Prime Minister In Turkey (Heper, 2005: 222). The
EU has criticised this institutional arrangement of the Turkish Armed Forces
and demanded that the Chief of Staff should Instead be responsible for the
Ministry of Defence. This EU requirement was strongly criticised by the military
and the military acted as a veto player on this particular Issue. This In turn
resulted in the postponement of the reform process on civilian control of the
military.
In terms of the evaluation of Turkey's Institutional transformation and
policy (re)formation concerning civilian control of the military, the Commission
in its Regular Report of 2003 noted that In spite of Turkey's noteworthy efforts,
the EU detected a number of problems at the Implementation level. The EU
also commented that 'the armed forces In Turkey [stili] exercise Influence
through informal mechanisms' (European Commission, 2003b). The Report
specifically highlighted that despite the legal arrangements around the NSC's
operation, auditing of the defence budget and expenditures was stili subject to
'restrictions under Article 160 of the Constitution under which the
confidentiality of the national defence Is foreseen' (European Commission,
2003b). This statement was also repeated In the Strategy Paper and Report on
Continued Enlargement which was Issued In 2003, where the Commission on
behalf of the EU noted more on the Issue of accountability and emphasised
that 'full parliamentary control over military expenditures must be ensured
both in terms of approving the budget and In terms of auditing' (European
Commission, 2003c).
Furthermore, In May 2003, Arle Oostlander, the Rapporteur of the
European Parliament on Turkey prepared a report proving political evaluation
of the Commission's Regular Reports and Turkey's progress respectively. In
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this report, Oostlander made a radical call for the termination of the NSCIn Its
current structure. Furthermore, he also called for the adoption of a new
Constitution instead of the revision and review process of the existing 1982
Constitution based on the assumption that the changes required by the EUare
so fundamental that the amendment of the current Constitution will not suffice
by any means. Given that, the EuropeanParliament's report stated that:
the army maintains a central position In the Turkish state and
society; notes with regret that the army's excessive role slows
down Turkey's development towards a democratic and pluralist
system, and advocates that Turkey must take the opportunity of Its
present government with its strong parliamentary support to
elaborate a new political and constitutional system, which
guarantees the principles of a secular system without military
supremacy above civil institutions, so that the traditional power of
the bureaucracy and the army (the 'deep State') can resume the
forms which are usual In the Member States (European Parliament,
2003).
Turkey's response to the requirements of the EU came In the form of
various measures adopted in the course of 2003-2004. First of all, with the
amendment on the Law on Public Financial Management and Control, the
extra-budgetary funds in the Ministry of Defence's annual budget would be
dissolved by the end of 2007 (Greenwood, 2006: 35). In the final stage of this
period, in January 2004, a new Regulation was adopted redefining the duties,
functioning and composition of the NSC,which was followed by the removal of
secrecy clause from the constitutional provisions governing the work of the
Court of Audit. Furthermore, the institutional structure of the Turkish Armed
Forces has significantly changed with an amendment dlsempowerlng the
General Staff to select a member to take charge in the Higher Education Board.
One significant change came in June 2004 on the institutional transformation
of civilian control of the military, when the system of State Security Courts was
completely abolished (Greenwood, 2006: 35).
By looking at these reforms on civilian control of the military, it can be
argued that the AKP government successfully contributed to the Institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey as part of its overall
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democratisation. EUconditionality has been a key factor In shaping the process
outcome In this period. The government In this period used the prospective EU
membership as an influential tool to trigger political and public support for
constitutional and legislative amendments which resulted In the lessening of
the military's impact on polltlcs. As acknowledged In the Regular Report of
2004, this was reflected In the successful alignment of civil-military relations
with the EU. However, as previously Indicated, these positive developments did
not necessarily guarantee full abolishment of the Turkish Armed Force's (TAF)
control in politics. In fact, It Is noted that the TAFcontinued to exercise political
Influence through various Informal channels. More specifically, the concerning
points in the Regular Report of 2004 were referred to as the 'provisions on the
basis of which the military continues to enjoy a degree of autonomy' and 'legal
and administrative structures which are not accountable to civilian structures'
(European Commission, 2004). In that respect, the EU promptly requested the
full exercise of the civilian authorities' supervisory functions to be practiced In
order to assert full civilian control of the military.
After taking these official documents Into account, It can be argued that
Turkey's compliance with the EU rules on civil-military relations has been
rather troubled. It is therefore difficult to come to a clear-cut conclusion on the
factor of the size of adoption costs, since domestic adoption costs are derived
from the power costs of target governments and the presence of veto players
(Schimmelfennig, 200Sc: S-6). In more concrete terms, civil-military relations
became one of the hardest areas for the AKPgovernment to reform, since the
guardianship role of the military has been highly Institutionalised by means of
constitutional and legal arrangements, and by having Its roots going back to
the independence of Turkey In 1919.
Nevertheless, the changes at the domestic level, I.e. the PKK's
disengagement from terrorist activities In this period, led to decreasing
Influence of the military In politics, along with changing strategies of the
military itself. The military, for example, adopted a more moderate stance on
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the prospect of EUmembership; and as a result, the military got less Involved
in crucial political decisions. This decreased the costs associated with the
reforms and rule adoptions In the area of civil-military relations. The military
was well aware of the fact that If It pursued any assertive public statements
regarding the AKP or Its alleged Islamist agenda, this would most certainly
delay the opening of accession negotiations and would also endanger the
military's 'public prestige' (Jenkins, 2007: 348-349). When all these factors are
taken into account, it can be concluded that the adoption costs In this period
remained at a medium level.
In this period, the EU's attitude towards Turkey, with regard to Its
democratisation process along with political reforms and legal amendments in
alignment with the EUstandards and practices, has significantly Improved and
shown a constant positive stance. This became evident when the EUpresented
a stronger and clearer accession strategy for Turkey also with the Inclusion of
additional financial and technical assistance hence a deeper commitment to
Turkey's accession process (Klri$~i, 2004c). These positive developments can
therefore be regarded as tangible indicators of the size and credibility of
rewards, showing a high value. In other words, It can be argued that the
substantial and credible rewards offered by the EU helped the Turkish
government to comply with the EU rules and conditions in terms of making
necessary legal and constitutional changes and rule adoptions for the
institutional transformation and policy (re)formation of civilian control of the
military.
For instance, in this period, the EU's attitude towards Turkey's
membership did not show variance in terms of offering its most Important
reward, full membership, as the strongest institutional tie with the EU Itself.
Although Turkey was expecting to get a date for the opening of accession
negotiations early In this period, In December 2002, at the Copenhagen
Summit, the EU decided to review Turkey's democratisation process with
respect to its requirements on further rule adoption and Implementation. As a
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result, the EU considered that the prospect of full membership was likely for
Turkey and Immediate delivery of additional financial and technical assistance
as encouraging for the process, hence triggering factors for the Turkish
government to continue Its reform efforts (European Council, 2002).
Nevertheless, at the end of this period, despite the existing shortcomings, the
EU found Turkey's efforts In aligning Its civil-military relations with the
practices of the EUmember states satisfactory and, In December 2004, at the
Brussels Summit, the EUannounced a start-date for formal EUaccession talks
as 3 October 2005 (European councu, 2004).
In contrast to the first period, In this period, the AKP was more
successful as the governing party In carrying out reforms In relation to clvll-
military relations. As a single party government, the AKP was not only
successful in terms of Identifying Itself with the EU, but had also benefited from
favourable domestic conditions which helped the party Itself to effectively
comply with the EU conditions on civil-military relations. More specifically,
having the powers of the military curbed to a certain degree, the AKP could
manage to reduce the role of the military as a veto player, hence Increasing
the chances of making further changes at the domestic level. In that respect,
the size of domestic adoption costs was significantly lower than In the previous
period. With the combination of favourable domestic conditions and strong
conditionality, this period has shown an affirmative/positive Europeanlsatlon,
hence, successful Institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon In the
area of civil-military relations.
7.5.3. Phase III: 2005-2008
Although the previous period ended with a promising development on
the institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon In the area of the
military, this period witnessed a dramatic down-turn In terms of Turkey's
domestic transformation all policy areas. This came as a result of reciprocal
disagreements between Turkey and the EU. As noted In previous chapters, the
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dispute over the Cyprus issue (I.e., Turkey's hesitation to provide access to the
Republic of Cyprus to use Turkish ports and airports) (Hakura, 2006) and the
EU's decision on suspending the opening of eight chapters In Acquls
Communautaire have accelerated the conflicts between the two parties and
slowed down the political reform process.
As previously noted, legitimacy and Identity factors are among the
domestic and international factors Impacting upon Turkey's compliance with EU
conditionality, which did not change In this period. In fact, despite the different
time periods specified here, the EU'sownership on the principles of democratic
governance of the defence sector and civilian control of the military remains
constant, therefore the legitimacy of EU rules and conditions In the area of
civil-military relations Is considered low In this period. The Identity factor Is
considered high, as in the case of previous period, since the target government
subject to EU conditionality in this period (the AKP government) remained the
same, and its approach to the EUdid not show any variance.
In contrast to the previous period, between 2005 and 2008, the size
and credibility of rewards showed a low value, which does not support the
theoretical presumptions of the external Incentives and social learning models.
It can be argued that the changes in Turkey's level of compliance with EU
conditions on civil-military relations In this period, as well as Its reluctance to
continue with the political reform process, signalled that there were other
Internal and external factors that caused this obstruction. Among the external
factors causing this obstruction were the changes In the EU's attitude towards
Turkey and Turkey's membership application, and the EU'sdeclining absorption
capacity (Patton, 2007). On the other hand, among the Internal factors were
the significant change In Turkish public opinion on EU accesston, and
diminishing political will of the AKP government In carrying out the reforms
demanded by the EU. As <;;:agaptay(2009: 2) potnts out, as soon as actual
talks of EU membership began In 2005, the AKP became 'reluctant to take on
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tough, potentially unpopular reforms mandated by the EU, making the
accession seem less and less a likely reality'.
Furthermore, the appotntrnent of General Yasar BOyOkamtas the Chief
of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) In August 2006 marked a new era for clvll-
military relations in Turkey. Starting from the first day of his term, BOyOkamt
made public statements on the role of the military in Turkey and the threat
posed by Islamic fundamentalism (Jenkins, 2007: 339). These developments
were perceived as Illustrating how the military's high profile In politiCSwas
being retained through Internal mechanisms which were tied In with the public
statements of major military officials on Turkey's political and security matters,
including the 'danger of weakening laicism, Kurdish separatism and Cyprus
issue' (Narh, 2009: 460).
For instance, among those Informal mechanisms that the military
Imposed, a clear Illustration of Its Influence on domestic politics came with the
appearance of the so-called 'e-memorandum'. On 27 April 2007, the Turkish
General Staff posted a statement on Its website announcing the following
statement: 'Some circles who have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb
fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, have
escalated their efforts recently', and they stated that the 'fundamentalist
understanding [of the government] was eroding the very foundation of the
Turkish Republic and the Ideas that It was founded upon' (BBC News, 2007b).
The AKP, along with various Islamists, regarded this statement from the
military as an 'internet coup'. In addition to this, due to the closure case
opened against the AKPon constitutional grounds, the party became defensive
in its policy actions and started a prosecution process against nationalist and
Kemalist circles (Capezza, 2009: 19).
Furthermore, the opposition of the military to the election of Abdullah
GOIas the President of the Republic of Turkey and Its explicit warning via Its
announcement on the Internet was considered as a postmodern Intervention In
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politics. The AKP used this intervention as a strong argument against the
democratic credentials of the country and managed to strengthen Its votes and
position within the society. As Tokta§ and Kurt (2008: 6) Indicate the election
victory of the AKP Is considered as a public's remonstration against the
military's Involvement in the political realm. In contrast to 2006, the period
following the electoral victory of the AKP, the military showed a low profile In
politics. One of the reasons for this change Is explained by the military's
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the e-memorandum as It was Intended to
warn the government and the Prime Minister Erdogan's against attempts to
keep the military out of the political sphere by making public statements (Narh,
2009: 463).
When examining the Internal and external changes that brought the
political reform process to a halt, one can conclude that the size of domestic
adoption costs were extremely high for the AKP government to proceed with
the legal changes, particularly regarding changes to Civil-military relations,
which resulted In the AKP government's failure to proceed with Its political
reforms in this area. As a response to the APof 2006 which provided a detailed
list of the EU's requirements on civilian control of the military, a few
constitutional amendments were made In 2006. For Instance, legal
amendments were made on the Law of the Court of Auditors and the
publication of the military expense report (which was formerly prepared and
undisclosed by the Court itself) was brought under the regulation of the
Council of Ministers (Narh, 2009: 455).
Due to the lack of political reforms In this period, the Commission In Its
Regular Report of 2006 found Turkey's political reform process Insufficient. The
report painted out that the short-term priorities on civilian control over the
military specified In the AP still remain to be fulfilled (European Commission,
2006a). In that respect, It can be concluded that the overall assessment of the
EUon the progress made by Turkey has been critical. It cannot be denied that
Turkey has gone a long way to align itself with the standards and the practices
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of the EU and meet the obligations of membership; however, due to
undesirable domestic factors and the absence of strong EU conditionality, not
much has been achieved in this period. Although certain amendments had
been made to provide for a democratic and civilian control of the military and
to curb its influence In politics, It Is stili clear that the social and political
salience of the role of military contradicts the EU's own norms and principles.
This again leaves us with the conclusion that as In previous periods, the
resonance factor remains low In the period of 2005-2008.
Furthermore, in 2007, the European Council criticised Turkey concerning
the setbacks on the transparency of Its defence budgeting. In relation to the
defence budgeting, in the same year, the Commission stated In Its Regular
Report that 'the Constitution, and EU harmonisation reforms enable the Court
of Auditors to carry out external ex-post audits of military expenditures and
properties' and 'no progress has been made In terms of strengthening
parliamentary oversight of the military budget and expenditure' (European
Commission, 2007). On the other hand, In late 2008, the tensions between the
military and the AKP government escalated. In October 2008, the AKP
government opened a trial against 86 people as members of an ultra-
nationalist group called Ergenekon based on the accusations that they were
organising a series of attacks and a possible military coup against the
government. This trial therefore set the scene for a power struggle between
the AKP government and the military hence decreasing the already troubled
trust between the two entities. Jenkins (2007: 354) summarises this period by
saying that:
In early 2007 Turkey appeared to be heading for a period of
sustained uncertainty against a backdrop of a slowing economy,
fading hopes of EU accession, rising nationalism and Increasing
tensions with the Kurds of northern Iraq. In such an environment,
and in the continued absence of a political party able to challenge
the JOP, many Turks will once again look to the country's military
not only as a force for stability but also as the de facto opposition
to the government.
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As pointed out in the 2008 Regular Report by the European Commission,
the armed forces continued to exercise significant political Influence, although
a certain level of political control over the military was applied. It Is further
stressed that the members of the National Security Council (NSC) and other
individual senior members of the military have continued to express their
opinion on domestic and international policy Issues on a regular basis. The
report further underlined that no changes have been made on military-related
issues, such as: the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law and the Law on
the National Security Council; strengthening parliamentary oversight of the
military budget and expenditure; and ensuring full supervisory functions over
the military (European Commission, 2008).
This period has been particularly disappointing both for Turkey to comply
with the EU conditions and for the EU to provide credible and strong
conditionality. Turkey failed to show Its full commitment to carrying out the
political reforms as part of its pre-accession strategy, and the EU failed to
provide the necessary incentives to trigger Institutional transformation and
policy (re)formatlon in Turkey. Therefore, the combination of unfavourable
conditions and weak conditionality has resulted In no process or policy outcome,
which is associated with negative Europeanlsatlon.
7.6. Discussion of the Results
The last decade of the 20th century has brought the Issue of clvil-
military relations to the core of political studies, tackling Issues such as
national security, democratic governance of defence sector and Influence of
military in politics, especially In countries that are democratising or In the
process of reform completion for the purpose of granting membership to
various regional or International organisations. On the other hand, since the
beginning of their relations, the EU has always criticised the Ineffective civilian
control of the military In Turkey. Within the context of EUaccession and In the
light of the Copenhagen political criteria, Turkey has been strictly required to
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establish a 'civilian control of military forces' and restrict the military's Impact
on Turkish politics. Overall, the prospective EU membership has
unquestionably been the 'strongest catalyst' for democratic reform In Turkey
(Gordon and Taspmar, 2004: 6). This chapter Identified potential factors that
can explain the conditions under which Turkey adopted or failed to adopt EU
rules on the civilian control of the military. The analysis focused on the
adoption of EU rules concerning the role of the military and was divided Into
three phases (1999-2002, 2002-2004 and 2005-2008). Primarily, It can be
concluded that each phase has shown differences In terms of rule adoption,
which mirror changes in the civil-military relations under the Influence of EU
conditionality and vary due to differences In domestic and International factors.
Overall, the analysis on the Institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation of the civilian control of the military In Turkey yields several
empirical and theoretical conclusions. Firstly, the empirical analysis shows that
although significant progress has been achieved towards civilian control of the
military since the beginning of the reform process In the 2000s, the role and
the responsibility areas of the National Security Council (NSC) In particular
remain practically unchanged. Prompted by the existence of significant Internal
and external security threats, the NSCcontinued to function as a power centre
wherein military officials enjoy a significant degree of autonomy over decisions
concerning the national security; hence, these officials are heavily Involved in
the political decision-making process along with the political parties. Secondly,
despite the changes in the composition of the NSC (I.e., changes In the
number of the civilians taking part in the NSC), certain official appolntments
indicated that military personnel retained their strong presence and control
over security matters. Thirdly, the tradition of the guardianship role of the
military in Turkey remained Intact as is evident in the cases of the Informal
mechanisms being employed by the Turkish armed forces, In addition to Its
continuing ability to have political influence over security related Issues.
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One important element that needs to be addressed here Is the
autonomy and the centralised organisational structure of the military,
constituting the two foundational qualities of Turkey's security framework.
Within the state mechanism, the military has enjoyed great power until
recently. Even if the recent reforms In this area limited the power of the
military to a great extent, the military bureaucracy stili assumes a decisive role
in domestic pollttcs and influence over core policy areas; but they did not have
a definite impact upon the complete clvillanisation of the policy-making process
in the security sector. The current decisive role of the military In politics helps
the organisation to be Immune to democratic governance and civilian oversight.
It can be concluded that the key component and determinant of democratic
civilian oversight of the military emerged as the government's power and
capacity to utilise the means to achieve this democratic governance of the
security sector. However, for the parliamentary oversight mechanisms to
function properly there are certain preconditions that need to be met: the
increase of legislative power of the parliament on security-related Issues, the
development and the framework of security poltcles and strategies by the
parliament, and the formulation of the defence budget and expenditure by the
parliament.
However, it can be concluded that the EU has failed to stimulate an 'au-
encompassing' political reform process regarding Civil-military relations In
Turkey. The ineffectiveness of EU pressure comes from Its lack of legitimacy In
the area of democratic governance of the security sector since the norms on
civilian control of the military do not have a fully Institutionalised character In
the EU. In fact, the Acquls Communautalre, the main body of EU laws, does
not include a chapter on civil-military relations which shows that the EU lacks
the ability to validate its requirements from the candidate countries that are In
the process of accession negotiations. Therefore, the legitimacy of the EU rules
and conditions on the issue of Civil-military relations falls to explain Turkey's
compliance with the EU rules and norms since It shows a low value for all three
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periods; hence this lack of legitimacy falls short In explaining the differences In
Turkey's level of compliance In the three different periods as It was a constant
factor. This assertion Is reflected in Turkey's efforts to carry out political
reforms particularly between 1999 and 2004, Inclusive of the first two phases.
As in the case of the legitimacy factor, the resonance of pollcles on
civil-military relations has shown a low stance In all three periods. In the social
learning model, the resonance variable refers to the legacy of the Turkish state,
Kemalism and the military, and the conformity of the pre-existing rules and
norms in the area of Civil-military relations with that of the EU. Since the
beginning of the creation of the Republic, the military has enjoyed great
autonomy in Turkey and became the guardian of the state which safeguarded
the unity and secularity of the nation. It was the leading actor In transforming
the social, political and economic structure of the country. Due to Its
guardianship role, the military has quite often stepped Into political affairs
hence It became a conventional figure In politics. This Involvement of the
military in the political affairs of the Turkish state entirely conflicts with the
EU's norms and practices. The EU Is a strong advocate of the non-Involvement
of the military in politiCSand the respective democratic control of the military
by civilian authorities. This contradiction between the already existing norms In
Turkey and the norms and practices In the EUmember states proves that the
resonance factor cannot provide any explanation to the variance In Turkey's
compliance in all three phases. Nevertheless, this factor might account for
Turkey's failure to fully comply with EUdemands on the role of the military.
On the other hand, one other factor that emerges as one of the
domestic level factors contributing to the explanation on Turkey's compliance
with the EU rules Is Identity, which represents target government(s)'
association with the EU as an aspiring group, In addition to their Internal
dynamics within the social learning model. Between 1999 and 2002, Turkey
carried out significant reforms on the role of the military. However, when
compared to the period after 2002, one can see that the level of achievement
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remains significantly low. This may be a result of the level of Identification of
the ruling government, the DSP-MHP-ANAPcoalition. The coalition partners
had a troubled start from the moment that they came to power due to their
ideological differences and their divergent perceptions on the role of the
military. While the DSPand the MHPstayed more moderate on the role of the
military, the ANAPemerged as the only coalition partner that challenged the
military's involvement In politiCS, which In turn made any proposal on
reforming the military structure more costly to Implement. However, this
negative aspect of identification disappeared when the AKPcame Into power In
2004. As a Single-party government, the AKP did not Involve Itself In any
ideological dispute with coalition partner(s). In fact, the AKPused the prospect
of EU accession as a tool to mobilise Its supporters and projected Its
commitment to obtain a date for the opening of accession negotiations as one
of the important foreign policy objectives. At the same time, the AKP put Its
pre-European character to the front as a strategic attempt to suppress various
accusations on its Islamist character.
Furthermore, the analysis shows that there had been strong
conditionality for the first and second phases. This can be explained by a
combination of factors, which give strength to the Impression that
conditionality is effective. More specifically, both the size and credibility of the
rewards offered by the EU strengthened the conditionality applied In these
phases. The tangible and timely rewards, I.e. candidacy status, financial and
technical pre-accession support, eligibility for participating In community
programmes and opening of accession negotiations, have altogether provided
a necessary catalyst for effective external pressure on domestic change In
Turkey. Although these conditions are necessary for the effectiveness of
conditionality, the outcome of domestic change cannot be fully achieved If
these factors are not combined with favourable domestic conditions. In the first
phase, the favourable domestic conditions necessary for a complete
transformation (hence for positive Europeanlsation) were missing. Firstly, the
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domestic adoption costs in relation to civil-military relations were significantly
high in the first period. Secondly, the identification of the DSP-MHP-ANAP
coalition government was also problematic, due to the ideological differences
between the coalition partners which negatively affected the favourable
domestic conditions; therefore reducing the likelihood of having positive
Europeanisation in the first period. Instead, as a result of the combination of
unfavourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality, Turkey could only
partially adjust its policies on civil-military relations with that of the EU and Its
compliance remained deficient. In that respect, the first period showed only a
fractional Europeanlsation in the area of civil-military relations.
On the other hand, favourable conditions were present in the second
phase, which can explain the deviation In the process and policy outcome. First
of all, by forming a Single-party government, the AKP used the advantage of
not having coalition partners which might have had ideological differences. In
that respect, the AKPwas more successful In terms of Identifying Itself with the
EU compared to Its predecessors. This evidently has contributed to the
favourable conditions at the domestic level which is argued to be necessary for
a complete domestic transformation, hence a positive Europeanisatlon.
However, this factor cannot explain the deviation between the first and second
period in terms of the process and policy outcome.
Another factor that should be taken into account, which can explain the
deviation, is the size of domestic adoption costs. In the area of civil-military
relations, any change in the rules for the purpose of aligning with the EU rules
and conditions is costly for the target governments. This is mainly because of
the position of the military in the Turkish state. It is a highly institutionalised
entity with an extremely strong support system, relying on the Turkish citizens.
Even if all the domestic factors would be favourable for the rule adoption and
hence compliance, this fact would increase the size of adoption costs to a
certain extent, which is evident in all three phases. Nevertheless, particularly
in the second period, the EUas an alternative security provider persuaded the
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military to leave the political arena, hence forming a 'conductive environment'
for impeding reforms (Tocci, 2005: 73-83). Therefore, the AKP government
has made great progress In terms of aligning Its civil-military relations with the
practices of the EU member states due to combining factors, such as the EU
conditionality and relatively favourable domestic conditions In the second
phase.
In the third phase, neither a strong conditionality, nor favourable
domestic conditions were present. This eventually led to no significant process
or policy outcome In this period, hence, resulting In negative Europeanlsatlon.
More specifically, any combination of factors, which bring about strong
conditionality (i.e., sizable and credible rewards, legitimacy) or domestic
factors for a favourable environment necessary for domestic change (I.e., low
domestic adoption costs, and resonance), were missing In this period. For
Instance, the relations between Turkey and the EU significantly deteriorated
soon after the opening of accession negotiations.
The pre-accession framework of Turkey and the enlargement agenda of
the EU have been negatively affected by political matters, such as the Cyprus
Issue and the EU's absorption capacity, as weli as the negative stance of major
EUcountries on Turkey's membership, Including Germany, France and Austria.
These matters have weakened the conditionality applied to Turkey In this
period. No significant or tangible rewards were given, and, on the contrary, the
EU, by suspending the opening of eight chapters In Acquls Communautarle,
discouraged any possible reform progress under the leadership of the AKP.
However, these were not the only Issues that have caused the negativity over
Turkey's domestic change. At the domestiC level, It was seen that the AKPwas
also struggling to cope with the EUdemands and Its attention was divided over
other domestic matters which has caused the AKP to move Its focus away from
political reforms and EUmembership.
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These factors Irrefutably prevented any concrete attempt for Turkey's
Institutional transformation and policy {re)formatlon In all of the policy areas.
Furthermore, the domestic adoption costs associated with Civil-military
relations were significantly high, due to the role of the military In politics In this
period. Even if its role In politics has been significantly curbed In the second
period, particularly after the AKP was re-elected as the ruling party and
Abdullah GUl'Selection as the President of the Republic of Turkey, have stirred
nationalist reactions from various circles Including a large portion of the public
and the military Itself. The military has shown Its reaction by making public
statements Indicating that the military would step In If deemed necessary for
the sake of protecting the secular character of the Republic. These changes
had a direct Impact on the AKP/s efforts or Initiatives on continuing with
political reforms In this period.
As previously noted, due to unfavourable domestiC conditions,
combined with strong conditionality, the first phase has shown a fractional
Europeanlsation of civil-military relations. However, the situation started to
change in the second period, when the domestiC conditions became relatively
more favourable compared to the first period. In that respect, the combination
of favourable conditions and strong conditionality has resulted In positive
Europeanisatlon. On the other hand, the third period has shown a negative
Europeanlsatlon, due to unfavourable domestic conditions and weak
conditionality. The outcome of each period Is summarised In Table 7.5. It can
be concluded that the empirical findings of the analysis on reforms on the role
of the military in Turkey reveal that neither the external Incentives model nor
the social learning model are fully compatible with the specific case of Turkey
in the area of the Civil-military relations and on the Civilian control of the
military.
In that respect, the findings are In support of the argument that there
Is a need for further and alternative Investigation on the other forms of formal
and informal influence mechanisms that may trigger or limit the reforms In the
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specified area. Nevertheless, it became clear that the external pressure of the
EU is not the only causing factor for the overall political change in Turkey. In
fact, the reforms carried out on civil-military relations within the three time
periods have been the result of the interconnection between the EU accession
process and the developing domestic atmosphere. As a result of these reforms,
the power of the military has been noticeably restrained and Its authority In
some civilian institutions and influence in politics has been diminish d to a
great extent (Aydin" et al., 2006: 77). In sum, the picture presented In this
chapter is a complex one; and it defies easy conclusions on the strength of th
EU's influence mechanisms and its impact on the reform process of Turkey. As
seen in the analysis, the EU's leverage varies across policy areas and different
time periods and, even when the influence of the EU is strongest, the analysis
shows that the domestic politics and domestic factors must sttll be tak n Into
account.
Table 7.5 Intervening factors of institutional transformation and polley
reformation
Period 1999-2002 2002-2004 2005-1008
High (significant High (significant Low (Inslgnlflc nt or
technical and financial rewards In return of nor rewards); mutual
Size of rewards in return of
national compliance det rloratlon of
national compliance and alignment with relations, n gatlve
rewards (EU- and alignment with the EU legal and perception oflevel) the EU legal and administrative ace sslon
administrative framework) requirements and
framework) national progress)
High (effective High (effective Low (Ineff ctlv
conditional ity; conditionality; conditionality; double
significant progress in significant progress In standards, confusion;
the determinacy of the determinacy of indeterminate
Credibility requirements and requirements and requirem nts and
(EU-Ievel) delivery of rewards; delivery of rewards; unsuccessful d livery
membership membership of rewards;
perspective) perspective) diminishing or no
membership
perspective)
High (sensitive toptc in Low (Increasing High (costs of
this period; presence benefits of legal and compliance
Size of of veto players;
Institutional overweight the
unsuitable, alignment'; Increasing rewards; impa t of
domestic undemocratic political financial and technical diminishing or no
adoption costs environment) assistance; prospect membership(Domestlc- of opening of perspective; limit d
level) accession Incentives to proceed
negotiations) with Institutional
tra nsformatlon
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Low (vague clauses on Low (vague clauses on Low (vague clauses
civilian control of the civilian control of the on civilian control of
military; less military; less the military; less
Legitimacy institutionalised institutionalised institutionalisedclauses; no clauses; no clauses; no(EU-Ievel) incorporation in the incorporation In the Incorporation In the
Acquis; no common Acquis; no common Acquls; no common
EU policy on civilian EU policy on civilian EU polley on civilian
control of the military control of the military control of the military
Low (failure of the High (successful High (successful
coalition partners in identification of the Identification of the
Identity self-identification with
ruling party with the ruling party with the
the EU; diverging EU; EU as an aspirant EU; EU as an aspirant(Domestlc- ideologies, different group) group)level) perceptions on the
prospective EU
membership
Low (embedded Low (embedded Low (embedded
military culture; military culture; military culture;
Resonance influence of Kemalism influence of Kemalism Influence of
(Domestic- ideology; the military ideology; the military Kemallsm Ideology;
level) as 'guardians of the as 'guardians of the the military as
Republic') Republic') 'guardians of the
Republic')
In the next chapter the empirical analysis of the institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation will turn to the judiciary in Turkey.
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8. The Reforms to the Judiciary in Turkey
B.1. Introduction
'In the modern world, [ ...] freedom to choose one's governor Is the
hallmark of a democracy' (Keong, 2010: 229). However, Keong's statement on
the freedom of choice does not guarantee a functioning democracy; In fact,
there are various elements, both necessary and essential, which are required
for the achievement of a functioning democracy. In that respect, the protection
and promotion of the rule of law can be considered as one of the necessary
elements for building a democracy. This element can only be provided If there
is a neutral institution, which ensures the enforcement and equal delivery of
the rule of law and justice. In all democracies, this neutral Institution Is known
as the judiciary. In this sense, the judiciary Is often seen as the 'Iynchpln of a
democratic society and the rule of law' (Tiede, 2006: 129). Nevertheless, there
are several conditions impacting upon the ability of the judiciary to fulfil Its role
in democracies. Mainly, It depends on whether the judiciary Is an Independent
and impartial institution (Larkins, 1996: 606). As Keong (2010: 230) rightly
points out 'a judiciary that is not independent would not be able to fulfil such a
role, and would provide a weak foundation for democracy and Its associated
attribute (i.e., the rule of law) to flourish'.
There are a number of international and regional human rights treaties
that recognise the right to a free trial and judicial Independence as a hallmark
of democracies. These treaties tend to provide the necessary principles and
obligations on the rule of law and efficient legal systems for developing,
transmon or developed countries in the world. Although these treaties do not
bestow an exact meaning of an Independent judiciary, they sufficiently present
a number of international and regional guidelines and Instruments Identifying
the baste principles on the independence and Impartiality of the judiciary
(Autheman, 2004: 1). However, it needs to be noted that these treaties are
not always binding, except on their member states. They Intend to provide
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advanced support for the principle of an Independent and Impartial judiciary;
and, although indirectly, they also provide international and regional courts
and commissions on human rights31 with sufficient provisions with which these
bodies can elucidate the minimum standards on judiciaries.
To start with, the foundations of the principle of judicial independence
and right to fair trial lie in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
of 1948. Article 10 of the UDHRstates that 'everyone is entitled in full equality
to a fair and public hearing by an independent and Impartial tribunal, In the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against
him' (United Nations, 1948). Although originally the UDHRwas not binding, It
eventually gained some binding effect. Secondly, the provisions of the UDHR
on the independence and Impartiality of the judiciary are further expanded In
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR
recognises the right to a fair trial by an Independent judiciary both
internationally and regionally, and It provides obligations for Its signatories and
binds them legally. Therefore, the signatories of the ICCPR are required to
comply with the principle of judicial independence and Impartiality. In Its
Article 14 (1), the ICCPRprovides that ' ... in the determination of any criminal
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations In a suit at law, everyone
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, Independent, and
impartial tribunal established by law...' (United Nations, 1966).
Furthermore, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)in Its Article 6 (1) states that 'in the
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and Impartial tribunal established by law'
(Council of Europe, 1950). This Convention is a reflection on Its signatories'
aim to enforce rights stated In the Universal Declaration, the further realisation
31 For example, the EuropeanHuman ~Ights Courts, the UN Human Rights Committee, the
Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Court, and the African Human Rights
Commission(Autheman,2004: 1).
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of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, and their practice In the
political realm.
It needs to be noted that these three documents do not provide a clear
definition of the right to a fair trial or of judicial independenceand Impartiality.
Although they provide minimum standards that need to be achieved for an
effective judicial system in the context of democratic governance, they fall to
provide clear benchmarks which Identify domestic courses of action and
harmonisation on judicial Independence. In that respect, they can be regarded
as 'declaratory instruments', which are not legally binding, but which Introduce
widely recognised standards on all-ernbraclnq human rights topics; these
instruments, by and large, represent common clauses In International law,
particularly those adopted In the framework of the UN (International
Commission of Jurists, 2007: 7).
Nevertheless, there are a number of recommendations that have been
adopted In order to clarify the governmental instruments on judicial Integrity
which shed light on the notion of judicial Independenceas assured under the
UDHRand the ICCPR.Firstly, the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of
the Judiciary in 1985 summons member states to guarantee judicial
independence in legal or constitutional provisions and draws attention to
common standards on the independence of the judiciary. These common
standards include 'separation of powers', 'technical competence', 'judicial
qualifications', 'judicial selection', 'conditions of service', 'security of tenure',
'training', 'immunity', and 'judlclal discipline' (Autheman, 2004: 3). For
instance, the first principle of the UNBPof 1985 states that, 'the independence
of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined In the
Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and
other institutions to respect and observe the Independence of the judiciary'
(United Nations, 1985).
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On the other hand, following the Initiatives of the UN, the Council of
Europe has also aspired to clarify the general principles on judicial
independence as assured under the ECHRand characterised under the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR); and the CoEfurthermore
adopted a Recommendation on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of
Judges in 1993. As Autheman (2004: 4) posits, with this recommendation, the
CaEaimed 'to present in a coherent, synthetic manner the set of principles and
elements that constitute "judicial Independence" including the separation of
powers, constitutional guarantees of independence, the jurisdiction of ordinary
courts, freedom of expression and assoctatton, ethical standards, objective and
transparent selection and disciplinary processes and judicial access to
information'. In that respect, the Court has been standing for 'everyone's right
to legal protection by an independent and Impartial tribunal for all disputes
regarding civil rights and obligations' (Uzelac and van Rhee, 2009: 1). The
ECtHR is particularly Important in defining the boundaries of judicial
independence in Europe. According to the case law of the ECtHR, judicial
independence is two-fold and looks at both the personal and institutional
independence of the judiciary; and its main criteria for the assessment of
independence involves the 'manner of appolntrnent and length of tenure of
members', 'guarantees against outside pressures', and 'the appearance of
independence' (Autheman, 2004: 12).
As in the case of the military and provisions on civil-military relations,
the EU relies heavily on the legal frameworks and policy benchmarks offered
by a number of international and regional organisations, and uses the
guidelines and standards that are provided in the International and regional
treaties. Nevertheless, the EU has successfully Incorporated Its provisions on
the judicial matters in its Acquls Communautaire, but these provisions do not
always clearly state the demands and requirements of the EU In the area of the
judiciary. Although the incorporation of the judiciary In the Acquls significantly
increases its legitimacy in the area of the judiciary, this, however, does not
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necessarily bring about clear requirements on judicial Independence and
Impartiality. As Smilov (2006: 320) argues, In fact, a universal application of
the principle of judicial Independenceremains as a 'myth' In the EU.
Therefore, it can be argued that although the EU has high levels of
legitimacy in the area of the judiciary, the lack of having clear benchmarks and
requirements on judicial independence cause severe Impediments to the
institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon processes In candidate
countries. In relation to the issues raised above, this chapter analyses the
impact of EU conditionality on the judiciary In Turkey In three periods (1999-
2002, 2002-2004, 2005-2008). As in the case of freedom of expression, the
EU has shown a strong commitment to establishing Institutions that protect
and promote the rule of law In its member states, which are materialised with
the adoption of extensive legislation within the EU. Furthermore, the principles
of judicial independence and impartiality are Incorporated In the 23rd chapter
of the Acquis Communautaire, legally binding all the Member States within the
EU (European Commission, 2012a). This chapter underpins the Importance of
having a common policy on 'freedom, security, and justice' based on
integrated and cohesive legal frameworks necessary for the reliability and
effectiveness of institutions ensuring respect for civil rights within the EU
(European Union, 2012b).
Furthermore, the Copenhagen Criteria also provide additional
requirements that concern judicial Independence and Impartiality. The
Copenhagen criteria specifically require '[",] stability of Institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law [ ... ]' (European Council, 2002).
Therefore, it can be argued that the Copenhagen Criteria entail the
establishment and effective functioning of the institutions that serve for
democratic governance. In light of this context, this chapter examines Turkey's
alignment with the EU's rules on the judiciary. This chapter therefore mainly
focuses on Turkey's efforts towards incorporating the legal and Institutional
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requirements, as well as international cooperation, to uncover the EU's Impact
on domestic change in Turkey in the area of the judiciary.
As in the previous empirical chapters, the analysis in this chapter
concentrates on the EU-Ievel and domestiC level factors put forward by the
external incentives and the social learning models. These factors are: size of
domestic adoption costs, credibility of conditionality, size of rewards,
legitimacy, identity, and resonance. Since the judiciary covers a broad field
within democratic governance, this chapter Intends to restrict the focus of
analysis on the judiciary's independence and impartiality as these constituents
are among the most important aspects of Turkey's democratisation required by
the EU.
This chapter finds first that, although sharing the same principles on
judicial independence and impartiality with the EU, Turkey has struggled to
meet the demands and requirements of the EU In terms of transforming Its
judicial institutions and (re}formlng its judicial practices. This In turn has
created problems in terms of the resonance of existing rules In Turkey with EU
rules. Although the constitutional provisions mirror the compatibility between
the Turkish rules and the EU's rules, the failure to Implement these rules In
practice significantly reduces the level of social salience and resonance of the
policies on the judiciary In Turkey. Moreover, although the EU's legitimacy In
this area remains high across the three periods analysed here, It Is also
observed that high levels of legitimacy do not always result In clear
benchmarks on the concerning area. In that respect, It Is observed that the
lack of clear benchmarks have put successful and complete Institutional
transformation and policy (re}formatlon at risk in the area of the judiciary.
Secondly, this chapter finds that neither the external incentives nor the
social learning model can explain the diverging process and policy outcomes In
different periods on its own. Firstly, strong conditionality combined with
unfavourable domestic conditions in the first period of time can explain the
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fractional Europeanisation outcome. The key factors that explain this outcome
are the sizeable and credible rewards for strong conditionality, and the lack of
identification and high domestic adoption costs resulting in unfavourable
domestic conditions. Secondly, strong conditionality combined with favourable
domestic conditions in the second phase mirror positive Europeanlsation as the
process and polley outcome. This diverging outcome can mainly be explained
by the changes at the domestic level where the key factors appear as low
levels of domestic adoption costs and the Identification of the government with
the EU. Lastly, the third period shows that no significant process or policy
outcome was achieved due to weak conditionality and unfavourable domestic
conditions in this period.
The analysis in this chapter begins with the conceptualisation of the
judiciary, and judicial independence and impartiality based on classical
traditions of democratiC theory. This section provides the rationale behind the
selection of the judiciary as a policy area that is exposed to Institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation in relation to Turkey's democratisation
efforts under the influence of EUconditionality. The following section provides
a historical overview of the internal dynamics in Turkey in relation to the
judicial practices; and aims to shed light on the domestic context In which
Turkey seeks to align with the EU's rules and practices in the area of the
judiciary. It is then followed by a discussion on EU conditionality and the
judiciary in order to identify how the EU engages with issues on the judicial
independence and impartiality in relation to the accession framework of
candidate countries. It also provides the legal instruments of the EU on the
institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in the area of the judiciary.
The final section provides the policy processes and outcomes In three phases
(1999-2002, 2002-2004, 2005-2008). This chapter concludes with a discussion
on the results.
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B.2. Conceptualisation of the .Judiciary
Many scholars of political science have so far emphasised factors such
as 'modernisation', 'socialisation', 'economic development', civil society', and
'social capital' as being the most important determinants of 'political' and 'civil'
rights (Lipset, 1959; Cohen and Arato, 1992; 1997; Putnam, 1993; Linz and
Stepan, 1996). Although these studies have not Identified the role of the
judiciary as an important factor for the protection of fundamental political
rights in a democratic political system, it would be misleading to argue that
these scholars have ignored the analysis of judicial independenceso far. In fact,
a number of relatively recent studies have examined different aspects of the
importance of the independence of judiciary and its implications on political
and human rights (Cross, 1999; Keith, 2002a; 2002b). These studies
particularly focus on the measurement of judicial Independenceand Influence
of 'constitutional provisions' and 'judicial power provisions' on political and
human rights; and emphasise that for an efficient and legitimate democratic
government to exist, an institutionalised and functioning judicial independence
is crucial.
Modern representative democracies require a wide range of
autonomous organisations and associations to create and preserve pluralistic
civil society. These autonomous organisations and esscclattons are therefore
entitled to assure equal considerations given to Individuals and to protect their
rights and interests (Dahl, 1998: 117-118). In these democracies,
constitutional stability emerges as a key component of the political system
since it implies the adoption of a supreme constitution constraining and
balancing existing political authorities, protecting human and minority rights,
and assuring the supremacy of rule of law. In that respect, having a
constitutional state implies a state of 'justice' requiring a 'legal and judicial'
system (Diamond, 1999: 12).
258
Therefore, it can be argued that democracies should allow a distribution
of power within politics and advocate the establishment of a system with
checks and balances between the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and
the administrative bureaucracy. In fact, an institutionalised and functioning
independent judiciary is a necessary condition for democratic legitimacy for the
protection of political rights (Russell and O'Brien, 2001). It can be argued that
even if institutions, such as political parties, executives, supremacy of rule of
law, active civil society and non-governmental organisations, along with media
and functioning economy, should exist within a democracy, the presence of
Independent judiciaries is still required to assure the rights of Individuals, or
minority or majority groups against any political oppression Imposed by the
rulers as an essential determinant of a democratic political system (Howard
and Carey, 2004: 284).
An efficient and impartial judiciary which Is able to provide the rule of
law constitutes one of the key components of the political and social structure
of democracies. For the consolidation of democracy (In other words, building a
more accountable, representative and receptive democracy), It Is necessary to
disperse power in politics, particularly by Increasing the Independence and
impartiality of the judiciary. In that respect, a judicial system In a democracy
should have a high level of Institutional coherence, capacity and autonomy
(Diamond, 1999: 75). As Boies (2006: 58) argues, 'judicial Independence and
judicial supremacy work together In an attempt to guarantee that the rule of
law will not be eroded by the political pressures In existence at any particular
point in time'. The main conditions of having an effective legal system within
democracies include: independent and impartial judges and prosecutors;
sufficient financial and technical resources; and clearly-formed laws, which are
democratic in nature. In that respect, for a functioning democracy, a 'stable
and legitimate' governmental structure, along with the rule of law and civil
liberties, is essential for the perseverance of effective democratic governance
(Hanggi and Tanner, 2005).
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Furthermore, it can be argued that the judiciary Is one of the Important
mechanisms for safeguarding democracies since the judiciary acts as a control
mechanism for the separation of powers between the executive and the
legislature, by operating certain checks and balances over the two branches of
the government. It is also important to note that the Independence of the
judiciary is vital for a functioning democracy since It contributes to the
protection of the rule of law, as well as the rights of citizens. Judicial
independence therefore produces greater political and civil rights, and liberties
in democracies (Howard and Carey, 2004: 286). As previously noted, for
analytical purposes, the impact of the EUon the judiciary will be analysed by
focusing on judicial independence and Impartiality. By focusing on these
components, the Intention Is to trace their process In three different time
periods with respect to the Impact of the Independent variables that are
introduced by the theoretical models of this study.
B.3. Internal Dynamics of Turkey Concerning the
.Judiciary
As noted in previous chapters, after the establishment of the Republic
of Turkey in 1923, the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal AtatOrk,
initiated an array of reformist Initiatives and he pointed to the west as the
destination of the new and modern Turkish nation. One of the first reform
initiatives in this period was the adoption of the Civil Code and the Code of
Obligations of Switzerland in 1926. This Civil Code of Switzerland was
considered as the most recent and the most reformist civil act at that time In
Europe. Also, in 1926, a new Criminal Code was adopted from the Italian
Criminal Code, which was then replaced after sixty years In 2005 In order to
include principles of the EU. Again In 1926, a new Code of Commerce was
enforced, influenced by German and Swiss laws. The entire legal system of
Turkey is based on the Roman and Continental systems; and Its fundamental
principles promote secularity, equality among citizens, the Independence and
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impartiality of the judiciary, the rule of law, as well as the protection of human
rights and freedoms (Tuncay, 2007: 242-243).
The functioning of the Turkish judicial system Is regulated by Articles 9,
36, 37 and 40 of the Turkish Constitution, where the 'independence of the
judiciary', the 'right to a fair trial' and 'guarantee of lawful judgement' are
preserved (Aydin and C;arkoglu,2004: 13). Furthermore, 'separation of powers'
is one of the principles of the Turkish political system; and the principle of
judicial independence Is guaranteed in the Turkish Constitution. In line with
this principle, Article 9 of the Constitution states that judicial power Is and
should be exercised by independent courts on behalf of the nation. Article 138
also indicates that the rule of law can only be sustained by the Independent
functioning of the judiciary; and there shall be no other organ or authority that
may command the jurisdiction of the courts or the judges. Furthermore, Article
142 of the Constitution states that the organisation, duties and jurisdiction of
the courts, their functioning and trial procedures shall be regulated by law
(Republic of Turkey, Constitutional Court, 1982). Despite these guarantees,
the principle of Independence Is challenged by a number of constitutional
provisions which provide for an overpowering bond between the executive and
the judiciary, particularly when administering the selection, training and
appointment of the judges (Aydin and Keyman, 2004: 42).
In the early days of the Turkish Republic, Turkey persistently followed
the strong state tradition since the Ottoman Empire times, where the notion of
the state as the absolute authority was widely recognised (Heper, 1985;
Ozbudun, 1994). In view of that, even after the establishment of the Republic,
the political arena was subjugated to the control of elite military officials, hlgh-
level bureaucrats and the judiciary (Ozbudun, 1994: 191; Heper and Keyman,
1998: 259). Nevertheless, with the transition to multi-party democracy In 1946,
the state elite (consisting of the aforementioned groups) and the political elite
(consisting of the newly-established political parties) started to clash over the
general interests of the nation and the welfare of the state. Although both
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groups aimed for the same objective, their attitude differed significantly. The
state elite, including the judiciary, followed the Kemalist Ideology and
perceived themselves to be the guardians of the state and the national Interest
(Ozbudun, 1994: 196-197).
In that respect, the judiciary In Turkey constitutes one of the Important
factions within the state elite. Its primary goals Include the protection of the
state (SOt<;O,2011: 2); the Identification and promotion of a new legal system
in a democratic setting (Scheppele, 200S); and the endorsement of the
democratic regime (Shapiro, 1986: 1SS). When examining the history of the
judicial system of Turkey, one can see that the constitutions of 1961 and 1982
play important roles In terms of defining the scope and the role of the judiciary.
As discussed previously, prior to the 1960s, Turkey had been ruled by the
Republican People'sParty (CHP) from the beginning of the establishment of the
Republic in 1923, until 19S0, four years Into the transition to multi-party
politics in 1946. As a single-party rule that dominated Turkish politics In this
period, the CHP was in control of the political scene and of the state
bureaucracy (Shambayatl and Kirdl~, 2009: 770).
In 1946, Turkey adopted a multi-party system with the Inclusion of
Democrat Party (DP) In the upcoming elections. Ahmad (1977: 162-163)
argues that the military intervention in 1960 occurred due to the DP's failure to
adhere to Kemalist reforms, and to respect the state's main Institutions and
the military, and its failure to keep close ties with the courts, judges,
universities and the press. In this context, the 1961 Constitution clearly
refiects the guardianship role of the judiciary, standing against the political
elite and the judgements of the political authority In that period (O'Donnell,
1999: 38; SOt<;O,2011: 2).
It can be argued that, in some ways, the Intervention of 1960 aimed to
reunify the political actors in order to continue with the modernisation process
and the consolidation of democracy. Constitutional lawyers were then asked to
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prepare a new constitution in the aftermath of the Intervention by the military.
Heper (1985: 89) notes that the constitution makers were committed to
carrying on with the principles of electoral democracy, but at the same time,
they had the intention of continuing with revolution and transforming society;
and in this context, the 1961 Constitution was seen as a 'last-ditch effort by
the bureaucratic intelligentsia to set the substantive, as well as the procedural
rules of the political game in Turkey'. The 1961 Constitution recognised the
judiciary as a 'semi-autonomous' institution 'beyond the reach and control of
the government' (Aybay, 1977: 24); and the judiciary's role In this system was
defined in terms of protecting the autonomy of the political Institutions. In that
respect, the judiciary was highly Involved In politics In this period and It
exercised judicial reviews of the decisions of the political authorities (Stone
Sweet, 2000; Guarnieri and Pederzoll, 2002) reflecting on Its primary
responsibility of protecting the secular character of the state.
Therefore, it can be claimed that the 1961 Constitution strengthened
guarantees of the independence of the judiciary and expanded the Internal
autonomy of the judiciary Itself and the power of Its Individual organs. The
newly established Supreme Council of Judges was given the responsibility of
carrying out internal judicial affairs, including the appolntments and
promotions of the judges. In addition, the Council of State, a system of
administrative courts, was reformed and given additional responsibilities, such
as the assessment of all administrative acts (Klli and GozObOyOk,2000b).
However, the military Intervention of 1980 complicated the Civilian
transformation of the political system. The reasons for the Intervention of 1980
were generally connected to the military's loss of faith in various civilian
institutions, including the political parties, the state bureaucracy, the judiciary,
the universities and civil society. From the military's point of view, these
institutions were unable to represent the Interests of the nation. Hence, the
military took power and direct control of the making of a new constitution. In
the process of constitution-making, the aforementioned actors and Institutions
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were deliberately excluded; and the responsibility was solely given to the
military officers, high-level bureaucrats and law professors (Shambayati and
Klrdi~, 2009: 773).
It can be argued that the 1982 Constitution envisaged a more 'direct'
role for the military and the judiciary for the prolongation of the 'civilising
mission' set in motion in the early years of the Republic. In contrast to the
1961 constitution, the 1982 constitution's general characteristics referred to
the purpose of the state as the transformation of the nation, the state's
commitment to protecting Its hegemony and dominance over political
institutions. In this context, the role of the judiciary was defined as an
,
'administrative attache of state elites [In] overseeing the political arena'
(Shambayati and Kirdi~, 2009: 778), with state elites being the members of
the executive and the legislative as well as the high bureaucracy and the
military.
Along with secularism, the role of EUmembership reflects on one of the
main roles of the courts in candidate countries like Turkey, where the Idea Is to
transform society through 'civilising missions'. In that respect, along with other
high courts in Turkey, the Turkish Constitutional Court has been carrying out
the objective of judging political actors based on their commitment to what Is
known as Kemalism, In a way, extending the powers and the reach of the state,
rather than limiting Its authority and command. In that respect, the simplistic
version of the main role of the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) and other
high courts is to 'regulate the political arena and to facilitate the
transformation of the society through state action' (Shambayatl and Klrdi~,
2009: 767).
Currently, the Independenceof the judiciary Is at risk due to the legacy
of its guardianship role of the state and the close association the judiciary has
with the executive. There are several ways through which the executive
influences the workings of the judiciary In Turkey. Although the principles of
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independence and impartiality are enshrined in the constitution, the practices
reveal that these principles are widely undermined. Among the most
problematic issues regarding this includes the role of the High Council of
Judges and Prosecutors in controlling the career paths of the judges and
prosecutors in Turkey.
Furthermore, the Institutional set up of the High Council of Judges also
major risk for the independence of the judiciary. Since the High Council Is
chaired by the Minister of Justice, and one of Its board members Is the
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice, the executive and the judiciary are
strongly linked with each other, which Increases the 'risk of political partiality'
(Kirca, 1996: 105-110; Aydin and Keyman, 2004: 42). Apart from the
composition of the High Council, It Is also Important to note that the Ministry of
Justice established an inspection board for administrative tasks and has a
personnel directorate that the High Council should comply with, which Implies
that the decisions of the High Council are reviewed by the executive, which
contradicts with the notion of judicial Independence and the principle of the
rule of law (Aydm and Keyman, 2004: 42).
Furthermore, another issue that puts judicial Independence at risk In
Turkey is Identified as political favouritism. For Instance, particularly at the
point of entry in the judicial career, the Ministry of Justice Is highly Involved, as
the Ministry itself is in charge of conducting written and oral exams which
potentially lead to groundless appointments of candidates In the judiciary. This
in fact also reflects the defldencles In the Independence of the judiciary,
starting at the entry level for the judicial profession (Aydm and Keyman, 2004:
42-43).
It is argued that the EUcan trigger the Institutional transformation and
policy (re)formation of the judiciary In Turkey In two ways. Firstly, the EU can
provide effective and sufficient Incentives through financial and technical
assistance to improve the Institutional structures and the administration of the
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judiciary; and secondly, but most importantly, through expert training to make
an ideological change in the mlndset of judicial personnel. As Aydin and
Keyman (2004: 45) argue that one way of achieving this is through the
improvement of the education system concerning the judiciary. They point out
that the current education system falls to provide learning based on analytical
reasoning and that it should be reformed 'inspired by the practices In other
European countries', which would help Turkey to align Its practices with those
of the EU, and enhance the expertise of the judiciary on EU law and
international human rights.
It Is argued that this could be achieved with the EU's assistance to
Turkey by developing better quality in law education, by establishing exchange
programmes for students, and through twinning programmes, which would
make the expertise of the EUmember states available to candidate countries.
In fact, as one interviewee put It, the twinning programmes were particularly
benefiCial for Turkey since these programmes made expert cooperation
possible; and as a result of the profound collaboration between the EUexperts
and Turkish officials, many amendments could be made In the structure of
institutions and policies could be reformed (Interview, Political Officer on Legal
Issues, Political affairs, CFSP,press and information section, Delegation of the
European Union to Turkey, 2012).
In support of this, another interviewee stated that the extensive
education programmes on the European Human Rights Law, supported by the
EU, have significantly contributed to the training of judges and prosecutors,
and helped to eliminate many anti-democratic judicial practices, particularly in
the area of human rights. As a result of these education programmes, judges
and prosecutors started to refer to the EU law, which can be considered crucial
for the transformation of the judiciary in Turkey (Interview, Member of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament, 2012). It is also further
suggested that, within the pre-accession framework of Turkey, Turkey's
participation in two EU programmes, firstly, the Framework Programme for
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Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters, and secondly, AGIS, a framework
programme to enhance cooperation between the judiciary and professionals In
criminal matters, would be beneficial for Turkey to promote networking and
exchange experience, Information and best practices (Aydin and Keyman, 2004:
44-45). Overall, it can be argued that these Initiatives could enhance the
administrative and judicial capacity In Turkey, which Is crucial for the
reinforcement of the Acquls Communautalre.
8.4. EU conditionality and the Judiciary in Turkey
Justice, liberty and security are among the major issues at the top of
the EU's agenda. From the very beginning of the integration process, the EU
has comprehended the importance of having compatible judicial systems
among its member states, in order to make its own judicial practices
operational and effective at the community level. In the area of the judiciary,
the EU therefore aims to ensure that all EU citizens have the same access to
justice throughout the EU. In fact, In order to attain judicial cooperation that
involves all the member states and in order to deal with their complexities and
incompatibilities on judicial matters, the EU Is Inclined to develop an action
plan concerning 'better access to justice', 'mutual recognition of judicial
decisions' and improved 'convergence' In procedural law (European
Commission,2012b).
Given this dependency of the EUon judicial restructuring in Its member
states, the reform of the judiciaries in the candidate countries, carried out
under their pre-accession preparations, became Vitally Important (Kochenov,
2008: 232); and over the course of its integration process, the EU has made
significant improvements in this policy area, which are materialised in the form
of the adoption of extensive pieces of legislation. As Petrov and Kallnlchenko
(2011: 326) argue, without the Europeanisatlon of the judiciaries in candidate
countries, neither the Acquls Communautaire nor the European norms and
values on the judicial independencecan be promoted.
267
In the broadest sense, the EU policies concerning the judiciary and
fundamental rights Intend to develop the EU as an area of 'freedom, security
and justice' (European Union, 2012b). As previously mentioned, the presence
of an independent, impartial and efficient judiciary Is of great Importance to
provide this area within the EU.The EU'sstrategic objectives on the reform of
the judicial system in candidate countries mainly Include cooperation In the
field of freedom, security, and justice, the consolidation of democratic values
and institutions, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
and efficient and democratic institutions and policy-making Instruments
(Pottakis, 2009: 351).
It is generally argued that for the safeguarding of the rule of law It Is
essential to have a functioning judicial system providing 'Impartiality',
'independence', 'Integrity' and a high standard of 'arbitration'. As the EUputs It
forward, to obtain these characteristics, It Is required to eliminate any external
influence over the judiciary and provide necessary and adequate technical and
financial assistance, and professional training. Similarly, In this particular area,
the EU promotes effective anti-corruption policies within Member States as It
constitutes one of the major challenges on the stability of democratic
institutions and the rule of law. For the deterrence of corruption, the EU
requires that each Member State has a 'solid' legal framework and 'reliable'
institutions, guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights and freedoms as
stated in the Community Acquis and the Fundamental Rights Charter
(Delegation of the EuropeanUnion to Turkey, 2012).
It can be argued that the Incorporation of a chapter on 'Judiciary and
Fundamental Rights' (Chapter 23) In the Acquls Communautalre, the main
body of common rights and obligations binding all the Member States Is a
major step for the EU's legitimacy in this area. This Acquls chapter mainly
stresses the importance of the independence of the judiciary and regards
'impartiality, integrity and a high standard of adjudication by courts'
fundamental for protecting the rule of law. In that respect, the EUstresses that
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the law applied within Member States should be subject to equal methods, and
checks and balances, provided by the judiciary and Independent from all
institutions, including the government (European Commission, 2012b).
Furthermore, in light of the considerable Increase In judicial cases and
workload, along with the latest enlargement of the Union to 27 Member States,
necessary measures were taken in the Nice Treaty in 2001 to Improve the
general operation of the judicial system of the European Union. The main
reforms in this area concerned the composition and the strengthening of the
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, the division of jurisdiction
between these two courts, and their rules of procedure (European Commission,
2012b).
Nevertheless, it must be noted that there are a number of official
documents in which the direction of the judicial reforms for the candidate
countries in the context of pre-accession was specified. First of all, although
vaguely stated, the Copenhagenpolitical criterion of democracy and the rule of
law can be identified as the main criterion In relation to the Importance of the
judicial reforms in candidate countries. In fact, the criterion mainly focuses on
the stability and efficiency of the judicial Institutions where it reads as 'stability
of institutions guaranteeing [ ...] the rule of law' (Copenhagen European Council,
Council Presidency Conclusions, 1993). This, in turn, Is argued to be
detrimental for providing clear Indications on what the EU requires In terms of
judicial reforms in candidate countries (Smllov, 2006: 320-321).
However, more specific statements and requirements on the judicial
reforms were later on provided In the Commission's Regular Reports,
Cornposlte and Strategy Papers followed by the Accession Partnership
documents, and the Action Plans for Strengthening of Administrative and
Judicial Capacity. Although they have structural differences, all these
documents emphasise the Importance of the (re)formatlon of the national
judicial structures and the improvement of their structural weaknesses In
candidate countries. Although the recommendations and specific requirements
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are at most times not clearly defined, these assessment tools are considered to
be useful in terms of providing a general discussion on the judicial reforms and
sufficient information for drafting a national response by the candidate
countries, in the course of their pre-accession process (Kochenov, 2008: 244).
Furthermore, as part of its pre-accession framework, the EU provided
Turkey with an Accession Partnership (AP) document in 2001, which was then
revised in 2003 and 2006. The AP is regarded as a roadmap for recognising the
priorities as well as short-term and medium-term measures need to be taken
on political reforms including in the area of the judiciary. The document sets
the objectives that are the centre stage on the reform of the judiciary, as well
as the objectives that are high on the reform agenda. The substantial list of
priorities and tasks that Turkey is expected to undertake can be found in Table
8.1. In addition to the APs, the Regular Reports issued by the European
Commission provide a formal assessment tool for candidate countries where
their annual progress in meeting the EU's requirements is evaluated by the EU.
Improve the functioning and efficiency of the judiciary
including the State security court in line with
international standards;
Strengthen in particular training of judges and
prosecutors on European Union legislation, including in
the field of human rights
Strengthen the independence and efficiency of the
judiciary and promote consistent interpretation of legal
provisions related to human rights and fundamental
freedoms in line with the European Convention on
Human Rights;
Take measures with a view to ensuring that the
obligation for all judicial authorities to take Into account
the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights is
respected;
Align the functioning of State security courts with
European Standards;
Prepare the establishment of intermediate courts of
Appeal
2001 Accession
Partnership (Short-term)
2003 Accession
Partnership (Priorities
2003/2004)
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Ensure consistent interpretation of legal provisions,
including the new penal code, related to human rights
and fundamental freedoms by all judicial authorities in
line with the European Convention on Human Rights and
its related case law;
Ensure the independence of judiciary, in particular as
regards the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors and
the appointment of new judges and prosecutors;
Ensure equality of arms between the prosecution and
defence during criminal proceedings, including layout of
courtrooms;
Continue the training of judges and prosecutors on the
application of the European Convention on Human Rights
and the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights;
Strengthen the efficiency of the judiciary through, in
particular, reinforcing its institutional capacity and
adopting a new code of civil procedure;
Proceed with the establishment of regional intermediate
courts of appeal
2006 Accession
Partnership (Short-term)
It can be argued that the pre-accession reform of the judiciary stands
out in many respects from the reforms of other branches of power for many
reasons. Following the argument that judicial independence and impartiality
are vital elements of an effective judicial system and necessary for the
functioning of democracies, it can be argued that Turkey has been
experiencing structural and legal problems in terms of providing a strong and
properly functioning judiciary. On the other hand, EU conditionality on the
judicial system of Turkey has revealed a complex picture.
Although the pre-accession strategies generated an exceptional
momentum for judicial reform, the EU failed to ensure that the accession
conditions with respect to the judicial reforms were clearly defined and
consistently applied across the EU, both to the current Member States and the
candidate countries. In fact, it has been noted in the EU monitoring
programme of the Open Society Foundation (051) that 'the Union itself needs a
more comprehensive approach to the reform question'; and that there are few
specific standards on the organisation and functionality of the judiciary and
that the expert support system remains 'uncoordinated' and 'ineffective' (051,
2002). In the case of Turkey, it can be argued that although the requirements
and conditions on judicial reform are incorporated into the EU's legal
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framework and the Acquis Communautalre (Chapter 23), the standards and
specific recommendations made by the EU institutions have not provided clear
indications for the Turkish government. This has had direct Implications for
Turkey's democratisation efforts and judicial reforms.
On the other hand, although the main principles of judicial
independence and impartiality are embedded in Turkey's political culture, and
they are in alignment with that of the EU's principles, the current practices In
Turkey show that these principles are frequently neglected. This negligence,
arising from the incompetence and polltlclsatlon of the judiciary, In turn causes
severe threats to the protection and promotion of the rule of law In Turkey,
which also creates challenges for Turkey's compliance with EU conditionality.
As previously noted, since the Copenhagen criteria require the stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, It became a formal
requirement for Turkey to meet the needs of democratisation and the rule of
law by transforming its judicial structure and to ensure Its effectiveness.
Turkey was therefore specifically required to solve the problems of the
politicisation, independence and impartiality of the judiciary; and deal with Its
systemic problems by introducing new standards for higher quality of judicial
practices and by harmonising its judicial procedures with that of the EU (Uzelac
and van Rhee, 2009: 2).
More specifically, the EU'smain criticism exerted on Turkey In terms of
its judicial practices is directly linked with the 'Independence' and 'Impartiality'
as well as the deep-rooted structure and procedures of the judiciary (TOrkmen,
2008: 155). This is evident in the report prepared by advisors Karl Bjornberg
and Ross Cranston on behalf of the EU Commission, In which they explicitly
stated that 'to an unacceptable degree, judicial Independence In Turkey
appears to be threatened by potential interference of the Ministry of Justice
despite the various constitutional guarantees' (European Commission, 2005b).
Nonetheless, the institutional transformation and policy (re)formation In this
area are not only important for Turkey's democratisation process, but also for
272
the EU itself. In fact, as is evident in the cases of accession to the EU, the EU
became directly dependent on the way the national judiciaries function In the
new Member States. This dependency can be explained by referring to the
equality principle in terms of the effective delivery of justice among the
individual Member States; and also by emphasising the Importance of
accepting the EU's fundamental principles on the judiciary and their
implementation. In that respect 'the reform of the judiciary In the candidate
countries can be viewed as an activity virtually internal to the EU' (Kochenov,
2008: 228-229).
B.S. Assessment of the Policy Process and Policy
Outcomes
In the following sections, the Impact of EU conditionality on the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary in Turkey Is examined across
three periods, as was the case in the previous empirical chapters. The first
phase of analysis (1999-2002) starts with the decision of the EuropeanCouncil
at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, where Turkey was granted EU candidacy
status. The ending of the first phase (also the beginning of the second phase,
2002-2004) coincideswith the early general elections held In Turkey where the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) established the first single-party
government to come to power since 1987. The third phase (2005-2008) of
analysis starts with the opening of accession negotiations and covers the
period where the accession negotiations were actively pursued. The analysis
will again focus on six variables (size of rewards, credibility, size of domestic
adoption costs, legitimacy, identity, and resonance) In these specified periods
in order to identify the causal relationship between EU conditionality and
institutional transformation and policy (re)formation In Turkey In the area of
judicial independence and Impartiality.
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8.S.1. Phase I: 1999-2002
Recall that after the fall of the minority government in November 1998,
a general election was held In April 1999, where the DSPand MHPbecame the
two parties with the largest share of votes; together with the ANAP, the DSP
and MHP formed a coalition government In June 1999. The coalition
government made a swift start on legislative activities with the Intention to
adopt new laws and regulations necessary for the progression of
democratisation in Turkey. However, as noted In the previous chapters, the
Ideological differences between the partners caused certain setbacks on
political reforms and negatively affected the government's Identification with
the EU. Nevertheless, the coalition partners managed to have a rather
moderate pro-European perspective In this period and they remained
committed to carrying out reforms to attain full membership to the EU,
regardless of disputes amongst themselves.
On the other hand, recall that the domestic conditions In this period
were not suitable for significant legislative changes. Following the formation of
the coalition government, a serious financial crisis hit Turkey In November
2000 and another crisis in February 2001. The crises caused serious difficulties
on the political front. The Ideological differences between the partners resulted
in their unsuccessful attempts to design domestic policies to cope with the
consequences of the unexpected financial downturn. There were also public
debates on the issue of the headscarf ban In universities and the Influence of
the military, as well as the secularist bureaucratic Circle, on the Issue of the
headscarf ban. The issue of 'concessions' on minority rights, Including the
socio-cultural rights of the Kurdish minority, caused further tensions between
national political actors and European political elite (Aydin and C;arkoglu,2004:
6-7). Furthermore, due to the emergence of Kurdish separatism and terrorist
activities, the state's capacity to fully engage In EU-Induced reforms was
limited, and any political reform in order to meet the EU's requirements in this
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period were considered to carry high domestic adoption costs for the coalition
government.
One of the main issues with regard to the judicial reforms In this period
appeared as the EU's requirement on the main legislative change In the
functioning of the Turkish judicial system concerns the reform of the State
Security Courts (SCCs). SCCs in Turkey deal with crimes with political
relevance. In previous years, the European Court of Human Rights stressed
that the presence of a military judge in the SCCcommittee infringed upon the
European Convention of Human Rights. Given that, the European Court
reassessed judgements on thirteen cases put forward by individuals between
1994 and 1995. In nine of these cases, the Court concluded that the
individuals were not given the right to have their trial by an 'Independent and
impartial tribunal' as a result of the fact that they were judged by a military
judge in the SCC(European Commission, 1999).
Nevertheless, in June 1999, just after the coalition government came
into power, several constitutional and legal amendments were made In order to
remove the military judge in the SSC, based on the recommendations of the
European Commission. The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) adopted
those constitutional amendments and they entered Into force at the end of
June 1999. Consequently, the military judge serving in the SSCIn Ankara, who
was also in charge of the trial against the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, was
replaced by a civilian judge immediately after the constitutional amendment.
This change in the structure of the SSCs was welcomed by the European
Commission and seen as a promising improvement In the overall functioning of
the judicial system of Turkey (EuropeanCommission, 1999).
It is also important to note that the coalition government made a
number of proposals on the functioning of the judicial system, Including a draft
Penal Code banning the death penalty, a draft law called the 'Law on the
prosecution of civil servants and other public officers' which facilitated the
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prosecution of public officers, and a draft law amending the Code of Criminal
Procedure so that it included new procedures on witness protection, payment
of compensation to witnesses, physical examination and genetic analysis.
Furthermore, the government also proposed to Improve the current training
programmes for judges and prosecutors (European Commission, 1999). These
proposals mirror the coalition government's swift efforts In meeting the EU's
demands. However, real successof alignment with the EU's rules and practices
cannot be achieved with such proposals. In that respect, the constitutional
amendments in 1999 can be considered successful in terms of rule adoptions,
but not sufficient since their implementation remained problematic.
For instance, following the constitutional reforms, the European
Commission in its 2000 Regular Report stated that Turkey had shown a
'positive' development In terms of embarking on transforming Turkish society
by means of political reforms necessary for accession to the EU. However, the
Commission underlined the fact that, although Turkey had the 'basic' features
of a democratic system, It had been falling to implement the institutional
reforms. More specifically, the Commission noted on the judiciary matters that
the new procedure facllitatlnq the prosecution of civil servants was an
'encouraging' development; however, the draft laws on the functioning of the
judiciary proposed in the previous reports were stili 'pending' and stated that
no further improvement had been achieved in terms of regulating the State
Security Courts (European Commission, 2000).
More specifically, in its 2000 Report, the Commission noted various
positive developments. Among these was first the Increase In the number of
judicial personnel fitting the existing needs of the extra staff by the Ministry of
Justice. Secondly, the adoption of a new law on the prosecution of civil
servants and state officials (as proposed in the previous report) was accepted
as an encouraging development by the CommisSion. Thirdly, the Ministry of
Justice had made significant progress In terms of ensuring the compliance of
the proposed legislations with the Copenhagen criteria concerning Issues such
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as the establishment of a judicial police and the creation of an Ombudsman's
office. Fourthly, the Commission welcomed the induction of training
programmes for judges and prosecutors covering issues such as the measures
for the effectiveness of the judiciary, alternative measures for Imprisonment,
human right issues and the ECLaw (European Commission, 2000).
However, the Commission criticised Turkey based on Its slow progress
in taking measures to increase the efficiency of the judicial system.
Furthermore, other important draft laws, such as a draft Penal Code and law
amending the Code of Criminal Procedure, remained to be adopted; and the
question of the SSCsstill had not been addressed based on the evidence that
no further amendments had taken place after the removal of the military
judges from these Courts and due to the Incompatibility with the standards
existing in the EU on the functioning, powers and responsibilities and other
provisions relating to the proceedings of these Courts (European Commission,
2000).
As stated previously, since the EU adopted and incorporated various
norms and conditions on the judiciary in Its legal framework, and in the Acquls,
it thus provides a legitimate policy on the Independent and effective
functioning of the judiciary across the three periods. However, the vagueness
on the EU's requirements, specifically on judicial Independence and Impartiality,
has caused severe problems for reforms of the judiciary In Turkey.
Nevertheless, as part of its pre-accession framework, the EU states Its
expectations in terms of Turkey's rule adoption and further Implementation In
the policy area of the judiciary through the Accession Partnership (AP)
Document. For instance, the AP of 2001 made a strong connection between
Turkey's 'alignment' and the EU's 'conditionality'. As a medium-term priority,
the EU required the strengthening of the independence and efficiency of the
judiciary, and the alignment of legal provisions concerning human rights and
fundamental freedoms, in accordance with the European Convention on Human
Rights (European Council, 2001b).
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As a response to the Accession Partnership of 2001, Turkey prepared
the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) in March 2001.
In practice, the NPAAincludes the list of the issues under the reform process
and gives references to the areas that the Turkish government is planning to
amend or change in accordance with the EU's criticisms and requirements. For
instance, regarding the concerns raised by the EU In the Commission's Regular
Report, the NPAAreplied in 2001 by stating that the Turkish Government gives
particular importance to the improved functioning and effectiveness of the
judiciary, and it plans to review the constitutional provisions on the SSCsand
the Act on the Establishment and Procedures of the State Security Courts; to
introducing a constitutional provision to establish legal defence as one of the
fundamental elements of the judicial process; to reviewing provisions infringing
upon the independence of the judiciary; and to providing regular training on
human rights and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights for
Turkish judges and prosecutors (Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EU Affairs,
2001).
With this NPAA, the government clearly showed its commitment to
reforming the judicial structure of Turkey in a way indicating the willingness of
Turkey to align its own judicial practices with that of the EU. Given that, It can
be concluded that the DSP-MHP-ANAPcoalition reasonably carried out political
reforms which resulted in significant amendments to the Turkish Constitution
in October 2001, followed by the adoption of legislation to enforce and
implement these amendments (Klri~c;i,2004a: 277). In fact, these reforms not
only aimed at strengthening guarantees In the field of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, but also limiting capital punishment; and In November
2001, a new Civil Code was adopted. Subsequently, these constitutional
changes, followed by the 'Harmonisation Laws', planned to transform the
changes in the Constitution into 'concrete action' to bring Turkish Law in line
with the Acquis Communautaire. In that respect, it can be argued that the
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period of 1999-2002 set the scene for 'momentous change' In Turkish politics
under the leadership of the DSP-MHP-ANAPcoalition (Onl~, 2003: 9).
Following these developments, the 2001 Regular Report of the
Commission notes that there had been significant changes to the judicial
system. Firstly, the constitutional and legal amendments on the restructuring
of the SSCs that had been adopted In 1999 entered Into force. As a result of
these amendments, all the members of the SSCsare appointed only from the
civil judiciary, which eliminates the presence of a military judge In the SSC
committee. However, the Commission raised concerns about the Independence
of the judiciary in practice. The 2001 Regular Report notes that the pressures
exerted on judges and prosecutors (particularly the ones who serve In the
prosecution of state officials) is stili causing problems. The Report also touches
upon the impartiality of the judiciary by referring to the fact that the Supreme
Board of Judges and Prosecutors was chaired by the Minister of Justice, which
raises the question of the actual 'separation of powers' between the judiciary
and the executive (European Commission, 2001).
Furthermore, In terms of the effective functioning of the judiciary, the
Report stresses that in addition to the training courses offered by the Centre
for Education and Training of Judges and Prosecutors, there had been other
initiatives including a Greek-Turkish co-operation Initiative to train judges In EC
law. In fact, in September 2001, sixteen members of the Turkish Constitutional
Court had visited the European Court of Human Rights which was accepted as
a positive development in terms of the reformation of the judicial system In
Turkey and increasing its efficiency (European Commission, 2001).
It can be argued that in the later phases of the period 1999-2002 the
domestic environment became more suitable for the political actors, I.e. for the
government, the political elites and the military, to accept certain overdue
changes that would dramatically affect the composition of their Institutional
structures. Apart from the factors, such as legitimacy, Identity, resonance and
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the size of adoption costs, one other factor that encouraged those changes can
be identified as the size and credibility of rewards. As indicated before, this
phase initially began with the Helsinki Summit where Turkey was granted Its
candidate status, consequently becoming eligible for receiving financial and
technical support as part of the EU's pre-accession strategy. Turkey's
participation in community programmes including the MEDA programme and
its access to TAIEX and PHAREprocedures have provided sufficient incentives,
hence, Increased the size and credibility of the EU rewards in this period
(European Council, 2001c).
To conclude, the institutional transformation and policy (re}formation of
the judiciary showed a relatively good degree of change In the first phase. The
coalition government initiated certain legislative changes In order to Increase
judicial independence and impartiality after their term of service commenced.
Although the ideological differences between the coalition partners negatively
affected their identification with the EU, as well as their success In designing a
political agenda for domestic change, all three partners were in agreement
with a reform agenda on the judiciary. Nevertheless, due to unfortunate
domestic turmoil, any reform initiative carried high domestic adoption costs in
this period. In that respect, high domestic adoption costs, In addition to the
lack of identification with the EU, have created unfavourable conditions for
domestic change. Nevertheless, the EU's strong conditionality In this period
pushed forward certain changes and resulted in Turkey's partial adjustment to
the EU's rules and practices in the area of the judiciary, which can be classified
as a fractional Europeanisation.
8.5.2. Phase II: 2002-2004
Due to the political turmoil that took place in the previous phase and
the failure of the coalition government in responding to the domestic downturn,
the DSP-MHP-ANAPgovernment had to call for early general elections in
August 2002. As a result, the AKP won the elections by a large margin and
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became a single-party government in November 2002. Compared to the
coalition government in the first phase, the AKPdid better In Identifying Itself
with the EU. In fact, the AKP had an observable pro-European stance as
evident in its party programme. This pro-European approach of the AKP
definitely helped the government to focus on the Institutional transformation
and policy (re)formatlon and carry out political reforms as required by the EU.
For instance, with regards to the judiciary, In Its party programme, the
AKP highlighted that respect for and the protection of Individual rights and
freedoms can only be obtained by constitutional guarantees, laws and an
independent judicial system; and declared that the party will work for the
protection of governance based on the rule of law where the existence of an
independent judiciary is vital for the projected legal system work. Therefore,
the AKP proposed 'the establishment of the maximum confidence In the justice
system which is the guarantee for the social order' as one of Its priorities for
'democratic reformation' within Turkey (Justice and Development Party, 2002).
This period started with a downbeat evaluation of the European
Commission on the reforms on the judiciary, due to the failure of the
government's implementation of the recently adopted rules In this area. The
European Commission's Regular Report of 2002 focused In particular on the
problematic nature of the State Security Courts, which continued to function
even after the recent legislative changes. Although their operation had been
altered after the adoption of a number of legislative amendments and their
jurisdiction had been limited, their powers, responsibilities and functioning had
not been brought in line with the EUstandards (European Commission, 2002).
Based on this, in December 2002 the European Council In Copenhagen
demanded that the Turkish government should promptly take action in
identifying the remaining shortcomings in this area and should produce an
action plan aiming the adoption and the Implementation of the necessary
legislation (Drent, 2006: 75). Following that, in May 2003, the Council adopted
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a revised Accession Partnership Document. In the revised AP, the Council
states that Turkey is expected to 'strengthen the Independence and efficiency
of the judiciary, promote consistent interpretation of legal provisions, take
measures to respect the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and
align the functioning of State Security Courts with European standards'
(European Council, 2003).
Although the demands and requirements of the EU on judicial
independence and impartiality remained unclear, after the renewed priorities
set in the Accession Partnership Document In 2003, the AKP government
accelerated the reform process by adopting new harmonisation packages. Over
the previous year, four major packages of political reforms were adopted that
carried great political significance that Impinged upon controversial Issues In
the Turkish political context. Following the recent reforms, In July 2003, with
the seventh harmonisation package, the government Introduced new measures,
particularly in the areas of the freedom of expression, freedom of association,
civil-military relations, through a series of amendments made to the Penal
Code, the Law on Associations, and the Law on the Establishment and Trial
Procedure of Military Courts.
Although these amendments were far-reaching In the areas stated
above, the amendments made In the area of judiciary did not bring dramatic
changes. In fact, so far, the priorities stated in the previous Accession
Partnership Document were dealt with In relation to the NPAAof 2001. The
only amendments concerning the judiciary in this harmonisation package
include the Law on the Court of Accounts, and the Law on the Establishment,
Duties and Trial Procedure of Juvenile Courts, which only concerned the
Institutional structure of the judicial system itself rather than Its Independence,
impartiality or the efficiency in operation (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2007). This can be
considered as a reflection on the problem of pollticlsatlon of the judiciary and
282
the continuance of the Kemalist legacy, where the judiciary predominantly
acted as the guardians of the state.
Throughout this process, the Turkish public to a great extent displayed
full support for the political reforms aimed at bringing Turkey In alignment with
the values, standards and practices of the EU (A~lk, 2012: 147).32 In the
meantime, the AKPgovernment continued Its efforts to meet Its main objective
of meeting the Copenhagen political criteria In time by setting up a 'Reform
Monitoring Group' overseeing the Implementation of reforms. In 2003, the
Commission made a positive assessment of the government's objectives and
positive stance of the public towards radical political reforms; however, It
stressed that in spite of these positive developments, the reforms had failed to
produce practical effects and their implementation remained slow and uneven
(European Commission, 2003).
Nevertheless, for the opening of accession negotiations with the EU, It
was necessary for the AKP government to continue with political reforms,
including the reforms on the judicial system in Turkey. In that respect, the
AKP's response to the requirements of the EU came in the form of various
measures adopted in the course 2004. Among the measures taken In 2004, the
introduction of a new PenalCode, a new Civil Code (to be entered Into force In
April 2005) and the abolition of State Security Courts stand out as major
changes to the Turkish judicial system. Particularly, the SSCs, comprising both
military and civilian judges working on cases against the Integrity of the state,
were subject to allegations of human rights abuses and absence of fair trial.
The abolition of the SSCswas widely accepted as a positive development by
the EU. Furthermore, after the constitutional amendments made In 2004, the
principle of the primacy of international and European human rights
conventions over domestic law were enshrined in the Constitution (Freedom
House, 2005).
32 C;arkoglu (2003: 173) reports that by the end of 19905, Turkish public support for EU
membership was quite high. In fact, around 64% were in favour of EU membership whereas
30% were against it.
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On the other hand, the 2004 Regular Report stated that Important
changes had been made to the judicial system of Turkey. First of all, the
European Commission welcomed the abolition of SSCs and their replacement
with Serious Felony Courts. Furthermore, the revised Article 90 of the
Constitution, regarding the supremacy of the European treaties over Turkish
domestic legislation, was seen as a positive development since the revised
Article obliges Turkey to apply rules according to the international agreements
in cases where there is conflict between the domestic and international
legislations. The adoption of a new Penal Code in September 2004 (replacing
the existing 80-year-old Penal Code) significantly Improved the judiciary's
compatibility with the modern European standards In line with the recent
developments of criminal law in many European countries (European
Commission, 2004). It can be argued that the abolition of the SSCsconstitutes
clear evidence for the institutional transformation of the judiciary in this period,
which is deemed necessary for Turkey's overall democratisation efforts under
the influence of the EU.
Moreover, over the course of September-October 2003 and in July
2004, two expert advisorv missions on the functioning of the judicial system In
Turkey took place. The results and recommendations of the second visit
showed that Turkey had made significant progress In less than a year. The
Ministry of Justice had organised numerous meetings with judges and
prosecutors to discuss and work on the suggestions made In the first advisory
report, and had presented a comprehensive action plan for the implementation
of the proposed changes. Furthermore, as in the previous period, the judges
and prosecutors had played a significant role in terms of the Implementation of
political reforms. The courts had continued to apply the proposed reforms and
had delivered judgements in line with the amended provisions, stemming from
the harmonisation packagesadopted so far (European Commission, 2004).
After taking these offiCial documents into account, It can be argued that
Turkey's compliance with the EU rules on the judiciary has been rather stable
284
in this period. It is therefore easier to come to a clear-cut conclusion on the
factor of the size of adoption costs, since the cost is derived from the power
costs of target governments and the presence of veto players (Schimmelfennig,
200Sc: S-6). In more concrete terms, the judiciary became one of the 'less
troubled' areas for the AKP government to reform, since the amendments
made and rules adopted in this area do not contradict with the established
rules in this area; and the willingness of the courts to Implement new
regulations has decreased the adoption costs, as they did not act as veto
players, but rather they acted as supporters of the judicial reforms. When all
these factors are taken into account, it can be concluded that the adoption
costs in this period remained at a low level.
At the same time, in this period, the EU's attitude towards Turkey with
regard to its democratisation process, along with political reforms and legal
amendments in alignment with the EU standards and practices, has
significantly improved and shown a constant positive stance. This became
evident when the EU presented a stronger and clearer accession strategy for
Turkey, and also with the inclusion of additional financial and technical
assistance hence a 'deeper commitment' to Turkey's accession process (Klrl$<;I,
2004c). These positive developments can therefore be regarded as tangible
indicators of the size and credibility of rewards, showing a high value. In other
words, it can be argued that the substantial and credible rewards offered by
the EU helped the Turkish government to comply with the EU rules and
conditions in terms of making necessary legal and constitutional changes and
rule adoptions.
For instance, in the period 2002-2004, the EU's attitude towards
Turkey's membership did not show variance in terms of offering its most
important reward, full membership as the strongest institutional tie with the EU
itself. In December 2002, at the CopenhagenSummit, Turkey was expecting to
get a date for the opening of accession negotiations; even if this was not
achieved, the EU reaffirmed its intention to review its decision again in 2004
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based on the Commission's Regular Report. Therefore, It can be argued that,
although certain criticisms were made on Turkey's reform progress along with
rule adoption and implementation, It was a tangible reward to keep the
prospect of membership in the picture, as well as the Immediate delivery of
additional financial assistance to encourage the Turkish government to carry
on with political reforms (European councu, 2002). At the end of this period,
along with reforms In policy areas, the EUfound Turkey's efforts In aligning Its
judicial system with the practices of the EUmember states satisfactory and in
December 2004, at the Brussels Summit, a start-date for formal EU accession
talks was set as 3 October 2005 (European Council, 2004).
To conclude, in contrast to the first period, as a single-party government,
the AKP was more successful in carrying out reforms in the judiciary, as was
the case of the other poliey areas. In that respect, the AKPcould Identify Itself
with the EU,which contributed to the favourable domestic conditions necessary
for a complete institutional transformation and policy reformation. Furthermore,
with low levels of domestic adoption costs and higher levels of state capacity
for domestic change, Turkey could benefit from the strong conditionality
effectively. In that respect, with the combination of favourable domestic
conditions and strong conditionality, this period set the scene for flourishing
institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon in the area of the judiciary;
and as a result, positive Europeanisation was observed.
8.5.3. Phase III: 2005-2008
The period of 2002-2004 showed remarkable development in terms of
adopting and implementing the EU rules, values and standards, particularly in
the area of the judiciary. The AKP government had made a series of
constitutional amendments, along with the adoption of harmonisation packages,
and put forward further initiatives to be achieved from 2005 onwards. Having
strong public support for political reforms to attain EUmembership, along with
the absence of veto players towards reforms in the judiciary, the AKP's job to
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transform the judicial system became less troublesome and more suitable for
drastic changes. The European Council In December 2004 decided to open
accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 and set out the
framework and requirements for starting accession negotiations.
Turkey was firstly to put six pieces of legislation In action, particularly
enhancing human rights and the functioning of the judiciary, and secondly, the
country was expected to sign the Additional Protocol, extending the existing
Association Agreement with the EU to all new Member States. Fulfilment of
these requirements by Turkey resulted In the opening of accession negotiations.
However, as noted in previous chapters, In spite of these favourable conditions
and positive start, the negotiations came to a halt rather quickly. Particularly,
the dispute over the Cyprus Issue, and the EU's decision to suspend the
opening of eight chapters in the Acquls Communautalre obstructed the
accession talks in this period. On the other hand, the Increasing threat of the
resurgence of PKK terrorist activities caused further Impediments on the
political reforms, by changing the priorities In the political agenda and by
diminishing the political will of the government to continue with political
reforms (Narh, 2009: 459).
Nevertheless, Turkey has attempted to make further progress on
judicial reforms in this period. In fact, Turkey took a significant step with the
entry into force of the PenalCode, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Law on
Enforcement of Sentences and the Law on the Establishment of the Regional
Courts of Appeal in June 2005. These changes then Introduced various
measures making it easier to convict members of the state security services
for human rights violations, provided for tougher penalties for torturers, and
criminalised genocide, crimes against humanity and the trafficking of people;
these changes were accepted as a positive development from the European
circles (Karakas and Green, 2010: 1). In fact, the abovementioned changes
allowed the judiciary to adopt European standards In line with the laws In
many European Member States. However, these changes did not directly
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impact upon the overall institutional transformation or policy (re)formatlon of
the judiciary in this period.
In fact, the European Commission's Regular Report of 2005 reiterated
the same concerns that were raised In previous Regular Reports regarding the
independence of the judiciary. This area remains particularly problematic and
therefore similar judgements had been made by the Commission. In fact, one
of the main reasons for this is due to the continued heavy Involvement of the
Ministry of Justice, predominantly In the process of the recruitment of judges
and prosecutors, which undermines the Independence of the judiciary
(European Commission, 2005a). The heavy Involvement of the Ministry of
Justice in the workings of the judiciary thus significantly reduces the
institutional independence of the judiciary and constitutes one of the major
obstacles in the political reforms.
Considering that the involvement and control of the Ministry of Justice
over the judiciary could not be restrained with the legislative and constitutional
changes made so far, it can be concluded that the reforms In relation to the
judicial Independence and impartiality have created high levels of domestic
adoption costs; and that the pollticlsatlon of the judiciary Is stili a matter of
concern. Following these developments, In January 2006, Turkey adopted the
revised Accession Partnership, setting out renewed priorities that Turkey was
expected to address in its preparations for accession. In the 2006 Accession
Partnership document, the priorities in the area of the judiciary were set as:
• Ensure consistent Interpretation of legal provisions, Including
the new penal code, related to human rights and fundamental
freedoms by all judicial authorities In line with the European
Convention on Human Rights and Its related case law;
• Ensure the independence of the judiciary, In particular as
regards the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors and the
appointment of new judges and prosecutors;
• Continue the training of judges and prosecutors on the
application of the European Convention on Human Rights and
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights;
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• Strengthen the efficiency of the judiciary through, In particular,
reinforcing its institutional capacity and adopting a new code of
civil procedure (European Council, 2006).
Throughout 2006, the authorities had focused on the Implementation of
the new Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Law on
Enforcement of Sentences following their entry into force In 2005. In particular,
the Ministry of Justice played an important role In updating the circulars
addressed to prosecutors in January 2006. In November 2006, the European
Commission in its 2006 Regular Report of Turkey stated that the political
reform process in general has significantly slowed down since the opening of
accession negotiations. The report pointed out that although there had been
some progress in the area of judiCial reform, the Implementation of the new
legislation by the judiciary had shown a mixed picture and the Independence of
the judiciary had remained problematic and stili needed to be further
established (European Commission, 2006a).
In that respect, it can be concluded that the overall assessment of the
EUon the progress made by Turkey has been critical. It cannot be denied that
Turkey has gone a long way to align itself with the standards and the practices
of the EU and meet the obligations of membership; however, due to
undesirable domestic factors and the absence of strong EU conditionality, not
much has been achieved in this period. In the 2007 Regular Report, the
European Commission stated that Turkey had successfully continued Its efforts
to modernise the judiciary by means of Information technology. The results of
the National Judicial Project, set up to Increase the efficiency of the judiciary,
had shown positive results from the judges' point of view. Furthermore, the
continuation of the implementation of adopted legislation and continued use of
IT has contributed to this outcome. However, the Commission also stressed
that there had been tensions In the relations between the government and the
judiciary over the course of 2007, which had not been conductive In terms of
having a smooth and effective functioning judicial system (European
Commission, 2007).
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For instance, in July 2008, the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) fined
the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) for undermining the
secular basis of the Turkish Republic. There was a general consensus that the
AKPwould become the next party (and the nineteenth since 1982) to be closed
by the TCC(Shambayati and Kirdl~, 2009: 767). Although the TCCagreed that
the AKP had acted against the secular order of the state and acted against the
Constitution, the charges put against the AKPwere balanced due to the AKP's
efforts to integrate Turkey into the European Union. In relation to this, a
closure case opened against the AKP on constitutional grounds. The AKP
became defensive in its policy actions and started a prosecution process
against nationalist and Kemallst political elite (Capezza, 2009: 19). Right after
this incident, in October 2008, the AKP government opened a trial against 86
people as members of an ultra-nationalist group called Ergenekon, based on
accusations that the group were organising a series of attacks and a possible
military coup against the government. This trial therefore set the scene for a
power struggle between the AKP government and the military, hence
decreasing the already troubled trust between the two entities.
In the NPAA of 2008, Turkey Identified certain legislative and
administrative measures to implement following a revised Accession
Partnership document in February 2008. First of all, the Ministry of the Interior
had started to prepare a 'Judicial Reform Strategy' and a 'Strategic Plan' In
order to strengthen the independence, Impartiality and efficiency of the
judiciary. Secondly, new measures were added to the NPAAIncluding works on
establishment and operation of new courts, the spread of specialised courts,
the strengthening the technological Infrastructure and an Increase In the
number of judges, prosecutors and other judicial staff to Improve the
functionality and the efficiency of the judiciary (Republic of Turkey, Ministry for
EUAffairs, 2008).
As pointed out in the 2008 Regular Report by the European Commission,
the draft judicial reform strategy prepared by the Ministry of Justice was found
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to be comprehensive, covering various Issues related to the Independence,
impartiality, efficiency and effectiveness of the judiciary, as well as
improvement of its professionalism, Its management system and confldence-
building initiatives within the judiciary Itself. Despite this positive Initiative, the
Commission also noted that there had not been any development with respect
to the establishment of the regional courts of appeal, which should have been
operational by June 2007. Other concerns mentioned In the report Include the
impartiality of the judiciary based on the fact that, on some occasions, senior
members of the judiciary had made political comments In the public domain
which might have compromised their Impartiality in prospective cases. Another
concern mentioned In the same report Is on the independence of the judiciary,
where no progress had been made on the composition of the High Council of
Judges and Prosecutors (European Cornmtsston, 2008). To conclude, the work
to date on the draft judicial reform strategy had been a positive development,
but the Ministry of Justice still needed to continue the consultations with
concerning stakeholders, such as civil SOCiety,and build the necessary support
base for the strategy to work.
This period has been particularly disappointing both for Turkey to comply
with the EU conditions, and for the EU to provide credible and strong
conditionality. Turkey failed to show its full commitment to carrying out the
political reforms as part of its pre-accession strategy, and the EU failed to
provide the necessary incentives to trigger Institutional transformation and
policy (re)formation in Turkey. Therefore, the combination of unfavourable
conditions and weak conditionality has resulted In no process or policy outcome,
which is associated with the negative Europeanlsatlon In this period.
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8.6. Discussion of the Results
This chapter was designed to determine the potential factors that
explain the effectiveness of EUconditionality on the institutional transformation
and policy reformation in the area of judicial independence and Impartiality in
Turkey. It also intended to find out the conditions under which the Turkish
government has been more likely to adopt EU rules, In order to comply with
the membership conditions. The results of the empirical analysis show that
each phase has shown differences in terms of formal rule adoption, hence, the
type of Europeanisation, mirroring the changes In the Turkish judicial system
under the influence of EU conditionality. The detailed list of the factors
impacting upon the effectiveness of EU conditionality and the Institutional
transformation and policy (re)formatlon of the judiciary In Turkey can be found
in Table 8.2, which will be discussed next.
Firstly, the empirical analysis reveals that although significant progress
has been achieved in the area of the judiciary since the beginning of reform
process on the structure, efficiency, and the functioning of the judicial system
in the early 2000s, the changes concerning the independence and Impartiality
of the judiciary remained limited. The factors that can account for the partial
domestic change in the first period can be assoctated with strong conditionality.
In fact, the EU, by offering sizeable and credible rewards, has provided Turkey
with sufficient incentives to initiate political reforms, Including reforms on the
judiciary. However, this period did not result In a complete Institutional
transformation and policy reformation In this policy area. This can be explained
by the unfavourable domestic conditions, such as the lack of Identification of
the coalition government with the EU and high levels of domestic adoption
costs.
Nevertheless, the second period was more positive In terms of the
domestic conditions and, due to this change, the second period set the scene
for a more successful domestic change In combination with the continuation of
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a strong EUconditionality. In that respect, with the addition of factors such as
the successful identification of the AKPwith the EU, and relatively lower levels
of domestic adoption costs, the single-party government has managed to make
significant changes to the institutional structure of the judiciary. In that respect,
the process and policy outcome of this period was a step closer to complete
transformation, which can be regarded as positive Europeanlsatlon.
Thirdly, the changes both at the EU and domestic level mirror yet
another diverging outcome In the third period. As a matter of fact, EU
conditionality became weaker compared to the previous phases due to the
anomalies in attitudes between the EU Member States towards the possible
membership of Turkey to the EU. In that respect, the EU, by giving mixed
messages to the Turkish government In this period, has escalated the
Eurosceptic stance of the Turkish public and political circles, which negatively
affected the AKP's political will to continue with political reforms. On the other
hand, the AKP's political agenda has changed due to party politics and other
political turmoil related to the escalation of PKKterrorist activities In this period.
In that respect, the priority that the AKP set for Its poliCies has significantly
changed and the political reforms necessary for the EU accession lost their
substance to a great extent. In that respect, no significant process or policy
outcome could be achieved in this period, which can be regarded as negative
Europeanisation.
When the theoretical models are taken into constderatlon, It can be
seen from the empirical analysis that neither the external incentives model nor
the social learning model can account well for describing the process and policy
outcomes across the three periods. In fact, the Isolation of one theoretical
model from the other can only provide a partial explanation for the
effectiveness of EU conditionality and domestic change in Turkey. In that
respect, as argued in the previous empirical chapters, this outcome requires a
more balanced approach to the Europeanisation of different policy areas in
candidate countries. The debate over Europeanisation, hence, polnts to a
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direction where the focus should be on differentiation between the domestic
level and EU-Ievel factors, instead of factors categorised under different
Europeanisation models.
Table 8.2 Intervening factors of institutional transformation and policy reformation
Period 1999-2002 2002-2004 2005-2008
High (significant technical High (significant rewards Low (InsignIFicant or nor
and financial rewards in In return of national rewards); mutu I
Size of rewards
return of national compliance and alignment deterioration Of
compliance and alignment with the EU legal and relations, negative(EU-Ievel) with the EU legal and administrative perception of ace sslon
administrative framework) requirements and
framework) national progress)
High (effective High (effective Low (Ineffective
conditionality; significant conditionality; Significant conditionality; doubl
progress in the progress In the standards, contusion i
Credibility
determinacy of determinacy of Indeterminate
requirements and requirements and requlr ments and(EU-Ievel) delivery of rewards; delivery of rewards; unsuccessful delivery of
membership perspective) membership perspective) rewards; diminishing or
no membership
perspective)
High (sensitive topic In Low (Increasing benefits High (costs of
this period; presence of of legal and Institutional compliance overweight
veto players; unsuitable, alignment'; Increasing the rewards; Imp et of
Size of domestic
undemocratic political financial and technical diminishing or no
environment) assistance; prospect of membership
adoption costs opening of accession perspective; limited
(Domestic-level) negotiations) Incentives to proceed
with Institutional
transformation and
pottcv (rejrorrnetton)
High (incorporation in the High (Incorporation In the High (Incorporation In
Legitimacy
Acquls; but vague Acquls; but vague the Acquls; but vague
benchmarks on the benchmarks on the benchmarks on the(EU-Ievel) judicial Independence and judicial Independence and judicial Independence
Impartiality) Impartiality) and Impartiality)
Low (failure of the High (successful High (successful
coalition partners In self- Identification of the ruling Identification of the
Identity
Identification with the EU; party with the EU; EU as ruling party with the eu;
diverging Ideologies, an aspirant group) EU as an aspirant group)(Domestic-level) different perceptions on
the prospective EU
membership
Low (embedded Low (embedded Low (embedded
Resonance guardianship role of the guardianship role of the guardianship role of the
(Domestic-level) judiciary; influence of judiciary; Influence of judiciary i Influence of
Kemalism Ideology) Kemallsm Ideology) Kemallsm Ideology)
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9. Discussion of Results
9.1. Introduction
In recent years, the EU has made significant efforts to transform Into
an important international actor In the political domain. Among changes In the
EU's political transformation an emphasis has been given to democratisation,
human rights and the rule of law greater than before (Kubicek, 2003). As part
of its enlargement policy, the EU incrementally Introduced new democratic
political conditions into its policy towards candidate countries. After the
introduction of these conditions, candidate countries became formally subject
to an assessment on democracy and democratisation In connection with the
EU's democratic principles; the failure of which would result In their exemption
from EUmembership (Pridham, 2002a; 2005).
In the meantime, EU conditionality - an Indispensable aspect of
domestic change in candidate countries under the Influence of the EU - has
undergone substantial advancement over time, comprising extensive
democratic requirements (Grabbe, 1999). Particularly In the case of CEECs,EU
conditionality became a central and proactive component of enlargement
process; and hence, a sine qua non factor In the study of the EUenlargement
and EU democracy promotion, which In turn evoked a growing Interest In
academic world and political circles in the last decade (Linz and Stepan, 1996;
Pridham, 1999b; Smith, 2003; Sadurskl, 2004; Schlmmelfennlg and
Sedelmeier, 2004).
In the literature on Europeanlsation, scholars widely contended that EU
does not have a uniform impact on domestic change in candidate countries. On
the contrary, the EU's impact Is found to be differential seeing that the
effectiveness of its conditionality varies across different national settings,
ultimately producing diverse domestic responses (Hughes et al., 2002; Grabbe,
2003; Haughton, 2007). In a similar vein, Turkey presents Itself as a complex
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case study when analysing the impact of the EUon Institutional transformation
and policy (re)formatlon In the context of the 'Europeanlsatlon of candidate
countries'. The main criterion for the choice of Turkey as a case study In this
thesis is due to the conflict between EUconditions and the state of democracy
in Turkey. This selection can be justified on methodological ground. In fact, as
Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) the selection of problematic cases facilitates the
investigation of the causal linkage between EU conditionality and domestic
change in target countries; and helps to verify the factors contributing to the
effectiveness of conditionality, which Is found to be more Influential In
problematic cases than in easier cases. In that respect, the selection of Turkey
as a case study is seen as constructive in terms of examining the effectiveness
and limitations of conditionality as Turkey illustrates a 'hard case' where the
complex internal dynamics limit the impact of the EU. In support of the
aforementioned arguments, this thesis illustrated that Indeed EU conditionality
has from far uniform effect on Turkey; and In relation to Turkish
democratisation process, It has produced diverse domestic responses across
policy areas subject to It.
Influenced by the previous studies on democratisation of CEECs,this
thesis was set out to explore the Impact of EUconditionality on the Institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey across four policy areas:
minority rights, freedom of expression, the judiciary, and the military, central
to the core liberal democratic principles of the EU. Europeanlsatlon offers
different ways to understand how the EU has an Impact on domestic change
and how it contributes to the democratisation process in national contexts. In
the context of democratisation, Institutional transformation Is seen as the
establishment of new institutional structures or the restructuring of political
principles in the realm of domestic politics. Policy (re)formatlon In turn Implies
normative changes in the policies of a target country as a result of Its
engagement with the EU's pre-accession framework, substantiating the
elements of EU membership accession negotiations. In order to address the
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degree of difference on the impact of EU conditionality on Turkish
democratisation, this thesis raised and answered an Important question: How
does Europeanisation impact upon institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation in Turkey? How does It affect the political actors, institutions and
cultural norms and values embedded in Turkish political system?
The theoretical background of the analysis (Chapter 3) Incorporated the
discussion on the effectiveness of EU conditionality In the literature on EU
enlargement and Europeanisatlon. In relation to this matter of subject, the
speCified literatures provided extensive debates on different models of
interaction such as rationalist and sociological Institutionalism to Investigate
individual or combinations of factors that Impinge upon the effectiveness of EU
conditionality when explaining the impact of International organisations on
domestic change in target countries (Schmitter, 1995; Grabbe, 1999; 2001;
2003; Vachudova, 2001; 2005). In a similar vein, this thesis focused on the
external incentives model and the social learning model stemming from the
aforementioned institutionalisms to assess the Impact of EU conditionality on
domestic change and responses In Turkey. Thereafter, the systematic analysis
presented in Chapters 5-8 has taken Into account and scrutinised the
interaction between identified domestic and external factors In accordance with
these models in order to provide a thorough examination by providing specific
patterns of actions from Turkey's exposure to Europeanlsatlon and Institutional
transformation processes.
This in turn, provided a basis for the development of two sets of
theoretically derived hypotheses (Chapter 4). The theoretical framing of the
research has fitted the combinatorial style, as Its theoretically derived
hypotheses assumed that different values of the Independent variables
resulted in different outcomes (i.e. different types of Europeanlsatlon). These
factors were identified as the size and credibility of rewards, size of adoption
costs, legitimacy, identity, and resonance. This thesis thereafter has
investigated the causal relevance of these different sets of explanatory factors
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(both domestic and EU level), which were assumed to be Influential upon the
effectiveness of EUconditionality.
In this context, when considering domestic changes with regard to
institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon of the selected policy
areas, it can hardly be concluded that Turkey has succeeded In achieving
complete transformation due to EUconditionality. In fact, the analysis revealed
that EU conditionality has only been a triggering factor, and Its effectiveness
has been limited at certain points In history due to critical domestic factors
which at times made the EU's conditionality strategy Imperceptible for the
Turkish political context (Chapters 5-8).
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and they were
summarised within the final section of respective empirical chapters (Chapters
5-8). The next section will synthesise the empirical findings to answer the main
research question of the thesis. It will provide the key theoretical findings and
the conditional configurations necessary for the Institutional transformation
and policy reformation In Turkey, and present the Indications on hypotheses
regarding the causal relationship between the effectiveness of EUconditionality
and Turkey's compliance.
9.2. Empirical Findings
The key factor that underlined Turkey's democratisation In the process
of EU accession was identified as 'conditionality'. However, as this thesis
revealed, Turkey's responses to EU conditionality has not been unified across
different policy areas. Turkey's response to conditionality was directly
influenced by prevailing ideas about the EU as a regional hegemon, historical
legacies and compliance with its principles. By carrying out extensive reforms
on minority rights, freedom of expression, the military and the judiciary,
Turkey considerably accommodated the EU rules and conditions In political
arena, but failed to fully transform its Institutions and reform Its policies. The
analysis of the policy processes behind the change In these areas revealed that
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unfavourable domestic conditions such as the historical legacies, strong and
centralised state, lack of political will to concede all the EU rules and conditions
distorted the ways In which main political actors approached EU conditionality
and pursued unremitting domestic change. This ultimately affected the policy
outcomes as well as the institutional transformation In Turkey.
According to the mechanisms of change tested in this thesis, from the
external incentives model domestic change Is seen as the outcome of political
actors' responses to sizeable and credible EU rewards (Schlmmelfennlg, 2005c;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeler, 2005a). These two variables constitute two
important elements of strong conditionality, which Is one major factor to
achieve complete transformation and/or domestic change. In the case of
Turkey, sizeable and credible rewards assisted Turkish democratisation to
flourish in the first and second phases. Nonetheless, as previously discussed In
Chapters 5-8, these mechanisms of change did not vary across policy areas
since political reforms across all policy areas were carried out under the same
EU reward scheme. The material Incentives offered by the EU In return for
Turkey's compliance and the EU's credible conditionality epitomising the EU's
capacity to adopt and implement effective Influence mechanisms and delivering
sizeable rewards in a timely manner supported the hypotheses generated from
the external incentives model, Implying that Turkey's compliance with EU
conditionality increases if the EUoffers substantial rewards (Ht); and if the EU
delivers the rewards soon after Turkey's compliant rule behaviour (Hz). For
instance, in the first and second phases, size and credibility of rewards showed
a high value due to extensive material incentives provided by the EU, and the
lack of which resulted In weak conditionality In the third period. Nevertheless,
these variables did not have explanatory power to clarify diverging process
outcomes isolation from other variables and they needed to be assessed In
combination with domestic level factors necessary for attaining complete
transformation.
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On the other hand, the analysis revealed that the size of domestic
adoption costs was another crucial factor, either contributing to favourable or
unfavourable domestic conditions necessary for domestic change. It Is
hypothesised that Turkey's compliance with EU conditionality Increases If
Turkey faces low levels of adoption costs In the process of rule adoption (H3).
The analysis across policy areas revealed that any rule adoption was
considered costly in the first phase due to political turmoil and lack of political
consensus among coalition partners at the national level. In fact, as the
literature on Europeanisation suggests If the power Is diffused In domestic
political context, it is highly unlikely to achieve domestic consensus necessary
to cope with EUconditionality (Borzel and Risse, 2004).
In addition to that, the presence of veto players such as the army and
bureaucracy also increased the size of domestic costs In this period and made
it difficult to achieve consensus among coalition partners (Chapter 7). This In
turn, created unfavourable condition for domestic change In relation to policies
in question. Among the issues increasing the domestic adoption costs were the
PKKterrorist activities posing a serious threat to the sovereignty and Integrity
of the Turkish state (Chapter 5), the lack of political will to grant extended
political freedoms (Chapter 6), the highly Institutionalised character of the
military in politics (Chapter 7), and strong control of the executive over the
judiciary (Chapter 8). Nonetheless, In the second phase, the size of rewards
exceeded the size of adoption costs and domestiC political context became
more suitable for domestiC change. Particularly after the replacement of the
coalition government by a Single-party government, domestiCconsensus could
be achieved which positively affected the political reform process.
On the other hand, the social learning model presupposes that the
effectiveness of EU conditionality depends on the legitimacy of EU rules,
domestic resonance of the newly introduced rules, and the Identification of the
target government with the EU. The findings revealed that these variables did
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not account well for the process outcome in the selected policy areas
independently.
For instance, in relation to legitimacy factor, it Is observed In Chapters
5 and 7, that the EU's policies on minority rights and the military lack
legitimacy because the EU falls to present common poncles In these areas
which are consensually shared among its member states; and the accession
requirements on these policy areas are not Institutionalised appropriately at
the EU level. It was also observed that legitimacy In Isolation from other
factors did not produce more compliance as an outcome when the four policy
areas are compared. In fact, as discussed In Chapter 6 and 8, the EU's
legitimate policy on freedom of expression or the judiciary did not result In
better or wider compliance, and Institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation in Turkey when compared to the EU's policies on minority rights
and the military which lack legitimacy.
Additionally, no evidence was found at the domestic level suggesting
that ineffective responses of target governments to the EUrequirements In the
areas where the EU lacks legitimacy negatively affect process and policy
outcomes. For instance, even if the EU's policies on minority rights, the
democratic governance of the security sector, and civil-military relations had
low values on the legitimacy factor, it Is observed that both the DSP-MHP-
ANAPcoalition government in the first period, and the AKPgovernment In the
second and third periods, had made constitutional and legal amendments In
order to meet the EU's requirements and comply with the EU rules in these
areas as part of its accession framework. In that respect, the hypothesis on
legitimacy implying Turkey's successful compliance in relation to coherently
presented EU rules where the EUcreates an ownership perception (H4) cannot
be supported or opposed In isolation from other factors.
Furthermore, the findings for different time periods showed that
identification of the target government with the EU provided a necessary and
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favourable condition for domestic change; therefore supported the hypothesis
that Turkey's compliance Increases if Turkey Identifies Itself with the EU and
shares its norms and values (Hs). For Instance, the reform process carried out
between 1999-2002 by the coalition partners of DSP-MHP-ANAPwas less
successful and more problematic when compared to the periods of 2002-2004
and 2005-2008 due to the low level of identification of the coalition
government and high levels of Ideological diversification In the first phase;
whereas the latter two phases showed high levels of Identification due to AKP's
successful identification with the EU as a single-party government. The low
levels of self-identification of DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition hindered the
establishment of the favourable domestic conditions necessary for domestic
change. However, this factor did not show variance cross-sectorally but
showed a discrepancy cross-temporally.
Finally, if individually assessed, the normative resonance factor also
falls short in explaining the process or policy outcomes In the Turkish context.
Resonance (or Its lack of) can form perceptions at the domestic level towards
the newly introduced EU rules. It was hypothesised that Turkey's compliance
would increase if there is a high level of Institutional association and conformity
between existing rules and newly introduced EUconditions (HIS)' All the policy
areas (Chapters 5-8) analysed in this thesis showed low values on the
resonance factor. For instance, in the case of minority rights, Turkey and the
EU do not share the same understanding on minorities. Whilst Turkish
definition of minority is strictly shaped by the Turkish state doctrine of
indivisibility, the EU has a more uniform and accommodating definition of
minority. Turkey's rejection of recognition of ethnic minority groups as
minorities significantly jeopardised the introduction of new rules by the EU;
and the existing rules continued to reduce normative resonance.
In a similar vein, the existing rules and practices on freedom of
expression, the judiciary, and the military also lack normative resonance.
Freedom of expression and the judiciary lack normative resonance due to the
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strict state control over fundamental freedoms stemming from the creation of
national unity in the very first days of the Turkish Republic; and due to existing
constitutional provisions limiting the Independence and Impartiality of the
judiciary and providing an overpowering bond between the executive and the
judiciary. The military lacks normative resonance because It has always been a
major actor in politics and has been seen as the guardians of the state,
responsible for the protection of the unity and secularity of the nation, which
contradicts with the norms that the EU set out In relation to civil-military
relations. Observing that resonance factor constantly remained low throughout
three phases and across policy areas, the diverging process and policy
outcomes could not be explained by this factor In Isolation from other factors.
As the general findings In relation to the model of Interaction of
variables revealed (Chapter 4), It was actually favourable domestic conditions
that ultimately impacted upon the democratisation process. Only In the
presence of these conditions and in combination with strong conditionality, a
complete institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon could be
achieved, which was reflected in positive Europeanlsatlon. Without these
favourable conditions, this complete domestic transformation cannot be
achieved since strong conditionality in the absence of these favourable
conditions can only result In partial adjustment of policies at the national level.
In that respect, this combination can only produce fractional Europeanlsatlon.
In order to achieve positive Europeanlsatlon It Is necessary to have both
favourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality.
In that respect, the findings necessitate a re-assessment of explanatory
powers of individual factors with regard to the theoretical highlights of
Europeanisation, since these findings not only challenge the current studies on
Europeanisation of candidate countries (Hughes et al., 2002; Grabbe, 2003;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; 200Sa; Haughton, 2007), they also
raise questions on the strength of the EU as an Important external actor on
domestic change. Starting from the presumption that the most declslve factors
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that lie in the heart of democratisation are positioned at the domestic political
domain, it can be claimed neither the external incentives nor the social
learning models can account well to explain this outcome. Rather than
choosing one model over the other, a more balanced approach on theoretical
grounds should be adopted. In that respect, it can be deduced that the focus of
theoretical investigation on Europeanisation and EU conditionality should not
be on examining the explanatory power of the external Incentives and the
social learning models; instead, the research should focus on how independent
variables stemming from both models interact with each other.
To conclude, it needs to be noted that the EUhas engaged In a lengthy,
public and political deliberation with Turkey to make Turkish democratisation
possible by offering prospective membership. This prospective provided Turkey
to have access to expending variety of political, economic and social
opportunities to change the embedded state character, Institutional structures,
policy reforms, which Interminably has diminished the development of
democratic practices In the political domain. This In turn, created a complex
interdependence between Turkey and the EU throughout Turkey's accession
negotiations, and provided the EU an asymmetrical power to Induce political
reforms which has been thought to help consolidating democracy at the
national level. Through conditionality, the EUhas possessedan Institutionalised
framework which helped the EU to diffuse political pressures with Intent to
make progress on democratisation at the domestic level (Prldham, 1999). In a
way, prospective EUmembership has helped significantly to the stabilisation of
political, economic and social developments at the domestic level more than
any other International commitment (Schmitter, 1995); and significantly
altered the institutional structures and pollcles In Turkey even If the final result
is yet to be seen.
All in all, having discussed the empirical findings, It Is also important to
discuss their policy implications to better understand how the analytical results
can potentially be applied 'on the ground'. The Identification of the policy
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implications of the findings Is Important to show how this research may
influence the debate with Europeanisation discourse and how the findings may
affect the practice in this field. In that respect, the next section will present a
brief synthesis of the policy relevance of key findings from this thesis.
9.3. Policy Implications
As presented in Chapter 2, the literature on democracy promotion by
international organisations reflects that EU has been associated with positive
form of democracy promotion (Laffan, 1998; Carothers, 1999; Sadurskl, 2004).
The EU, by providing support, Incentives, and reward expedites the process of
democratisation in target states. In support of these arguments, the overall
findings associated with Turkey and Turkish democratisation reaffirmed the key
functioning of the EU as an international organisation In the spread of Its
democratic principles and the development of these principles through Its
conditionality strategy in the cases of candidate countries. Regardless of the
extent of its impact, the EU is an Important actor for Turkish democratisation;
and the dynamics of domestic transformation of Turkey cannot be fully
understood if the ways in which the EU generates Incentives for political
reforms at the domestic level in relation to its pre-accession framework are not
considered.
In Chapter 2 it is also revealed that studies on democratisation that do
not incorporate the international dimension fall to adequately address the
dynamics of domestic change In countries which are directly exposed to
external impact (Schmitter, 1995; 2001; Whitehead, 1996; 2001). In fact, In
the case of democratisation and liberalisation of Southern Europe In 1970s, It
is observed that international actors such as extra-regional powers had been
highly supportive of this transformation (Schmitter, 1986); and In this context
the EU has become a symbol for flourishing democratisation and moral
supporter of democratic values (Pridham, 1999b). It Is definitely a prerequisite
of the EUthat any candidate country should have a democratic political system
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to be a part of it. In fact, Turkey's application for EU membership resulted In
the EU's utilisation of conditionality strategy to produce political regime change
since EU membership is restricted to fully functioning democracies. In that
respect, through its conditionality strategy, the EUexerts external Influence to
trigger such a change at the domestic level, which makes the EUan Influential
external actor (McLaren, 2008).
Nevertheless, this deduction needs to be linked to the diverging
domestic politics of individual target countries In the process of EU accession.
In fact, although there can be certain similarities between candidate countries,
nonetheless, every country has Its own political culture and different historical
facts. Therefore, some candidate countries might differ In terms of their
'openness' to Europeanisation and their adaptation to externally Induced
domestic change might be more challenging compared to others (Laffan, 1998).
In a similar vein, as Risse et al. (2001: 3) poslt, Europeanlsation entails the
formation of new 'layers of politics', which Interact with pre-existing ones,
leading to 'distinct and identifiable' changes In domestic politics - even If these
changes are perceived as 'domestic adaptation with natural colors'. In this
context, the EU's impact can only be far from uniform when taking these
domestic factors into consideration. This thesis has used empirical findings to
show that the current EU conditionality Is not making the antiCipated external
impact. The theoretical arguments for this justification suggest the need for
the EU's policy review on conditionality which will enable diversification to work
for target countries by taking Into conSideration of their unique political culture
and historical legacies.
On the other hand, the findings regarding the Importance of domestic
factors when explaining the actual institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation in relation to Turkish democratisation are to be considered as
hypotheses complementary to theories of democratisation accepting their
earlier assumptions. In relation to this literature, In the case of Turkish
democratisation, the utilisation of Europeanlsatlon framework helped to
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describe the domestic factors and the International factors that contributed to
democratisation in the country In question which at the same time happened to
be in the process of EU accession negotiations. For Instance, In line with the
actor-oriented literature on democratisation (Rustrow, 1970), It Is observed
that domestic political elites playa significant role in democratisation In Turkey,
as these actors are responsible for showing sufficient political will to change
the political landscape of the country. This, however, Is not an unexpected
result, as the dominant approach within literature on democratic transitions to
a great extent gives emphasis to the role of political actors In explaining any
regime change at the domestic level. According to this, democratisation Is
determined by the decisions of major political actors wherein old political elites
are considered to be the biggest potential threat to this process (O'Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986; Di Palma, 1990; Karl, 1990).
This deduction however leaves many aspects of political Interactions In
the process of democratisation unexplained. For Instance, It Is stili an
unresolved matter whether the end result of partial or complete domestic
change is attributable to the political actors as the main decision-makers at the
domestic level or to the constraints they faced due to the embedded state
character and structural differences (Doorenspleet and Mudde, 2008). In either
way, it is observed that Turkish political actors seemed to have approached the
conditionalities imposed by the EU in a rather selective manner; and used the
state to protect their own Interests at different points of democratisation.
Nonetheless, without their political will and favourable domestic conditions, any
externally induced democratisation efforts and Imposed conditionality are
destined to be inconclusive.
Furthermore, in the theory and research on democratisation, It Is
argued that 'the possibility of differential structural causation - that the
structural causes of the transitions towards democracy' should be pursued
(Muller, 1995: 995). In that respect, this thesis, by structuring the discussion
on the basis of the common internal-external and structure-agency debates,
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has contributed to the literature on democratisation and showed how In the
context of Europeanisation, Turkish democratisation Is structurally caused and
influenced by the interactions of Internal and external actors.
As previously noted in Chapter 2, whilst the literature on
democratisation acknowledges Internal factors as the most Important ones
during the transition phase, the same literature also acknowledges the role of
the external factors and their contribution to democratisation, what Is actually
seen as a domestic phenomenon. In relation to this literature, one Important
factor that grabs the attention in the case of Turkey and external factors Is the
factor of regional hegemon. Regional hegemon Is seen as an external (f)actor
implementing neutral or moderate pro-hegemon foreign policy within target
countries to stimulate transition to democracy or democratisation at the
national level (Doorenspleet and Mudde, 2008). With regard to Turkey, the EU
as an international actor and as the regional hegemon in question, took an
important role, as it often positively Interfered In democratisation In Turkey by
providing substantial aid which can be linked to the asymmetrical relation
between the two based on Turkey's membership application. This In turn,
made the EU an indispensable actor Impacting upon the Institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation In Turkey.
To conclude, the findings of this thesis certainly generate further
questions for policy-makers both at the EU level and domestic level on the
dynamics of institution-building and policy (re)formatlon as well as dispersion
of EU level practices on democracy as rule adoption in national settings. The
findings also point to different avenues of research for academics who
investigate the emergence and development of new pollctes and institutional
set-ups in specific national contexts as a result of direct exposure to the EU's
impact through its conditionality strategy. These Issues will be tackled in the
next, also the concluding chapter of this thesls,
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10. Conclusion
10.1. Introduction
Turkey's association with the EEC/EU has a long history, covering a
period of more than half a century. Some would argue that the current
Republic of Turkey was born out of the 'ashes of the Ottoman Empire' (Ergll,
2000; Nas, 2005) and became the 'sick man of Europe' (Llvanlos, 2006; Tarlfa
and Adams, 2007). Since the first day of Its foundation, Turkey wanted to be
part of Western civilisation. Hence, It always turned Its face to Europe. It Is In
this European conjuncture that Turkey's political will and Intention to become a
part of the EC/EU emerged already In 1959 when Turkey applied for EC
membership. Turkey's EC application also marked the beginning of Its very
long and compelling journey to Europeanlsatlon/Westernlsatlon.
The European Council of Helsinki In 1999, where Turkey was granted
candidacy status marked a new era In Turkey-EU relations. In this period, the
enlargement policy became an Important instrument for the EU to exert Its
influence on Turkey during accession negotiations to align Turkey's domestic
rules and practices with its own rules, norms and conditions by providing
necessary rewards and incentives. Whilst doing this, the EU expliCitly made It
clear to Turkey that Its accession Is at all times conditional upon a wide range
of requirements including the requirements and standards of democracy. In
that respect, particularly with reference to its accession criteria, also known as
the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU closely engaged with the Institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation In Turkey In the areas directly linked
to democratic principles, and influences the rule adoption and domestic policy-
making processes of political actors at the national level.
Thereafter a considerable political reform process was Initiated in
Turkey which soon turned into substantial Institutional transformation and
policy (re)formation despite some political setbacks. As Indicated previously,
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prospective EUmembership has become one of the leading factors for Turkey
to undertake drastic political reforms as required by the EU. As Vachudova
(2005: 108) puts it 'the greater the beneflts of membership, the greater the
potential political will in applicant countries to satisfy intrusive political and
economic requirements'. This assessment seems appropriate In many ways as
without the prospective benefits of accession or financial and technical
assistance provided within the pre-accession framework, Turkey would have
failed dramatically at achieving democratisation the way it did within a very
short period of time. In many ways, the EU's approach to democracy
promotion has become instrumental In Its efforts to Induce political reforms;
and its conditionality strategy has become the main 'triggering factor' of
domestic change in Turkey.
In this context, this thesis presented a thorough assessment of the
impact of the EUon the process of domestic change in Turkey In the course of
its EU accession process by conducting cross-sectoral analysis of minority
rights, freedom of expression, the military, and the judiciary In relation to the
democratic principles of the EU. In this context, these policy areas were
selected as case studies to shed light on the process of domestic change In
Turkey and its alignment with the EU based on their relevance for the main
research question and for the theoretical framework. They also served the
purpose of improving the theoretical and empirical understanding of how
Europeanisation impacts on domestic change in target countries and the ways
in which the Europeanisatlonof different policy areas affects the policy-making
of political actors and Institutions as well as cultural norms and values
embedded in national political systems as they are exposed to external
influence. The empirical analysis thereof involved the process-tracing of: I)
structural changes to the Institutions; ii) policy processes; III) the extent of EU
involvement; and iv) the effectiveness of conditionality across three time
periods, 1999-2002, 2002-2004, and 2005-2008 and across polley areas.
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Scholars recently have been involved In a lively debate on the nature
and relative importance of the diffusion of democratic and liberal norms by the
EU to the candidate states In the process of accession negotiations. These
scholars tend to question whether this diffusion of democratic values are
driven mainly by external or internal forces, and whether the most effective
measures are those that are carried out through the mechanisms of
conditionality (Sadurski 2004: 375). Consequently, a significant number of
theories and concepts, aimed to explain the role of the EU In the
democratisation of candidate countries can be found In the Europeanlsatlon
literature. In that respect, the theoretical framework of this thesis was framed
around the external incentives model and the social learning model which were
found to be the most suitable theoretical models when assessing the
effectiveness of conditionality as an Important mechanism of democratisation.
On the whole, the analytical Investigation was designed as the hypotheses-
testing qualitative study of the conditions under which the EU has had an
effective impact on democratisation In Turkey. After reviewing the literature on
democratisation and EU conditionality, and taking Into consideration the
insights from the external incentives and the social learning models, two sets
of measures and four types of interactions of variables, which the prior
research have shown to be relevant to effectiveness of conditionality, have
been developed.
The empirical analysis of the chosen policy areas revealed that the
conditionality on those poliey areas involve a wide range of issues related to
the democratic principles of the EU, and they reflect on how important It Is for
the EU to spread its democratic credentials to the candidate countries. Firstly,
as part of the pre-accession framework, the EU requires candidate countries to
adopt its Acquis Communautaire comprising the main body of EU law, and
demands the ratification of relevant International conventions in specific policy
areas. The adoption of the Acquis Communautaire mirrors the EU'sstrict policy
to align on a legal basis the laws of the candidate countries at the domestic
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level with that of the EU. That type of legal alignment Is found to be useful to
regularise the practices at the national level and reflects the highly
institutionalised character of certain poliey areas.
Methodologically, this thesis presented a qualitative case study
research examining the causal relationship and conditions of the Impact of EU
conditionality on domestic change in Turkey. In order to facilitate this framing
and taking into account the research objective, by using small number of cases
and collected qualitative data, an In-depth empirical analysis was conducted by
utilising the process-tracing method as a suitable data analytical strategy. This
method is found to be useful In examining complex patterns of Interplay
between independent variables across policy areas and across time. To simplify
the research and minimise the patterns of outcomes, four types of
Europeanisation are defined. Following that, the Independent variables were
dichotomously coded by giving either high or low values, Indicating their role In
domestic change. Subsequently, combination of factors (both domestic and EU
level) was associated with the corresponding outcome (I.e. different types of
Europeanisation), which subsequently constituted the results of the conducted
empirical analysis revealing the necessary factors/conditions for Institutional
transformation and policy (re)formation In the targeted polley areas, thus
allowing the test of hypotheses stemming from the external Incentives model
and the social learning model.
In order to conduct the empirical analysis, a wide range of qualitative
data relevant to Europeanisatlon and EU conditionality have been tested
against the sequence of events (i.e. domestic change and democratisation) In
Turkey and the EU. The general narrative of Turkey's domestic situation was
presented at the outset of the empirical analysis, listing the main conflicts
between the democratic practices in Turkey and the EU's democratic
reqUirements, depicting the main conditions of EU conditionality across policy
areas, providing empirical evidence for the values of domestic and EU level
factors (i.e. independent variables), and evaluating the impact of EU
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conditionality. Therefore, in order to answer the main research question as to
what the real policy changes have been in the context of democratisation In
Turkey, this thesis assessed the overall policy changes across three time
periods to attain the general picture of the current state of democratisation In
Turkey.
The next section will present an overview of the contribution of this
thesis with respect to the research topic and results of the empirical analysis.
This is useful on portraying how these may Impinge on the further
understanding of the subject, theory and policy In question.
10.2. Contribution of the Thesis
Principally, the academic contribution of this thesis has been to the
literature on Europeanlsatlon and EU conditionality. Through the In-depth
analysis of the interactions between the EU conditionality and Turkey's
domestic change, this thesis displayed the factors relevant to the successof EU
conditionality and factors that cause or limit the Institutional transformation
and policy (re)formation in Turkey; and built new models for Interaction of
these factors indicating diverse process outcomes, hence different types of
Europeanlsation.
Second, this thesis has gone beyond the borders of the existing studies
(both theoretical and comparative) on Europeanlsatlon and EUconditionality by
broadening the number of policy areas (cross-sectoral analysis) and time
periods (cross-temporal analysis) and by applying a much stronger analytical
framework. Whilst previous studies on Europeanlsatlon and EU conditionality
(Herltler, 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; 2002; B6rzel, 2002,
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeler, 200Sa) utilise a similar theoretical framework,
this thesis goes further in capturing the broad range of primary data, a
thorough data processing and analytical methods and a better suited research
design allowing the scope of independent variables that produce different
outcomes.
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Third, the findings of this thesis mainly contribute to the relevant
academic literature by proposing causal mechanisms associating domestic
change with EUconditionality. In addition to that, the findings also contribute
to policy-oriented research In general since It alms to expose the actual
divergence of the impact of EU conditionality and compliance problems of
target countries. In that respect, It can be used as a guide for the policy
makers both in the EU and target countries to better understand the
conditionality-compliance dichotomy and Its Implications In actual policy-
making.
Fourth, the contribution of this thesis has been to the broader academic
work on the EU's role in democracy promotion In Its region. The literature
presupposes that international organisations trigger democratisation within
target countries through their conditionalities In support of their liberal
democratic values and norms (Kubicek, 2003; Smith, 2003). The same
literature also potnts out that International organisations, In order to achieve
this, should be designed to have enforcement mechanisms to obtain such
changes at the domestic level (Schlmmelfennlg and Sedelmeler, 2002;
Schlmmelfennig et al., 2003; Vachudova, 2005). This thesis, Instead, claims
that democratisation in target countries cannot be achieved only through these
external influence mechanisms and through conditionality; and based on the
analytical results, it argues that this can only be achieved If these external
mechanisms are combined with favourable domestic conditions based on the
fact that without sufficient pro-democracy pressures at the domestic level, any
externally induced democratisation Is destined to be Insufficient.
Lastly, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the recently
widening literature on EU candidate countries' compliance with the EU's
democratic criteria. The narrative In this thesis provided careful analysis of
conditionality-compliance dichotomy and the factors pertinent to It In a
candidate country (i.e. Turkey) which has not been discussed in detail In the
academic literature which predominantly analyses these trends in CEECs(Risse
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et al., 2001; Hughes et al., 2002; Sedelmeler, 2006; Haughton, 2007). In that
respect, the analysis of Turkey, with particular emphasis on policy areas
reflecting upon the democratic credentials and process of democratisation can
be considered as a significant contribution and an exemplar for a new path for
academic work stressing the intertwined link between Europeanlsatlon and
democratisation. In fact, to generate achievable policy strategies and domestic
change with regards to democratisation, there Is need for more case studies at
the national level to allow further assessment of local dimensions of the
subject. Exploring the following as future research strategies can facilitate the
attainment of this goal.
To sum up, this thesis investigated the dynamics of domestic change
and impact of EU conditionality and presented an In-depth study of Turkish
democratisation, subsequently making considerable contributions to the
literature on Europeanisatlon and the literature on democratisation.
Nonetheless, this thesis has encountered several limitations; and only after
taking these limitations Into account, new directions for a fruitful future
research can be drawn. The following section will discuss the limitations of this
thesis, and in relation to these limitations, the subsequent section will highlight
potential future research areas to develop the current research further.
10.3. Limitations of the Thesis
As previously stated, this thesis has offered an evaluative perspective
on the institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon In Turkey under
the influence of EU conditionality. In this empirical research, whilst conducting
analysis of the specified topic, a number of limitations were encountered,
which need to be considered.
First, this thesis presented a case study and conducted cross-sectoral
and cross-temporal analysis. Case studies are commonly considered as unique,
their findings cannot be generalised easily. In that sense, one limitation that
might immediately be recognisable Is that the findings of this thesis may not
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be generalised to other cases. As a candidate country to the EU, Turkey poses
a unique case where its background, geopolitical condition, Its culture, and
demographics are different to that of the previous candidate countries such as
the CEECs.The specific findings on the Internal dynamics In Turkey cannot be
easily generalised if and when compared with other country cases.
Nevertheless, In spite of Turkey's patchy road towards EU accession
and its different cultural background, It Is difficult to think of a candidate
country being able to adopt the required reforms as part of the EU accession
framework, where country-specific historical legacies, political culture, and
political dynamics among political elites, do not play an Important role. In that
respect, Turkey must be considered an Important case because It does not only
offer an interesting case study to explore externally Influenced democratisation,
it also presents an Important case for the understanding of the Importance of
domestic politics, which ultimately appears to be the most decisive factor
shaping the process and outcome of democratisation. Therefore, In order to
overcome this challenge and to have a wider Impact than that of only being a
thorough explanation of the specific case of Turkey, and to Increase the
chances of having a wider scope on the generalisation of the findings, this
thesis has incorporated a strong theoretical discussion on Europeanlsatlon Into
the case study research design.
Second, as a direct consequence of the methodology of the thesis, the
cross-sectoral and cross-temporal empirical analysis might have certain
limitations in the sense that the empirical analysis In this thesis only covers
four different policy areas and a relatively short time span. As Indicated In
Chapter 4, the selection criteria for these policy areas was chosen based on the
modern conceptualisations of democracy, and in relation to the EU's formal
membership accession conditions as stated in the Copenhagen political criteria.
Nonetheless, as indicated In Chapter 2, there are a number of Institutions
structuring the minimum requirements for democracies Including free and fair
elections under no government coercion, freedom of association, and
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engagement with strong civil society (Dahl, 1998). Given that, the analysis of
democratisation in Turkey or in any other candidate country can be extended
to cover these institutions. This in turn, may allow the researcher to compare
the effectiveness of EUconditionality on democracy with an analysis covering a
wider spectrum of policy areas.
Furthermore, the selected time frame for the empirical analysis covers
the period from 1999-2008, which Is divided Into three phases (1999-2002,
2002-2004, 2005-2008). This is the period In which the EU had been actively
involved in the institutional transformation and policy (re)formatlon of Turkey
and influenced the domestic change through Its conditionality strategy.
Particularly due to the broad nature of Europeanlsatlon and democratisation as
the phenomena under Investigation, only a limited number of policies and a
moderately short time frame could be examined In the empirical analysis of
this thesis, which as one would expect, might have caused an analytical
limitation.
Third, this thesis only tested the variables stemming from two major
theoretical models within the Europeanlsatlon framework: the external
incentives model and the social learning model, which were developed by
Schlmmelfennig and Sedelmeler (200sa) to Investigate the Europeanlsatlon
process of the Central and Eastern European countries In particular. In that
respect, as previously noted, the theoretical framework of this thesis remained
exclusive of an approach from historical Institutionalism. Although the external
incentives model and the social learning model have strong explanatory value,
the findings of the analysis Imply that, path dependency and relevant set of
concepts such as critical junctures, historical legacies, and political culture
might also have impacted upon the Institutional transformation and policy
(re)formation of Turkey under the influence of the EU. Thus the exclusion of
historical institutionalism In the evaluation of the effectiveness of EU
conditionality might have causeda theoretical limitation.
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Although the aforementioned limitations might seem problematic when
assessing the current research, these limitations might be turned Into new
potential future research areas and a value can be added to them In order to
include recommendations for future action. The next section will outline these
points demonstrating how future research could fill In the gaps recognising and
responding to the aforementioned limitations and taking the present thesis
further on.
10.4. Recommendations for Future Research
Although this thesis has extensively analysed the democratisation
process in Turkey across four policy areas, which are considered as the core
principles of democracies, the research findings did not paint a complete
picture of the state of democratisation In Turkey. For future research of this
topic, while this might not be an easy task, It can be attempted to focus on
other policy areas in relation to democratic principles. This could not only
create a new empirical setting, where the scope of democratisation would be
advanced further, but it could also potentially reveal more. Therefore, a logical
extension to this thesis would be to Investigate the process of domestic change
in other policy areas, which can show whether there are any other divergences
in the process and policy outcomes In the Turkish national context with regard
to the effectiveness of EU conditionality and domestic responses of the poucv-
makers in Turkey.
In the literature on democratisation there are a number of concepts
and frameworks which solely focus on a number of mechanisms of
democratisation apart from conditionality. In the literature, In addition to
conditionality mechanism within Europanlsatlon framework, another Identified
mechanism of democratisation is listed as modernisation. The modernisation
theory which perceives democracy as a function of social and economic
development within a country, identifies main social conditions In support of a
democratic system as economic development, level of education and
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Industrialisation (Llpset, 1959). In fact, several scholars have also proved the
causal relationship between economic development and level of democracy by
utilising a number of indicators and approaches (Diamond, 1994; Przeworskl,
1995). These studies on modernisation as a mechanism of democratisation
adopt a framework which emphasises the Importance of domestic, bottom-up,
societal and political conditions of democratisation In contrast to conditionality
framework which emphasises the Importance of International and top-down
mechanisms of democratisation (Schlmmelfennlg and Scholtz, 2007).
Acknowledging that there are alternative mechanisms of democratisation, a
fruitful avenue for future research would be the comparison of the strengths of
these alternative approaches in explaining the institutional transformation and
policy (re)formation in target countries.
On the other hand, as the research In this thesis has focused on Turkey,
and Turkish democratisation under the Influence of the EU, one avenue of
research would be to utilise the research design and methodology of this thesis
on the Europeanlsatlon of policy areas and Impact of EU on democratisation In
other current and prospective candidate countries as well as the ENPcountries.
This would provide a wider spectrum of knowledge In terms of how the EU
matters for the spread of democratic principles In different national contexts,
and how the individual candidate countries perceive the EU and respond to the
external pressures imposed by EUthrough Its conditionality strategy.
This in turn, might allow the researcher to Include other theoretical
models such as historical Institutionalism which Is better equipped to capture
the path dependency and relevant set of concepts such as critical junctures,
historical legacies, and political culture In order to provide better explanations
for the diverging domestic responses to the externally Induced democratisation
efforts by international actors. Therefore, another avenue of research would be
to develop a wider theoretical framework, with the Inclusion of a historical
institutionalist approach to Europeanlsation. By doing so, the explanatory value
of three strands of Instltutlonalisms can be tested against each other, which
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would potentially Introduce new variables related to the concepts such as path
dependency, historical legacies and political culture.
Last but not least, as Indicated In the previous section, the short-time
span of the empirical analysis might be seen as an analytical limitation.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that an In-depth Investigation of the short-term
processes of domestic change under the Influence of EU conditionality Is a
necessary opening for a long-term assessment. In that respect, a longer-term
assessment of the impact of EUconditionality on democratisation In Turkey can
be considered as a natural prolongation to the current research.
10.5. Conclusion
Returning to the starting point of this thesis, the Institutional
transformation and policy {re)formatlon of Turkey along with Its everlasting
democratisation process Is currently subject to debate within the EU since It Is
one of the most problematical candidate countries In the history of the EU's
enlargement; hence there Is a serious need to rethink the dynamics of
domestic change and Europeanlsatlon effects across policy areas within
domestic political domain. this thesis has polnted to problems with the current
situation in Turkey and it has shown that, while the Institutional transformation
and policy {re)formation of minority rights, freedom of expression, the military,
and the judiciary has developed fairly positively, some discrepancies In these
areas still prevail.
The findings reveal that particularly after 1999, while Turkish
democracy has gone through a subtle alignment In adapting to the EU's own
democratiC norms and values as well as the EU practices, the overall political
culture or the political thinking In Turkish national context has not been
transformed to any great extent. The EU has certainly triggered the
transformation of institutional structures and {re)formed policies and polley
practices in Turkish political domain, which intended to bring the functioning of
these institutions and policy implementations up to the EUstandards. Although
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Turkey made significant constitutional and legal amendments to meet the EU's
formal accession requirements, it failed to effectively respond to the EU's
adaptational pressures. This ultimately jeopardised the process of Its domestic
change. Turkey's ineffective response can be linked to the very nature of the
existing national institutions, strong centralised state and political ethos, and
their ability to form, delay or completely obstruct the externaliy Induced
democratisation efforts. Even if EU democratic conditionality has provided a
greater scope of political freedoms, social and cultural rights of minorities, and
democratic governance in Turkey in relation to the Civil-military relations and
judicial independence, pre-existing domestiCstructures, where the Institutional
core of the state and the role of the political elite are predominantly Important,
became the main reason for the lacking of democratic features.
To conclude, the act of creating a consolidated democracy based on
truly developed state capacity and political will - or Institutional transformation
and policy (re)formatlon in accordance with the principles of a supranational
organisation such as the EU - is a complex social phenomenon. This process
can neither be degraded to a constant modus operandi nor can It be
considered a matter of statistical estimation or assessment specifying either a
complete success or complete failure. Instead, It Is a matter of an adaptation
and conversion requiring even more than financial or technical aid, social and
political commitment, and above all a genuine and authentic change of frames
of mind. For it to become possible, all citizens, and the governing and political
elite in the first place, should view the domestic transformation and
democratisation as important mutual benefits In the common Interest of the
society as a whole, and one deserving pre-eminence. This, at the end, should
become a shared goal for Turkey and the EU, which can be achieved and
cultivated in cooperation for the benefit of both parties.
Evidently the EU's external influence on Its own Is not (and will not be)
sufficient to prompt change for Turkish democratisation to be successful In the
future. Instead, a real and democratic change can only be achieved If the
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mindsets of the political elite and the system-wide policy structures are altered
In a way to accept and actually Implement any democratic norms and rules
necessary for the endurance of a stable democratic system In Turkey. With the
current lack of political will and declining EU support, any reform necessary to
change ideology and policy structures in the Turkish national context Is likely
to impede over Turkey's ever-lasting journey to have a functioning democracy
and to become a member of the EU, which Is anything but complete. The
remaining residual question therefore is whether Turkey Is really willing to get
involved in a real institutional and political evolution to constructively
transform its political ethos with or without the prospect of EU membership.
Only with an answer to this question we can find out whether Turkish
democratisation serves as a means for other ends or as an end In Itself.
322
Bibliography
Ahmad, Feroz (1977) The Turkish experiment in democracy, 1950-1975,
london and Boulder: Westview Press, for the Royal Institute of International
Affairs.
Ahmad, Feroz (1985) 'The transition to democracy In Turkey', Third World
Quarterly, 7/2: 211-226.
Ahmad, Feroz (1991) 'Politics and Islam In modern Turkey', Middle Eastern
Studies, 27/1: 3-21.
Ahmad, Feroz (1993) The making of modern Turkey, london and New York:
Routledge.
Ahmad, Feroz (2003) Turkey - The Quest for Identity, Oxford: Oneworld
Publications.
Andersen, Sveln S., Eliassen, Kjell A. (eds.) (1996) The European Union: How
Democratic Is It?, london: Sage Publications.
Algan, BOlent (2008) 'The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal
Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases In Turkey', German Law
Journal, 9/12: 2237-2252.
Ankan, Harun (2003) Turkey and the EU - An awkward candidate for EU
membership?, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Asian, Senem (2009) 'Incoherent State: The Controversy over Kurdish Naming
in Turkey', European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10: 1-17.
Aspinwall, Mark, Schneider, Gerald (2001) 'Institutional research on the
European Union: mapping the field', In G. Schneider, M. Aspinwall (eds.) The
Rules of Integration - Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe,
Manchester: Manchester University Press: 1-18.
A~lk, CzgOr (2012) 'legal Reforms in Turkey: Ambitious and Controversial',
Turkish Policy Quarterly, 11/1: 145-153.
Autheman, Violaine (2004) 'Global Best Practices: Judicial Integrity Standards
and Consensus Principles', IFES Rule of Law White Paper Series No.1. Available
at:
http://www.ifes.org/publication/e34efa3403c4f206cI1404a6fbc37cdO/WhitePa
per_l_FINAL.pdf (23 March 2011).
Aybay, Rona (1977) 'Some contemporary constitutional problems in Turkey',
British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 4/1: 21-27.
323
Aydm, Ertan (2004) 'Peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology In the
1930s: The OlkOVersion of Kemalism, 1933-1936', Middle Eastern Studies,
40/5: 55-82.
Aydm, Ertan (2007) 'The tension between secularism and democracy In Turkey:
Early origins, currency legacy', European View, 6/1: 11-20.
Aydm, Senem (2006) 'Seeking Kant In the EU's relations with Turkey', Tesev
Publications. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV),
Istanbul.
Aydm, Senem, <;arkoglu, Ali (2004) 'EU Conditionality and Democratic Rule of
Law in Turkey', in L. Morllno, A. Magen (eds.) Evaluating the Influence of EU
'Democratic Rule of Law' Promotion In Variably Integrated Countries: Romania,
Turkey, Serbia-Montenegro, Ukraine and Morocco as Case Studies; report
prepared for the Workshop on Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law:
American and European Strategies and Instruments, CDDRL, SIIS, Stanford
(USA), (4-5 October).
Aydm, Senem, Keyman, Fuat E. (2004) 'European Integration and the
Transformation of Turkish Democracy', Centre for European Polley Studies EU-
Turkey Working Papers No.2, 1-56.
Aydmh, Ersen, Ozcan, Nihat A., Akyaz, Dogan (2006) 'The Turkish Military's
March Towards Europe', Foreign Affairs, 85/1: 77-90.
Baban, Feyzi (2005) 'Community, citizenship and Identity In Turkey', In F.
Keyman, A. iC;duygu (eds.) Citizenship in a Global World - European Questions
and Turkish Experiences, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge: 52-69.
Bacharach, Samuel B., Bamberger, Peter, Sonnenstuhl, William J. (1996) 'The
Organizational Transformation Process: The Micropolltlcs of Dissonance
Reduction and the Alignment of Logics of Action', Administrative Science
Quarterly, 41/3: 477-506.
Barnes, Ian, Randerson, Claire (2006) 'EU enlargement and the effectiveness
of conditionality: keeping to the deal?', Managerial Law, 48/4: 351-365.
Batum, SOheyl, Kalaycloglu, Ersln (2001) Turkiye'de Demokratlkle~me
Perspektifleri ve AB Kopenhag Siyasal Kriterleri "G(jru~/er ve 6ncellkler",
istanbul: TOsiAD Yaymlan.
BBC News (2004) 'Turkey agrees death penalty ban (9/1/2004)'. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/3384667.stm (17 December 2009).
BBC News (2007a) 'Turkish PMvows to pursue reform (23/7/2007)'. Available
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/6911223.stm (9 January 2010).
324
BBC News (2007b) 'Excerpts of Turkish army statement (28/4/2007)'.
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hl/world/europe/6602775.stm (14
January 2010).
Bechev, Dimitar, NicolaIdis, Kalypso (2010) 'From Polley to Polity: Can the EU's
Special Relations with Its 'Neighbourhood' be Decentred?', Journal of Common
Market Studies, 48/3: 475-500.
Betten, Lammy, Grief, Nicholas (1998) EU Law and Human Rights, London and
New York: Longman.
Bilgin, Pmar (2005) 'Turkey's changing security discourses: The challenge of
globalisation', European Journal of Political Research, 44: 175-201.
Boies, David (2006) 'Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law', Washington
University Journal of Law & Policy, 22: 57-70.
Bora, Taml (1998) TUrk Sagmm O~Hall: Mllliyet~illk Muhaafazakarllk lstemauk,
istanbul: Birikim vavmcrhk.
Borzel, Tanja A. (1999) 'Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional
Adaptation to Europeanisation in Germany and Spain', Journal of Common
Market Studies, 37/4: 573-596.
Borzel, Tanja A. (2002) 'Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting:
Member State Responses to Europeanization', Journal of Common Market
Studies, 40/2: 193-214.
Borzel, Tanja A. (2010) 'The Transformatlve Power of Europe Reloaded - The
Limits of External Europeanization', KFG Working Papers No.11, Free University
Berlin.
Borzel, Tanja A., Risse, Thomas (2000) 'When Europe Hits Home:
Europeanization and Domestic Change', European Integration online Papers
4/15. Available at: http://eiop.or.at/elop/texte/2000-015a.htm.
Borzel, Tanja A., Risse, Thomas (2003) 'Conceptualising the Domestic Impact
of Europe', in K. Featherstone, C. Radaelli (eds.) The Politics of
Europeanisation, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 57-83.
Borzel, Tanja A., Risse, Thomas (2004) 'One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the
Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law', paper presented
at the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Centre for Development,
Democracy, and the Rule of Law, Standford (4-5 October 2004).
Brown, James (1987) 'The Military and Politics In Turkey', Armed Forces &
Society, 13/2: 235-253.
325
Bruszt, Laszlo (2008) 'Multi-level Governance-the Eastern Versions: Emerging
Patterns of Regional Developmental Governance In the New Member States',
Regional & Federal Studies, 18/5: 607-627.
Bryman, Alan (2008) Social Research Methods, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bulmer, Simon (2007) 'Theorising Europeanlsatlon', In P. Graziano, M.P. Vlnk
(eds.) Europeanisation: New Research Agendas, Baslngstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan: 46-58.
Bulmer, Simon, Lequesne, Christian (eds.) (2005) The Member States of the
European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bulmer, Simon, Paterson, William (1987) The Federal Republic of Germany and
the European Community, London: Allen & Unwin.
Bulmer, Simon, Paterson, William (1989) 'West Germany's Role In Europe:
'Man Mountain' or 'Semi-Gulliver'?', Journal of Common Market Studies, 28/2:
95-117.
Bulmer, Simon, Radaelli, Claudio M. (2004) 'The Europeanlsatlon of National
Policy?', Queen's Papers on Europeanisation No.1, Queens University Belfast.
Burk, James (2002) 'Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations', Armed
Forces & SOCiety, 29/1: 7-29.
Burnell, Peter (2000) 'Democracy Assistance: The State of the Discourse', In P.
Burnell (ed.) Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for
Democratization. London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers: 3-33.
Burnell, Peter (2008) 'From Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising
Democracy Promotion', Political Studies, 56: 414-434.
Burnham, Peter, Gilland Lutz, Karin, Grant, Wyn, Layton-Henry, Zig (2008)
Research Methods in Politics, Baslngstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Capezza, David (2009) 'Turkey's MIlitary Is a Catalyst for Reform', Middle East
Quarterly, 16/3: 13-23.
Carothers, Thomas (1999) Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve,
Washington, DC: Endowment for International Peace.
Cernat, Lucian (2006) Europeanisation, Varieties of Capitalism and Economic
Performance in Central and Eastern Europe, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Chari, Raj 5., Heywood, Paul M. (2008) 'Institutions, European Integration,
and the Policy Process in Contemporary Spain', In B. N. Field, K. Hamann (eds.)
326
Democracy and Institutional Development - Spain in Comparative Theoretical
Perspective, Houndmills, Baslngstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan: 178-
202.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1998) 'The Constructivist Turn In International Relations
Theory', World Politics, 50/2: 324-348.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999a) 'International Institutions and Socialization', Arena
Working Paper 99/5, ARENA/Unlversltetet I Oslo.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999b) 'Norms, Institutions, and National Identity In
Contemporary Europe', International Studies Quarterly, 43/1: 83-114.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999c) 'Social construction and Integration', Journal of
European Public Policy, 6/4: 545-560.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2000) 'Compliance and Conditionality', Arena Working
Paper 00/18, ARENA/Universitetet I Oslo.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001) 'The Europeanization of Citizenship?', In M.G.
Cowles, J.A. Caporaso, T. Risse (eds.) Transforming Europe - Europeanization
and Domestic Change, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press: 180-197.
Cirtautas, Arista Maria, Schlmmelfennlg Frank (2010) 'Europeanlsatlon Before
and After Accession: Conditionality, Legacies and Compliance', Europe-Asia
Studies, 62/3: 421-441.
Cizre, Omit (1997) 'The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy',
Comparative Politics, 29/2: 151-166.
Cizre, Omit (2003) 'Demythologyslng the National Security Concept: The Case
of Turkey', Middle East Journal, 57/2: 213-229.
Cizre, Omit (2004) 'Problems of democratic governance of civil-military
relations in Turkey and the European Union enlargement zone', European
Journal of Political Research, 43: 107-125.
Closa, Carlos, Heywood, Paul M. (2004) Spain and the European Union, London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Cohen, Jean L., Arato, Andrew (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cohen, Jean L., Arato, Andrew (1997) 'Politics and the Reconstruction of the
Concept of Civil Society' In A. Honneth, T. McCarthy, C. Offe, A. Wellmer (eds.)
Cultural-Political Intervention in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment, U. S. :
MIT Press.
327
Cornell, Svante E. (2001) 'The Land of Many Crossroads - The Kurdish
Question In Turkish Politics', Orb/s, 45/1: 31-46.
Cottey, Andrew, Forster, Anthony (2004) Reshaping defence diplomacy: new
roles for military co-operation and assistance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Council of Europe (1950) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights (1959) ECtHR case-law.
Council of Europe (2005) Recommendation on the democratic oversight of the
security sector, 1713.
Council of Europe (2007) European Commission for Democracy through Law,
Study on the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, CDL-DEM(2007)003.
Council of Europe (2012) Background Paper on the Future of the European
Court of Human Rights - role of national parliaments, European Conference of
Presidents of Parliament, Strasbourg, 20-21 September 2012.
Council of the European Union (2001) 40th meeting of the Association Council
between the European Union and Turkey, Luxemburg, 26 June, 2001.
Cowles, Maria Green, Risse, Thomas (eds.) (2001) Transforming Europe -
Europeanisation and Domestic Change, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press.
Crawford, Gordon (2000) 'European Union Development Co-operation and the
Promotion of Democracy' In P. Burnell (ed.) Democracy Assistance -
International Co-operation for Democratisation, London and Portland: Frank
Cass Publishers: 90-127.
Cross, Frank B. (1999) 'The relevance of law In human rights protection',
International Review of Law and Economics, 19/1: 87-98.
C;agaptay, Soner (2002a) 'The November 2002 Elections and Turkey's New
Political Era', Middle East Review of International Affairs, 6/4: 42-48.
C;agaptay, Soner (2002b) 'Challenges for the Justice and Development Party
Government in Turkey', policywatch. Available at:
http://www.cagaptay.com/650/challenges-for-the-justice-and-development-
party-government (18 December 2010).
C;agaptay, Soner (2002c) 'Turkey Will Find a Balance between Secularists and
Islamists', Los Angeles Times. Available at:
http://www.cagaptay.com/701/turkey-wlll-find-a-balance-between-secularlsts-
and-islamists (18 December 2010).
328
<;agaptay, Soner (2003a) 'Citizenship policies in interwar Turkey', Nations and
Nationalism, 9/4: 601-619.
<;agaptay, Soner (2003b) 'European Union reforms diminish the role of the
Turkish military: Ankara knocking on Brussels' door', The Turkish Yearbook, 35:
213-217. Available at: http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergller/44/674/8592.pdf
(18 December 2010).
<;agaptay, Soner (2009) 'Is Turkey Leaving the West? - An Islamist Foreign
Policy Puts Ankara at Odds With Its Former Allies', Foreign Affairs. Available at:
http://www.cagaptay.com/6485/turkey-leavlng-the-west (20 December 2010).
<;andar, Cengiz (1999) 'Redefining Turkey's Political Centre', Journal of
Democracy, 10/4: 129-141.
<;arkoglu, Ali (2002) 'Turkey's November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning?',
Middle East Review of International Affairs, 6/4: 30-41.
<;arkoglu, Ali (2003) 'Who Wants Full Membership? Characteristics of Turkish
Public Support for EU Membership In Turkey', Turkish Studies, 4/1: 171-194.
<;avdar, Gamze (2007) 'Behind Turkey's Presidential Battle', Mlddie East
Research and Information Project. Available at:
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero050707 (16 September 2010).
<;olak, Yllmaz (2006) 'Ottomanism vs. Kemallsm: Collective memory and
cultural pluralism in 1990s Turkey', Middle Eastern Studies, 42/4: 587-602.
Dagl, ihsan (1996) 'Democratic transition in Turkey, 1980-83: the impact of
European diplomacy', Middle Eastern Studies, 32/2: 124-141.
Dagl, ihsan (2001) 'Human rights and democratization: Turkish politics in the
European context', Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 1/3: 51-68.
Dagl, ihsan (2008) 'Turkey's AKP In Power', Journal of Democracy, 19/3: 25-
30.
Dahl, Robert A. (1998) On Democracy, New Heaven and London: Yale
University Press.
Dannreuther, Roland (2006) 'Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The
European Neighbourhood Policy', European Foreign Affairs Review, 11: 183-
201.
Davison, Roderich H. (1988) Turkey - A Short History, UK: Eothen Press.
329
De Witte, Bruno (2000): 'Politics Versus Law in the EU's Approach to Ethnic
Minorities', Robert Schuman Centre Working Paper No.4. Florence: European
University Institute.
Delegation of the European Union to Turkey (2012) 'Judiciary and Fundamental
Rights'. Available at: http://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eu-and-turkey/accession-
negotloations/negotlation-chapters/judlciary-fundamental-rlghts.html
Democracy Web (20lla) 'Majority Rule/Minority Rights: Essential Principles'.
Available at: http://www.democracyweb.org/majorlty/prlnclples.php (13
December 2011)
Democracy Web (20llb) 'Freedom of Expression: Essential Principles'.
Available at: http://www.democracyweb.org/expresslon/prlnclples.php (13
December 2011)
01 Palma, Giuseppe (1990) To Craft Democracies. An Essay on Democratic
Transitions. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Diamond, Larry (1999) Developing Democracy - Towards Consolidation,
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Dodd, Clement H. (1983) The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, Beverley, North
Humberside: Eothen Press.
Dogan, Erhan (2005) 'The Historical and Dlscourslve Roots of the Justice and
Development Party's EU Stance', Turkish Studies, 6/3: 421-437.
Doorenspleet, Renske, Mudde, Cas (2008) 'Upping the Odds: Deviant
Democracies and Theories of Democratization', Democratization, 15/4: 815-
832.
Drent, Margriet, Greenwood, David, Hulsman, Sander, Volten, Peter (2001)
'Organising National Defence for NATOMembership - The Unexamined
Dimension of Aspirants' Readiness for Entry', Harmonie Paper 15. Gronlngen,
the Netherlands: The Centre for European Security Studies.
Drent, Margriet (2006) 'EU conditionality concerning Turkish civil-military
relations', in S. Falta~, S. Jansen (eds.) Governance and the Military:
Perspectives for Change in Turkey, the Centre for European Studies (CESS)
and the Istanbul Policy Centre: 69-86.
Duina, Francesco G. (1999) Harmonising Europe: Nation-states within the
Common Market, Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.
Eckaus, Richard S. (1986) 'How the IMF lives with Its conditionality', Policy
Sciences, 19/3: 237-252.
330
Eckel, Peter, Hill, Barbara, Green, Madeleine (1998) 'On Change - En Route to
Transformation', Washington, D.C.: American Council of Education, Centre for
Institutional and International Initiatives. Paper series of the ACE project on
leadership and institutional transformation.
Eckel, Peter, Hill, Barbara, Green, Madeleine, Mallon, Bill (1999a) 'On change,
Reports from the road: Insights on Institutional change', Washington, D.C.:
American Council of Education, Centre for Institutional and International
Initiatives. Paper series of the ACEproject on leadership and Institutional
transformation.
Eckel, Peter, Hili, Barbara, Green, Madeleine, Mallon, Bill (1999b) 'On change
III, Taking charge of change: A primer for colleges and universities',
Washington, D.C.: American Council of Education, Centre for Institutional and
International Initiatives. Paper series of the ACE project on leadership and
institutional transformation.
Ergil, Dogu (2000) 'Identity Crises and Political Instability In Turkey', Journal of
International Affairs, 54/1: 43-62.
ErgOder, OstOn 'The Motherland Party, 1983-1989', In M. Heper, J. M. Landau,
Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, London: I.B. Taurls: 152-169.
EurActiv (2005) 'A French 'no': looming crisis for Europe? (29/4/2005)'.
Available at: http://www.euractlv.com/future-eu/french-Ioomlng-crlsls-
europe/article-138738 (18 May 2011).
EurActiv (2007) 'Erdogan's ruling AKP wins Turkish election (23 July 2007),.
Available at: http://www.euractlv.com/enlargement!erdogans-rullng-akp-wlns-
turkish-news-218575 (23 May 2011).
EurActiv (2008) 'EU says move to ban ruling Turkish party 'undemocratic'
(18/3/2008),. Available at: http://www.euractlv.com/enlargement!eu-move-
ban-ruling-turkish-party-news-219466 (29 May 2011).
European Commission (1998) Regular Report from the Commission on
Turkey's Progress towards Accession.
European Commission (1999) Regular Report from the Commission on
Turkey's Progress towards Accession, COM(1999) 513.
European Commission (2000) Regular Report from the Commission on
Turkey's Progress towards Accession.
European Commission (2001) Regular Report from the Commission on
Turkey's Progress towards Accession, SEC(2001) 1756.
331
European Commission (2002) Regular Report from the Commission on
Turkey's Progress towards Accession, SEC(2002) 1412.
European Commission (2003a) Communication from the Commission on to the
Council, the European Parliament, and the European Economic and Social
Committee - Govemance and Development, COM(2003) 615.
European Commission (2003b) Regular Report from the Commission on
Turkey's Progress towards Accession, SEC(2003) 1212.
European Commission (2003c) Continuing enlargement: Strategy paper and
Report of the European Commission on progress towards accession by Bulgaria,
Romania and Turkey, COM(2003) 676.
European Commission (2004) Regular Report from the Commission on
Turkey's Progress towards Accession, SEC(2004) 1201.
European Commission (200Sa) Turkey 2005 Progress Report, SEC(200S) 1426.
European Commission (200Sb) The Functioning of the Judicial System In the
Republic of Turkey: Report of an Advisory Visit.
European Commission (2006a) Turkey 2006 Progress Report, SEC(2006) 1390.
European Commission (2006b) Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament - A Concept for European Support for
Security Sector Reform, COM(2006) 253.
European Commission (2007) Turkey 2007 Progress Report, SEC(2007) 1436.
European Commission (2008) Turkey 2008 Progress Report, SEC(2008) 2699.
European Commission (2009) Commission Decision on the Annual Action
Programme 2009 for the European Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy
and the Human Rights, C(2009) 7082.
European Commission (2012a) 'Acquls (7/9/2012)'. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquls_en.htm
European Commission (2012b) 'Recognition of decisions between EU countries
(3/2/12)'. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/crimlnal/recognltlon-
decision/index_en.htm
European Council (1993) Presidency conctustons, Copenhagen European
Council, 21-22 June, 1993.
332
European Council (1999a) Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European councu,
3-4 June, 1999.
European Council (1999b) Presidency ConcluSions, Copenhagen European
Council, 10-11 December, 1999.
European Council (2000) The Race Equality Directive, 2000/43/EC.
European Council (2001a) Council Regulation of 17 December 2001 concerning
pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey, (EC) No 2500/2001.
European Council (2001b) Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the principles,
priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained In the Accession
Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, (2001/235/EC).
European Council (2001c) Framework Agreement between the European
Community and the Republic of Turkey on the general principles for the
participation of the Republic of Turkey in Community programmes,
(2002/179/CE).
European Council (2002) Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European
councu, 12-13 December, 2002.
European Council (2003) Council Decision of 19 May 2003 on the principles,
priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained In the Accession
Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, (2003/398/EC).
European Council (2004) Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European councu,
16-17 December, 2004.
European Council (2006) Council Decision of 23 January 2006 on the principles,
priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession
Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, (2006/35/EC).
European Parliament (2003) Report on Turkey's application for membership of
the European Union, A5-0160/2003.
European Union (1992) Treaty on European Union, C191.
European Union (2000) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
(2000/C 364/01).
European Union (2001) European Union Observations on an Evolving EU
Human Rights Policy.
European Union (2006) Screening Report on Chapter 23: Judiciary and
Fundamental Rights. Available at:
333
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/tarama/tarama_flles/23/SC23EXP _Fundamental%20rl
ghts%20-%20Basic%20human%20rlghts_TXT.pdf (27 August 2011)
European Union (2007a) 'Phare Programme (12/4/2007)'. Available at:
http:// europa .eu/legislation_summarles/enlargement/2004_and_2007 _enlarge
mentje50004_en.htm (25 May 2010).
European Union (2007b) 'MEDA Programme (12/2/2007)'. Available at:
http:// europa .eu/legislatlon_summarles/enlargement/2004_and_2007 _enlarge
ment/e50004_en.htm (25 May 2010).
European Union (2012a) 'What Is TAIEX? (17/9/2012)'. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/talex/what-Is-talex/lndex_en. htm
European Union (2012b) 'Turkey - Justice and security (3/1/2012)'. Available:
http://europa .eu/leglslatlon_summarles/justlce_freedom_securlty /enlargement
/e22113_en.htm
Falta~, Sami, Jansen, Sander (2006) 'Introduction' In S. Falta§, S. Jansen (eds.)
Governance and the Military: Perspectives for Change in Turkey, the Centre for
European Studies (CESS) and the Istanbul Policy Centre: 7-20.
Featherstone, Kevin (2003) 'Introduction: In The Name of 'Europe", In K.
Featherstone, C. Radaelii (eds.) The Politics of Europeanlsat/on, Oxford: Oxford
University Press: 3-26.
Featherstone, Kevin, Radaelii, Claudio (eds.) (2003) The Pol/t/cs of
Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Finnemore, Martha, Sikkink, Kathryn (1998) 'International norm dynamics and
political change', International Organization, 52/4: 887-917.
Freedom House (2005) Countries at the Crossroads 2005 - Turkey. Available
at:
http://old.freedomhouse.org/modules/publicatlons/ccr/modPrlntVerslon.dm?e
dition=2&ccrpage=8&ccrcountry=103 (24 June 2011).
Freyburg, Tina, Lavenex, Sandra, Schimmelfennlg, Frank, Skrlpka, Tatlana,
Wetzel Anne (2009) 'EU promotion of democratic governance In the
neighbourhood', Journal of European Public Polley, 16/6: 916-934.
Freyburg, Tina, Lavenex, Sandra, Schlmmelfennlg, Frank, Skrlpka, Tatlana,
Wetzel Anne (2011) 'Democracy promotion through functional cooperation?
The case of the European Neighbourhood Policy', Democrat/satlon, 18/4: 1026-
1054.
George, Alexander L., Bennett, Andrew (2005) Case Studies and Theory
Development, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
334
Gerring, John (2001) Social Science Methodology: A Crlterlal Framework,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goetz, Klaus H. (2005) 'The new member states and the EU: Responding to
Europe', in S. Bulmer, C. Lequesne (eds.) The Member States of the European
Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 254-280.
Gordon, Philip, Taspmar (2004) 'Turkey's European Quest: The EU's Decision
on Turkish Accession', U.S.-Europe Analysis Series No.6, the Centre on the
United States and Europe, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Grabbe, Heather (1999) 'A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU
Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants', Robert Schuman
Centre Working Paper No. 12, Florence: European University Institute.
Grabbe, Heather (2001) 'How Does Europeanization Affect CEEGovernance?
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity', Journal of European Public Policy, 8/6:
1013-1031.
Grabbe, Heather (2002) 'European Union Conditionality and the Acquls
Communautaire', International Political Science Review, 23/3: 249-268.
Grabbe, Heather (2003) 'Europeanlsatlon Goes East - Power and Uncertainty
in the EUAccession Process', in K. Featherstone, C. Radaelll (eds.) The Politics
of Europeanisation, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 303-327.
Graziano, Paolo, Vlnk, Maarten P. (eds.) (2006) Europeanization: A Handbook
for a New Research Agenda. Houndmills, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Greenwood, David (2006) 'Turkish Civil-Military Relations and the EU:
Preparing for Continuing Convergence - Final Expert Report on an
International Task Force', In S. Falta~, S. Jansen (eds.) Governance and the
military: perspectives for change in Turkey, the Centre for European Studies
(CESS) and the Istanbul Policy Centre: 21-68.
Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. (2009) Trials of Europeanlsatlon - Turkish Political
Culture and the European Union, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Guarnieri, Carlo, Pederzoli, Patrlzla (2002) The Power of Judges - A
Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy, ed. In English C. A. Thomas,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
GOndOz,Asian (2001) 'Human Rights and Turkey's Future In Europe', Orbls,
45: 15-30.
GOne~-Ayata, Ay~e (2003) 'From Euro-sceptlclsm to Turkey-scepticism:
changing political attitudes on the European Union In Turkey', Journal of
Southern Europe and the Balkans Online, 5/2: 205-222.
335
GOney, Aylin, Karatekelio~lu, Petek (2005) 'Turkey's EUCandidacy and Clvll-
Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects', Armed Forces & Society, 31/3:
439-462.
Hakura, Fadi (2006) 'Europe and Turkey: sour romance or rugby match?',
openDemocracy. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-
turkey/turkey_europe_ 4088.jsp (12 November 2010).
Hale, William (1994) Turkish Politics and the Military, London: Routledge.
Hale, William (2003) 'Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish
Accession Process', Turkish Studies, 4/1: 107-126.
Hall, Peter A., Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996) 'Political science and the three
new institutionalisms', Political Studies, 44/5: 936-957.
Hanggi, Heiner, Tanner, Fred (2005) 'Promoting security sector governance In
the EU's neighbourhood', Challiat Paper No. 80, EU Institute for Security
Studies (ISS), Conde-sur-Nalreau, France: Corlet Imprlmeur.
Hannum, Hurst (1995) 'The Status and Future of the Customary International
Law of Human Rights', Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law,
25/1&2: 287-397.
Harmsen, Robert (2000) 'Europeanization and Governance: A New
Institutionalist Perspective', in R. Harmsen, T. M. Wilson (eds.)
Europeanization, Institutions, Identities and Citizenship, Amsterdam: Editions
Rodopi: 51-81.
Haughton, Tim (2007) 'When Does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality
and the Accession Process in Central and Eastern Europe', Political Studies
Review,S: 233-246.
Haverland, Markus (2000) 'National Adaptation to European Integration: The
Importance of Institutional Veto Points', Journal of Public Polley, 20/1: 83-103.
Haverland, Markus (2007) 'Methodology', In M. P. Vlnk, P. Graziano (eds.)
Europeanisation: New Research Agendas, Baslngstoke: Palgrave Macmillan:
59-72.
Held, David (2006) Models of Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Heper, Metin (1985) The state tradition in Turkey, Beverley: Eothen Press.
Heper, Metin (2005) 'The Justice and Development Party Government and the
Military in Turkey', Turkish Studies, 6/2: 215-231.
336
Heper, Metin, Itzkowitz-Shifrinson, Joshua R. (2005) 'Civil-military relations In
Israel and Turkey', Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 33/2: 231-248.
Heper, Metin, Keyman, Fuat (1998) 'Double-faced state: political patronage
and the consolidation of democracy In Turkey', M/ddle Eastern Studies, 34/4:
259-277.
Herltler, Adrienne (2001) 'Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on
National Policymaking' in A. Heritler, D. Kerwer, C. Knill, D. Lehmkuhl, M.
Teutsch, A. Douillet (eds.) Differential Europe - The European Union Impact on
National Policymaking, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield: 1-21.
Heritier, Adrienne, Knill, Christoph, Mingers, Susanne (1996) Rlng/ng the
Changes in Europe - Regulatory Competition and the Transformation of the
State: Britain, France and Germany, Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.
Herttler, Adrienne, Kerwer, Dieter, Knill, Christoph, Lehmkuhl, Dirk, Teutsch,
Michael, Douillet, Anne-Cecile (2001) Differential Europe - The European Un/on
Impact on National Policymaking, Lanham, MD: Rowman & littlefield.
Heywood, Paul (1993) 'Spain and the European Dimension: The Integrated
Market, Convergence and Beyond', Strathclyde Papers on Government and
Politics, 94: 1-31.
Heywood, Paul (1996) 'The emergence of new party systems and transitions to
democracy - Spain in comparative perspective' in G. Pridham, P. G. Lewis
(eds.) StabiliSing Fragile Democrac/es - Comparing New Party Systems In
Southern and Eastern Europe, London and New York: Routledge: 145-166.
Howard, Robert M., Carey, Henry F. (2004) 'Is an Independent Judiciary
Necessary for Democracy', Judicature, 87/6: 284-290.
Hughes, James, Sasse, Gwendolyn, Gordon, Claire (2002) 'The Ambivalence of
Conditionality: Europeanization and Regionallzation in Central and Eastern
Europe'; ECPRJoint sesson», Turin (22-27 March).
Hughes, James, Sasse, Gwendolyn, Gordon, Claire (2004a) 'Conditionality and
Compliance in the EU's Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform
of Sub-national Government', Journal of Common Market Studies, 42/3: 523-
551.
Hughes, James, Sasse, Gwendolyn, Gordon, Claire (2004b) European/sat/on
and Regionalisation in the EU's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe:
The Myth of Conditionality, New York: Palgrave Macmillian.
Human Rights Watch (1999) Report on Violations on Free Express/on In Turkey.
Available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/turkey/ (13 December 2011).
337
Hurewitz, Jacob C. (1956) Diplomacy /n the Near and Middle East, New York:
Van Nostrand.
HOrriyet (2006) 'Erdogan: 301 ic;inonerilere aC;lglz(5/11/2006)'. Available at:
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew .aspx?ld=S379298 (8 March
2011).
International Commission of Jurists (2007) 'International Principles on the
Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors',
Practitioners Guide No.1. Available at: http://icj.wpenglne.netdna-
cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Principles-lndependence-Iawyers-
publication-2007.pdf (14 March 2011).
iC;duygu, Ahmet, Romano, David, Sirkecl, Ibrehlrn (1999) 'The ethnic question
in an environment of insecurity: the Kurds in Turkey', EthnIc and Racial Studies,
22/6: 991-1010.
Jenkins, Gareth (2007) 'Continuity and change: prospects for civil-military
relations in Turkey', International Affairs, 83/2: 339-355.
Johns, Michael (2003) "'Do as I Say, Not as I Do": The European Union,
Eastern Europe and Minority Rights', East European Politics and Societies, 17:
682-699.
Jung, Dietrich (2006) '"Secularism": A Key to Turkish Politics', Intellectual
Discourse, 14/2: 129-154.
Justice and Development Party (2002) 'Party Programme'. Available at:
http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akpartl/parti-programme (23 November
2010).
Kahraman, Sevilay (2005) 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European
Union's New Engagement Towards Wider Europe', Perceptions, 10/3: 1-28.
Kalaycloglu, Ersin (2002) 'The Motherland Party: The Challenge of
Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party', in B. Rubin, M. Heper (eds.)
Political Parties in Turkey, London: Frank Cass: 41-61.
Karabelias, Gerassimos (1999) 'The evolution of civil-military relations In
post-war Turkey, 1980-95', Middle Eastern Studies, 35/4: 130-151.
Karakas, Sanya, Green, Penny (2010) 'Introducing State Crime in Turkey',
International State Crime Initiative. Available at:
http://statecrime.org/online_article/turkey-overview/ ( 13 April 2011).
Karakas, Cemal (2011) 'Promoting or Demoting Democracy Abroad? - US and
German reactions to the rise of political Islam in Turkey', PRIF-Report No. 106,
1-40.
338
Karl, Terry L. (1990) 'Dilemmas of Democratization In latin America', In D. A.
Rustow, K. P. Erickson (eds.) Comparative PoI/tical Dynamics: Global Research
Perspectives. New York: Harper Collins: 163-191.
Karpat, Kemal H. (1959) Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party
System, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Katzenstein, Peter J. (1997) 'United Germany In an Integrating Europe', In P. J
Katzenstein (ed.) Shaping the Rules? The Constitutive PoI/tics of the European
Union and German Power, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 1-48.
Keating, Michael (2004) 'European Integration and the Nationalities Question',
Politics & Society, 32/3: 367-388.
Keith, Linda C. (2002a) 'Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection
Around the World', Judicature, 85/4: 194-200.
Keith, Linda C. (2002b) 'Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights
(1977 1996): Are They More than Mere "Window Dressing?''', PoI/tical Research
Quarterly, 55/1: 111-143.
Kelley, Judith G. (2004) 'International Actors on the Domestic Scene:
Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions',
International Organization, 58/3: 425-457.
Kelley, Judith G. (2006) 'New wine In old wineskins: Promoting political
reforms through the new European Neighbourhood Policy', Journal of Common
Market Studies, 44/1: 29-55.
Keong, Chan S. (2010) 'Securing and maintaining the Independence of the
court in judicial proceedings', Singapore Academy of Law Journal, 24: 229-251.
Available
at:http://www.sal.org.sg/digltallibrary/Lists/SAL%20JournaI/Attachments/500/
(2010)%2022%20SAcU%20229-251 %20(March)%20Chan%20CJ.pdf (23 May
2011)
Keyman, Fuat (2010) 'Modernization, Globallsatlon and Democratisation In
Turkey: The AKP Experience and its Limits', Constellations, 17/2: 312-327.
Keyman, Fuat, Oni~, Ziya (2004) 'Helsinki, Copenhagen and beyond -
Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State' In M. U~ur, N. Canefe
(eds.) Turkey and the European Integration - Accession Prospects and Issues,
London and New York: Routledge: 173-193.
Kezar, Adrianna J. (2001) Understanding and facilitating organisational change
in the 21st Century: Recent research and conceptualisations, Washington, D.C.:
ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Reports.
339
Klrca, Coskun (1996) 'Yargl Sistemimlzln Bazl Anayasal Meselelerl', Yenl
TOrkiye, 10: 105-110.
Kill, Suna, GozObOyOk,Seref (2000a) TOr/(Anayasa Metln/erl: 1982Anayasasl
.. 'Istanbul: TOrkiye I~ Bankasl KOltOrYaymlan: 253-334.
Kili, Suna, GozOb~yOk, Seref (2000b) TOrkAnayasa Metlnlerl: 1961Anayasasl,
istanbul: TOrkiye I~ sankas: KOItOrYaymlan: 173-233.
King, Gary, Keohane, Robert 0., Verba, Sidney (1994) DesIgning Socia/Inquiry:
Scientific Inference in Qua/itative Research, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Kirl~~i, Kemal (2004a) 'The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy', In L.
G. Martin, D. Keridis (eds.) The Future of Turkish Foreign Polley, Cambridge:
The MIT Press: 277-314.
Kiri$c;i, Kemal (2004b) 'Between Europe and the Middle East: The
Transformation of Turkish PoliCY',Middle East RevIew of InternatIonal AffaIrs,
8/1: 39-51.
Kiri$c;i, Kemal (2004c) 'The December 2004 European Council Decision on
Turkey: Is It an Historic Turning Point?', Middle East Review of International
Affairs, 8/4: 87-94.
Kirt$C;I,Kemal (2007) 'The Kurdish Question and Turkey: Future Challenges and
Prospects for a Solution', ISPI Working Paper, 24: 1-35.
Knill, Christoph, Lehmkuhl, Dirk (1999) 'How Europe Matters - Different
Mechanisms of Europeanisation', European Integration Online Papers (EIOP),
3/7: 1-19.
Knill, Christoph, Lehmkuhl, Dirk (2002) 'The National Impact of European
Union Regulatory Policy: Three Europeanization Mechanisms', European Journal
of Political Research, 41/2: 255-280.
Knill, Christoph, Lenschow, Andrea (2001) '''Seek and Ye Shall Find" - Linking
Different Perspectives on Institutional Change', Comparative Political Studies,
34: 187-215.
Kochenov, Dimitry (2008) EU enlargement and the failure of conditionality:
pre-accession conditionality in the fields of democracy and the rule of law,
Austin: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business.
Kohler-Koch, Beate (1997) 'Interactive governance: Regions In the network of
European politics'; paper presented at ECSA5th Biennial Conference, Seattle
(28 May - 1 June).
340
Kohn, Richard H. (1997) 'How democracies control the military', Journal of
Democracy, 8/4: 140-153.
Kramer, Heinz (1999) 'Turkey Toward 2000 - In Search of National Consensus
and a New Political Centre', The Brookings Review, 17/3: 32-35.
Kramer, Heinz (2000) A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the
United States, Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution.
Kramer, Heinz (2006) 'Turkey and the EU: The EU's Perspective', Insight
Turkey, 8/4: 24-30.
Krlzsan, Andrea, Popa, Raluca (2007) 'A Success for the women's movement?
Putting domestic violence on the policy agenda of Central and East European
countries', paper presented at the 4thECPRGeneral Conference, Plsa (6-8
September 2007).
Kubicek, Paul J. (2003) 'International Norms, the European Union, and
Democratization: Tentative Theory and Evidence' In Paul J. Kubicek (ed.) The
European Union and Democratization, London: Routledge: 1-29.
KOc;Okcan,Talip (2003) 'State, Islam and Religious Liberty In Modern Turkey:
Reconfiguration of Religion in the Public Sphere', Brigham Young University
Law Review, 2003/2: 475-507. Available at:
http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/paglne/documents/News_1186_Kuc. pdf (26
September 2010).
Laffan, Brigid (1998) 'The European Union: a distinctive model of
internationalization', Journal of European Public Policy, 5/2: 235-253.
Larkins, Christopher M. (1996) 'Judicial Independence and Democratisation: A
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis', The American Journal of Comparative
Law, 44: 605-626.
Lavenex, Sandra, Schimmelfennig, Frank (2009) 'EU rules beyond EU borders:
theorising external governance in European politics', Journal of European Public
Policy, 16/6: 791-812.
Lavenex, Sandra, Schimmelfennig, Frank (2011) 'EU democracy promotion In
the neighbourhood: from leverage to governance?', Democratisation, 18/4:
885-909.
Leech, Beth L. (2002) 'Interview Methods in Political Science', Political Science
and Politics, 35/4: 663-664.
Linden, Ronald H. (ed.) (2002) Norms and Nannies: The Impact of
International Organizations on the Central and East European States, Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
341
Linz, Juan J., Stepan, Alfred (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation - Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe,
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lippert, Barbara (2007) 'The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood POlicy _
Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions', International Policy
Analysis, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stlftung.
Lippert, Barbara (2008) 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Many reservations _
some progress - uncertain prospects', International Policy Analysis, Berlin:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Upset, Seymour M. (1959) 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy', The American Political SCienceReview,
53/1: 69-105.
Livanios, Dlmitris (2006) 'The 'sick man' paradox: history, rhetoric and the
'European character' of Turkey', Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans
Online, 8/3: 299-311.
Lopez-Santana, Mariely (2006) 'The Domestic Implications of European Soft
Law: Framing and Transmitting Change In Employment Policy, Journal of
European Public Policy, 13/4: 481-499.
Maier, Sylvia, Schimmelfennig, Frank (2007) 'Shared Values: Democracy and
Human Right', in K. Weber, M. E. Smith, M. Baun (eds.) Governing Europe's
Neighbourhood, Manchester: Manchester University Press: 39-57.
March, James G., Olsen, Johan P. (1998) 'The Institutional Dynamics of
International Political Orders', International Organization, 52/4: 943-969.
Mattli, Walter, PlUmper, Thomas (2002) 'The demand-
side politics of EU enlargement: democracy and
the application for EUmembership', Journal of European Public Pol/cy, 9/4:
550-574.
Mattli, Walter, Plumper, Thomas (2004) 'The Internal Value of External Options:
How the EU Shapes the Scope of Regulatory Reforms in Transition Countries',
European Union Politics, 5/3: 307-330.
Mayo, Henry B. (1960) An Introduction to Democratic Theory, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Mclaren, Lauren M. (2000) 'Turkey's Eventual Membership of the EU: Turkish
elite Perspectives on the Issue', Journal of Common Market Studies, 38/1:
117-129.
342
Mclaren, Lauren M. (2007) 'Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of
the EU', European Union Politics, 8/2: 251-278.
Mclaren, Lauren M. (2008) Constructing Democracy In Southern Europe - A
comparative analysis of Italy, Spain and Turkey, Abingdon, axon: Routledge.
Mlgdalovitz, Carol (2007) 'Turkey's 2007 Elections: Crisis of Identity and
Power', CRS Report for Congress Washington D.C.. Available at:
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPreflx=htm1&ldentlfler-A
DA469078
Mill, John S. (2011) On Liberty, Luton, Bedfordshire: Andrews UK Limited.
Miller, William L., White, Stephen, Heywood, Paul (1998) Valued and Political
Change in Postcommunist Europe, Houndmllls: Palgrave.
Minority Groups International (2007) A Quest for Equality: Minorities In Turkey.
Available at: http://www.minorltyrights.org/4572/reports/a-quest-for-equallty-
mlnorlties-in-turkey.html (20 September 2010).
Moravcsik, Andrew, Vachudova, Milada Anna (2003) 'National Interests, State
Power and EU Enlargement', East European Politics and Soc/etles, 17/1: 42-57.
Morelli, Vincent (2011) 'European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on
Turkey's Accession Negotiations', CRSReport for Congress, 1-17.
Muller, Edward N. (1995) 'Income Inequality and Democratization: Reply to
Bollen and Jackman', American Sociological Review, 60/6: 990-996.
Musselin, Christine (2009) 'The side effects of the Bologna process on national
institutional settings: The case of France', In A. Amaral, G. Neave, C. Musselln,
& P. Maassen (eds.), European integration and the governance of higher
education and research, Dordrecht: Springer: 181-205.
M(jft(jler-Ba~, Meltem (1998) 'The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the
European Union', Middle Eastern Studies, 34/4: 240-258.
M(jftOler-Ba~, Meltem (200S) 'Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the
European Union', South European Society and Politics, 10/1: 17-31.
M(jftOler-Ba~, Meltem, Mclaren, Lauren (2003) 'Enlargement Preferences and
Poliey Making in the European Union: Impacts on TURKEY', Journal of
European Integration, 25/1: 17-30.
Narh, NilOfer (2000) 'Civil-military relations in Turkey', Turkish Studies, 1/1:
107-127.
343
Nanl, NilClfer (2009) 'EU harmonisation reforms, democratisation and a new
modality of Civil-military relations In Turkey', In G. caforlo (ed.) Advances In
Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos (Contributions to
Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12),
Emerald Group Publishing Umlted: 433-472.
Nas, <;Igdem (2005) 'Democratisation In Turkey: A Regional Model or a Unique
case in the Mediterranean', EuroMeSCo Papers No.43. Available at:
http://www.euromesco.net/lndex. php?optlon =com_content&vlew=category&ld
=61&1temid=48&1ang=en (23 April 2008).
Nasr, Vali (2005) 'The rise of "muslim democracy"', Journal of Democracy,
16/2: 13-27.
NATO (1994) Partnership for Peace: Framework Document.
NATO (1999) Membership Action Plan.
Ntvmsnbc (2009) 'HEP, DEPve HADEPde kapatllml~tl (11/12/2009)'. Available
at: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/ld/25029246/ (23 April 2011)
O'Donnell, Guillermo (1999) 'Horizontal Accountabilities In New Democracies',
in A. Schedler, L. Diamond, and M. F. Plattner (eds.) The Self-Restraining State:
Power and Accountability in New Democrades, London: Lynne Rlenner
Publishers: 29-52.
O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Schmitter, Phillippe C. (1986) 'Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies', In G. O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter (eds.)
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. Baltimore, MD:
The John Hopkins University Press.
OECD (2007) OECDDAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting
security and justice.
Olsen, Johan P. (1995) 'Europeanisatlon and nation-state dynamics', Arena
Working Paper 9/95, ARENA/Unlversltetet i Oslo.
Olsen, Johan P. (2002) 'The many faces of Europeanization', Journal of
Common Market Studies, 40/5: 921-950.
Open Society Foundations (2002) Monitoring the EUAccess/on Process:
Minority Protection. Available at:
http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/eumlnorltyFull_2002112S_0.pdf (18
June 2009).
OSCE (1994) The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of SecurIty.
344
Oni$, Zlya (2003) 'Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the
State: Turkey-EU Relations In the post-Helsinki Era', Turk/sh Studies, 4/1: 9-
34.
Onl$, Zlya (2006) 'The Political Economy of Islam and Democracy In Turkey:
From the Welfare Party to the AKP', In D. lung (ed.) Democracy and
Development - New Political Strategies for the Middle East, New York:
Palgrave: 103-128.
Onl$, Zlya (2008) 'Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate',
Insight Turkey, 10/4: 35-50.
Onl$, Zlya (2009) 'Conservative Globalism at the Cross Roads: The Justice and
Development Party and the Thorny Path to Democratic Consolidation In Turkey',
Mediterranean Politics, 14/1: 21-40.
Onl$, Zlya, Baklr, Caner (2007) 'Turkey's Political Economy In the Age of
Financial Globalization: The Significance of the EU Anchor', South European
Society and Politics, 12/2: 147-164.
Onl$, Zlya, Keyman Fuat (2003) 'A New Path Emerges', Journal of Democracy,
14/2: 95-107.
Ozatay, Fatlh, Sak, GOven (2002) 'Banking Sector Fragility and Turkey's 2000-
01 Financial Crisis', Brookings Trade Forum, 121-160.
Ozbudun, Ergun (1994) 'State Elites and Democratic Political Culture In Turkey',
In L. Diamond (ed.) Political Culture and Democracy tn Developing Countries,
london and Boulder: lynne Rlenner Publishers: 247-268.
Ozbudun, Ergun (2000) Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to
Democratic Consolidation, Boulder: Lynne Rlenner Publishers.
Ozbudun, Ergun, Genc;kaya, Orner F. (2009) Democratization and the Politics
of Constitution-Making in Turkey, Budapest: Central European University Press.
Ozel, Soli (2003) 'After the Tsunami', Journal of Democracy, 14/2: 80-94.
Ozkan, GOIc;lnF. (2005) 'Currency and Financial Crises In Turkey 2000 -2001:
Bad Fundamentals or Bad Luck?', The World Economy, 28/4: 541-572.
Ozier, Zeynep (2012) 'Breaking the vicious circle In EU-Turkey relations: visa
negotiations', Turkish Polley Quarterly, 11/1: 121-131.
Panico, Christopher (1999) Turkey: Violations of Free Express/on In Turkey,
New York: Human Rights Watch.
345
Papadimitrlou, Dimltrls, Phlnnemore, David (2004) 'Europeanlsatlon,
Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative
Reform In Romania', Journal of Common Market Studies, 42/3: 619-639.
Patton, Marcie 1. (2007) 'AKP Reform Fatigue In Turkey: What has happened to
the EU Process?', Mediterranean Politics, 12/3: 339-358.
Peters, Guy B., Pierre, Jon, King, Desmond S. (2005) 'The Politics of Path
Dependency: Political Conflict In Historical Institutionalism', Journal of Politics,
67/4: 1275-1300.
Petrov, Roman, Kalinlchenko, Paul (2011) 'The Europeanlsatlon of third country
judiciaries through the application of the EUAcquls: the cases of Russia and
Ukraine', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 60/2: 325-353.
Pfaff, Richard H. (1963) 'Disengagement from Traditionalism In Turkey and
Iran', The Western Political Quarterly, 16/1: 79-98.
Phinnemore, David (2000) 'Stuck In the 'grey zone'? - Fears and frustrations
in Romania's quest for EU membership', Perspectives on European Politics and
Society, 1/1: 95-121.
Phinnemore, David (2001) 'Romania and Euro-Atlantlc Integration since 1989:
a Decade of Frustration?', In D. Light, D. Phlnnemore (eds.) Post-Communist
Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition, Houndmllls: Palgrave Publishers:
245-269.
Phinnemore, David (2006a) 'Beyond 2s-The Changing Face of EU Enlargement:
Commitment, Conditionality and the Constitutional Treaty', Journal of Southern
Europe and the Balkans, 8/1: 7-26.
Phinnemore, David (2006b) 'Romania and Euro-Atlantlc Integration' In D.
Phinnemore (ed.) The EU and Romania: Great Expectations, London: The
Federal Trust: 38-48.
Phlnnemore, David (2010) 'And We'd Like to Thank ... Romania's Integration
into the European Union, 1989-2007', Journal of European Integration, 32/3:
291-308.
Pollack, Mark A. (2003) 'Control Mechanism Or Deliberative Democracy? : Two
Images of Comltology', Comparative Political Studies, 36/1-2: 125-155.
Pollack, Mark A. (2009) 'The New Instltutlonalisms and European Integration',
In A. Wiener, T. Dlez (eds.) European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford
University Press: 125-143.
346
Pottakis, Andreas I. (2009) 'Judicial reform In Ukraine meeting European
standards'. Available at: http://www.kul-llb.narod.ru/blbl.flles/chas/351.pdf
(12 January 2012).
Przeworskl, Adam (1995) Sustainable Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Prldham, Geoffrey (1999a) 'Complying with the European Union's Democratic
Conditionality: Transnational Party Linkages and Regime Change In Slovakia,
1993-1998', Europe-Asia Studies, 51/7: 1221-1244.
Pridham, Geoffrey (1999b) 'The European Union, Democratic Conditionality
and Transnational Party Linkages - The case of Eastern Europe' In J. Grugel
(ed.) Democracy Without Borders, London: Routledge:59-75.
Prldham, Geoffrey (2002a) 'EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy In
Post Communist States - Formality and Reality', Journal of Common Market
Studies, 40/3: 953-973.
Prldham, Geoffrey (2002b) 'The European Union's Democratic Conditionality
and Domestic Politics In Slovakia: The Metlar and Dzurlnda Governments
Compared', Europe-Asia Studies, 54/2: 203-227.
Prldham, Geoffrey (2005) Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime
Change in Post-Communist Europe, Baslngstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pridham, Geoffrey (2008) 'The EU's Political Conditionality and Post-Accession
Tendencies: Comparisons from Slovakia and Latvia', Journal of Common
Market Studies, 46/2: 365-387.
Putnam Robert D. (1993) 'What makes democracy work?', National Civic
Review, 82/2: 101-107.
Radaelll, Claudio M. (2000) 'Whither Europeanlsatlon? Concept Stretching and
Substantive Change', European Integration online Papers (EloP), 4/8: 1-25.
Radaelli, Claudio M. (2003) 'The Europeanlsatlon of Public Policy', In K.
Featherstone, C. Radaelll (eds.) The Politics of Europeanlsatlon, Oxford: Oxford
University Press: 27-56.
Radaelll, Claudio M. (2004) 'Europeanlsatlon: Solution or problem?', European
Integration online Papers (EloP), 8/16: 1-23.
Ragin, Charles C. (1987) The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative
and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
Ragin, Charles C. (1994) Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity
of Method, Newbury Park, California: Pine Forge Press.
347
Reisman, Michael W. (1990) 'Sovereignty and Human Rights In Contemporary
International Law', The American Journal of International Law, 84/4: 866-876.
Republic of Turkey, Constitutional Court (1982) 1982 Turkish Constitution, No.
2709. Available at: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982constltutlon.htm (13
February 2009)
Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EUAffairs (2001) 2001 National Programme for
the Adoption of the Acquls.
Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EU Affairs (2003) 2003 National Programme for
the Adoption of the Acquls.
Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EUAffairs (2008) 2008 National Programme for
the Adoption of the Acquls.
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretariat General for EU
Affairs (2007) Political Reforms in Turkey.
Risse, Thomas, Ropp, Stephen C., Slkklnk, Kathryn (eds.) (1999) The Power of
Human Rights - International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Risse, Thomas, Cowles, Marla Green, Caporaso, lames A. (2001)
'Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction', In M. G. Cowles, J. A.
Caporaso, T. Risse (eds.) Transforming Europe - EuropeanizatIon and
Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 1-20.
Robins, Philip (1993) 'The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue',
International Affairs, 69/4: 657-676.
Rometsch, Dietrich, Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.) The European Union and
Member States: Towards InstItutional Fusion?, Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Rumford, Chris (2002) 'Failing the EUTest? Turkey's National Programme, EU
Candidature and the Complexities of Democratic Reform', Mediterranean
Politics, 7/1: 51-68.
Russell, Peter, O'Brien, David (eds.) (2001) Judicial Independence In the Age
of Democracy, Charlottesville, NC: University Press of Virginia.
Rustrow, Dankwart A. (1970) 'Transitions to Democracy; Toward a Dynamic
Model', Comparative Politics, 2/3: 337-363.
Sadurskl, Wojclech (2004) 'Accession's Democracy Dividend: The Impact of the
EU Enlargement upon Democracy In the New Member States of Central and
Eastern Europe', European Law Journal, 10/4: 371-401.
348
Santlso, Carlos (2001) 'International co-operation for democracy and good
governance: moving toward a second generation', European Journal of
Development Research, 13/1: 154-180.
Sartori, Giovanni (1970) 'Concept mlsformatlon In comparative politics',
American Political Science Review, 64/4: 1033-1053.
Sartori, Giovanni (1976) Parties and Party Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Sartori, Giovanni (1991) 'Comparing and mlscomparlng', Journal of Theoretical
Politics, 3/3: 243-257.
Sayan, Sabri (2002) 'The Changing Party System' In S. Sayan and Y. Esmer
(eds.) Political Parties and Elections In Turkey, London: Lynn Rlenner: 9-32.
Sayed, Fatma H. (2006) Transforming Education In Egypt: Western Influence
and Domestic Policy Reform, Cairo and New York: The American University In
Cairo Press.
Scheppele, Kim L. (2005) 'Democracy by Judiciary. Or, why Courts Can
Sometimes be More Democratic than Parliaments', In A. W. Czarnota, M.
Krygier, and W. Sadurskl (eds.) Rethinking the Rule of Law after Communism,
Budapest: Central European University Press: 25-60.
Schlmmelfennlng, Frank (2005a) 'Strategic Calculation and International
Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained
Compliance In Central and Eastern Europe, International Organization, 59:
827-860.
Schlmmelfennlng, Frank (2005b) 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Political
Conditionality and Its Impact on Democracy In Non-Candidate Neighbouring
Countries'; paper presented at the EUSA 9th Biennial International Conference,
Austin (31 March - 2 April).
Schlmmelfennlng, Frank (2005c) 'The International Promotion of Political
Norms In Eastern Europe: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis', Central and
Eastern Europe Working Paper No. 61, the Centre for European Studies,
University of Mannhelm.
Schlmmelfennlg, Frank (2008) 'EU political accession conditionality after the
2004 enlargement: consistency and effectiveness', Journal of European Public
Pol/cy, 15/6: 918-937.
Schlmmelfennlg, Frank (2010) 'The normative origins of democracy In the
European Union: toward a transformatlonalist theory of democratisation',
European Political Science Review, 2/2: 211-233.
349
Schlmmelfennig, Frank, Scholtz, Hanno (2007) 'EU Democracy Promotion In
the European Neighborhood: Conditionality, Economic Development, and
Linkage'; paper presented at EUSABiennial Conference, Montreal (17-19 May).
Schlmmelfennig, Frank, Schwellnus, Guido (2004) 'The Constltutlonallsatlon of
Human Rights In the European Union: Human Rights Case Studies and QCA
Coding', Internal Project Doss/er.
Schlmmelfennlng, Frank, Sedelmeler, Ulrich (2002) 'Theorizing EU
enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research', Journal
of European Public Policy, 9/4: 500-528.
Schimmelfennlng, Frank, Sedelmeler, Ulrich (2004) 'Governance by
Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central Eastern
Europe', Journal of European Public Polley, 11/4: 661-679.
Schlmmelfennlng, Frank, Sedelmeler, Ulrich (200Sa) 'Introduction:
Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe' In F.
Schlmmelfennlng, U. Sedelmeler (eds.) The Europeanization of Central and
Eastern Europe, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. PP. 1-29.
Schimmelfennlng, Frank, Sedelmeler, Ulrich (200Sb) 'Conclusions: The Impact
of the EU on the Accession Countries' In F. Schlmmelfennlng, U. Sedelmeler
(eds.) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press: 210-228.
Schlmmelfenlng, Frank, Engert, Stefan, Knobel, Helko (2002) 'The Conditions
of Conditionality - The Impact of the EU on Democracy and Human rights In
European Non-Member States'; paper prepared for Workshop 4, "Enlargement
and European Governance", ECPRJoint Session of Workshops, Turin (22-27
March).
Schimmelfennlng, Frank, Engert, Stefan, Knobel, Helko (2003) 'Costs,
Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on
Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey', Journal of Common Market Studies, 41/3: 495-
518.
Schleifer, Ylgal (2006) 'When east meets west', The Jerusalem Report.
Available at: http://www.gab-bn.com/IMG/pdf/Tr4-
_When_east_meets_west.pdf (14 June 2010)
Schmidt, Vivien A. (1996) From State to Market? The Transformation of French
Business and Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schmidt, Vivien A., Radaelll, Claudio M. (2004) 'Polley Change and Discourse In
Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues', West European Politics, 27/2:
183-210.
350
Schmitter, Philippe C. (1986) 'An Introduction to Southern European
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey',
in G. O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter, L. Whitehead (eds.) Transition from
Authoritarian Rule. Maryland and London: The John Hopkins University Press:
3-10.
Schmitter, Phillippe C. (1995) 'The International Context of Contemporary
Democratization' in G. Pridham (ed.) Transitions to Democracy: Comparative
Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe,
Dartmouth: Aldershot: 499-534.
Schmitter, Philippe C. (2001) 'The Influence of the International Context Upon
the Choice of National Institutions and Policies In Neo-Democracles', L.
Whitehead (ed.) The International Dimensions of Democratization - Europe
and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online: 26-54.
Schmitter, Philippe C., Karl, Terry L. (1991) 'What Democracy Is ... and Is Not',
Journal of Democracy, 2/3: 75-88.
Schwellnus, Guido (2005) 'The Adoption of Nondiscrimination and Minority
Protection Rules In Romania, Hungary, and Poland', In F. Schlmmelfenning, U.
Sedelmeler (eds.) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press: 51-70.
Schwellnus, Guido, Schlmmelfennlng, Frank (2008) 'The Adoption,
Implementation and Sustalnabllity of Minority Protection Rules in the Context
of EU Conditionality - A Comparative Analysis of Ten New Member States in
Central and Eastern Europe', Research Proposal submitted to the SNSF, (29
February).
Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2006) 'Europeanlsatlon In new member and candidate
states', Living Reviews of European Government, 1/3: 4-34.
Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2011) 'Europeanlsation in new member and candidate
states', Living Reviews in European Governance, 6/1: 1-52.
Shambayatl, Hootan, Klrdls, Esen (2009) 'In Pursuit of "Contemporary
Civilization": Judicial Empowerment In Turkey', Political Research Quarterly,
62/4: 767-780.
Shapiro, Martin (1986) Courts - A Comparative and Political Analysis, Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
Smilov, Daniel (2006) 'EU Enlargement and the Constitutional Principle of
Judicial Independence' in W. Sadurskl, A. Czarnota, M. Krygier (eds.)
Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law?, The Netherlands: Springer: 313-
334.
351
Smith, Karen E. (2003) 'The Evolution and Application of EU Membership
Conditionality', in M. Cremona (ed.) The Enlargement of the European UnIon,
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 105-140.
Smith, Karen E. (2005) 'The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy',
International Affairs, 81/4: 757-773.
serensen, Georg (ed.) (1993) Political Conditionality, London: Frank Crass.
serensen, Georg (1995) 'Conditionality, Democracy and Development', In O.
Stokke (ed.) Aid and Political Conditionality, London: Frank Cass: 392-409.
Steunenberg, Bernard, Dlmltrova, Antoaneta L. (2007) 'Compliance In the EU
Enlargement Process: The Limits of Conditionality', European Integration online
Papers (EIoP), 11/5: 1-22.
Stokke, Olav (1995) 'Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of
the Art', In O. Stokke (ed.) Aid and Political Conditionality, London: Frank Cass:
1-46.
Stone Sweet, Alec (2000) Governing with Judges - Constitutional Politics In
Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sunar, ilkay, Sayan, Sabri (1986) 'Democracy In Turkey: Problems and
Prospects', in G. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, L. Whitehead (eds.) Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule: Experiences in Southern Europe, Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press: 165-186.
SOtl;O, GOliz (2011) 'Revising the Turkish Judiciary's Role Through a New
Constitution', Near East Quarterly. Available at:
http://www.neareastquarterly.com/lndex.php/2011/12/17 /revlslng-the-
turkish-judiciarys-role-through-a-new-constltutlon/?output=pdf (10 January
2012).
szernerkenvt, Reka (1996) 'Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk',
Adelphi Paper No.306. 1155, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tallberg, Jonas (2002) 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How,
and with What Consequences?', West European Politics, 25/1: 23-46.
Tank, Plnar (2005) 'Political Islam In Turkey: A state of controlled secularity',
Turkish Studies, 6/1: 3-19.
Tanlak, Pmar (2002) 'Turkey EU relations In the post Helsinki phase and the EU
harmonisation laws adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly In August
2002', SEI Working Paper No.55, Sussex European Institute.
352
Tarifa, Fatos, Adams, Benjamin (2007) 'Who's the Sick Man of Europe? A
Wavering EUShould Let Turkey In', Mediterranean Quarterly, 18/1: 52-74.
TezcOr, GOne~M. (2007) 'Turkey divided: politics, faith and democracy',
openDemocracy, 1-5. Available at:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-turkey /turkey _dlvlded_ 4593.jsp
(28 March 2010).
Thatcher, Mark, Stone Sweet, Alec (2002) 'Theory and Practice of Delegation
to Non Majoritarlan Institutions', West European Politics, 25/1: 1-22.
Thelen, Kathleen (1999) 'Historical Institutionalism In Comparative Politics',
Annual Review of Political Science, 2: 369-404.
Tiede Lydia B. (2006) 'Judicial independence: often Cited, rarely understood',
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 15: 129-161.
Tierney, William G., Rhoades, Robert A. (1993) 'Enhancing promotion, tenure,
and beyond: Faculty socialization as a cultural process', ASHE-ERIC Higher
Education Report Series, No.6. Available at:
http://www.erlc. ed.gov/PDFS/ED368322. pdf
Tocci, Nathalie (2001) '21st Century Kemalism Redefining Turkey-EU Relations
in the Post-Helsinki Era', Centre for European Policy Studies EU-Turkey
Working Document No.170.
Tocci, Nathalie (2005) 'Europeanization In Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for
Reform?', South European Society and PoI/tics, 10/1: 73-83.
Toggenburg, Gabriel (2000) 'A Rough Orientation Through a Delicate
Relationship: The European Union' s Endeavours for (Its) Minorities', European
Integration online Papers (EloP), 4/16: 1-30.
Tokta~, Sule, Aras, BOlent (2009) 'The EU and Minority Rights In Turkey',
Political Science Quarterly, 124/4: 697-720.
Toktas, Sule, Kurt, Omit (2008) 'The Impact of EU Reform Process on Clvll-
Military Relations in Turkey', SETA Policy Brief, No. 26: 1-7.
Torreblanca, Jose I. (2003) 'The Enlargement acquls and external strategy: a
prelude to deliberative foreign policy?', CPAEstudlos/Worklng Papers, 4/2003.
Available at:
http://www.uned.es/dcpa/estudlos_worklngpapers/CPAestudloS4_2003.pdf
Trenz, Hans-Jorg (2008) 'Measuring the europeanlsatlon of public
communication: the question of standards', European Political Science, 7: 273-
284.
353
Tsakatika, Myrto (2012) 'Slovenlan Employment Policy: 'Soft' Europeanlsatlon
by Consensus', Europe-Asia Studies, 64/4: 673-693.
Tuncay, Can A. (2007) 'The Three Most Important Features of Turkey's Legal
System That Others Should Know', paper presented at the IALS Conference,
Suzhou (17-19 October).
Turkish Grand National Assembly (2004) Turkish Penal Code, No.5237.
Turkish Grand National Assembly (2010) 'About Parliament'. Available at:
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/(19 July 2011).
TOrkmen, FOsun (2008) 'The European Union and Democratization In Turkey:
The Role of the Elites', Human Rights Quarterly, 30/1: 146-163.
Ugur, Mehmet (1999) The European Union and Turkey - An Anchor/Credibility
Dilemma, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Ugur, Mehmet, Yankaya, Dilek (2008) 'Policy Entrepreneurship, Policy
Opportunism, and EU Conditionality: The AKP and TOStAD Experience In
Turkey', Governance, 21/4: 581-601.
UN (1948) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
UN (1966) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
UN (1985) UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.
USAK (2006) 'USAK 3. Avrupa Birllgi (AB) Algllama Anketl'. Available at:
http://www.usak.org.tr/anket.asp?ld=17 (23 July 2011).
Uzelac, Alan, van Rhee, Remco (eds.) (2009) Access to Justice and the
Judiciary: Towards New European Standards of Affordablllty, Quality and
Efficiency of Civil Adjudication, Antwerpen, Portland: Intersentla.
Vachudova, Mllada Anna (2001) 'The Leverage of International Institutions on
Democratising States: Eastern Europe and the European Union', Robert
Schuman Centre Working Paper No. 33, Florence: European University
Institute.
Vachudova, Mllada Anna (2005) Europe Undivided - Democracy, Leverage &
Integration After Communism, New York: Oxford University Press.
Vachudova, Milada Anna (2008) 'Tempered by the EU? Political parties and
party systems before and after accession', Journal of European Public Policy,
15/6: 861-879.
354
van der Lippe, John M. (2005) The Politics of Turkish Democracy -lsmet lnOnO
and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950, Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Van Evera, Stephen (1997) Guide to Methods for Students of PoI/tical SCience,
London: Cornell University Press.
Vennesson, Pascal (2008) 'Case studies and process tracing: theories and
practices' in D. Della Porta, M. Keating (eds.) Approaches and Methodologies In
the Social SCiences - A Pluralist Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Vermeersch, Peter (2003) 'EU Enlargement and Minority Rights Policies In
Central Europe: Explaining Polley Shifts In the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland', Journal on Ethnopolltics and Minority Issues In Europe, 1: 1-32.
Vukasovic, Martina (2013) 'Change of higher education In response to
European pressures: conceptualization and operatlonallsatlon of
Europeanization of higher education', Higher Education, 1-14.
Welker, Walter (1963) The Turkish revolution, 1960-1961. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution.
Whitehead, Laurence (1996) The International Dimens/ons of Democratisation:
Europe and the Americas, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Whitehead, Lawrence (2001) 'Three International Dimensions of
Democratization', in L. Whitehead (ed.) The International Dimensions of
Democratization - Europe and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship
Online: 3-25.
Yegen, Mesut (2007) 'Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question', Ethnic
and Racial Studies, 30/1: 119-151.
Ylldlz, ihsan (2007) 'Minority Rights In Turkey', Brigham Young University Law
Review, 2007/3: 791-812. Available at:
http://lawreview.byu.edu/archlves/2007/3/10YILDIZ.FIN.pdf (17 August 2010).
Yllmaz, Hakan (2009) 'The International Context', In C. W. Haerpfer, P.
Bernhagen, R. F. Inglehart, C. Welzel (eds.) Democratization, New York:
Oxford University Press. PP. 92-106.
Yin, Robert K. (2003) Case Study Research - Design and Methods, Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Zeydanhoglu, Welat (2008) "'The White Turkish Man's Burden": Orlental/sm,
Kemalism and the Kurds in Turkey', In G. Rings, A. Ife (eds.) Neo-cotonte;
Mentalities in Contemporary Europe? Language and Discourse In the
355
Construction of Identities, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 155-
174.
Zurcher, Erik J. (2004) Turkey - AModern History, London and New York:
I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.
Zurcher, Erik J. (2010) The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building - From the
Ottoman Empire to AtatUrk's Turkey, London and New York: I.B.Tauris & Co
Ltd.
356
Appendix - Interview List
Interview (2012) Member of Parliament, CHP Deputy#l, Ankara, Turkey.
Interview (2012) Member of Parliament, CHP Deputy#2, Ankara, Turkey.
Interview (2012) Member of Parliament, MHPDeputy, 2012, Ankara, Turkey.
Interview (2012) Official from the Undersecretary of the Ministry of EUAffairs,
Ankara, Turkey.
Interview (2012) Former Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ankara, Turkey.
Interview (2012) Ambassador, Directorate General for Europe, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ankara, Turkey.
Interview (2012) Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament,
Ankara, Turkey.
Interview (2012) Representative from the Turkish Industry and Business
Association (TOSIAD), Istanbul, Turkey.
Interview (2012) Researcher at the Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation (TESEV), Istanbul, Turkey.
Interview (2012) Political Officer on Public administration and security sector
reform, political affairs, CFSP, press and Information section, Delegation of the
European Union to Turkey, Ankara, Turkey.
Interview (2012) Political Officer on Legal Issues, Political affairs, CFSP, press
and information section, Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, Ankara,
Turkey.
Interview (2012) Turkish activist, journalist and professor, Istanbul, Turkey.
357
